Money Laundering and Financial Crimes

www.state.gov

Introduction

Overall anti-money laundering efforts in the year 2000 made progress across two broad fronts. The international community demonstrated its resolve to confront money laundering by showing a strong commitment to work collectively to address the problem while seeking to isolate those countries and jurisdictions that lack this commitment. In this regard, the year 2000 marked a milestone in international cooperation on fighting money laundering as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)(1) publicly released a list of 15 countries and territories that were found to be non-cooperative in the international fight against money laundering. At the conclusion of its June 2000 plenary meeting, the FATF published a report that stated that these 15 countries and territories had "serious systemic problems with money laundering controls and that they must improve their rules and practices as expeditiously as possible or face possible sanctions." Following publication of this report, the United States, its G-7 partners and other FATF members issued advisories, notices or other various communications alerting the financial institutions in their countries about the money laundering risks they face in the "non-cooperating" jurisdictions.

The publication of the FATF report represents the first step in an ongoing process to bring international financial centers into compliance with international anti-money laundering standards. The development of a consensus among the FATF membership was the result of a five-month process in which FATF evaluated the anti-money laundering systems of numerous countries in order to identify those anti-money laundering efforts that fail to meet international norms. The willingness of the FATF members to agree on this list demonstrates the seriousness of the money laundering problem in those jurisdictions and the commitment of the members to address it in a meaningful way.

This exercise has already shown positive results. Since the list was published, seven of the 15 jurisdictions have enacted all or almost all of the legislation needed to address deficiencies identified by the FATF, and now must demonstrate effective implementation of the legislation. Several other jurisdictions have enacted some relevant legislation to address the deficiencies identified by FATF. These jurisdictions are commended for beginning their legislative processes, and are encouraged to continue to work toward developing comprehensive anti-money laundering regimes that meet international standards. The FATF will be assessing the progress made by all listed jurisdictions to determine whether any should be removed from the list and will also continue its review process to determine whether any new countries should be added.

Further international commitment was reflected in additional advances by FATF and FATF-like regional bodies. Three countries—Argentina, Brazil and Mexico—joined FATF, increasing its membership to 29 nations. In addition, two new regional FATF-like bodies were created to extend the fight against money laundering. The Financial Action Task Force against Money Laundering in South America and the Eastern and Southern African Anti-Money Laundering Group were formed in 2000, increasing the number of regional bodies to five.

The December 2000 signing of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime in Palermo, Italy represents another significant development in the effort to promote international cooperation against money laundering and other forms of organized crime. The Convention was signed by over 125 countries, including the United States, and will enter into force after forty have become parties. This Convention includes many significant provisions with respect to money laundering and international cooperation in financial investigations. Once again, the drafting and signing of this Convention demonstrate the recognition by the international community that it must stand together to effectively fight international organized crime and money laundering.

(1)The Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering is an inter-governmental body whose purpose is the development and promotion of policies to combat money laundering.

The relationship between money laundering and foreign corruption was highlighted in the U.S. National Money Laundering Strategy for 2000, which called for numerous actions to be taken in this area. Most significantly, the Department’s of Treasury and State, and the federal bank regulators issued guidance to help U.S. financial institutions avoid transactions that may involve the proceeds of foreign official corruption. The importance of such guidance was reinforced by the publication last year of a report by the Swiss Federal Banking Commission. The report detailed how 19 banks that operate in Switzerland handled almost $1 billion in funds relating to corruption by the former ruler of Nigeria, General Sani Abacha. The report criticized several of the banks for weaknesses in their account-opening procedures or monitoring and reporting mechanisms. The report noted that "[t]he Abacha case is a clear example of the international dimensions of the issue of the deposit of corruption proceeds in the financial system."

In 2000, the political and diplomatic anti-money laundering efforts were complemented by an initiative from the private sector. In October 2000, eleven world money center banks agreed to a set of anti-money laundering guidelines—the "Wolfsberg Anti-Money Laundering Principles"—for private banking activities. The guidelines state at the outset that "bank policy will be to prevent the use of its world-wide operations for criminal purposes." The participating banking organizations are hopeful that other banking organizations and financial institutions will adopt the anti-money laundering principles that have been developed.

The FATF initiatives, the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Wolfsberg Principles were some of the highlights from 2000 that have made contributions to stemming the flow of illegal proceeds around the globe. These international efforts should yield even greater results in the year to come.

Why We Must Combat Money Laundering

Money laundering is necessitated by the requirement for criminals, be they drug traffickers, organized criminals, terrorists, arms traffickers, blackmailers, or credit card swindlers, to disguise the origin of their criminal money so that they can use it more easily. Money laundering generally involves a series of multiple transactions used to disguise the source of financial assets so that those assets may be used without compromising the criminals who are seeking to use the funds. These transactions typically fall into three stages: (1) Placement, the process of placing, through deposits, wire transfers, or other means, unlawful proceeds into financial institutions; (2) Layering, the process of separating the proceeds of criminal activity from their origin through the use of layers of complex financial transactions; and (3) Integration, the process of using an apparently legitimate transaction to disguise the illicit proceeds. Through this process the criminal tries to transform the monetary proceeds derived from illicit activities into funds with an apparently legal source.

Money laundering has devastating social consequences and is a threat to national security. It provides the fuel for drug dealers, terrorists, illegal arms dealers, corrupt public officials and other criminals to operate and expand their criminal enterprises. Crime has become increasingly international in scope, and the financial aspects of crime have become more complex, due to rapid advances in technology and the globalization of the financial services industry. Modern financial systems, in addition to facilitating legitimate commerce, permit criminals to order the transfer of millions of dollars instantly, using personal computers and satellite dishes. The criminal's choice of money laundering vehicles is limited only by his or her creativity. Money is laundered through currency exchange houses, stock brokerage houses, gold dealers, casinos, automobile dealerships, insurance companies, and trading companies. Private banking facilities, offshore banking, shell corporations, free trade zones, wire systems, and trade financing all have the ability to mask illegal activities. In doing so, criminals manipulate financial systems in the United States and abroad.

Unchecked, money laundering can erode the integrity of a nation's financial institutions. Due to the high integration of capital markets, money laundering could also adversely affect currencies and interest rates as launderers reinvest funds where their schemes are less likely to be detected, rather than where rates of return are higher.

Ultimately, this laundered money flows into global financial systems where it could undermine national economies and currencies. Money laundering is thus not only a law enforcement problem but poses a serious national and international security threat as well.

There is now worldwide recognition that we must deal firmly and effectively with increasingly elusive, well-financed and technologically adept criminals who are determined to use every means available to subvert the financial systems that are the cornerstone of legitimate international commerce. The continued abuse of some offshore financial centers, the proliferation of on-line Internet banking and Internet gambling have further enhanced the need to scrutinize new technologies to combat money laundering schemes.

Money launderers also negatively impact jurisdictions by reducing tax revenues through underground economies, competing unfairly with legitimate businesses, damaging financial systems, and disrupting economic development. Money laundering is now being viewed as a central dilemma in dealing with all forms of international organized crime because financial gain means power. Fighting money launderers not only reduces financial crime; it also deprives criminals and terrorists of the means to commit other serious crimes.

The United States and other nations are victims of tax evasion schemes that use various financial centers around the world and their bank secrecy laws to hide money from tax authorities, thus undermining legitimate tax collection. Financial centers that have strong bank secrecy laws and weak corporate formation regulations, and that do not cooperate in tax inquiries from foreign governments, are found worldwide. These financial centers, known as "tax havens," thrive in providing sanctuary for the deposit of monies from individuals and businesses that evade the payment of taxes in their home jurisdictions and allow them to keep the money they have deposited from the knowledge of tax authorities. Billions of funds on which tax is properly due, denominated in various currencies, are held on deposit in these tax havens.

Both tax evasion and money laundering are activities that are aided by financial centers that have strong bank secrecy laws and a policy of non-cooperation with foreign law enforcement authorities, as is the case with some jurisdictions with offshore financial centers.

Offshore Financial Centers

Background

Nearly sixty jurisdictions, scattered around the globe, comprise the constantly expanding offshore financial services sector. A recent study found that by the end of 1997, the share of cross-border assets held in the offshore sector ($4.8 trillion) accounted for more than half of all cross-border assets held globally.(1)

(1) Luca Errico and Alberto Musalem, Working paper of the International Monetary Fund, "Offshore Banking: An Analysis of Micro-and Macro-Prudential Issues", 1999, p.10.

The attention of many multilateral entities concerned with global financial stability in an increasingly interdependent financial system has been focused on more than just the sheer volume of cross-border assets held by the offshore financial centers (OFCs). While this discussion is not intended to suggest that OFCs, as a class, are all unregulated or all centers of illegal financial activity, the nature of the regulatory and legal regimes in a number of OFCs can be viewed as problematic, as are some of the services and products provided in many OFCs. In particular, the lack of transparency that characterizes many of the OFCs(1) has acted as a powerful magnet attracting governments, groups and individuals desiring to hide their financial activity from public scrutiny.

Although there is little consensus regarding the exact definition of an offshore financial center, certain characteristics distinguish traditional onshore financial centers from those termed "offshore." First, offshore financial centers are in almost all cases, segregated from the normal banking structure of the jurisdiction. The vast majority of jurisdictions offering offshore financial services restrict access to these services and products to non-residents, thereby creating a parallel system within their own borders. Many jurisdictions with OFCs conduct financial transactions only in currencies other than the local currency. OFCs also differ from onshore jurisdictions in their regulatory regimes and in their legal frameworks. Many OFCs lack the stringent regulatory and supervisory regimes found in developed onshore jurisdictions. In the majority of OFCs, banks are not required to adhere to a wide range of regulations normally imposed on onshore banks.

Formation of a bank is more easily accomplished in most OFCs; it is even reported that in some jurisdictions a bank can be formed, registered and its ownership placed in the hands of nominee directors via the Internet. However formed, there are few, if any, disclosure requirements; bank transactions are free of exchange and interest rate restrictions; minimal or no capital reserve requirements are required; and transactions are mostly tax-free.

Some 4000 banks are thought to have been licensed and registered globally in the offshore sector by December 1998.(2) How many are merely "plaque banks," (banks without an actual physical presence in the jurisdiction in which they are registered) is not currently known, although the United Nations Global Program Against Money Laundering is currently collecting that data. In many OFCs, non-bank financial industries, such as the insurance and securities industries, are subject to even less, if any, regulation than is the banking industry.

While there are many well-regulated OFCs, a principal attraction is often the existence of legal frameworks designed to obscure the identity of the beneficial owner, to promote regulatory and supervisory arbitrage, and to provide mitigation or evasion of home-country tax regimes. Some of these OFCs offer the ability to form and manage confidentiality of a variety of international business companies (IBCs) and exempt companies, trusts, investment funds and insurance companies, many with nominee directors, nominee officeholders and nominee shareholders. When combined with the use of bearer shares and "mini-trusts" (the latter are instruments used to further insulate the beneficial owner while bridging the ownership and management of the corporate entity), IBCs can present impenetrable barriers to law enforcement.(3)

(1) The term "offshore financial center" (OFC) is generally thought to describe an entire jurisdiction. However, there are important OFCs located with the borders of jurisdictions. "OFC" in this report is used to describe both cases. OFCs maintain that their carefully crafted laws and regulations provide beneficial business and financial planning options for their clients. These include, but are not limited to: sophisticated trade financing; estate planning for high net worth individuals; tax mitigation for individuals and corporations; avoidance of exchange controls; liability containment for ships and airplanes; sophisticated insurance management options; investment opportunities that transcend home country marketing regulations; preservation of assets; investment of overnight funds; and freedom from certain home country regulatory requirements.

(2) Working paper of the United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, "The United Nations Forum", January 2000, p6. Of all offshore banks, 42% are located in the Caribbean and Latin America, 29% in Europe, 19 % in Asia and the Pacific and 10% in Africa and the Middle East.

(3) "IBC" is the term used to describe a variety of offshore corporate entities, which are restricted to transacting business outside the jurisdiction in which they are formed. IBCs are characterized by rapid formation, at low cost, with broad powers, low to no taxation, minimal or non-existent reporting requirements and secrecy. Many OFCs permit IBCs to issue bearer shares. The "UN Offshore Forum" paper estimated that of the nearly 2.5 million IBCs registered globally, 38% were registered in the Caribbean and Latin America, 25% in Europe, 29% in Asia and the Pacific and 8% in Africa and the Middle East.

This lack of transparency, coupled with a concomitant reluctance or refusal of many OFCs to cooperate with regulators and law enforcement officials from other jurisdictions, attracts those with both legitimate and illegitimate purposes. Drug traffickers, terrorists, money launderers, tax evaders and other criminals have found the OFCs a particularly inviting venue in which to conduct and conceal their activities.

The opacity of many offshores sector makes financial supervision difficult. The Errico and Musalem 1999 working paper of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded that the OFCs of Uruguay, Malaysia and Thailand contributed to the recent financial crises of Latin America and Asia by providing a hiding place for losses from loans of the international financial institutions. Another recent study demonstrates how the Russian Central Bank used an IBC formed in the Jersey OFC to mislead the IMF into thinking that Russia’s currency reserves were higher than they actually were.(1)

The increased opportunities new technology provides to those who wish to use the offshore sector for criminal purposes have galvanized intensive scrutiny of the offshore sector—generally by a variety of international organizations and multilateral task forces and bodies. Two prominent international bodies, the Financial Stability Forum and the Financial Action Task Force, published reports in 2000 that have already had a dramatic impact on the offshore sector.

Products and Practices

Although IBCs have served as the predominant instruments for committing financial crimes, a variety of types of trusts play important roles as well. One form of trust, the Asset Protection Trust (APT), protects the assets of individuals from civil judgments in their home countries. A common provision of APTs is that challenges or claims against the assets of the trust must be brought before the courts of the jurisdiction of the APT domicile within a relatively short period of time (usually two years). Many APTs contain "flee clauses" providing for funds to be immediately transferred to another OFC if the APT is threatened by inquiry. Used in combination, IBCs, mini-trusts, bearer shares and APTs make it nearly impossible for competent authorities to generate paper trails or to identify beneficial owners of companies, while they simultaneously protect those engaging in serious financial crime from civil or criminal prosecution.

Other practices found in some OFCs cause problems for law enforcement. One such practice, well advertised on the Internet, is the selling of "economic citizenship"—a practice that enables individuals suspected of committing crimes to purchase citizenship in an OFC jurisdiction that does not have an extradition agreement with the purchaser’s original home country. Currently five Caribbean Basin OFCs are actively selling economic citizenships: Belize, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts/Nevis and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. In the Pacific region, economic citizenships are for sale in Nauru.

Internet gaming executed via the use of credit cards and offshore banks represents yet another powerful vehicle for criminals to launder funds from illicit sources as well as to evade taxes. Advertised on the Internet as being located primarily in the Caribbean Basin, virtual casinos can be extremely profitable for governments that sell the licenses and likely share in the operator’s profits. By the end of December 2000, Antigua and Barbuda, for example, reportedly had licensed more than 80 Internet gaming websites at a cost of $75,000–$85,000 for a sports betting shop and $100,000 for a virtual casino. As the Offshore Financial Services chart indicates, with the exception of St. Vincent and the Grenadines, all Caribbean Basin OFCs that sell "economic citizenships" also sell virtual casino licenses. In the Pacific region, only the Palau and Vanuatu OFCs are reported to sell gaming licenses (reportedly for much lower fees than are charged in the Caribbean). Neither Palau nor Vanuatu sell economic citizenships.(2)

(1) Errico and Musalem analyze the role of the OFCs in the Asian and Latin American crises, pp. 37-38. The PricewaterhouseCoopers, "Report to V.V. Gerashenko, Central Bank of Russia, re: FIMACO", August 1999. Commissioned by the IMF, the report leads to the conclusion that the Russian Central Bank used FIMACO (the Jersey registered IBC) to anonymously purchase Russian government debt.

(2) See the Offshore Financial Services Chart at the end of this section.

With the advent of the Internet and other technological advances, monies can be quickly transferred around the globe, providing further opportunities to engage in the placement and layering of illicitly gained funds. There is a growing concern that criminals are increasingly enlisting the services of unethical lawyers, accountants and other professionals to help them discover and manipulate new money laundering opportunities afforded by the new technologies.

Initiatives Targeting Financial Abuse

In recent years, various bodies have examined the threats presented by a lack of transparency and oversight posed to an increasingly interdependent global financial system. Two initiatives, The Financial Stability Forum’s Offshore Working Group and the Financial Action Task Force’s Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories Initiative, have had a direct impact on the offshore financial services industry in 2000. These initiatives have drawn distinctions between the better-regulated and cooperative jurisdictions and those that are not. Both initiatives have focused a great deal of attention on the OFCs although the FATF initiative addresses jurisdictions beyond OFCs.

The Financial Stability Forum Working Group on Offshore Financial Centers

The Financial Stability Forum (FSF) was convened in 1999 at the request of the G-7 Finance Ministers to promote international financial stability through information exchange and international cooperation in financial supervision and surveillance. At its first meeting in April 1999, the FSF established the Working Group on Offshore Financial Centers. The working group was comprised of officials of industrial and emerging market economies, international institutions and international regulatory and supervisory groupings.

The FSF Working Group’s mandate was to consider the significance of OFCs in relation to global financial stability. In April, the FSF Working Group issued a report concluding that a number of the OFCs were perceived as having weaknesses in financial supervision, cross-border cooperation and transparency. In order to prioritize the jurisdictions for eventual IMF assessment, OFCs were divided into three categories: Group I (cooperative OFCs with high quality supervision), Group II (potentially cooperative OFCs with low quality supervision) and Group III (non-cooperative OFCs with low quality supervision).

The OFCs in Group I, Hong Kong, Luxembourg, Singapore and Switzerland, were "generally perceived as having legal infrastructures and supervisory practices, and/or a level of resources devoted to supervision and co-operation relative to the size of their financial activities, and/or a level of cooperation that are largely of a good quality and better than in other OFCs." The OFCs of Guernsey, Ireland, the Isle of Man and Jersey were also generally viewed in the same light "though continuing efforts to improve the quality of supervision and co-operation should be encouraged in these jurisdictions.’’ (1)

(1) Financial Stability Forum press release, May 26, 2000. The Report of the Working Group on Offshore Financial Centers is located at the FSF’s website: http://www.fsforum.org.

OFCs in Group II (Andorra, Bahrain, Barbados, Bermuda, Gibraltar, Labuan (Malaysia), Macao, Malta and Monaco) were considered to be of lower quality than Group I but higher than the OFCs in Group III.

OFCs listed in Group III were Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Belize, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Nauru, Netherlands Antilles, Niue, Panama, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Seychelles, the Bahamas, Turks and Caicos, and Vanuatu. These jurisdictions were generally perceived as having legal infrastructures and supervisory practices, and/or level of resources devoted to supervision and co-operation relative to the size of their activity, and/or level of co-operation that are largely of a lower quality than in Group II.

The report concluded that the perceived deficiencies in Groups II and III OFCs could allow financial market participants to engage in regulatory arbitrage of several forms, thereby undermining efforts to strengthen the global financial system. As a result, the FSF in May released the groupings of the OFCs by category, requesting that the IMF develop, organize and conduct assessments of OFC adherence to international financial standards, including several of the FATF 40 Recommendations. The FSF recommended giving "highest priority to those in Group II" and "high priority to those OFCs in Group III whose scale of financial activity has the greatest potential impact on global financial stability."

The IMF agreed in July to a program that contemplates three levels of assessment that review principally the supervisory and regulatory arrangements in place for banking, securities and insurance activities. The first level is a self-assessment, the second is an assessment led by the IMF and the third, a more complex assessment, will also be led by the IMF. Participation in the program is voluntary and no IMF assessment will be made public unless the assessed jurisdiction voluntarily agrees to its release(1)

The Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering

Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories Initiative

In response to the G-7 Finance Ministers 1998 Birmingham Summit, the FATF formally created the Ad Hoc Group on Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories (NCCT.) In 1999, this group developed twenty-five criteria for the purpose of determining which jurisdictions weakened the global effort to combat money laundering. These criteria encompass four broad areas:

  • Loopholes in financial regulations
  • Obstacles raised by other regulatory requirements
  • Obstacles to international cooperation
  • Inadequate resources for preventing and detecting money laundering activities

FATF initiated a review of a first tranche of jurisdictions in February 2000. After a through review and dialogue with these jurisdictions, the FATF at its June 2000 Plenary identified fifteen jurisdictions as non-cooperative in the international fight against money laundering. Those fifteen were as follows: the Bahamas, the Cayman Islands, the Cook Islands, Dominica, Israel, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Panama, the Philippines, Russia, St. Kitts and Nevis, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. All but Israel, Lebanon and Russia are OFCs.

Fourteen other jurisdictions, all OFCs, were identified as having deficiencies, but were not placed on the non-cooperative list. Those jurisdictions are as follows: Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cyprus, Gibraltar, Guernsey, the Isle of Man, Jersey, Malta, Mauritius, Monaco, Samoa and St. Lucia. The reviews of two other OFC jurisdictions, Vanuatu and the Seychelles, were not completed at the June Plenary, but at the October Plenary neither jurisdiction was determined to be non-cooperative.

At the July G-7 Finance Ministers Summit held in Japan, the United States along with its partners, issued formal advisories or notices notifying all financial institutions in G-7 countries of the FATF’s issuance of Recommendation 21.(2) The U.S. Department of Treasury issued individual advisories regarding each of the fifteen named NCCTs to all U.S. financial institutions. The advisories advised financial institutions to "give enhanced scrutiny" to transactions involving the named jurisdictions.

(1) The report, Offshore Financial Centers, The Role of the IMF, can be found at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/nb/2000/nb0062.htm.

(2) FATF Recommendation 21 states: Financial institutions should give special attention to business relations and transactions with persons, including companies and financial institutions, from countries which do not or insufficiently apply these Recommendations. Whenever these transactions have no apparent economic or visible lawful purpose, their background and purpose should, as far as possible, be examined, the findings established in writing, and be available to help supervisors, auditors and law enforcement agencies.

The FATF’s NCCT exercise, while not designed to focus on OFCs, has had a significant impact on the OFCs and other jurisdictions around the globe. For more information on this initiative see the discussion of the NCCT process in the Multilateral Section—FATF overview—in this report.

Explanatory Notes To the Offshore Financial Services Chart

Public information regarding offshore financial centers can be difficult to obtain. Industry publications, discussions with regulators of the OFCs, foreign government finance officials, embassy reports, analyses from United States Government (USG) agencies, international organizations, and secondary sources provided the data for the chart.

Excluded are jurisdictions that provide low or no taxes to individuals but offer no other services or products normally associated with the offshore financial service sector. Also excluded are jurisdictions that have established OFCs but for which the USG has little or no information regarding the operations of the OFC. Within most categories presented on the chart, the designations Y and N are used to denote the existence (Y) or the non-existence (N) of the entity or service in a specific jurisdiction. Where there is no (or only fragmentary) information regarding specific categories, the corresponding cells on the chart are left blank. In some categories, symbols other than or in addition to Y or N are used. Explanations for additional symbols are provided below.

Explanations of the categories themselves are either provided in the preceding text, are considered to be self-evident, or are provided below.

Category Designations on the Offshore Financial Services Chart

Offshore Banks: The number is provided if known. A Y indicates that although a jurisdiction that offers offshore financial services ( OFC) licenses offshore banks, the number of such banks is not known. An N indicates that no offshore banks are known to be licensed in the jurisdiction. A blank cell indicates that the USG does not know if offshore banks are offered within the OFC.

Trust and Management Companies: These are companies that provide fiduciary services, as well as serving as marketing agents, representatives, lawyers, accountants, trustees, nominee shareholders, directors, and officers of international business companies.

International Business Companies (IBCs) & Exempt Companies: Numbers are provided when known and public; in many cases, the numbers are significantly underreported.

Bearer Shares: Share certificates can be issued without the name of the beneficial owner. A Y indicates that the OFC offers bearer shares; an N indicates that it does not; and a blank cell indicates that the USG does not know if bearer shares are offered within the OFC.

Asset Protection Trusts (APTs): Trusts that protect assets from civil judgement. A Y indicates that the OFC offers APTs; an N indicates that it does not; and a blank cell indicates that the USG does not know if APTs are offered within the OFC.

Insurance and Re-insurance Company Formation: A Y indicates that the OFC allows formation of insurance and re-insurance companies; an N indicates that it does not; and a blank cell indicates that the USG does not know if insurance and re-insurance companies are allowed within the OFC.

Sells "Economic Citizenship": A Y indicates that the OFC sells economic citizenships; an N indicates that it does not; and a blank cell indicates that the USG does not know if the OFC sells economic citizenships.

Internet Gaming: Licenses granted by jurisdictions that enable grantees to establish "virtual casinos" on the Internet, in which customers can pay via credit card. A Y indicates that the OFC licenses Internet gaming; an N indicates that it does not; and a blank cell indicates that the USG does not know if Internet gaming is offered within the OFC.

Criminalized Drug Money Laundering. A D indicates that the OFC has a law criminalizing narcotics-related money laundering only. A BD indicates that crimes other than those related to narcotics are considered to be predicate crimes for money laundering in the OFC. An N indicates that there is no legislation criminalizing money laundering in the OFC.

Reports Suspicious Activities: An M indicates that reporting suspicious activities to law enforcement by banks, and in some OFCs and other financial institutions, is mandatory. A P indicates that such reporting is voluntary. An N indicates that there is no requirement to report suspicious activities.

Financial Stability Groupings: This column provides the grouping provided by the Financial Stability Forum. Group I OFCs are OFCs with generally good supervision and are generally cooperative with foreign supervisors and law enforcement agencies; Group II OFCs are OFCs in which supervision and/or cooperation and/or human resources is of a lesser quality than OFCs in Group I; Group III OFCs are OFCs that lack the political will and/or resources to adhere to international standards and norms and to cooperate with the international financial community in combating money laundering. A blank cell indicates that the jurisdiction was not reviewed.

Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Non-Cooperative Exercise: This column provides the FATF finding. NC indicates the jurisdiction was determined to be noncooperative; R indicates that the jurisdiction was reviewed and determined not to be noncooperative; a blank cell indicates that the jurisdiction was not reviewed.

Membership in International Organizations: This cell lists the multinational organizations that have been formed to combat money laundering and/or to establish a sound supervisory regime in which the OFC participates.

 

Offshore Financial Services Chart

Money Laundering Trends and Typologies

As in previous years, money launderers have demonstrated a great deal of creativity in combining traditional money laundering techniques into complex money laundering schemes designed to thwart the ability of authorities to prevent, detect and prosecute money laundering. Increasingly, however, money launderers are modifying traditional techniques to take advantage of developments and technologies designed to streamline the process as well as employing the services of professionals such as lawyers and accountants to help launder illicit proceeds. Below are some examples of various money laundering typologies and a review of statistical information on U.S. money laundering trends for 2000.

Statistical Overview of U.S. Money Laundering Trends

Suspicious Activity Reporting: Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) continue to play a critical role in U.S. anti-money laundering efforts. Similar types of reporting systems are in operation throughout the world and are a key component in global anti-money laundering efforts as well. In addition to their importance to law enforcement efforts to combat money laundering, SAR reporting can also provide important information on current money laundering trends and typologies. This information can then be used by authorities to develop more effective countermeasures. The following statistical overview is derived from aggregate totals for Suspicious Activity Reports filed by depository institutions (i.e., banks, thrifts and credit unions) from the U.S. SAR system. A small part of the total volume relates to reports filed by affiliates of depository institutions or, in some cases, filed voluntarily by brokers and dealers in securities, money service businesses, or gaming businesses.

Chart 1: U.S. Suspicious Activity Report Filings by Year and Month

Month

Number of Filings


1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

January

            -

5,794

7,600

8,621

10,789

February

            -

5,522

7,107

9,950

9,910

March

            -

6,967

8,718

10,986

14,923

April

2,022

7,628

8,293

9,759

11,928

May

3,315

6,814

7,646

10,625

13,364

June

5,756

6,414

8,163

10,715

13,908

July

6,882

6,844

9,061

8,759

12,031

August

6,785

6,930

7,696

10,014

13,500

September

6,139

7,221

8,625

8,735

                -

October

7,269

7,486

8,223

10,049

                -

November

5,060

6,384

7,577

10,540

                -

December

6,297

7,593

8,223

11,753

               -

          -

49,786

81,597

96,932

120,506

100,353(1)

Total Filings

449,177

(1) Represents those SARs currently in the system as of 31 August 2000.

Underlying Suspicious Activity

Underlying suspicious activity identified in SARs data is provided in rank order in Chart 2. It should be noted that for the largest number of filings (Structuring/Money Laundering—45.3 percent of all filings), structuring activity comprises about 50 percent of the SARs identified under this category. Chart 3 breaks out the overall data by violation/year.

Chart 2: SAR Filings Ranked by Type of Violation

Rank

Violation

Filings

Percentage

1

BSA/Structuring/Money Laundering(1)

221,402

45.3%

2

Check Fraud

64,237

13.15%

3

Other

35,646

7.3%

4

Counterfeit Check

25,670

5.25%

5

Defalcation/Embezzlement

22,700

4.65%

6

Credit Card Fraud

21,856

4.5%

7

Unknown/Blank(2)

18,561

3.8%

8

Check Kiting

18,392

3.75%

9

False Statement

10,441

2.15%

10

Consumer Loan Fraud

10,347

2.1%

11

Mortgage Loan Fraud

10,276

2.1%

12

Mysterious Disappearance

8,097

1.65%

13

Misuse of Position or Self Dealing

7,455

1.5%

14

Commercial Loan Fraud

4,301

Less than 1%

15

Debit Card Fraud

3,021

Less than 1%

16

Wire Transfer Fraud

2,737

Less than 1%

17

Counterfeit Credit/Debit Card

1,746

Less than 1%

18

Counterfeit Instrument (Other)

1,326

Less than 1%

19

Bribery/Gratuity

473

Less than 1%

20

Computer Intrusion(3)

9

Less than 1%

 

(1) The Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) and related rules and regulations require the filing of reports of certain financial transactions.

(2) The Unknown/Blank classification encompasses those SARs that do not correspond to an established violation or where the violation is not specified.

(3) Violation did not appear until issuance of the Revised SAR Form in June 2000.

 

Chart 3: SAR Filings by Characterization of Suspicious Activity

Violation

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000(1)

BSA/Structuring/Money Laundering

20,565

35,949

47,509

61,007

56,371

Bribery/Gratuity

91

109

93

101

79

Check Fraud

8,639

13,274

13,832

16,239

12,253

Check Kiting

2,747

4,298

4,037

4,061

3,249

Commercial Loan Fraud

554

960

905

1,080

802

Consumer Loan Fraud

1,148

2,048

2,185

2,549

2,417

Counterfeit Check

2,317

4,244

5,918

7,396

5,795

Counterfeit Credit/Debit Card

385

387

182

351

441

Counterfeit Instrument (Other)

212

292

265

321

236

Credit Card Fraud

3,375

5,083

4,383

4,938

4,077

Debit Card Fraud

245

610

566

721

879

Defalcation/Embezzlement

3,136

5,306

5,260

5,179

3,819

False Statement

1,807

2,204

1,978

2,376

2,076

Misuse of Position or Self Dealing

914

1,537

1,645

2,063

1,296

Mortgage Loan Fraud

1,265

1,719

2,268

2,936

2,088

Mysterious Disappearance

1,168

1,767

1,855

1,857

1,450

Wire Transfer Fraud

284

499

594

772

588

Other

4,600

6,777

8,696

8,755

6,817

Computer Intrusion

0

0

0

0

9

Unknown/Blank

1,652

2,317

2,728

7,295

4,569

(1) Represents those SARs currently in the system as of August 31, 2000.

Developments in Analyzing U.S. National SAR Data

The size of the U.S. national SAR database presents special opportunities for developing analytic approaches to the data set. Analysis of the data set has enabled FinCEN to provide banks with important feedback regarding examples and patterns of suspicious activity.

Money Laundering Trends in 2000

Wire Transfers and Shell Company Activity

SARs filed during the first half of 2000 reflect several complex activities involving suspicious wire transfer patterns. As reported in the SAR narratives, many of these suspicious wire transfer patterns involve shell companies—i.e., corporations that engage in no apparent business activity and that only serve as a conduit for funds or securities. Often the activities also involve foreign transactors located in jurisdictions considered non-cooperative in the fight against global money laundering.

Several complex suspicious wire transfer transactions have been observed, each involving geographically complicated wire transfer routing (originator, beneficiary, or transit/intermediary banks) and/or geographically complex originator and beneficiary activity. More than $500 million in suspicious wire transfers have been reported in connection with this type of activity.

These activities display common patterns of underlying suspicious activity:

  • A lack of evidence of legitimate business activity, or any business operations undertaken by many of the companies;
  • Unusually large numbers of wire transfers (several thousand wires totaling more than U.S. $500 million);
  • Transactions conducted in bursts of activities within a short period of time;
  • Beneficiaries maintaining accounts at foreign banks that have been the subject of previous SAR reporting due to suspicious wire transfer activity;
  • Reappearing beneficiary banks based in offshore locations, the account of at least one of which has been closed by the reporting financial institution due to overall suspect activity.

Increased SAR Reporting Involving Mexico

Law enforcement information and SARs filed by U.S. financial institutions confirm a shift in suspected money laundering activity involving Mexico. Rather than transiting through Mexico en route to Colombia or other Central and South American destinations, often drug proceeds are now cycled through Mexico directly back into the United States. SARs have revealed patterns of large wire transactions ($1.5 million or more per transaction) moving funds to U.S. payees from Mexican money exchange houses and other financial institutions, which may at least, in part, be attributable to changes in the laundering cycle. Such changes in patterns are believed to stem from the heightened profile of Mexico-based criminal groups in drug trafficking in the U.S., which creates a corresponding increased threat of money laundering activity linked to Mexico.

Money Remitter Activity

The 2000 National Money Laundering Financial Sector Strategy Conference, co-sponsored by the U.S. Departments of Treasury and Justice, provided a forum for discussing recently observed trends pertaining to the use of money remitters for illicit funds transfer and money laundering.

There was a general consensus among the conference participants that there are three major categories of remitters currently operating: a) money remitters that are corrupt and are working directly with the money launderers and drug dealers; b) money remitters that might not be directly involved with the illicit proceeds, but are "willfully blind" to these activities and transactions; and c) money remitters that are not necessarily aware of nor "willfully blind" to the illicit activities.

Various schemes appear primarily designed to evade federal and industry practice that is mandated by record keeping, reporting, and customer identification requirements. These varied activities include basic structuring of money transfer transactions below the reporting and identification dollar amount thresholds mandated by government; the use of multiple money transfer agent businesses and/or parent remitter companies to avoid overall monitoring and detection by the industry(1); and frequent use of falsified names, addresses, and receipts as a "cover" justification for the substantial illicit funds transfers.

(1) As DEA also points out, "In some cases, the agent (business) may represent a variety of remittance companies. When this is the case, the agent may suggest dividing the deposit, sending a portion with each of the represented businesses (companies). Thus, detection is increasingly challenging."

Federal authorities at the conference also highlighted the recent growth of smaller independent remitters (beyond the more established Western Union and MoneyGram systems), particularly of those providing service to and from Mexico. DEA reported that although these remitters provide important legitimate services to migrant worker populations, the location of these businesses, "do not necessarily parallel the employment centers for these laborers. Rather, it appears that the agent locations are primarily located in states without regulations governing the money services industry."

Update on Suspicious Automated Teller Machine (ATM) Activity

Analysis of SAR reporting on ATM transactions confirms a continuing trend in suspicious transactions in which funds are wired to/through a U.S. financial institution from a foreign source and then withdrawn in cash in a third country using ATMs. SARs indicate such ATM withdrawals in at least 57 nations, with the highest incidence in Colombia (408 occurrences), followed by Venezuela (145), Mexico (119), and Argentina (31). The wire transfers that start the cycle originate primarily in Switzerland, Italy, Germany, and England. Amounts up to several hundred thousand dollars have been withdrawn over several months using this method.

Other Money Laundering Trends and Typologies

Black Market Peso Exchange System

The Black Market Peso Exchange System (BMPE) is a trade-based system that depends on commercial traffic between the U.S. and Colombia to launder profits from the sale of illegal drugs in the United States. The BMPE is a significant money laundering conduit used by Colombian narcotics traffickers in repatriating revenues to Colombia. The process begins when a Colombian drug organization arranges the shipment of drugs to the United States. The drugs are sold in the U.S. in exchange for U.S. currency that is then sold to a Colombian black market peso broker's agent in the United States. The U.S. currency is sold at a discount because the broker and his agent must assume the risk of evading the Bank Secrecy Act reporting requirements when later placing the dollars into the U.S. financial system.

Once the dollars are delivered to the U.S.-based agent of the peso broker, the peso broker in Colombia deposits the agreed upon equivalent in Colombian pesos into the organization’s account in Colombia. At this point, the organization has laundered its money because it has successfully converted its drug dollars into pesos, and the Colombian broker and his agent now assume the risk for introducing the laundered drug dollars into the U.S. banking system, usually through a variety of surreptitious transactions. Having introduced the dollars into the U.S. banking system, the Colombian black market peso broker now has a pool of laundered dollars to sell to Colombian importers. These importers then use the dollars to purchase goods, either from the U.S. or from other markets, which are transported to Colombia, often via smuggling in order to avoid applicable Colombian law.

The exact size and structure of the BMPE system cannot be determined with any degree of precision. However, based on anecdotal law enforcement evidence, informants' statements, and Colombian law enforcement and intelligence officials, it is believed that between $3 billion and $6 billion is laundered annually. Other sources of demand for BMPE dollars include capital outflows by Colombian residents, who seek either to conceal the funds from the Colombian authorities or simply to take advantage of the favorable BMPE exchange rate.

To combat the BMPE, the U.S. Department of Treasury has instituted an interagency working group that has aggressively attacked this problem and whose efforts have resulted in better coordinated and integrated anti-BMPE investigations and increased successful prosecutions. Treasury's outreach programs to educate U.S. exporters of the operations of and their vulnerability to the BMPE have also achieved success. During the past year, high level U.S. Government officials met with senior officials of U.S. companies whose products are vulnerable to the BMPE to explain the system and to encourage them to develop programs to counter the BMPE.

In addition to these domestic outreach efforts, the United States, Colombia, Panama, Venezuela and Aruba have formed an international working group of experts to combat this money laundering system. This working group is to study the BMPE, report its findings, and recommend policy options and actions that can be taken by the governments against the BMPE.

On October 21, 2000, a task force composed of U.S. Treasury Department and Department of Justice officials and government officials from Aruba, Colombia, Panama, and Venezuela participated in the first meeting of this working group. At the meeting, the 30 experts discussed how the BMPE money laundering system affected each of their respective countries. Topics of discussion included the BMPE steps, documentation of international commercial transactions, the problems with existing paper trails and laws, and ways to improve international cooperation. The group’s work is planned to continue in meetings to be held in Colombia, Panama, and Venezuela during the course of 2001.

The Hawala System

The hawala (or hundi) alternative (or parallel) remittance system continues to be a key factor in money laundering and other financial crimes committed in and associated with South Asia. It is closely related to the "black" or "off the books" economies in the region. The size of the underground economies in South Asia are estimated to be 50 to 100 percent the size of the "white" or "documented" economies.

Hawala operates on trust and connections ("trust" is one of several meanings associated with the word "hawala"). Customers trust hawala "bankers" or "operators" (known as hawaladars) who use their connections to facilitate money movement worldwide. Hawala transfers take place with little, if any, paper trail; and, when records are kept, they are usually kept in code. Contrary to various media reports, hawala is an ancient system; it was the primary money transfer mechanism used in South Asia prior to the introduction of Western banking. Today, hawala continues to be used for many legitimate transfers for cultural and financial reasons; and it also often operates in conjunction with Western banking operations.

Dubai, India and Pakistan form a "hawala triangle" responsible for significant international money laundering activities that go far beyond South Asia. While interdiction of non-bank money laundering systems, such as hawala, is difficult enough in itself, this difficulty is sometimes compounded by ineffective money laundering countermeasures in Dubai and the other Emirates.

Internet Gambling

Internet gambling is illegal in the United States. A joint FBI-IRS Internet gambling investigation recently targeted a Sports Tout Service (STC) which was providing its services via the Internet, as well as functioning as an Internet Service Provider (ISP). The STC service collected, collated and analyzed statistical and other information relative to sporting events, and then in turn sold this information to subscribers who factored it into their betting decisions. The STC/ISP also included two offshore gambling operations located in the Caribbean, both of which accepted wagers via the Internet or toll-free telephone numbers. Law enforcement personnel were successful in infiltrating the operation.

To launder the proceeds from their illegal Internet gambling activities, the subjects of this investigation employed the services of an attorney. The attorney devised an elaborate scheme in which the STC/ISP leased its services to the subjects of the investigation for a specified amount. Proceeds were also laundered through a series of bank accounts in the Caribbean and eventually funneled back to U.S. banking institutions. Investigators estimate that approximately $178 million was wagered through the STC/ISP annually. It is anticipated that subjects in this investigation will be charged with gambling, money laundering, tax evasion and RICO-related offenses.

Lawyers/Notaries, Accountants and Other Non-Financial Professionals

United States law enforcement authorities have observed that as money laundering schemes become more complex, the perpetrators turn to the learned expertise of attorneys, accountants, consultants and agent representatives to aid them in the movement of illegal currency. These professionals, using shell corporations, nominees and fictitious records, devise elaborate paper trails to disguise the true source of illegal income. During Fiscal Years 1999 and 2000, 131 attorneys, accountants and consultants were sentenced as a result of money laundering convictions.

The Market for Gold and other Precious Metals

Gold is known to play a significant role in international money laundering. Gold, just like certain currencies (e.g., the U.S. dollar, Swiss franc, and British pound, the Euro) is a nearly universal commodity for international commerce. The attractiveness and value of a particular currency depend on a complex and often unstable variety of political and economic conditions. Gold has been a key medium of exchange since antiquity and will, in fact, most likely always enjoy this position, as it appears nearly immune to the consequences of changing global fortunes.

Gold serves as both a commodity and, to a lesser extent, a medium of exchange in money laundering conducted in Latin America, the United States, Europe and Asia. In this cycle, for example, gold bullion makes its way to Italy via Swiss brokers. There it is made into jewelry, much of which is then shipped to Latin America. In Latin America, this jewelry (or the raw gold from which it was made) then becomes one, if not the most important, of the commodities in the black market peso exchange.

In a recent case, United States law enforcement authorities identified a money laundering system that makes use of the legitimate gold trade to launder money through black market currency exchanges. In this system, gold jewelry is sold in the Panama Colon Free Trade Zone to Colombians (who are allegedly hoarding gold against the devaluation of the peso). The jewelry is smuggled into Colombia through the city of Bucaramanga. The jewelry is then melted and formed to resemble gold from mines, fabricated into pigment and then shipped to the U.S. for refining. (The pigment fabrication stage is important because the Colombian government will pay a 4.5 percent export tax credit on the exported goods.) The "gold pigment" arrives in the U.S. but is instead entered as "bullion", which does not qualify for the export credit. The gold is refined and sold in the U.S. and then smuggled back to South America. The resulting loss to the Colombian government is estimated to be over $20 million. A variant of this scheme has the refined gold being exported to Switzerland for sale to Italian jewelry manufacturers for delivery to Panama. In all cases, it is believed that the same gold is being recycled throughout each step of the scheme.

Structured Postal Money Orders—Alien Smuggling Proceeds

An anti-smuggling task force consisting of U.S. Postal Inspectors and special agents from the Immigration and Naturalization Service and Internal Revenue Service executed a federal warrant at the Bank of America in New York City to seize the contents of an account (totaling roughly $230,000) maintained by an international exchange firm located in the United Arab Emirates. The investigation indicated that the account contained alien smuggling proceeds, in the form of structured postal money orders and other monetary instruments. These proceeds were being moved through the exchange company’s account to members of alien smuggling organizations in India and, as reimbursement for smuggling fees, to relatives in India who helped with the operation.

Structured Postal Money Orders—Illicit Drug Proceeds

A multi-agency task force consisting of U.S. Postal Inspectors from the North Jersey/Caribbean Division and special agents from the Internal Revenue Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation and U.S. Customs Service arrested nine members of a narcotics and money laundering ring known as the "Dussan Organization." The ring operated in Northern New Jersey, New York and Colombia and was charged with money laundering and structuring transactions to avoid currency transaction reporting requirements. Members of the group allegedly structured postal and commercial money orders at various post offices and convenience stores in New Jersey and New York, and used express mail services to send the money orders to various businesses in the United States and South America. It is estimated that the ring laundered at least $3 million in illegal proceeds.

Suspicious Financial Activity in Casinos

A review of SARs filed by gaming establishments reveals patterns of suspicious activity in which casino accounts are used to transfer significant amounts of funds through non-bank financial transaction channels. The funds are cashed out by the client or moved to other accounts with minimal or no gaming activity. Variations on this theme involved an initial deposit by wire or bank cashiers check, but then the funds would be wired out to another account. The funds were then stored for a period of time in a casino safety deposit box or held in the form of safekeeping markers, and then cashed out. In several instances the client was observed transferring chips to other individuals to cash out, as well as cashing out a greater amount than held on deposit (with no gambling winnings to account for the excess amount).

Trusts, Other Non-Corporate Entities and Money Laundering

One multi-agency task force investigation focused on a scheme where an investment consultant had formed a management group under the laws of Anguilla and offered investment services to citizens of the United States. A confidential informant (CI), cooperating with law enforcement, advised the offshore consultant of the CI's desire to launder drug proceeds. The consultant offered to set up an off shore trust for the CI and withhold the CI's identity from the trust records, thereby distorting the true illegal source of the funds.

Due to the U.S. Customs Service requirement of filing an International Transportation of Currency Report, the consultant required delivery of the funds by a courier to an international airport in Canada before the consultant actually took possession of the funds. In Toronto, Canada the consultant took delivery of $100,000 in unsigned traveler checks, promising to deposit the checks in Caribbean bank accounts and to wire transfer the money back to the CI, less commissions. The consultant then traveled to St. Maarten and Anguilla and established the promised accounts. These accounts were opened at Barclays Bank, Anguilla and Chase Manhattan, St. Maarten. The funds were then wire transmitted back to the U.S.

Upon his return to the United States, the subject was arrested. The subject was indicted on six counts of money laundering and Customs violations. Through plea negotiations, the subject received 18 months incarceration.

U.S. Money Laundering Countermeasures

National Money Laundering Strategy

On October 15, 1998, Congress passed the Money Laundering and Financial Crimes Strategy Act of 1998. The Act called upon the President, acting through the Secretary of the Treasury and in consultation with the Attorney General, to develop a national strategy for combating money laundering and related financial crimes. The Act called for the first national strategy to be sent to Congress in 1999, and updated annually for the following four consecutive years. The first annual strategy was released on September 23, 1999. The National Money Laundering Strategy for 2000 was released on March 8, 2000, at a press conference co-chaired by the Deputy Attorney General and Deputy Treasury Secretary.

The 2000 Strategy is organized according to the four following overarching goals: (1) to strengthen domestic enforcement in order to disrupt the flow of illegal money; (2) to enhance regulatory and cooperative public-private efforts to prevent money laundering; (3) to strengthen partnerships with state and local governments to fight money laundering throughout the United States; and (4) to strengthen international cooperation in order to disrupt the global flow of illicit money.

These four goals are supported by identified objectives which, in turn, are to be accomplished through approximately 65 specific action items set out in the strategy.

Significant Action Items

The following are summaries of the most significant action items:

  • Designation of High Intensity Financial Crime Areas (HIFCAs): The designation of HIFCAs was mandated by the 1998 legislation and was the first action item in the 1999 Strategy. HIFCAs are defined as special, high-risk areas or sectors where law enforcement will concentrate its resources and energy to combat money laundering. The Justice and Treasury Departments led a process to identify and designate the first HIFCAs. As part of this process, the two departments convened an interagency HIFCA Working Group to collect and analyze relevant information and make recommendations to the Deputy Attorney General and the Deputy Treasury Secretary for the HIFCA designations. The 2000 Strategy designated the first HIFCAs: (1) New York City/Northern New Jersey area; (2) the Los Angeles, California, metropolitan area; (3) San Juan, Puerto Rico; and (4) a "systems" HIFCA to focus and enhance current efforts addressing the problem of cross-border currency smuggling/movements between Mexico and Texas and Arizona. The HIFCA program is intended to concentrate law enforcement efforts at the federal, state, and local levels to combat money laundering in the designated high-intensity money laundering zones. Future HIFCAs will be selected from applications received from prospective areas or from candidates proposed by the Secretary of the Treasury or the Attorney General.
  • Financial Crime-Free Communities Support Program: The 2000 Strategy announces the launching of the Financial Crime-Free Communities Support (C-FIC) program. The C-FIC program is also the result of a legislative mandate which calls for the establishment of a federal grant program to provide seed capital for emerging state and local anti-money laundering enforcement efforts. The Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) is assisting the Treasury Department in administering this grant program. Congress appropriated $2.9 million in fiscal year 2000 for the commencement of the program. The first nine recipients for C-FIC grants were announced in September 2000 and included a variety of programs proposed by state and local law enforcement agencies in New York, Illinois, Arizona, Florida, Texas and California.
  • Money Service Business Suspicious Activity Report Reporting: In conjunction with the release of the strategy, the Treasury Department announced the issuance of final regulations, effective December 31, 2001, mandating that money transmitters, issuers, sellers, and redeemers of money orders and traveler’s checks must report suspicious transactions to the Treasury Department.
  • Financial Crime Havens: The 1999 Strategy called for the formation of an interagency working group to explore whether measures should be adopted to restrict financial institutions in the United States from opening or maintaining correspondent banking accounts for foreign banks that are organized in "lax" offshore jurisdictions. This initiative was pursued in conjunction with the FATF NCCT initiative which resulted in the naming of fifteen Non-cooperative Countries and Jurisdictions in June 2000. The issuance of this list was followed by the issuance of FinCEN Advisories to United States financial institutions concerning the fifteen designated jurisdictions.
  • "Gatekeepers": Pursuant to the 1999 Strategy, an interagency working group was created to examine the responsibilities of professionals, such as lawyers and accountants, with regard to money laundering. The 2000 Strategy directed the working group to continue its review and "to make recommendations—ranging from enhanced professional education, standards or rules, to legislation—as might be needed." In April 2000, a meeting of representatives from the G-8 countries was convened in Washington, D.C. to discuss this issue. Because of the difficult legal and policy issues involved when considering the responsibilities of lawyers and accountants in this area, the working group is continuing to study this issue and prepare recommendations for the Steering Committee in 2001.
  • Legislation: The Treasury Department announced that in conjunction with the 2000 Strategy, the administration was sending new anti-money laundering legislation to Congress. The International Counter-Money Laundering Act of 2000 offered needed new authority to take calibrated action against foreign financial crime havens. In addition to seeking enactment of the Treasury bill, the 2000 Strategy called for the administration to seek enactment of the Justice Department’s Money Laundering Act of 2000, which was submitted to Congress on November 10, 1999. This bill contained numerous provisions that would enhance the effectiveness of the money laundering statutes. However, neither of these bills was enacted in 2000.

In conjunction with the announcement of the 2000 Strategy, on March 7, 2000, the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury issued a joint memorandum to all U.S. Attorneys (USAs) and the heads of all of the federal law enforcement agencies emphasizing the importance of anti-money laundering enforcement. In addition it requested the implementation of several action items recommended in the 1999 Strategy.

Specifically, the memorandum urged the USAs and the law enforcement agencies:

  • to encourage below-threshold investigations and prosecutions that potentially have a systemic or financial sector-wide effect on money laundering;
  • to establish SAR review teams;
  • to ensure that all informants and cooperating witnesses are debriefed with respect to money laundering methods and their knowledge of money laundering techniques;
  • to increase the use of electronic surveillance in appropriate money laundering cases;
  • to enhance the support and analysis of multi-district money laundering investigations;
  • to increase training for financial investigations; and
  • to increase the strategic use of asset forfeiture in money laundering cases.

The 2000 Strategy set out a far-reaching and highly ambitious regimen of action items and milestones to be addressed and accomplished during 2000. The implementation of the Money Laundering Strategy is being guided by an interagency Steering Committee co-chaired by the Deputy Secretary of the Treasury and the Deputy Attorney General, with the participation of relevant departments and agencies. The Steering Committee has the responsibility of tracking and identifying progress toward fulfillment of the goals and objectives identified in the 2000 Strategy and this progress will be reported in the 2001 Strategy.

Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) – 42

At the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations in 1995, the President of the United States broadened the definition of what constitutes a national security threat to include international crime. Shortly thereafter, in October of that year, PDD-42 was signed, directing a cooperative federal effort against international criminal organizations and money laundering. The U.S. Departments of Justice, State and the Treasury as well as the U.S. Coast Guard, the National Security Council, intelligence agencies and other federal entities were instructed to work together to confront and counter this threat to U.S. national security and international stability.

PDD-42 directs the agencies to cooperate to accomplish the following objectives: (1) produce greater results in this area by increasing the priority and resources devoted to this effort; (2) achieve increased effectiveness and synergy by improving coordination among agencies and across the types of international criminal activity; (3) assist and work more closely with other governments to create a global response and to eliminate this threat and to eliminate sanctuaries; and (4) use creatively and aggressively all legal means available to the government to combat international organized crime.

The year 2000 saw progress on all of these fronts with notable success achieved in developing a global response identifying money laundering vulnerabilities and encouraging compliance with international anti-money laundering standards. A United States interagency group worked with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in its groundbreaking effort to name non-cooperative countries and territories in the fight against money laundering. As noted previously in this report, the FATF developed a set of twenty-five criteria to be used in determining whether a jurisdiction had an acceptable or deficient anti-money laundering regime and issued a report listing fifteen jurisdictions as having serious deficiencies.

The FATF non-cooperative countries and territories exercise encompasses some of the essential tenets of PDD-42. It has brought together the 29 FATF member nations in a multilateral effort to not only define what makes a country vulnerable to money laundering but to then clearly identify those nations whose substandard anti-money laundering regimes attract illegal proceeds that underwrite international criminal activity. The United States, in making its contribution to FATF, draws upon the collective expertise of the federal interagency community. That community has played a vital role by assessing the money laundering threat in various regions, analyzing the shortcomings in existing national laws, regulations and practices, crafting countermeasures and providing training and technical assistance to identified jurisdictions making a conscientious effort at improvement. During 2000, this integrated federal effort in support of the FATF initiative on non-cooperative jurisdictions has focused international attention and brought unprecedented progress in dealing with the global challenge of money laundering.

Another key component of the International Crime Control Strategy and PDD-42 has been the imposition of sanctions under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). The U.S. now has at its disposal two powerful economic sanctions options against narcotics traffickers, the entities they own or control, and those persons acting for them or supporting their narcotics trafficking activities.

In addition to IEEPA, the U.S. Government also is using the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act ("the Kingpin Designation Act"). In December of 1999, the President signed into law the Kingpin Designation Act, which provides him with a statutory framework for imposing sanctions against foreign drug kingpins when such sanctions are appropriate. Twelve foreign persons were identified as appropriate for sanctions on June 1, 2000 and others will be designated by June 1, 2001. Of those twelve foreign persons, six were from Mexico (Benjamin Alberto Arellano Felix, Ramon Eduardo Arellano Felix, Jose de Jesus Amezcua Contreras, Luis Ignacio Amezcua Contreras, Rafael Caro Quintero, Vicente Carrillo Fuentes), two were from the Caribbean (Noel Timothy Heath, Glenroy Vingrove Matthews), two were from Nigeria (Abeni O. Ogungbuyi, Oluwole A. Ogungbuyi) and two were from Asia (Chang Chi Fu, Wei Hsueh Kang).

The Kingpin Designation Act is modeled after the highly effective Specially Designated Narcotics Traffickers ("SDNT") program that Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control ("OFAC") administers against the Colombian cartels pursuant to Executive order 12978, which was issued in October 1995 under the authority of IEEPA. Nearly 600 individuals and entities have been identified as SDNTs since the Colombia program’s inception.

Both the Kingpin Designation Act and the IEEPA-SDNT program prohibit U.S. persons from engaging in transactions, trade and services involving foreign narcotics kingpins and derivative designees. The objective of both laws is to deny drug kingpins, their businesses and their agents access to the U.S. financial system and to the benefits of trade and transactions involving U.S. businesses and individuals. The long-term effectiveness of designations under the Kingpin Designation Act, as well as designations under an IEEPA program, depends heavily upon Treasury’s authority to make derivative designations of entities and individuals, as is being done in the IEEPA-SDNT program against Colombian cartels.

The Kingpin Designation Act moves beyond the IEEPA-SDNT Colombia model to target the activities of significant foreign narcotics traffickers ("drug kingpins") and their organizations on a worldwide basis. In keeping with PDD-42’s emphasis on interagency cooperation, the Kingpin Designation Act requires that the Departments of Treasury, Justice, State, and Defense and the CIA coordinate to develop a list of recommended kingpins for presidential designation by June 1 of each year. The statute permits kingpin designations at other times as well.

In accordance with PDD-42’s emphasis on international cooperation and collaborations, to the extent feasible, the United States will continue to coordinate carefully with host governments concerning drug kingpins. Furthermore, the United States will continue to work cooperatively with appropriate host government authorities to pursue additional measures and leads against those significant foreign narcotics traffickers. An example of the importance of this cooperation has been the success the Government of Colombia has had in applying the IEEPA-SDNT program against narcotics cartels in that country.

Enforcement Cases

Attorney/Accountant Case

This case involved 19 individuals in the Home Health Care service, one being both an attorney and accountant. This indictment contained 123 counts involving conspiracy, false claims, wire fraud and money laundering. The false claims involved fictitious patient claims and claims for services which were not provided.

The two primary subjects employed an attorney to incorporate four interrelated shell corporations as the controlling entities. In addition, eight nominee corporations were created to generate fictitious health care service records reflecting in-home therapy and nursing care. Health care providers including therapists, registered nurses and physicians operated the nominee corporations. To keep the health care billing, tax return filings and bank account records synchronized, the two main subjects relied on the attorney/accountant defendant.

In excess of $4 million was laundered through bank accounts in New York, Florida and suspected offshore accounts in connection with this scheme. Numerous accounts were created at four or five separate banks for purposes of amassing and moving these funds. Cashier's checks often were purchased and even negotiated through the attorney/accountant's trust account to conceal property acquisition. This defendant was sentenced to two years in jail.

Both primary defendants were ordered to forfeit real and personal property, including the $4 million and purchased property. They received five- and two-year prison sentences respectively. Two related case defendants laundered an additional $2 million and were charged in a separate 33 count indictment. They were ordered to forfeit $95,000 in currency.

Colombian Money Laundering Operation

The Department of Justice announced in November 2000 that Jose Stroh, of Cali, Colombia, pled guilty to conspiring to launder in excess of $129 million of narcotics proceeds for various drug cartels in Colombia between 1986 and 1992.

Stroh, a fugitive Colombian national, was apprehended by the DEA in early February 2000 while attempting to pass through Panamanian customs. He was transported to Miami and eventually Connecticut to face charges.

Stroh was charged with operating a money laundering enterprise which was responsible for turning millions of dollars of proceeds generated from cocaine sales in New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, California and Mexico into Colombian pesos which he returned to the Cali narcotics traffickers.

Stroh, operating from Colombia, opened bank accounts in Panama into which the drug proceeds were delivered in the form of money orders, checks and wire transfers. Cash was transferred in suitcases, boxes, bags, and other containers. Money launderers then would convert the cash to checks or deposit it into accounts where it could be transferred anywhere in the world. Some of these funds were wired to bank accounts in Israel and Germany where the laundered funds were subsequently moved to one of two Panamanian shell corporations that Stroh controlled. Often times, the money orders were concealed inside of magazines and shipped out of the U.S. through various courier services in New Jersey to Stroh’s businesses in Panama.

At the same time Stroh was negotiating with Cali Cartel intermediaries for the purchase of dollars in the United States, he was also negotiating with others for the sale of these dollars in exchange for Colombian pesos. Stroh often sold dollars to "legitimate" businesses in Colombia that needed dollars for transactions in the United States.

Stroh is scheduled for sentencing in February 2001. He faces a maximum term of imprisonment of five years, and $5,000,000 in fines. As part of his agreement with the Government, Stroh agreed to relinquish $930,000 in several accounts that he held at Lehman Brothers brokerage house in Miami, Florida.

Dinero Express

Dinero Express Inc. is a Dominican money remitter licensed in the states of New York, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Florida, and Puerto Rico. In August 1996, three Dinero Express employees were arrested and pled guilty to money laundering violations. In addition to these arrests, two search warrants were executed on Dinero Express locations. Analysis of the search warrant documents, as well as documents provided by a cooperating defendant, revealed a money laundering operation, responsible for the laundering of approximately $10.1 million in criminally derived proceeds through an elaborate structuring scheme.

On April 18, 2000, at the conclusion of a 7 year investigation, a Federal Grand Jury empanelled within the Southern District of New York, issued an indictment charging Dinero Express Inc., and its President, Roberto Beras with 82 counts of money laundering and currency reporting violations. The indictment went on to charge Luis Francisco Soriano, a manager of Dinero Express, with 4 counts of money laundering and currency reporting violations, as well as Maria Mendoza, clerk of Dinero Express, who was charged with 35 counts of currency reporting violations.

On December 5, 2000, the Jury ordered forfeiture of $10 million against Dinero Express Inc. and Roberto Beras.

Operation Cashback Nets 60 Individuals

Operation Cashback is one of the largest investigations of the Black Market Peso Exchange System (BMPE) ever undertaken by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). It culminated with the indictment of 60 individuals for money laundering in the Miami area. Of the 60 people charged, 16 defendants were Colombian nationals who were pesos brokers or business owners, 9 defendants were Colombian couriers residing in the United States, and 35 defendants were employees of 16 businesses located in the South Florida area. Since the indictments, 50 individuals have pled guilty or were found guilty. In addition to the indictments, the United States is pursuing the forfeiture of over $3.6 million, which represented the monies associated with the laundering scheme.

The centerpiece of this investigation was an undercover storefront in operation for approximately 3 years. IRS undercover agents staffed the storefront and acted as an intermediary for Colombian money brokers to launder narcotics proceeds. The undercover agents arranged with the brokers to have couriers deliver the narcotics proceeds to the storefront. A significant portion of the money delivered was used to purchase merchandise from businesses in the Miami area. The merchandise was shipped to Colombia to complete the BMPE cycle.

Operations Powerplay & Pressure Point

In an effort to attack the illegal exportation of unreported currency derived from suspected illicit activities, Customs initiated two currency smuggling investigative efforts known as Operations Powerplay and Pressure Point. These two nationally coordinated operations focused on identifying, arresting, and prosecuting violators involved with transporting proceeds out of the United States. As a result of these two operations, Customs made 525 currency seizures totaling over $16.8 million, resulting in 224 arrests. Customs special agents and inspectors intensified their outbound enforcement operations by targeting air, sea, and land passengers, air cargo, sea cargo, courier hubs, courier bags, inbound mail facilities, and land borders in search of unreported currency in violation of federal law.

Customs officers identified and seized bulk cash shipments concealed in automobiles, trailers, bicycle tires, food products, stereo equipment, internal body carriers, clothing, shoes, luggage, and express courier parcels. To assist in their outbound enforcement efforts, Customs used canines specially trained to sniff out cash as well as x-ray technology to scan large pieces of cargo and containers.

Customs determined that 38 percent of the seizures occurred at airports, 27 percent at land borders, 21 percent from couriers, 13 percent as result of investigations, and 1 percent from seaports. More than half of all the seized cash was destined for Mexico, the Dominican Republic, Israel, Colombia, Guatemala, and Jamaica.

Operation Southwest Express

In August 1998, the FBI initiated a nationwide investigation code named "Operation Southwest Express" targeting the San Diego-based drug trafficking organization of Omar Rocha Soto (Rocha). This multi-jurisdictional/multi-divisional investigation was carried out in conjunction with the Drug Enforcement Administration, Internal Revenue Service, Immigration and Naturalization Service, and other federal, state and local law enforcement agencies.

During the course of the operation, investigations were conducted in San Diego, California; El Paso, Texas; Houston, Texas; Cleveland, Ohio; Nashville, Tennessee; Chicago, Illinois; Boston, Massachusetts; and New York City and Utica, New York.

The Rocha organization was believed to be associated with the smuggling of ton quantities of cocaine and marijuana through Mexico, with distribution networks throughout the United States. In particular, the Rocha organization was believed to have been one of the twenty largest drug distribution organizations in the United States. The Rocha organization also laundered large quantities of U.S. currency in an attempt to disguise the profits derived from their illegal activities. Furthermore, this group utilized automobiles, tractor-trailers, and railway systems to transport illegal drugs and money to and from major American cities such as Houston, Chicago, and New York.

When Operation Southwest Express was concluded in August 1999, more than 100 subjects were indicted throughout the United States. The arrested individuals faced charges including money laundering, drug distribution, and conspiracy. During this investigation, more than 4,100 pounds of marijuana, 2,700 kilograms of cocaine, and $1 million were seized. Additionally, the majority of the indicted subjects have either pled guilty or been convicted by federal juries.

Russian Money Laundering Operation

In February 2000, a couple pled guilty in a Manhattan federal court to a variety of charges, including conspiracy to commit money laundering, operating an unlawful banking and money transmitting business and aiding and abetting Russian banks in conducting unlawful and unlicensed banking activities in the United States. A large number of Russian individuals and businesses used this illegal banking operation to transfer and receive money in violation of Russian currency control limitations and to promote a variety of schemes to defraud the Russian government of customs duties and taxes.

This particular operation was originally centered upon a company called Benex International, Inc., in Forest Hills, Queens. Benex was small, but despite its size, it intersected in a number of ways with a world wide money laundering infrastructure. Benex had an account at the Bank of New York and during one eighteen month period, it moved more than $4.2 billion through the account, utilizing over 8,000 monthly transactions. The head of this operation was Peter Berlin, a Russian who married a United States citizen named Lucy Edwards.

Their scheme began in late 1995, when Berlin and his wife, who then worked for the Bank of New York in Manhattan, entered into a pact with certain individuals who controlled the Russian bank DKB (Depozitarno-Kliringovy Bank). Berlin opened an account at the Bank of New York, and, with his wife’s help, gained access to electronic banking software available to certain select customers. With this software Berlin and his associates were able to direct wire transfers in their account at the Bank of New York.

By early 1996, Berlin had access to the software and his wife installed it in the Forest Hills offices. Those offices served DKB. Using several Russian correspondent bank accounts opened at the Bank of New York, DKB transferred funds into the Benex account in bulk amounts on a continuous basis. DKB then issued daily instructions from its offices in Moscow to the employees in the Benex offices to transfer funds out of the Benex account, using the software, to a large number of third parties around the world.

By the fall of 1998, Berlin and Edwards had established two additional corporations (BECS International L.L.C. and Lowland Inc.) to move money. Benex, BECS and Lowland were not licensed to act as money-transmitting businesses nor were they authorized to conduct banking operations in the United States on behalf of foreign banks, but offered a back-channel method of secretly and illegally transferring funds in and out of Russia.

Ultimately, more than $7 billion moved through the Bank of New York accounts of Benex, BECS and Lowland from February 1996 to August 1999. During this time, Berlin and Edwards received a total of approximately $1.8 million in commissions, much of which they laundered and funneled into foreign bank accounts. In excess of $15 million has been seized by authorities and litigation continues. The case is ongoing and many matters remain to be adjudicated.

Sergio Rubalcava Sandoval Drug Trafficking Organization

This investigation originated in August 1997 as part of the FBI undercover operation entitled "Crosswire." Sergio Rubalcava Sandoval was identified as a large-scale drug trafficker and former Baja California State Judicial Police officer with close ties to Ismael Higuera-Guerrero, a command and control figure of the Arellano-Felix Drug Cartel.

Through various investigative methods, agents determined that Sandoval, his wife, and several of his associates in the United States purchased land, houses, boats and helicopters as a means to launder drug proceeds generated by the organization. The FBI obtained a federal indictment for Sandoval and fifteen of his associates, charging each with several counts including drug trafficking and money laundering.

On March 21, 2000, Sandoval and his wife pled guilty to drug trafficking and money laundering charges bringing the total of subjects convicted in the case to thirteen. The FBI documented over $10 million in laundered proceeds and seized over $1 million in assets.

Terrorist Financing Operation

In 1999, terrorists launched 392 attacks, killing 233 people and wounding 706 others worldwide.(1) Many of the terrorist organizations responsible for these acts are believed to have financial support infrastructures in the United States and in many other developed countries. Legislation enacted in 1996 enables us to better detect, deter and punish those who finance terrorism. United States law enforcement authorities are now aggressively using the newest tools available in the fight against terrorist financing, including laws that make it a crime to knowingly provide material support or resources to a designated foreign terrorist organization.

(1) Patterns of Global Terrorism—1999, United States Department of State Publication 10687, April 2000.

A wide-ranging joint FBI and Department of Treasury investigation into interstate cigarette smuggling, involving a suspected Hizballah terrorist cell operating in Charlotte, North Carolina, led to the July 21, 2000 arrest by U.S. authorities of 18 individuals. Ten days later a federal grand jury in North Carolina indicted these individuals, including seven suspected Hizballah supporters, for immigration fraud and related bribery and conspiracies; conspiring to smuggle contraband cigarettes; and conspiring to launder money. Many of the defendants continue to be detained prior to trial, while the investigation continues.

At least seven of the defendants are suspected members of, or sympathetic to Hizballah, a foreign terrorist organization designated as such under U.S. law in 1997 and again in 1999. These seven defendants appear to be providing material support or resources to Hizballah in violation of U.S. law.

The indictment alleges that seven of the indicted defendants entered into fraudulent marriages with United States citizens in order to obtain permanent resident status, which would permit them to remain indefinitely in the United States. Having arranged for presence in the United States between March 1996 and July 2000, several of the defendants smuggled large quantities of contraband cigarettes, purchasing them in North Carolina, where the state cigarette tax is $0.50 per carton, and illicitly transporting them to Michigan for resale, where the state cigarette tax is $7.50 per carton. During the same period, these defendants laundered the funds involved in and derived from the conspiracy through various bank and credit card accounts.

The defendants are each facing substantial periods of incarceration, criminal fines and asset forfeiture. Among the assets that may be subject to forfeiture are two residences, a BP service station, an undetermined amount of U.S. currency, five late model vehicles and 30 bank accounts. At the request of the defense, the trial will likely be continued to April 2001.

Bilateral Activities

Training and Technical Assistance

During 2000, a number of U.S. law enforcement and regulatory agencies provided training and technical assistance on money laundering countermeasures and financial investigations to their law enforcement, financial regulatory, and prosecutorial counterparts around the globe. These courses have been designed to give financial investigators, bank regulators, and prosecutors the necessary tools to recognize, investigate, and prosecute money laundering, financial crimes, and related criminal activity. Courses have been provided in the U.S. as well as in the jurisdictions where the programs are targeted.

Department of State

The Department of State's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) developed a fiscal year 2000 $4.0 million program for providing law enforcement, prosecutorial and central bank training to countries around the globe. A prime focus of the training program was a multi-agency approach to develop or enhance financial crime and anti-money laundering regimes in selected jurisdictions. Supported by and in coordination with INL, the Department of Justice, Treasury Department component agencies, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, and non-government organizations offered law enforcement, regulatory and criminal justice programs worldwide.

During 2000, INL funded over 60 programs to combat international financial crimes and money laundering in 35 countries. Nearly every federal law enforcement agency assisted in this effort by providing basic and advanced training courses in all aspects of financial criminal activity. In addition, funds were made available for intermittent posting of financial advisors at selected overseas locations. The advisors work directly with the host government to assist in the creation, implementation, and enforcement of anti-money laundering and financial crime legislation. Further, several federal agencies were provided funding to conduct multiagency financial crime training assessments and develop specialized training in specific jurisdictions worldwide to combat money laundering.

In addition to funding specific training and technical assistance anti-money laundering courses around the globe, INL provided funding for other important anti-money laundering projects in 2000. For example, funding assistance was provided for the October Pacific Rim Money Laundering and Financial Crimes Conference held in Vancouver, Canada.

Also, INL continues to fund the Caribbean Anti-Money Laundering Programme (CALP) along with funding from the European Union and the Government of the United Kingdom. The objectives of CALP are to reduce the incidence of the laundering of the proceeds of all serious crime by facilitating the prevention, investigation, and prosecution of money laundering. CALP also seeks to develop a sustainable institutional capacity in the Caribbean region to address the issues related to anti-money laundering efforts at a local, regional and international level.

INL continues to provide significant financial support for many of the anti-money laundering bodies around the globe. During 2000, support was furnished to the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, CFATF, COE, and the FATF. In 2000, additional support was provided to the APG and COE to conduct mutual evaluation training programs for their members.

As in previous years, INL training programs continue to focus on the interagency approach and bringing together, where possible, foreign law enforcement, judicial and central bank authorities in assessments and training programs. This allows for an extensive dialogue and exchange of information. This approach has been used successfully in Asia, Central and South America, Russia, the New Independent States (NIS) of the former Soviet Union, and Central Europe. INL also provides funding for many of the regional training and technical assistance programs offered by the various law enforcement agencies, including those at the International Law Enforcement Academies (ILEAs).

The following summary provides a glimpse of training activities undertaken in 2000 by U.S. law enforcement agencies.

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

The Federal Reserve has a long-standing commitment to combating money laundering and ensuring compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act and related suspicious activity reporting requirements by the domestic and foreign banking organizations that it supervises. Federal Reserve staff has provided training in anti-money laundering procedures to foreign law enforcement officials and central bank supervisory personnel in dozens of jurisdictions each year. Some examples include: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Poland, Russia, South Pacific jurisdictions, United Arab Emirates and Uruguay. In addition, training has been provided by Federal Reserve staff to U.S. law enforcement agencies including programs at the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Federal Law Enforcement Training Center and at the FBI Academy, as well as regular and frequent training for the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Secret Service and the U.S. Customs Service.

Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)

International Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Seminars are a part of the U.S. Department of Justice Asset Forfeiture Program conducted by the Drug Enforcement Administration’s Office of Training, International Training Section. The intent of these seminars is to share, compare, and contrast U.S. legislation with that of other countries, building relationships and fostering communications with foreign narcotics enforcement and prosecutorial personnel. On average, the yearly budget allotted is $420,000 to complete five seminars. Each seminar provides instruction to 35 to 50 high-level foreign drug law enforcement and money-laundering specialists.

DEA’s primary focus for its training courses includes specialized training for foreign central bank regulators, police and customs officials, and prosecutors. Course materials include training in U.S. asset forfeiture laws, asset and financial gathering techniques, financial investigation techniques, case studies, document exploitation, and international banking.

Training is designed for one-week seminars involving lectures, presentations, case studies, and practical application exercises. Guest lecturers from various areas of the U.S. Government participate, including from the Department of Justice, the U.S. Customs Service, the U.S. Marshal Service, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve as well as from various divisional offices of DEA.

This training is focused on cultures with economic systems developed enough to accommodate money laundering activities. All seminars are conducted in the host country. During 2000, seminars were conducted in the following locations: Hungary, Panama, Peru, Singapore, South Africa and Spain. In addition, DEA conducted a money laundering training session in Brasilia, Brazil, which was funded by the Department of State.

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

The FBI Money Laundering Unit conducts training with the goal of providing international law enforcement with the ability to adequately investigate various methods of money laundering. The training emphasizes the techniques that money launderers use to conceal or disguise the true nature of illicit cash proceeds and provides law enforcement with the ability to trace the location, source, or ownership of these proceeds.

The FBI has either exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction over 150 of the 176 "Specified Unlawful Activities" (SUAs) under the United States money laundering statutes. This expansive jurisdiction has allowed the FBI to gain extensive experience in unconventional money laundering methodologies associated with various SUAs in areas such as organized crime, drugs, violent crime, and white collar crime. This experience places the FBI in a unique position to provide expert training in traditional and non-traditional money laundering investigations across a broad spectrum of SUAs.

The FBI has also provided experts for advanced training in areas of traditional and emerging technologies such as digital cash, smart cards, Internet banking, the Black Market Peso Exchange, and bulk cash shipments. Further, the FBI provides technical assistance for the new tools that law enforcement are using to investigate money laundering activities such as geographic targeting orders, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, and Suspicious Activity Report Task Forces.

The FBI provides training independently and in conjunction with other federal, state, and local agencies within the United States and internationally. The FBI’s money laundering unit has worked with the United Nations in conferences to provide a United States perspective on successful tactics used to disrupt and dismantle money laundering industries and facilities. On other occasions, the FBI has provided independent money laundering training and briefings at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia and at FBI headquarters in Washington, D.C.

During 2000, the FBI participated in money laundering and financial crimes training courses in: Chisinau, Moldova; Islamabad, Pakistan; Panama City, Panama; Warsaw, Poland; Volgograd, Russia; Irkutsk, Russia; Bratislava, Slovakia; Kiev, Ukraine; and Hanoi, Vietnam.

Financial Crimes Enforcement Network

FinCEN, the U.S. financial intelligence unit (FIU), has an international training program that focuses on providing training and technical assistance to a broad spectrum of foreign government officials, financial regulators, law enforcement personnel, and bankers. This training covers a wide variety of topics, including money laundering typologies, the creation and operation of FIUs, assistance in the establishment of comprehensive anti-money laundering regimes, computer systems architecture and operations, and assessments of country-specific money laundering regimes and regulations. FinCEN also works closely with the Egmont Group of FIUs to provide training and technical assistance to various jurisdictions for establishing and operating their own FIUs.

FinCEN participated in four seminars in El Salvador in 2000 to train Salvadoran officials on anti-money laundering techniques. Seminars in March and May focused on training personnel of the newly formed financial intelligence unit. A July seminar trained members of the banking Superintendency, as well as compliance officers from various private banks, on money laundering and compliance issues and in September a seminar focused on training tax auditors and investigators.

FinCEN conducted two personnel exchanges with the Korean and Belgian FIUs. Additionally, FinCEN provided financial intelligence unit and money laundering briefings to visitors from a number of jurisdictions including Argentina, Armenia, Australia, the Bahamas, Brazil, Canada, China, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Isle of Man, Jamaica, Jersey, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Italy, Liechtenstein, Nauru, Netherlands, Palau, Russia, Seychelles, Switzerland, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Taiwan, Thailand, Tonga, and the United Kingdom.

In May 2000, FinCEN was invited by the UN Global Programme against Money Laundering to give several presentations at a weeklong joint UN/GCC seminar on money laundering that was held in Abu Dhabi. In August 2000, FinCEN organized and took part in a three-day seminar in Montevideo for 60 Uruguayan bankers, prosecutors, and law enforcement officials. FinCEN also participated in several U.S. Secret Service organized financial crimes training seminars in Russia and China during the year.

FinCEN participated in an interagency team visit to the South Pacific to assess the feasibility of creating a regional Financial Intelligence Unit there. The assessment team also included representatives from the Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering, South Pacific Forum Secretariat, Australia and New Zealand. The team visited Fiji, the Cook Islands, Vanuatu and Samoa.

FinCEN hosted three visits in 2000 by members of the task force setting up Korea's FIU. The first visit in May focused on orientation; the second visit in July covered information technology experts who will develop systems to store and exploit SAR and CTR data envisioned in Korea's anti-money laundering legislation. The third visit, which occurred in October 2000, was a financial analysis course for Korean FIU analysts and investigators.

During the week of October 30, a FinCEN analyst traveled with a State Department INL representative to Paraguay to assess the status of the country's anti-money laundering program. The team conducted meetings with Paraguay's FIU, the antidrug secretariat, the Attorney General, the central bank President, and the Superintendent of Banks. FinCEN also conducted two briefings for private banking officials.

In October, FinCEN participated in an interagency money laundering training assessment trip to China. The delegation met with senior officials of the Ministry of Public Security, People's Bank of China, Supreme People's Procuraturate, National Audit Office, Ministry of Finance and the State Administration of Taxation, along with Beijing-based executives of some U.S. banks.

As follow-on to the China visit, the U.S. Consul General in Hong Kong requested that the China assessment delegation visit Macau to discuss the jurisdiction's anti-money laundering regime. Macau agencies visited included the Macau Association of Banks, Judiciary Police, Monetary Authority of Macau, Macau Special Administrative Region's Legislative Affairs Office, and unofficial meetings with a casino representative and a Macanese police officer.

In December, FinCEN hosted delegations from Nigeria, Tanzania, and South Africa for discussions on anti-money laundering legislation. The participants were briefed on U.S. laws, regulations and programs of implementation. Individual meetings were held with each delegation to consult on its country's efforts in this area. The intent of the program was to provide each country with a clearer understanding of the requirements of current anti-money laundering recommendations and to develop an understanding of the political climate and legislative processes in each country.

Internal Revenue Service

The Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Criminal Investigations Division, International Training Program is one segment of the IRS international strategy. IRS focuses its training on investigative techniques courses involving financial crime and money laundering. The goal of this training is to provide assistance to foreign governments in establishing or enhancing money laundering, criminal, tax and asset forfeiture laws. In addition, the training program provides assistance in the investigation of violations of these laws and promotes enhanced anti-money laundering regimes that conform to international standards.

IRS develops and conducts training courses independently, as well as with other agencies. In some instances these courses are developed jointly with other law enforcement agencies to address a specific need. IRS participates on an ad hoc basis with other agencies as part of their curricula and invites other agencies to participate in IRS training.

Training led by IRS during 2000 included:

  • Financial Investigative Techniques training in Lagos, Nigeria, Ufa, Russia and Budapest, Hungary.
  • Money laundering training in Kazan, Russia, Beijing, China and Mexico City, Mexico.
  • Advanced money laundering training in Mexico City, Mexico.
  • Complex Financial Investigations training in Bangkok, Thailand (taught jointly with the U.S. Customs Service).

IRS participates in the core course program at ILEA Budapest and ILEA Bangkok. IRS also participated in training sponsored by other USG agencies in Romania, Costa Rica, and Russia. In addition, the IRS took part in a training needs assessment in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

Department of Justice

The Overseas Prosecutor Development and Training Section (OPDAT) of the Criminal Division is the primary source for the training of foreign prosecutors, judges and law enforcement for the Department of Justice. During 2000, OPDAT sponsored 13 seminars throughout the world that dealt in whole or in part with money laundering and asset forfeiture issues. Approximately 800 students received training in transnational money laundering, international asset forfeiture and asset sharing. Additionally, the Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section conducted an Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering conference in Buenos Aires, Argentina which included approximately 200 prosecutors and law enforcement officials from Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Bolivia.

Secret Service

The Secret Service continues to be extensively involved in training foreign government officials and law enforcement in the areas of financial fraud schemes and counterfeit U.S. currency investigations. In 2000, the Secret Service taught foreign officials to identify and investigate violations that impact on their jurisdictions as well as those of the Secret Service. Specific financial fraud schemes involving credit cards, smart cards, electronic fund transfers, fictitious financial instruments, "4-1-9" advance fee fraud, cellular telephone fraud, skimming, telemarketing fraud, identity theft and other types of schemes were highlighted. These crimes represent the underlying Specific Unlawful Activities (SUA's) that provide the nexus for the Secret Service to conduct money laundering investigations.

The goal of the Secret Service foreign training program is to train and assist the foreign participants with their financial systems, and to establish a permanent conduit for information exchange and liaison. The previously mentioned SUA's were highlighted in an effort to concentrate all available resources on the root of the criminal activity.

Training programs have varied depending on the foreign participants. The training initiative throughout 2000 proved invaluable in fostering a heightened awareness for foreign government officials and law enforcement in the identification of systemic weaknesses within financial systems. In training foreign law enforcement officials, the Secret Service conducted comprehensive programs that included an emphasis on crimes involving electronic commerce.

Smart cards, generally issued by non-banking financial service providers such as large brokerage houses, operate completely outside of any U.S. government regulations. This lack of regulatory oversight creates vulnerability as no record is created or maintained on the transfer of data. In theory, financial information and monetary funds can be accessed, manipulated, and transferred to or from an account, or from card to card, with no "footprint" being made. Systems that support this industry can move billions of dollars a day through computer networks that often are not regulated or controlled by any government entity.

Skimming is the unauthorized capture and replication of data from a person's credit card through the use of a small, hand-held device, which can later be used to download the information for illicit purposes. The ease and speed with which information can be gathered and used for illegal purposes in a skimming operation represents a threat to financial institutions around the world. The Secret Service has trained foreign law enforcement officials about the type of equipment, manner of operation, and distribution methods for the information taken from unsuspecting credit card holders. Industry sources have estimated that skimming outside of the United States alone affects approximately one hundred seventy five different businesses per week. This large number of compromised points of sale has the potential to cause many millions of dollars in fraud losses.

During 2000, the Secret Service, using INL-provided funds, conducted training for foreign law enforcement and financial institutions in China, Nigeria, Bulgaria, and Lithuania. Additional presentations were made at the ILEAs in Budapest, Hungary and Bangkok, Thailand. The Secret Service provided independent classes in Greece, Romania, Mexico, Italy, Bulgaria, Columbia, and at the Interpol conference in Lyon, France.

One of the more notable examples of interagency cooperation occurred when the Senior Special Agent assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Lagos, Nigeria, working with the embassy’s country team, collaborated on an investigation into a "4-1-9" type financial crime. A bank in North Carolina had been victimized when approximately $425,000 was wired to Lagos. Thanks to the swift and aggressive action by the Secret Service and Department of State, the entire amount of the fraud scheme was recovered and returned to North Carolina.

United States Customs Service

The U.S. Customs Service (USCS), Office of Investigations, Financial Investigations Division continues to be extensively involved in the INL-sponsored multi-agency international money laundering training programs. Drawing on its expertise in undercover drug money laundering as well as traditional money laundering investigations, the USCS strives to impart its considerable experience to law enforcement, regulatory, and banking officials identified by INL.

As host or co-host with numerous other federal agencies, the USCS conducted anti-money laundering and financial crime seminars domestically and abroad for officials from sixteen nations. Approximately 725 representatives from foreign nations received USCS anti-money laundering training in FY2000.

United States Department of Treasury Office of Technical Assistance (IET)

Treasury’s Office of Technical Assistance is located within the Office of the Assistant Secretary for International Affairs. The office delivers interactive, advisor-based assistance to senior level representatives in various ministries and central banks in the areas of tax reform, government debt issuance and management, budget policy and management, financial institution reform, and more recently, law enforcement reforms related to money laundering and other financial crimes.

In 1997, the Enforcement Program was added to Treasury’s advisory office. It is a long-term, advisor-based program developed out of concern that financial crime, corruption, organized criminal enterprises, and other criminal activities were undermining economic reforms promoted by the Department of the Treasury. The Enforcement Program essentially focuses on the development of legal foundations, policies, and organizations in three areas: (1) money laundering and other financial crimes, (2) organized crime and corruption, and (3) the reorganization of law enforcement and financial entities in developing economies to help them prevent, detect, investigate and prosecute sophisticated international financial crime. The Enforcement Program relies on intermittent advisory trips to deliver its technical assistance. It works with embassy staff and host country clients on long-term projects designed to promote systemic changes and new organizational structures. The program receives most of its funding and outside guidance from the State Department’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL). Originally operating in only two countries using Treasury funds, the last two years have seen a rapid expansion of the program with the support of INL funding. The program has now given technical assistance to over a dozen countries throughout the world. The demands on the program are likely to increase even further as international anti-money laundering efforts increase.

The Enforcement Program is comprised of a group of approximately 30 highly experienced advisors with backgrounds in various areas of financial and economic crimes such as money laundering, white collar crime, organized crime, securities fraud, internal affairs and corruption, criminal law, and organization administration. Most advisors have previously held responsible positions with U.S. law enforcement and regulatory organizations or prosecutors with the Department of Justice. In addition, the office cooperates closely in its programs with all components of Treasury and Justice law enforcement, especially FinCEN, IRS, USSS and USCS.

During 2000 extensive projects were conducted in a number of countries. For example in Armenia the "Armenia" Enforcement Team provided technical assistance in the areas of financial crimes, organized crime, gaming crimes, and insurance fraud. To assist in establishing an effective liaison with U.S. law enforcement, the Enforcement Team arranged for the Armenian Prosecutor General and other assistants to meet with appropriate U.S. officials in Washington, DC and in Los Angeles. Finally, the team facilitated the assessment of a program to develop a centralized computer system for the Office of the Prosecutor General and Directorate Six.

The Enforcement Team also played a significant part in drafting and implementing the anti-money laundering law in El Salvador. It has helped to design, staff and build the El Salvador Financial Investigation Unit (FIU), under the direction of the Attorney General. The team sponsored a visit by members of the FIU and the Attorney General to the FIUs in Mexico and Costa Rica so they could learn from their regional counterparts. The team then helped train the members of the FIU, along with some judges and prosecutors, in aspects of money laundering and financial crimes investigation. Additionally, training courses on Financial Crimes were provided to the Superintendent of Banking and the Finance Ministry.

In Georgia, the "Georgia" Enforcement Team in cooperation with USAID, the U.S. Department of Justice, and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, completed a report on the enforcement authorities of the National Securities Exchange. Working cooperatively with the U.S. Department of Justice, it has assessed the adequacy of Georgia’s Law on Conflict of Interest and Corruption, and the practical application of its reporting regime.

The Enforcement Team developed and delivered two separate training programs designed to enhance the forensic accounting abilities of the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) personnel and to provide knowledge and abilities relating to financial investigations and asset recovery. The first program addressed the needs of attendees as they related to anti-corruption and general forensic accounting and financial crime investigative principles and techniques. The second addressed these principles and techniques along with asset recovery techniques as they related to specific cases being investigated by IBRA, as well as providing specific case direction and investigative and prosecutorial strategies. Assistance was centered on methods of identifying assets constituting bank fraud proceeds, tracing such proceeds to the U.S., and repatriating those assets once identifications were complete. The Indonesians also met with the FBI, DOJ prosecutors, Customs, Interpol and other U.S. government representatives regarding cooperation and coordination of future assistance that may be useful in detecting, investigating and prosecuting violations of U.S. law as well as repatriating the proceeds from Indonesian bank fraud.

In Moldova, the Enforcement Team provided technical assistance to the drafters of the economic and financial crime section of the criminal procedure code currently under consideration in Parliament. The team also provided technical assistance to the drafters of the proposed anti-money laundering law. The team assisted the Finance Ministry in organizing a tax evasion enforcement unit and a bank fraud working group. The team also provided specialized forensic training and assistance in combating credit card fraud, document fraud, and developing the capabilities of the government’s forensic laboratories.

Advisors from the Enforcement Team also made visits to Peru and Malaysia to assist in drafting and discussing proposed anti-money laundering legislation.

International Law Enforcement Academies (ILEAs)

The ILEA training academies around the globe conduct a variety of law enforcement courses to mid-level managers. Core law enforcement training courses include modules on financial crime and money laundering. In addition, financial crime and money laundering seminars for senior law enforcement officials have been conducted in 2000.

Europe

The ILEA in Budapest, Hungary offers a core law enforcement training course targeted at mid-level managers in the police and criminal justice services of Central Europe and the New Independent States. Over 1,300 officials from 25 countries have successfully completed this course. In addition to this program, ILEA Budapest also offers regional seminars and specialized training courses. More than 3,500 criminal justice officials have participated in such courses.

Asia

The ILEA for Southeast Asia opened in March 1999, in Bangkok, Thailand. The curriculum and structure of this Academy is similar to that in Budapest, except for the duration of the core course and an added emphasis in narcotics matters. ILEA Bangkok also offers specialized courses in a wide range of topics. Over 1,000 officials from 10 Southeast Asian nations have attended these courses.

The Americas

For the Western Hemisphere, we offered a core course similar to Bangkok's—tailored to regional needs—for officials from Central America and the Dominican Republic. Two pilot courses were conducted in Panama in 1997 at a temporary site. Sixty-four participants attended these courses. All activities of this Academy have been temporarily suspended, pending a review to determine its permanent location.

Africa

The interagency group responsible for the ILEAs is taking steps aimed at the establishment and operation of an ILEA for Southern Africa, to be located in Gaborone, Botswana. The overall format for this new Academy will be similar to the other three, adjusted to suit the needs of the region.

Treaties, Agreements, and Other Mechanisms for Information Exchange

Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) allow generally for the exchange of evidence and information in criminal and ancillary matters. In money laundering cases, they can be extremely useful as a means of obtaining banking and other financial records from our treaty partners. MLATs, which are negotiated by the Department of State in cooperation with the Department of Justice to facilitate cooperation in criminal matters, including money laundering and asset forfeiture, are in force with the following countries: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Dominica, Estonia, Grenada, Hong Kong SAR, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, Panama, the Philippines, Poland, South Korea, Spain, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United Kingdom with respect to its Caribbean overseas territories (Anguilla, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Montserrat, and the Turks and Caicos Islands), and Uruguay. MLATs have been signed by the United States but not yet brought into force with the following countries: Belize, Brazil, Colombia, Cyprus, Egypt, France, Greece, Nigeria, Romania, Russia, South Africa, Ukraine, and Venezuela. The United States has also signed the Organization of American States MLAT and the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. The United States is actively engaged in negotiating additional MLATs with countries around the world. The United States has also concluded executive agreements for cooperation in various criminal matters with Russia, Haiti, the Philippines, and Venezuela. Comparable executive agreements with Nigeria, Singapore and China are signed but were not yet in force as of the end of 2000.

In addition, the United States has entered into executive agreements on forfeiture cooperation, including: (1) an agreement with the United Kingdom providing for forfeiture assistance and asset sharing in narcotics cases; and (2) a forfeiture cooperation and asset sharing agreement with the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The United States has asset sharing agreements with Canada, the Cayman Islands (which was extended to Anguilla, British Virgin Islands, Montserrat, and the Turks and Caicos Islands), Colombia, Ecuador, and Mexico.

To facilitate the ongoing exchange of information to combat money laundering, the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) has fostered information exchange with other financial intelligence units (FIUs) around the globe, as well as, on a case by case basis, law enforcement and regulatory agencies of foreign governments. In a few cases (Argentina, Australia, Belgium, France, Mexico, Slovenia, Spain and the United Kingdom), information exchange arrangements involving FinCEN and other FIUs have been reduced to writing in the form of memoranda of understanding (MOUs) or an exchange of letters. Prior to the establishment of these types of information exchange arrangements, the United States in limited circumstances entered into cooperation agreements referred to as Financial Information Exchange Agreements (FIEAs) for the exchange of "currency transaction information" with the governments of certain Latin American countries (Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela). FinCEN's methods of exchanging information with other FIUs as described above are intended to supplant the old FIEA model.

The United States has Customs Mutual Assistance Agreements (CMAAs) with the European Community and with the following countries: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Honduras, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Mexico, Mongolia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine, United Kingdom and Yugoslavia. (The U.S. view is that the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) has dissolved and that the CMAA continues to apply to the successors that formerly made up the SFRY—Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Slovenia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia). The United States has CMAAs, negotiated but not yet in force, with the following countries: PRC, Lithuania, Panama, the Philippines, South Africa, Turkey, and Venezuela. All of the agreements are patterned after a Customs Organization Model CMAA. Since assistance can be provided in the enforcement of any laws related to customs, the U.S. Customs Service uses these agreements to assist in the gathering of information and evidence for criminal and civil cases involving trade fraud, smuggling, violations of export control laws, and most recently, in the growing effort to combat narcotics trafficking and money laundering.

Asset Sharing

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 981(i), 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(1)(E), and 31 U.S.C. § 9703(h)(2), the United States is authorized to share assets with countries that facilitate the forfeiture of criminal proceeds. Under this authority, the Departments of Justice, State and Treasury have aggressively sought to encourage foreign governments to cooperate in joint investigations of drug trafficking and money laundering, offering the possibility of sharing in forfeited assets. A parallel goal has been to encourage spending of these assets to improve narcotics law enforcement. The long-term goal has been to encourage governments to improve asset forfeiture laws and procedures, so that they will be able to conduct investigations and prosecutions of drug trafficking and money laundering which includes asset forfeiture. The United States and its partners in the G-8 are currently pursuing a program to strengthen asset forfeiture and sharing regimes. To date, Canada, Cayman Islands, Hong Kong, Jersey, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom have shared forfeited assets with the United States.

From its inception in 1989 through December 2000, the international asset-sharing program administered by the Department of Justice has resulted in the forfeiture in the United States $389,229,322.96 of which $169,397,852.33 was shared with foreign governments that cooperated and assisted in the investigations. In 2000, the Department of Justice transferred forfeited proceeds to Barbados ($100,000.00); Canada ($37,809.97); Ecuador ($14,850.00); Hong Kong ($907,403.00); Switzerland ($226,447.88); Thailand ($19,144.00) and United Kingdom ($612,500.00). Prior recipients of shared assets (1989-1999) include: Argentina, the Bahamas, British Virgin Islands, Canada, the Cayman Islands, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Egypt, Guatemala, Guernsey, Hungary, Isle of Man, Israel, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Netherlands Antilles, Paraguay, Romania, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and Venezuela.

From its inception in 1995 through December 2000, the international asset sharing program administered by the Department of Treasury has resulted in the forfeiture in the United States of approximately $13,404,441.00 of which $6,412,864.00 was shared with foreign governments which cooperated and assisted in the investigations. In 2000, the Department of Treasury transferred forfeited proceeds to Cayman Islands ($2,680,803.00); Canada ($241,446.00); Dominican Republic ($63,885.00); Netherlands ($1,717,213.00); Portugal ($85,840.00); Switzerland ($903,934.00) and United Kingdom ($719,743.00). Prior recipients of shared assets (1995-1999) include Aruba, the Bahamas, Canada, the Cayman Islands, Egypt, Guernsey, Jersey, Mexico, Qatar, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

Multilateral Activities

Financial Action Task Force

The Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF), which was established at the G-7 Economic Summit in Paris in 1989, is an inter-governmental body whose purpose is the development and promotion of policies to combat money laundering. In 1990, the FATF issued Forty Recommendations to fight this phenomenon. The Recommendations were revised in 1996 to reflect changes in money laundering trends. These recommendations are designed to prevent proceeds of crime from being utilized in future criminal activities and from affecting legitimate economic activities.

In June 2000, membership of the FATF expanded from 26 to 29 governments(1) and two regional organizations(2), representing the major financial centers of North America, Europe and Asia. Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, who had participated in the work of the FATF as observers since September 1999, were accepted as full members. The delegations of the Task Force's members are drawn from a wide range of disciplines, including experts from the Ministries of Finance, Justice, Interior and External Affairs, financial regulatory authorities and law enforcement agencies.

(1) Argentina; Australia; Austria; Belgium; Brazil; Canada; Denmark; Finland; France; Germany; Greece; Hong Kong, China; Iceland; Ireland; Italy; Japan; Luxembourg; Mexico; the Kingdom of the Netherlands; New Zealand; Norway; Portugal; Singapore; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; Turkey; the United Kingdom and the United States.

(2) European Commission and Gulf Co-operation Council.

FATF focused on several major initiatives during 2000. As mentioned, FATF took concrete steps to enlarge its membership with the completions of the mutual evaluations of Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. The principal objective of these evaluations was to determine whether these countries complied with certain fundamental anti-money laundering requirements, the implementation of which is a pre-condition to becoming a full member of the FATF.

Throughout 2000, the FATF continued its efforts to persuade Austria to eliminate its system of anonymous savings passbooks. On February 3, 2000, the FATF decided to suspend Austria as one of its members in June 2000 unless action was taken to eliminate anonymous passbooks. Following this unprecedented move, the Government of Austria took the appropriate steps to meet the conditions required by the FATF and thus avert suspension of its membership, through new legislation and issuance of a banking circular.

The year 2000 also marked the completion of FATF’s first phase of the important work on Non-Cooperative Countries or Territories (NCCTs). This work resulted in the June publication of a report entitled Review to Identify Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories: Increasing the Worldwide Effectiveness of Anti-Money Laundering Measures(1). This report describes the process and provides summaries of jurisdictions considered to be of concern. The aim of the work is to enhance the level of protection for the world’s financial system and to prevent the circumvention of the anti-laundering measures introduced over the last ten years. To ensure transparency and sound operation in the international financial system, it is desirable that all financial centers across the world have comprehensive controls, regulations and supervisory arrangements in place and that all financial agents assume anti-money laundering obligations.

(1)This report can be found on the FATF home page at http://www.oecd.org/fatf.

To tackle this question, fatf established an Ad Hoc Group on NCCTs to discuss in more depth the action to be taken with regard to these countries and territories. Throughout 2000, the Ad Hoc Group on NCCTs met in the margins of all FATF Plenary meetings, and autonomously on May 24-25, 2000 in Paris. After the FATF adopted criteria for defining non-cooperative countries and territories, 29 jurisdictions were selected for review in February 2000. The assessments took place between February and June. Fifteen of those counties (Bahamas, Cayman Islands, Cook Islands, Dominica, Israel, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Panama, Philippines, Russia, St. Kitts and Nevis and St. Vincent and the Grenadines) were identified in the report as having serious deficiencies in their anti-money laundering systems and thus named "non-cooperative." Immediately following the issuance of the June NCCT report, the G-7 members issued advisories to their financial institutions recommending increased scrutiny of transactions involving these jurisdictions. A number of other FATF members followed with similar advisories.

The FATF then determined that additional jurisdictions should be examined in the second round of NCCT reviews and took stock of the progress made by the 15 jurisdictions identified in June. On October 5, 2000, the FATF issued a press release that welcomed the significant, rapid progress made by many of the jurisdictions that it had identified in June as "non-cooperative" in the fight against money laundering. As of October, seven of the NCCTs (Bahamas, Cayman Islands, Cook Islands, Israel, Liechtenstein, Panama and St. Vincent and the Grenadines) had enacted legislation to address deficiencies identified by the FATF and several others had taken steps or made political commitments to do the same. The FATF decided to monitor progress towards meeting international standards and addressing the deficiencies previously identified. For example, in the context of the dialogue initiated by the FATF's NCCT exercise, the Governor of the Central Bank of Seychelles informed the FATF President that the Economic Development Act 1995 has been repealed on July 25, 2000. The FATF therefore lifted Recommendation 21 against the Seychelles.

In February 2001, FATF issued a press release acknowledging that seven jurisdictions—the Bahamas, the Cayman Islands, the Cook Islands, Israel, Liechtenstein, the Marshall Islands and Panama—have enacted most, if not all, legislation needed to remedy the deficiencies identified in June 2000. On the basis of that progress, those seven jurisdictions have been invited to submit to FATF implementation plans to enable FATF to evaluate the actual implementation of the legislative changes. The FATF will be assessing the progress made by these jurisdictions during 2001 to determine whether any jurisdictions should be removed from the list of NCCTs. These assessments will be done initially by the FATF review groups, including through face-to-face meetings, and will be discussed as a priority item at each Plenary of FATF. In making these assessments, the FATF will look for the existence of comprehensive and effective anti-money laundering systems. Decisions to add or delete countries from the list published in June 2000 will be taken in the FATF Plenary in June 2001.

In deciding whether a jurisdiction should be removed from the list, the FATF Plenary must be satisfied that the jurisdiction has addressed the deficiencies previously identified. The FATF will rely on its collective judgment, and will attach particular importance to reforms in the area of criminal law, financial supervision, customer identification, suspicious activity reporting, and international co-operation. As necessary, legislation and regulations will need to be enacted and have come into effect before removal from the list can be considered. In addition, the FATF will seek to ensure that the jurisdiction is implementing the necessary reforms. Thus, information related to institutional arrangements, as well as the filing and utilization of suspicious activity reports, examinations of financial institutions, and the conduct of money laundering investigations, will be considered.

In 2000, the FATF agreed to initiate a review of the Forty Recommendations, including the issues of particular concern for anti-money laundering purposes identified in the June 2000 Report on NCCTs. The FATF discussed how best to approach this exercise and agreed that work should begin to conduct an initial examination on the specific issues of concern with the goal of establishing one or more working groups in 2001. The three major issues of concern are the identification of clients (e.g. through eligible introducers or through electronic banking transactions); non-financial professions (e.g. lawyers, accountants: a.k.a.: gatekeepers), and non-corporate entities (e.g. international business companies and trusts). This work will involve the participation of all FATF member countries as well as FATF-style regional bodies. It is also envisaged that FATF will involve the private sector at some stage of this review.

Under the chairmanship of the United States, the annual study of money laundering typologies was published in February 2000(1). The report was based on a meeting of experts, which was conducted in Washington, DC on November 18-19, 1999. This report covered the vulnerabilities of Internet banking; the increasing reach of alternative remittance systems; the role of company formation agents and their services; international trade-related activities as a cover for money laundering; and specific money laundering trends in various regions of the world. The 1999-2000 report represented the first time countries outside of the FATF participated in the typologies exercise making it an unprecedented and truly global review of anti-money laundering activity. On December 6-7, 2000 FATF conducted its subsequent experts meeting in Oslo, Norway. The specialized topics included on-line banking, trusts and other non-corporate entities, non-financial professionals, and the role of cash and alternate payment systems. The results of this meeting were published in February 2001.

The Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) is in the unique position of being a member of FATF, but with non-FATF member countries as its constituents(2). During 2000, noticeable progress was made to improve the implementation of effective anti-money laundering systems within the GCC States. On January 17-18 2000, in Riyadh, the GCC held a technical seminar for its member States with the participation of the FATF Secretariat on the subject of self-assessment and mutual evaluation procedures. In addition, five members of the GCC (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates) have agreed to undergo a mutual evaluation. The first on-site visit of these evaluations took place in Bahrain on June 5-7, 2000, and will be followed by other examinations.

(1) This report can be found on the FATF home page at http://www.oecd.org/fatf.

(2) Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

The current mandate of the FATF, as agreed at a meeting of FATF's Ministers on April 28, 1998, calls for close co-operation with the relevant international organizations and in particular the international financial institutions (IFIs). Throughout 2000, the FATF discussed how to better incorporate measures against financial abuse into the IFIs activities. Mainly, the issues focused on information sharing between the FATF and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the availability of FATF experts to participate in IMF reviews and assessments, and the extent to which the FATF 40 Recommendations might appropriately be included in structural assessments performed by the IMF

The FATF continued to analyze the question of co-operation between anti-money laundering authorities and tax administrations. The objectives of this co-operation were to ensure that suspicious transaction reporting obligations were not undermined by the so-called "fiscal excuse" and to permit, to the fullest extent possible, the exchange of information between anti-money laundering and tax authorities without jeopardizing the effectiveness of anti-money laundering systems. On February 3, 2000, the FATF and OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs held a second informal contact meeting to consider the issue of cooperation between tax authorities and anti-money laundering authorities. While it was agreed that tax and anti-money laundering authorities have distinct priorities, work on cooperation issues will continue in the future.

One of the FATF's goals is to encourage co-operation with the private sector in the development of policies and programs to combat money laundering. To further this aim, a third Forum was convened on February 4, 2000 with representatives from the financial services industry and accounting professions(1). The purpose of this event was to discuss with the private sector, areas of common interest and the best way to develop measures to prevent and detect money laundering through the financial community. Four general topics were addressed in the Forum: current money laundering trends, feedback to institutions reporting suspicious transactions, the role of the accounting profession in identifying and discouraging money laundering and the issues raised by the wire transfers of funds.

(1)  Representatives attended the Forum from FATF members, national banking, financial and accounting associations, and companies such as SWIFT and Western Union. Delegates from international financial services industry and accounting organizations (European Banking Federation, International Banking Security Association, European Insurance Committee, European Savings Banks Grouping, International Federation of Accountants, European Federation of Accountants and the Federation of European Stock Exchanges) also attended.

During the year, the Ad Hoc Group on Estimating the Magnitude of Money Laundering held several meetings, including a two-day Technical Workshop on estimating drug trafficking proceeds. As a result of this work, an expert consultant prepared a report to the Ad Hoc Group. The report examined a range of national and international efforts to quantify the value of illicit drug sales on either a global or national basis. The purpose of the study was to identify and assess alternative approaches for estimating total revenues generated annually by sales of cocaine, heroin and cannabis globally and in each of the 29 FATF members and observer members. Due to data and analytical constraints, the FATF decided to end this work at this stage. However, several international organizations and interested FATF members are continuing to work to improve the available data, and will also continue to work to address the problem.

Africa FATF-Style Bodies

Two FATF-style regional bodies are in various stages of development on the African continent:

Eastern and Southern African Anti-Money Laundering Group

Tanzanian authorities are working with other governments in the region to further develop the Eastern and Southern African Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG). The group was launched at a meeting of Ministers and high-level representatives in Arusha, Tanzania, in August 1999 and held its first meeting in April 2000. Following the signature of its Memorandum of Understanding by seven jurisdictions, the ESAAMLG came into formal existence. The group will maintain its Secretariat in Dar es Salaam. The ESAAMLG recently appointed its first secretary and early plans call for the group to study the impact of money laundering in the region and to produce a typologies report on arms trafficking and the cash economy.

Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, Tanzania, Uganda have now signed the ESAAMLG Memorandum Of Understanding (MOU) and are considered members. Botswana and Zambia have both completed the necessary preparations to sign in the very near future. Lesotho, Swaziland and Zimbabwe are also nearing completion of preparatory work and are expected to sign the MOU at a later date. It is hoped that South Africa will also sign in the future. Work on an ESAAMLG web program is progressing with the designation of national contact points and the start of an effort to collect copies of relevant money laundering legislation. The group has established three standing subgroups (legal, financial and law enforcement) to begin dealing in more detail with anti-money laundering issues in each of these areas. Funding for the ESAAMLG is another major issue that still must be resolved for the group to be able to move forward.

Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering (GIABA)

The first meetings of GIABA(1), established by the December 1999 Decision of the Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), were held in Dakar, Senegal, in November 2000. GIABA members include: Benin, Cape Verde Islands, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Togo.

The meeting adopted the statutes and explored ways of financing the GIABA. The statutes endorse the Forty Recommendations, recognize the FATF as an observer and provide for self-assessment and mutual evaluation procedures to be carried out by GIABA. While the text prepared by the experts provided for a strong involvement of ECOWAS in the activities of GIABA, the Ministers agreed to give more autonomy to the new body. As an interim measure, Senegal offered to provide a provisional structure until the formal establishment of GIABA.

Essential issues such as the location of the headquarters and the selection of the Executive Secretary of GIABA were not discussed. However, one possibility considered in the margins of the meetings was to establish the Secretariat in Senegal (Dakar) and to appoint a representative from an English speaking country of the region (Nigeria was mentioned) as head of the Secretariat.

Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering

The Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG) Secretariat is the focal point for APG activities. Currently the APG is comprised of nineteen members(2) from South Asia, Southeast and East Asia and the South Pacific. There are also seven observer jurisdictions(3) and thirteen observer international and regional organizations(4). The purpose of the APG is to ensure the adoption, implementation and enforcement of internationally accepted anti-money laundering standards as set out in the 40 Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).

(1) Groupe Intergouvernemental d’Action contre le Blanchiment en Afrique

(2) Australia, Bangladesh, Chinese Taipei, Fiji Islands, Hong Kong, China, Japan, India, Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Republic of Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Republic of the Philippines, Samoa, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, United States of America, Vanuatu.

(3) Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Cook Islands, Macau, China, Nepal, Burma, Vietnam.

(4) ASEAN Secretariat, Asian Development Bank, Commonwealth Secretariat, Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units of the World, Financial Action Task Force Secretariat, International Development Law Institute, International Monetary Fund, Interpol, Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors, South Pacific Forum Secretariat, United Nations Office of Drug Control and Crime Prevention, The World Bank, World Customs Organization.

During 2000, the APG held one plenary meeting in Sydney on May 31—June 2, 2000 hosted by Australia. The meeting resulted in an expansion of the APG Terms of Reference, which included distinctive membership criteria, a commitment to implementing the FATF 40 Recommendations, a budget for the APG Secretariat and a requirement that each APG member commit itself to a mutual evaluation. The APG also agreed on a strategic plan that includes, among other initiatives, self-assessment exercises, a training and technical assistance strategy and typologies workshops. This meeting also noted the enactment of anti-money laundering legislation in several jurisdictions. The next plenary meeting of the APG will be held May 22-24, 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

In March 2000, the APG conducted its third typologies workshop in Bangkok, Thailand which received a report on underground banking and alternative remittance systems, examined the use of false identities for money laundering purposes and identified some other current money laundering methods being used in the region. The APG will continue and expand its typologies work in close consultation with the FATF and other regional bodies. The next APG Typologies Meeting will take place in Singapore in October 2001. There will also be a meeting of and report from the APG Working Group on Underground Banking and Alternative Remittance Systems.

An extremely positive development was the APG’s commencement of a mutual evaluation program. At the Sydney meeting, the APG approved its first mutual evaluation report (of Vanuatu), which was jointly conducted with the Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors (OGBS). The APG has scheduled four mutual evaluations (Labuan Offshore Financial Center, Samoa, Taiwan and Macau) to be conducted during 2001. A mutual evaluation training project, funded by the U.S. Government, will also be conducted in early 2001 to increase the skills needed in the region to conduct mutual evaluations.

Because of the particular vulnerability of offshore financial centers to misuse by money launderers, the APG Secretariat has devoted extensive time and effort in the Pacific region in the last 12 months. With extensive assistance from the United States, New Zealand, Australia and the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, a project to establish a regional Financial Intelligence Unit was launched. On March 13-28, 2000, a multinational assessment team visited the jurisdictions that expressed support for this initiative, mainly Fiji, Cook Islands, Vanuatu and Samoa. The first task in the project will be to assist Pacific jurisdictions to establish domestic FIUs. The second task will be a project assessment of the regional financial intelligence unit. The outcome of this work has been an agreement that South Pacific jurisdictions will establish domestic FIUs. Cook Islands, Vanuatu and Samoa have already done so. Fiji and several other jurisdictions are in the process of doing so.

The APG has adopted a detailed technical assistance and training strategy to provide necessary assistance to its members covering the legal, financial and law enforcement sectors. The APG has entered a number of joint arrangements with other organizations in this regard. However there is a greater demand than current resources can meet. As a consequence, the APG is asking for assistance from the FATF and from other bodies to provide funding and expertise in order to effectively execute the technical assistance and training strategy. Throughout 2000, the APG Secretariat has either directly provided or arranged for the provision of assistance and training to many countries in the region, including Thailand, Malaysia, Samoa, Pakistan, Indonesia, Fiji, the Philippines, Vanuatu and Sri Lanka.

Caribbean Financial Action Task Force

The Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), a FATF-style regional body comprised of 25 jurisdictions(1), continues to advance its anti-money laundering initiatives within the Caribbean basin. In October 2000, Aruba assumed the Chairmanship of the CFATF, succeeding the British Virgin Islands. The Dominican Republic assumed the Deputy Chair.

(1) CFATF members include Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Commonwealth of the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Costa Rica, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Jamaica, Montserrat, the Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua, Panama, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Turks and Caicos Islands, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela.

Members of the CFATF subscribe to a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that delineates the CFATF’s mission, objectives, and membership requirements. All members are required to make a political commitment to adhere to and implement the 40 Recommendations of the FATF, as well as the CFATF’s additional 19 Recommendations, and to undergo peer review in the form of mutual evaluations to assess their level of implementation of the Recommendations. Members are also required to contribute to the CFATF budget and to participate in the activities of the body.

In addition to members, the CFATF MOU also provides for other categories of participation in the organization. In October 2000, Mexico was welcomed as the newest Cooperating and Supporting Nation (COSUN) of the CFATF (joining Canada, France, the Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States), bringing the number of COSUNs to seven. COSUNs are expected to provide support to the CFATF. Haiti was admitted to the CFATF as an observer member and the World Customs Organization was welcomed as an observer organization.

The CFATF completed its first round of mutual evaluation on-site visits during the year 2000. All CFATF members, except Nicaragua, have undergone mutual evaluation visits. Five mutual evaluation reports were adopted by the CFATF Council during 2000—Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, and Venezuela. Mutual evaluation reports on Anguilla, Belize, and Suriname are expected to be discussed, finalized, and adopted during 2001, at which point the first round of evaluations will be complete. In May 2001, the CFATF plans to conduct a mutual evaluation training seminar in preparation for its second round of evaluations, which will be based on the revised 1996 40 Recommendations, and will also incorporate the FATF’s 25 criteria for Non-Cooperative Countries or Territories. These second round evaluations are scheduled to commence in July 2001.

All member contributions have been paid with the exception of arrears owed by Nicaragua. Due to Nicaragua’s lack of participation in the CFATF and non-payment of its arrears, a decision was taken by the CFATF Council to suspend Nicaragua’s membership in the CFATF in March 2001, if Nicaragua does not address these outstanding issues.

In October 2000, the CFATF conducted the first part of a two-part typologies exercise on free trade zones and money laundering. Part two of the exercise will be conducted in March 2001 and a report with recommendations to address the money laundering vulnerabilities of free trade zones will be issued. In December 2000, the CFATF held a conference on the international financial services sector, attended by both public and private sector participants. The conference was designed to educate participants on money laundering vulnerabilities of the international financial services sector, as well as measures that can be taken to reduce money laundering risks in the sector.

Council of Europe

The Council of Europe’s Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures (PC-R-EV)(1) has achieved significant progress since its creation in 1997. Its first round of mutual evaluation on-site visits has been completed, and all but two of the mutual evaluation reports have been finalized and adopted. The final two reports (on Georgia and Albania) will be discussed by the PC-R-EV plenary at its next meeting to be held in June 2001.

(1) PC-R-EV members include Albania, Andorra, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malta, Moldova, Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine.

Two PC-R-EV plenary meetings were conducted during 2000. At the February 2000 meeting, mutual evaluation reports on Liechtenstein, Poland and Romania were adopted and a typologies exercise focusing on organized crime and money laundering was conducted. At the PC-R-EV’s June meeting, mutual evaluation reports on Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia were adopted.

A mutual evaluation training seminar for examiners was conducted in Lisbon, Portugal in November 2000, in preparation for the PC-R-EV’s second round of evaluations, planned to commence June 2001. The seminar focused on the experiences of the first round of evaluations and priorities for the second round.

At the plenary meeting of the PC-R-EV held January 15-19, 2001, mutual evaluation reports on Latvia, the Russian Federation, San Marino, and Ukraine were adopted. The plenary also agreed that the FATF’s 25 criteria to identify non-cooperative countries and territories would be considered in assessing members’ anti-money laundering regimes during the PC-R-EV’s second round of mutual evaluations.

European Union

The European Union (EU) is currently proposing revisions to its anti-money laundering Directive (Council Directive 91/308/EEC of 10 June 1991). The Directive covers issues on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering. The EU is considering imposing anti-money laundering obligations on "gatekeepers." The modifications under consideration would require a broad range of professionals (including independent legal professionals, accountants, auditors, and notaries) to abide by anti-money laundering rules. The rules would apply when professionals assist in the planning or execution of certain transactions or act on behalf of their clients in the conduct of certain financial or commercial activities. If this amendment is endorsed by the European Parliament, the 15 member states of the EU will be required to bring their domestic laws into conformity with the new provisions of the Directive.

The following is a draft text currently being considered: 

Member states shall ensure that the obligations laid down in this Directive are imposed on the following institutions: . . .

1. notaries and other independent legal professionals, when they participate, whether:

    (a) by assisting in the planning or execution of transactions for their client concerning the

          (i) buying and selling of real property or business entities;

          (ii) managing of client money, securities or other assets;

          (iii) opening or management of bank, savings or securities accounts;

          (iv) organization of contributions necessary for the creation, operation or management of companies

    (b) or by acting on behalf of and for their client in any financial or real estate transaction

Financial Action Task Force Against Money Laundering in South America

The Memorandum of Understanding establishing the South American Financial Action Task Force, (Grupo de Acción Financiera de Sudamerica Contra el Lavado de Activos-GAFISUD) was signed on December 8, 2000 by nine member states, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, Paraguay, and Uruguay. In addition, the Organization of American States’ Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS/CICAD) is a special member of GAFISUD.

In addition, the Inter-American Development Bank, Canada, Portugal, Spain and the United States all attended the first meeting of GAFISUD. At this meeting Spain applied for and was granted official observer status with the organization, and the other attendees are considering joining as observers as well.

Colombia was elected to be the first President of the organization for a one-year term. In addition Colombia will serve as the provisional Executive Secretariat until the next meeting of GAFISUD, which is scheduled to be held in May 2001 in Uruguay.

GAFISUD is a FATF-style regional body committed to the adoption and implementation of the FATF’s 40 Recommendations, a program of self assessment and mutual evaluations of its members.

OAS/CICAD

During 2000, the Organization of American States Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS/CICAD) carried out three major initiatives related to combating money laundering:

  • Initiating a peer review process including indicators of progress in implementation of "members" anti-money laundering programs;
  • Provided training to several member states in various aspects of anti-money laundering that will best assist states in implementation of the Buenos Aires Communiqué; and
  • Participating in the development of the South American Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FAFISUD).

Work on the peer review process concerning antidrug policies and activities of member states including related activities such as money laundering control under the Multilateral Evaluation Mechanism (MEM) continued on schedule throughout the year. The first round of evaluations of all 34 OAS/CICAD member countries began in the first half of 2000 and concluded in December 2000. The results will be presented to the Summit of the Americas meeting scheduled to take place in Quebec City, Canada in May 2001. Additionally, the Group of Experts to Control Money Laundering proposed that CICAD use the information derived from the Multilateral Evaluation Mechanism to evaluate the money laundering situation in the Hemisphere. It was also proposed that they develop policies in order to take into account recent developments not anticipated in the Plan of Action of Buenos Aires.

Many anti-money laundering training activities have been carried out during 2000, including, the culmination of the CICAD-Inter American Development Bank (IDB) Pilot Project to train officials of banking regulatory organizations and financial entities. This Project was carried out in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Uruguay between April and December 2000. The follow-up stage of this program has begun in these countries by means of a web page created by CICAD for providing updated information and for consultation purposes. Additionally, training courses for judges, prosecutors and officials of the Financial Intelligence Units were designed during the year, and the IDB has committed funds to support courses for judges and prosecutors.

As a result of an agreement between the National Drug Plan of Spain and CICAD, a course on the control and investigation of money laundering has begun. This one-week course will be given every six months. It is divided into four modules, the first of which was carried out in Antigua and Barbuda and Guatemala from May 29 to June 2. The second module of the course was held in Cartagena, Colombia in November 10-17 and addressed the control and investigation of money laundering.

With respect to the Regional Centre for Legal Cooperation and Development in Central America, two courses on the prevention of money laundering were carried out in August and October in Panama and Honduras, respectively. A round-table session of judges, prosecutors and legislators will be held in Costa Rica in the first quarter of 2000 to endeavor to reach agreements on how to develop laws in areas where legal deficiencies have impeded better money laundering controls.

Finally, in regard to course participation, representatives of CICAD gave presentations at the "First Latin American Conference in Money Laundering" organized by Alert Global Media, which took place in Buenos Aires in October. Representatives also participated at a Regional Seminar held in Lima, Peru in November for the Andean countries organized by the United Nations Office of Drug Control Programs and the French Police Force.

The United Nations

UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime

The UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (Convention), signed by 125 countries including the United States at a high-level signing conference December 12-14 in Palermo, Italy, is the first legally binding multilateral treaty specifically targeting transnational organized crime. Two supplemental Protocols addressing trafficking in persons and migrant smuggling were also signed in Palermo. Each instrument requires 40 states to become parties before it can enter into force.

The Convention takes aim at preventing and combating transnational organized crime through a common toolkit of criminal law techniques and international cooperation. It requires states parties to have laws criminalizing the most prevalent types of criminal conduct associated with organized crime groups, including money laundering, obstruction of justice, corruption of public officials and conspiracy. The article on money laundering requires parties to institute a comprehensive domestic regulatory and supervisory regime for banks and financial institutions to deter and detect money laundering. The regime will have to emphasize requirements for customer identification, record keeping and reporting of suspicious transactions.

United Nations Global Programme against Money Laundering (GPML)

The United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (UNODCCP), through its Global Program Against Money Laundering (GPML), serves a unique function as the only global international organization providing comprehensive anti-money laundering training and technical assistance. Its programs extend to legislators, law enforcement officials, prosecutors and judges, regulators, bankers and providers of other financial services. GPML’s mission is to use this capacity to provide practical, results-oriented assistance, in close cooperation with its other international partners, that will help countries and jurisdictions achieve compliance with the full range of international anti-money laundering standards.

Key to achieving this objective in 2000 was the GPML Forum (formerly the UN Offshore Forum), which was launched at a Plenary meeting in the Cayman Islands on March 30-31. The Forum brought together 35 offshore jurisdictions, hoping to secure their commitment to the international standards and norms that have emerged in the last decade from the United Nations, FATF, the OECD, the Basel Committee, IOSCO and others. Some 33 OFCs, subsequently lodged letters of political commitment with the United Nations to adhere to international standards and norms. These requests for assistance will help determine the direction of GPML’s technical assistance priorities for some time to come and will result in greater demands on the GPML’s and the United Nations’ technical assistance capacities and its fiscal resources.

GPML’s cooperation with the Government of Israel in 1999 and 2000 is now serving as one of the models for its future technical assistance efforts. Israel passed anti-money laundering legislation on August 2, 2000 after working closely with the United Nations for over a year on the drafting, and on the development of other anti-money laundering institutions. GPML’s own lawyers cooperated with their Israeli counterparts on drafting the laws, offering the UN model legislation as a foundation but working towards provisions appropriate to the individual requirements of Israel’s legal system. GPML also brought in experts to advise on structuring a financial intelligence unit that would function well with Israel’s existing institutions, and organized seminars in the Knesset and with the private sector to inform legislators and business people about what the new mechanisms would demand of them.

Many other jurisdictions have also turned to the United Nations, either individually or as part of a sub-regional grouping. They include the Bahamas, Dominica, Liechtenstein, Panama, St. Kitts and Nevis and St. Vincent and Grenadines. In light of this, GPML is planning to expand its highly successful mentoring program, which offers longer term on-site assistance to countries. In 2000, GPML placed mentors in Barbados and Jamaica, using expertise provided by AUSTRAC, the Australian FIU, and in Antigua and Barbuda.

GPML plans to continue its focus on assistance aimed at developing successful financial intelligence units (FIUs) and, in particular, on the development of regional FIUs, where appropriate. Considerable preparatory work on the Eastern Caribbean regional FIU was already underway in 2000, in partnership with the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) and the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB). GPML also supported regional approaches to anti-money laundering by coordinating sub-regional workshops for the Gulf States and the Andean sub-region.

Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism

On December 9, 1999, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. It was opened for signature from January 10, 2000 to December 31, 2001. This Convention requires parties to criminalize the provision or collection of funds with the intent that they be used, or in the knowledge that they are to be used, to conduct certain terrorist activity. Article 18 of the Convention requires states parties to cooperate in the prevention of terrorist financing by adapting their domestic legislation, if necessary, to prevent and counter preparations in their respective territories for the commission of offenses specified in Article 2. To that end, Article 18 encourages implementation of numerous measures also included among the FATF’s 40 Recommendations. These measures, which states parties may implement at their discretion, include: prohibiting accounts held by or benefiting people unidentified or unidentifiable; verifying the identity of the real parties to transactions; and requiring financial institutions to verify the existence and the structure of the customer by obtaining proof of incorporation.

The Convention also encourages states parties to obligate financial institutions to report complex or large transactions and unusual patterns of transactions which have no apparent economic or lawful purpose, without incurring criminal or civil liability for good faith reporting; to require financial institutions to maintain records for five years; to supervise (for example, through licensing) money-transmission agencies; and to monitor the physical cross-border transportation of cash and bearer negotiable instruments. Finally, the Convention addresses information exchange, including through the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol). As of January 29, 2001, 37 states had signed the Convention, including the United States. It will enter into force on the thirtieth day after 22 states have become parties.

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision

The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision(1), part of the Bank for International Settlements, issued in January 2001, a consultative paper on customer due diligence for banks. The paper is part of an ongoing effort by the Basel Committee to strengthen risk management procedures in banks throughout the world. In developing the consultative paper, the Basel Committee determined that many countries around the world have not developed basic supervisory practices with regard to money laundering and other financial crimes and look to the Basel Committee for guidance in these areas. The consultative paper, once adopted by national supervisors, will provide the framework for national supervisory standards with regard to customer due diligence. The consultative paper sets forth guidance for national banking supervisors to establish minimum standards and internal controls to ensure that banks know with whom they are doing business. The essential elements for customer due diligence, as set forth in the paper, include customer acceptance polices, customer identification, monitoring of high-risk accounts and risk management.

(1) The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is a Committee of banking supervisory authorities which was established by the central bank Governors of the Group of Ten countries in 1975. It consists of senior representatives of banking supervisory authorities and central banks from Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States.

Financial Intelligence Units and the Egmont Group

The fight against money laundering has been an essential part of the overall struggle to combat illegal narcotics trafficking and the activities of organized crime. The measures governments have developed to counter money laundering can also help stem corruption, terrorist financing, and other serious crime. Banks and other financial institutions are an important source for information about money laundering and other financial crimes.

In the 1990s, governments around the world began to work together to mitigate the corrosive dangers that unchecked financial crimes posed to their economic and political systems. To address this threat, many governments created specialized agencies to deal with the problem of money laundering. In the beginning, there was no unifying concept of what functions these agencies should perform, and it was almost by accident that they had in common the function of receiving and processing financial disclosures. At about this time, the heads of these organizations began to become visible on national delegations at various international meetings and conferences. Through these informal contacts, they shared common experiences and determined that it might be useful to meet and discuss these commonalties. These first contacts led to a meeting on June 9, 1995 at the Egmont-Arenberg Palace in Brussels, Belgium to discuss financial intelligence units or FIUs. Chaired jointly by FinCEN and the Cellule de Traitement des Informations Financieres (CTIF) of Belgium, the meeting in Brussels enabled participants to become acquainted with the already existing FIUs (14 nations) and to open communication channels. Now known as the Egmont Group, these FIUs meet yearly to find ways to cooperate, especially in the areas of information exchange, training, and the sharing of expertise.

During the Egmont Plenary in November 1996, in Rome, the Egmont Group came to an agreement on the definition of an FIU. Financial Intelligence Units are centralized agencies that, at a minimum, receive, analyze, and disclose to competent authorities information provided by financial institutions (and other mandated entities) concerning possible money laundering and other financial crimes. FIUs offer law enforcement agencies around the world an important new avenue for information collection and exchange.

The Egmont Group as a whole meets once a year, and working groups (Legal, Training/Communications, and Outreach) meet three times a year to discuss issues related to money laundering and to conduct business. These working groups consist of a Chair, Vice-Chair and other working representatives from FIU members who serve on a voluntary basis.

The Legal Working Group has focused its efforts on issues related to information exchange between FIUs.

The Training/Communications Working Group looks at ways to communicate more effectively, identifies training opportunities for FIU personnel and examines new software applications that might facilitate the analytical work of these personnel. Other significant programs developed by this working group are the FIU personnel exchange programs and the topical/regional workshops hosted by various FIUs. Exchanges and workshops between FIUs have occurred all over the globe with good results. Another major initiative of the Training/Communications Working Group was the co-hosting of an FIU training seminar for analysts in January 2001. All FIUs, as well as countries working toward creating FIUs, were invited to participate in this first major Egmont training opportunity in which over 120 analysts participated.

It is also via this working group that changes and enhancements are identified for the Egmont Secure Web. It has long been recognized that feedback to the various financial institutions and other entities required to report suspicious or unusual transactions was lacking. In order to attempt to provide a document to show the utility in reporting suspicious/unusual transactions, the Training/Communications Working Group undertook a major project in 2000 to compile a booklet of successful money laundering cases from around the world. It is expected that the booklet will be available to all FIUs in early 2001.

The Outreach Working Group works to create a global network of FIUs to facilitate international cooperation. The Outreach Working Group has identified countries that the Egmont Group should approach to offer to assist in the development of FIUs. These have been categorized into short, medium and long-term FIU development projects for the Outreach Working Group.

The Egmont Group has no secretariat. Administrative functions are shared by FIUs on a rotating basis. Currently, the Dutch MOT has assumed this function.

There are currently 53 operational FIU units worldwide, with many others in various stages of development. FIUs operate in: Aruba, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bermuda, Bolivia, Brazil, British Virgin Islands, Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Guernsey, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Isle of Man, Italy, Japan, Jersey, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico, Monaco, Netherlands, Netherlands Antilles, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States and Venezuela.

During the plenary meeting in May 2000, five new jurisdictions (bolded above) joined the Egmont roster. One of the main goals of the Egmont Group is to create a global network of FIUs to facilitate international cooperation. Although FIUs operate differently, FIUs exchange information with their counterparts under certain specific conditions. This information could be suspicious or unusual transaction reports from the financial sector as well as government administrative data and public record information. Many FIUs can be of assistance in providing financial intelligence rapidly to other FIUs. One of the most significant accomplishments of the group's efforts has been the creation of a secure Internet web site. Egmont's International Secure Web System (ESW)-developed primarily by FinCEN-permits members of the group to communicate with one another via secure e-mail, posting and assessing information regarding trends, analytical tools, and technological developments. In other words, this system provides the ability to facilitate practical, rapid exchanges of information that could enhance the efforts of the fight against money laundering. FinCEN, on behalf of the Egmont Group, maintains the Egmont Secure Web. Currently, there are 34 FIUs connected to the ESW.

The ongoing development and establishment of FIUs exemplify how countries around the world continue to intensify their efforts to focus on research, analysis and information exchange in order to combat money laundering and other financial crimes.

Money Laundering Comparative Table

Each year, U.S. officials from agencies with anti-money laundering responsibilities meet to assess the money laundering situations in more than 175 jurisdictions. The review includes an assessment of the significance of financial transactions in the country’s financial institutions that involve proceeds of serious crime, steps taken or not taken to address financial crime and money laundering, each jurisdiction's vulnerability to money laundering, the conformance of its laws and policies to international standards, the effectiveness with which the government has acted, and the government's political will to take needed actions.

The 2000 INCSR assigned priorities to jurisdictions using a classification system consisting of three differential categories titled Jurisdictions of Primary Concern, Jurisdictions of Concern, and Other Jurisdictions Monitored.

INCSR priorities draw upon a number of factors which include: (1) whether the country’s financial institutions engage in transactions involving significant amounts of proceeds from serious crime; (2) the extent to which the jurisdiction is or remains vulnerable to money laundering, notwithstanding its money laundering countermeasures, if any; (3) the nature and extent of the money laundering situation in each jurisdiction (for example, whether it involves drugs or other contraband); (4) the ways in which the U.S. regards the situation as having international ramifications; (5) the situation's impact on U.S. interests; (6) whether the jurisdiction has taken appropriate legislative actions to address specific problems; (7) whether there is a lack of licensing and oversight of offshore financial centers and businesses; (8) whether the jurisdiction's laws are being effectively implemented; and (9) where U.S. interests are involved, the degree of cooperation between the foreign government and U.S. government agencies. There are approximately two dozen sub-factors that are also considered. These sub-factors (Category Criteria) are explained below.

A government (e.g., the U.S. or the UK) can have comprehensive laws on its books and conduct aggressive anti-money laundering enforcement efforts but still be classified a "Primary Concern" jurisdiction. In some cases, this classification may simply or largely be a function of the size of the jurisdiction’s economy. In such jurisdictions, the volume of money laundering is likely to be substantial, necessitating quick, continuous and effective anti-money laundering efforts by the government. "Primary Concern" jurisdictions will therefore likely receive priority attention from the United States. While the threat from jurisdictions classified "Concern" is not as acute, they too must undertake efforts to develop or enhance their anti-money laundering regimes. Finally, while jurisdictions in the "Other" category do not pose an immediate concern, it will nevertheless be important to monitor their money laundering situations because, under the right circumstances, virtually any jurisdiction of any size can develop into a significant money laundering center.

Category Criteria

The current ability of money launderers to penetrate virtually any financial system makes every jurisdiction a potential money laundering center. There is no precise measure of vulnerability for any financial system; but a checklist of what drug money managers reportedly look for provides a basic guide. The checklist includes:

  • Failure to criminalize money laundering for all serious crimes or limiting the offense to narrow predicates.
  • Rigid bank secrecy rules that obstruct law enforcement investigations or that prohibit or inhibit large value and/or suspicious or unusual transaction reporting by both banks and non-bank financial institutions.
  • Lack of or inadequate "know your client" requirements to open accounts or conduct financial transactions, including the permitted use of anonymous, nominee, numbered or trustee accounts.
  • No requirement to disclose the beneficial owner of an account or the true beneficiary of a transaction.
  • Lack of effective monitoring of cross-border currency movements.
  • No reporting requirements for large cash transactions.
  • No requirement to maintain financial records over a specific period of time.
  • No mandatory requirement to report suspicious transactions or a pattern of inconsistent reporting under a voluntary system; lack of uniform guidelines for identifying suspicious transactions.
  • Use of bearer monetary instruments.
  • Well-established non-bank financial systems, especially where regulation, supervision, and monitoring are absent or lax.
  • Patterns of evasion of exchange controls by legitimate businesses.
  • Ease of incorporation, especially where ownership can be held through nominees or bearer shares, or where off-the-shelf corporations can be acquired.
  • No central reporting unit for receiving, analyzing and disseminating to the competent authorities information on large value, suspicious or unusual financial transactions that might identify possible money laundering activity.
  • Lack of or weak bank regulatory controls, or failure to adopt or adhere to the Basle Principles for International Banking Supervision, especially in jurisdictions where the monetary or bank supervisory authority is understaffed, underskilled or uncommitted.
  • Well-established offshore financial centers or tax-haven banking systems, especially jurisdictions where such banks and accounts can be readily established with minimal background investigations.
  • Extensive foreign banking operations, especially where there is significant wire transfer activity or multiple branches of foreign banks, or limited audit authority over foreign-owned banks or institutions.
  • Limited asset seizure or confiscation authority.
  • Limited narcotics, money laundering and financial crime enforcement and lack of trained investigators or regulators.
  • Jurisdictions with free trade zones where there is little government presence or other supervisory authority.
  • Patterns of official corruption or a laissez-faire attitude toward the business and banking communities.
  • Jurisdictions where the U.S. dollar is readily accepted, especially jurisdictions where banks and other financial institutions allow dollar deposits.
  • Well-established access to international bullion trading centers in New York, Istanbul, Zurich, Dubai and Mumbai.
  • Jurisdictions where there is significant trade in or export of gems, particularly diamonds.
  • Jurisdictions with large parallel or black market economies.
  • Limited or no ability to share financial information with foreign law enforcement authorities.

Changes in INCSR Priorities, 2000-2001

Upgrades

Downgrades

Additions

Greece à Concern—Primary

Comoros à Other—Removed

Angola

Grenada à Concern—Primary

Iceland à Other—Removed

Benin

Monaco à Other—Concern

Lesotho à Other—Removed

Eritrea

Nicaragua à Other—Concern

Netherlands Antilles à Primary—Concern

Madagascar

Palau à Other—Concern

Syriaà Other—Removed

Malawi

Philippines à Concern—Primary

 -

Mali

St. Kitts & Nevis à Concern—Primary

-

Micronesia FS

St. Vincent à Concern—Primary

-

Niger

-

-

Papua New Guinea

-

-

Solomon Islands

-

-

Togo

-

-

Yemen

Comparative Chart

The comparative chart that follows the Glossary of Terms below identifies the broad range of actions that jurisdictions have, or have not, taken to combat money laundering, that were effective as of December 31, 2000. This reference chart provides a comparison of elements that define legislative activity and identify other characteristics that can have a relationship to money laundering vulnerability. Where there is no (or only fragmentary) information regarding specific categories, the corresponding cells on the chart have been left blank.

Glossary of Terms

  1. "Criminalized Drug Money Laundering": The jurisdiction has enacted laws criminalizing the offense of money laundering related to drug trafficking.
  2. "Criminalized Beyond Drugs": The jurisdiction has extended anti-money laundering statutes and regulations to include non-drug-related money laundering.
  3. "Record Large Transactions": By law or regulation, banks are required to maintain records of large transactions in currency or other monetary instruments.
  4. "Maintain Records Over Time": By law or regulation, banks are required to keep records, especially of large or unusual transactions, for a specified period of time, e.g., five years.
  5. "Report Suspicious Transactions": An "M" (for "mandatory") indicates that by law or regulation, banks are required to record and report suspicious or unusual transactions to designated authorities. A "P" indicates that by law or regulation, banks are permitted to record and report suspicious transactions. An effective know-your-customer policy is considered a prerequisite in this category.
  6. "Financial Intelligence Unit": The jurisdiction has established a central, national agency responsible for receiving (and, as permitted, requesting), analyzing, and disseminating to the competent authorities disclosures of financial information concerning suspected proceeds of crime, or required by national legislation or regulation, in order to counter money laundering. These reflect those jurisdictions that are members of the Egmont Group.
  7. "System for Identifying and Forfeiting Assets": The jurisdiction has enacted laws authorizing the tracing, freezing, seizure and forfeiture of assets identified as relating to or generated by money laundering activities.
  8. "Arrangements for Asset Sharing": By law, regulation or bilateral agreement, the jurisdiction permits sharing of seized assets with third party jurisdictions which assisted in the conduct of the underlying investigation.
  9. "Cooperates w/Domestic Law Enforcement": By law or regulation, banks are required to cooperate with authorized law enforcement investigations into money laundering or the predicate offense, including production of bank records, or otherwise lifting the veil of bank secrecy.
  10. "Cooperates w/International Law Enforcement": By law or regulation, banks are permitted/required to cooperate with authorized investigations involving or initiated by third party jurisdictions, including sharing of records or other financial data.
  11. "International Transportation of Currency": By law or regulation, the jurisdiction, in cooperation with banks, controls or monitors the flow of currency and monetary instruments crossing its borders. Of critical weight here are the presence or absence of wire transfer regulations and use of reports completed by each person transiting the jurisdiction and reports of monetary instrument transmitters.
  12. "Mutual Legal Assistance": By law or through treaty, the jurisdiction has agreed to provide and receive mutual legal assistance, including the sharing of records and data.
  13. "Non-Bank Financial Institutions": By law or regulation, the jurisdiction requires non-bank financial institutions to meet the same customer identification standards and adhere to the same reporting requirements that it imposes on banks.
  14. "Disclosure Protection Safe Harbor": By law, the jurisdiction provides a "safe harbor" defense to banks or other financial institutions and their employees who provide otherwise confidential banking data to authorities in pursuit of authorized investigations.
  15. "Offshore Financial Centers": By law or regulation, the jurisdiction authorizes the licensing of offshore banking and business facilities.
  16. "States Parties to 1988 UN Drug Convention": As of December 31, 2000, a party to the 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, or a territorial entity to which the application of the Convention has been extended by a party to the Convention.

Annex to the Offshore Financial Centers Section

FATF Criteria for Defining Non-Cooperative Countries or Territories

A. Loopholes in financial regulations

(i) No or inadequate regulations and supervision of financial institutions

1. Are there effective regulations and supervision, if any, for all financial institutions in a given country or territory, onshore or offshore, on an equivalent basis with respect to international standards applicable to money laundering?

(ii) Inadequate licensing and rules for the creation of financial institutions, including assessing the backgrounds of their managers and beneficial owner

2. Is it possible for individuals or legal entities to operate a financial institution without authorization or registration or with very rudimentary requirements for authorization or registration?

3. Are there measures to guard against holding of management functions and control or acquisition of a significant investment in financial institutions by criminals or their confederates?

(iii) Inadequate customer identification requirements for financial institutions

4. Do anonymous accounts or accounts in obviously fictitious names exist?

5. Are there effective laws, regulations, agreements between supervisory authorities and financial institutions or self-regulatory agreements among financial institutions on identification by the financial institution of the client and beneficial owner of an account?

    • Is it mandatory to verify the identity of the client?
    • Is it a requirement to identify the beneficial owners where there are doubts as to whether the client is acting on his own behalf?
    • Is there an obligation to renew identification of the client or the beneficial owner when doubts appear as to their identity in the course of business relationships?
    • Are financial institutions required to develop ongoing anti-money laundering training programs?

6. Is there a legal or regulatory obligation for financial institutions or agreements between supervisory authorities and financial institutions or self-agreements among financial institutions to record and keep, for a reasonable and sufficient time (five years), documents connected with the identity of their clients, as well as records on national and international transactions?

7. Are there legal or practical obstacles to access by administrative and judicial authorities to information with respect to the identity of the holders or beneficial owners and information connected with the transactions recorded?

(iv) Excessive secrecy provisions regarding financial institutions

8. Can secrecy provisions be invoked against, but not lifted by competent administrative authorities in the context of inquiries concerning money laundering?

9. Can secrecy provisions be invoked against, but not lifted by judicial authorities in criminal investigations related to money laundering?

(v) Lack of efficient suspicious transactions reporting system

10. Is there an efficient mandatory system for reporting suspicious or unusual transactions to a competent authority, provided that such a system aims to detect and prosecute money laundering?

11. Are there monitoring and criminal or administrative sanctions in respect to the obligation to report suspicious or unusual transactions?

B. Obstacles raised by other regulatory requirements

(i) Inadequate commercial law requirements for registration of business and legal entities

12. Are there adequate means for identifying, recording and making available relevant information related to legal and business entities (name, legal form, address, identity of directors, provisions regulating the power to bind the entity)?

(ii) Lack of identification of the beneficial owner(s) of legal and business entities

13. Are there obstacles to identification by financial institutions of the beneficial owner(s) and directors/officers of a company or beneficiaries of legal or business entities?

14. Are there regulatory or other systems which allow financial institutions to carry out financial business where the beneficial owner(s) of transactions is unknown, or is represented by an intermediary who refuses to divulge that information, without informing the competent authorities?

C. Obstacles to international co-operation

(i) Obstacles to international co-operation by administrative authorities

15. Do laws or regulations prohibit international exchange of information between administrative anti-money laundering authorities or do not grant clear gateways or subjecting exchange of information to unduly restrictive conditions?

16. Are relevant administrative authorities prohibited from conducting investigations or inquiries on behalf of or for account of their foreign counterparts?

17. Has obvious unwillingness to respond constructively to requests (e.g. failure to take the appropriate measures in due course, long delays in responding) been observed?

18. Are there restrictive practices in international co-operation against money laundering between supervisory authorities or between FIUs for the analysis and investigation of suspicious transactions, especially on the grounds that such transactions may relate to tax matters? (ii) Obstacles to international co-operation by judicial authorities 

19. Is the laundering of the proceeds from serious crimes being criminalized?

20. Do laws or regulations prohibit international exchange of information between judicial authorities (notably specific reservations to the anti-money laundering provisions of international agreements) or place highly restrictive conditions on the exchange of information?

21. Has obvious unwillingness to respond constructively to mutual legal assistance requests (e.g. failure to take the appropriate measures in due course, long delays in responding) been observed?

22. Does the jurisdiction refuse to provide judicial co-operation in cases involving offences recognized as such by the requested jurisdiction especially on the grounds that tax matters are involved?

D. Inadequate resources for preventing and detecting money laundering activities

(i) Lack of resources in public and private sectors

23. Are the administrative and judicial authorities provided with the necessary financial, human or technical resources to exercise their functions or to conduct their investigations?

24. Is there inadequate or corrupt professional staff in governmental, judicial or supervisory authorities or among those responsible for anti-money laundering compliance in the financial services industry?

(ii) Absence of a financial intelligence unit or of an equivalent mechanism

25. Is there a centralized unit (i.e., a financial intelligence unit) or of an equivalent mechanism for the collection, analysis and dissemination of suspicious transactions information to competent authorities?

Country/Jurisdictions Table(1)

Countries/Jurisdictions of  Primary Concern

Countries/Jurisdictions of Concern

Other Countries/Jurisdictions Monitored

Antigua and Barbuda

Russia

Albania

Romania

Afghanistan

Maldives

Australia

Singapore

Argentina

Samoa

Algeria

Mali

Austria

Spain

Aruba

Seychelles

Angola

Malta

Bahamas

St. Kitts & Nevis

Bahrain

Slovakia

Anguilla

Mauritius

Brazil

St. Vincent

Barbados

South Africa

Armenia

Micronesia FS

Burma

Switzerland

Belgium

St. Lucia

Azerbaijan

Moldova

Canada

Taiwan

Belize

Turks & Caicos

Bangladesh

Mongolia

Cayman Islands

Thailand

Bolivia

Ukraine

Belarus

Montserrat

China, People Rep

Turkey

British Virgin Islands

Vanuatu

Benin

Morocco

Colombia

United Arab Emirates

Bulgaria

Vietnam

Bermuda

Mozambique

Cyprus

United Kingdom

Cambodia

Yugoslavia FR

Bosnia & Herzegovina

Namibia

Dominica

USA

Chile

 

Botswana

Nepal

Dominican Rep

Uruguay

Cook Islands

 

Brunei

New Zealand

France

Venezuela

Costa Rica

 

Cameroon

Niger

Germany

 

Czech Rep

 

Cote D’Ivoire

Norway

Greece

 

Ecuador

 

Croatia

Oman

Grenada

 

Egypt

 

Cuba

Papua New Guinea

Guernsey

 

El Salvador

 

Denmark

Qatar

Hong Kong

 

Gibraltar

 

Eritrea

Saudi Arabia

Hungary

 

Guatemala

 

Estonia

Senegal

India

 

Haiti

 

Ethiopia

Slovenia

Indonesia

 

Honduras

 

Fiji

Soloman Islands

Isle of Man

 

Ireland

 

Finland

Sri Lanka

Israel

 

Jamaica

 

Georgia

Suriname

Italy

 

Korea, Republic of"

 

Ghana

Swaziland

Japan

 

Korea (DPRK)

 

Guyana

Sweden

Jersey

 

Latvia

 

Iran

Tajikistan

Lebanon

 

Macau

 

Jordan

Tanzania

Liechtenstein

 

Malaysia

 

Kazakhstan

Togo

Luxembourg

 

Marshall Islands

 

Kenya

Tonga

Mexico

 

Monaco

 

Kuwait

Trinidad and Tobago

Nauru

 

Netherlands Antilles

 

Kyrgyzstan

Tunisia

Netherlands

 

Nicaragua

 

Laos

Turkmenistan

Nigeria

 

Niue

 

Liberia

Uganda

Pakistan

 

Palau

 

Lithuania

Uzbekistan

Panama

 

Peru

 

Macedonia

Yemen

Paraguay

 

Poland

 

Madagascar

Zambia

Philippines

 

Portugal

 

Malawi

Zimbabwe

(1) See the (previous) section entitled Money Laundering Comparative Table for an explanation of these categories.

 

Comparative Chart

Country Reports

Afghanistan (Other). Afghanistan has no formal credit institutions, and its financial institutions are rudimentary. Afghanistan is not considered a center for money laundering. However, Afghanistan does play a key role in the heroin trade. The proceeds of heroin trafficking generally are laundered in other countries, or through the hawala alternative remittance system. Reports indicate that the Taliban and other factions in Afghanistan are involved in narcotics trafficking. The private investment of drug profits reportedly has fueled a surge in construction and commercial activity in Kandahar City in recent years.

Afghanistan is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Albania (Concern). Albania is at significant risk to money laundering because it is a transit country for trafficking in narcotics, arms, contraband, and illegal aliens. Organized crime groups use Albania as a base of operations for conducting criminal activities in other countries. The proceeds from these activities are easily laundered in Albania because of official corruption and weak government controls.

Albania criminalized all forms of money laundering through Article 287 of the Albanian Criminal Code of 1995. In 2000, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) assisted Albania in drafting anti-money laundering legislation that was subsequently approved by Albania's legislature. The law reportedly would establish an agency to coordinate the Government of Albania's (GOA) efforts to detect and prevent money laundering. This agency will fall under the control of the Ministry of Finance and will evaluate reports filed by financial institutions. If the agency suspects that a transaction involves the proceeds of criminal activity, it must forward the information to the prosecutor's office.

The legislation would also require financial institutions to report to the anti-money laundering agency all transactions that exceed approximately US $10,000. Financial institutions would be required to report transactions within 48 hours if the origin of the money cannot be determined. In addition, private and state entities would be required to report all financial transactions that exceed certain thresholds.

In December 2000, Albania signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Albania is a member of the Council of Europe (COE) Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures (PC-R-EV).

The GOA should enact and fully implement the provisions of its anti-money laundering legislation. In particular, the GOA should provide adequate resources and support to the new anti-money laundering agency.

Algeria (Other). Algeria is not a financial center, and currently there is no available information suggesting that money laundering is a significant problem there. However, the Algerian government has not enacted anti-money laundering legislation nor does it have in place any procedures such as a suspicious transaction reporting system to detect money laundering. Individuals entering Algeria must declare all foreign currency, but it remains unclear how strictly this is enforced.

Algeria is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Angola (Other). Money laundering does not appear to be a significant problem in Angola because of its poorly developed financial sector. However, Angola does not have in place a set of comprehensive laws, regulations, and other procedures to detect money laundering and financial crime. Angola's counternarcotics laws criminalize money laundering related to drug trafficking.

In December 2000, Angola signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Anguilla (Other). Anguilla has a small but growing offshore financial sector that renders it vulnerable to money laundering. As with the other United Kingdom Caribbean Overseas Territories, Anguilla underwent a thorough evaluation of its financial regulations in 2000, co-sponsored by the local and British governments.

Anguilla's domestic financial sector includes four domestic banks and 17 insurance companies. The Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB) supervises Anguilla's four domestic banks. The offshore sector includes two banks, one captive insurance company, and approximately 2000 international business companies (IBCs) and 43 trusts. IBCs may be registered using bearer shares that conceal the identity of the beneficial owner of these entities.

In 2000, Anguilla enacted several pieces of legislation to improve its anti-money laundering regime. The Proceeds of Criminal Conduct Act (PCCA) 2000 extends the predicate offenses for money laundering to all indictable offenses. It provides for suspicious activity reporting and a safe harbor for this reporting. The Money Laundering Reporting Authority Act (MLRA) 2000 requires persons involved in the provision of financial services to report any suspicious transactions derived from drugs or criminal conduct. It also details provisions for a Reporting Authority that will receive the suspicious transaction reports required and may forward information to the police for further investigation. The Criminal Justice (International Co-operation) (Anguilla) Act 2000 enables Anguilla to directly cooperate with other jurisdictions through mutual legal assistance.

Anguilla is subject to the US/UK MLAT and the US/UK extradition treaty. Anguilla is a member of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), and through the UK, is subject to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

Anguilla has developed important legal tools for detecting and investigating money laundering and other financial crimes. It should move quickly to implement provisions of the PCCA and the MLRA and establish a Reporting Authority that can easily cooperate with foreign authorities. Anguilla should also adopt consider measures to ensure complete identification of beneficial owners of IBCs so that international criminals do not use these entities to perpetuate financial crimes.

Antigua and Barbuda (Primary). Although Antigua and Barbuda remains vulnerable to money laundering because of its offshore financial sector and its internet gaming industry, it has made significant progress toward improving the regulation of the offshore financial sector since the US Treasury Department issued an advisory to US financial institutions in April 1999. In its advisory the Treasury Department recommended "enhanced scrutiny to all financial transactions routed into or out of Antigua and Barbuda" because of 1998 amendments that had seriously weakened Antigua and Barbuda's anti-money laundering regime. The United Kingdom (UK) also issued a bank advisory at that time and France publicly expressed it concerns.

In response to this international action, in 1999 the Government of Antigua and Barbuda (GOAB) repealed those amendments to the Money-Laundering (Prevention) Act (MLPA) of 1996 that had effectively strengthened bank secrecy, inhibited money laundering investigations and infringed on international cooperation. Additionally, in 2000 the GOAB amended the International Business Corporations Act (IBCA) of 1982 in order to excise the 1998 amendments that had given the International Financial Sector Regulatory Authority (IFSRA) responsibility to market and regulate the offshore sector, as well as to allow members of the IFSRA Board of Directors to maintain ties to the offshore industry.

In August 2000, the GOAB again amended the IBCA to require resident agents to ensure the accuracy of the records and registers that are kept at the Registrar's office, and to know the names of beneficial owners of IBC's and to disclose such information to authorities upon request. Furthermore, in December 2000 the GOAB issued a Statutory Instrument, which has the force of law, requiring banks to establish the true identities of account holders and to verify the nature of an account holder's business, source of funds and beneficiaries. The GOAB has also drafted an International Trusts Bill and a Mutual Funds Bill.

The GOAB has established and staffed the Supervisory Authority (SA) within the ONDCP as mandated by the MLPA, and has issued regulations that implement its suspicious transactions reporting system. According to an Antiguan official, by year's end Antiguan and Barbudian financial institutions had filed a total of between ten and twenty suspicious transaction reports (STRs).

During 1999 and 2000, the GOAB conducted an extensive review of the offshore banking sector. As a result, 21 offshore banks had their licenses revoked, were dissolved, were placed in receivership, or were otherwise put out of business. Currently, Antigua and Barbuda has 26 licensed offshore banks of which only 18 are currently in operation and in good standing.

Like most of the other countries in the Eastern Caribbean, GOAB does not have a unified regulatory structure or uniform supervisory practices for its financial services sector. This is due to the fact that the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB) supervises Antigua and Barbuda's domestic banking sector, conducting both on-site and off-site reviews of the country's financial institutions. Examiners review information related to savings and demand deposits during on-site inspections. To date, the ECCB has not begun supervising offshore banks.

The IFSRA issues licenses for the offshore sector, including the issuance of licenses for offshore banks and international business corporations, of which there are approximately 12,000. The license application requires disclosure of the names and addresses of directors-who must be natural persons-the activities the corporation intends to engage in, and the names of shareholders and number of shares that they will hold. Additionally, the IFSRA is responsible for the supervision of the offshore banking sector. IFSRA is currently increasing its staff in order to effectively perform on-site and off-site examinations of licensed offshore banks. To date, IFSRA has not performed any on-site examinations.

In October 2000, a joint US and UK interagency team visited Antigua and Barbuda to review the GOAB's progress in enacting and implementing legislation that addresses the issues raised in the 1999 US and UK advisories. As a result the UK subsequently issued a statement announcing modification of its advisory which reads in part:

HM Treasury recognizes the considerable effort that the Government of Antigua and Barbuda has made since April 1999 to strengthen the system of supervision and control, with a particular view to strengthening anti-money laundering systems. Although it is too early to judge whether these new systems have been fully successful, it is clear that there has been a step-change in the culture of combating money laundering in the Government and supervisory structures. But as has been recognized by the Government of Antigua and Barbuda, there is still room for further improvement before the jurisdiction meets the highest standards of international anti-money laundering laws and practice.

While waiting for the new systems to bed down, and the final legislative changes to be made, the UK still believes that financial institutions should continue to undertake additional due diligence when accepting new business from the financial institutions in Antigua and Barbuda. In particular, UK financial institutions should be aware of concerns that there are serious risks associated with involvement in transactions linked to the offshore gaming industry.

The report of the US members of the assessment team and recommendations regarding the US advisory are pending.

During 2000, the GOAB continued its bilateral and multilateral cooperation in various criminal and civil investigations and prosecutions. The GOAB has provided substantial assistance to US law enforcement and prosecutors investigating and prosecuting fraud and money laundering cases involving Antiguan-licensed American International Bank, European Union Bank and European Federal Credit Bank. As a result of Operation Risky Business, an FBI and US Customs Service investigation in which 19 individuals were convicted for fraud and money laundering, a request for the extradition of Antiguan citizen William Cooper, who assisted in the establishment of Antiguan-licensed Caribbean American Bank, was made in 1999. The request is currently pending in the Antiguan courts. In 1999, the GOAB charged former Ukrainian Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko with money laundering and froze approximately $83 million in alleged fraud proceeds that had been deposited in European Federal Credit Bank. This money was ultimately forfeited by an Antiguan court in 2000, but the court's decision has been appealed. Lazarenko is currently in US custody awaiting trial on money laundering charges filed in the Northern District of California.

Casinos and sports book-wagering operations in the Free Trade Zone are regulated and supervised by the Directorate of Offshore Gaming (DOG) and are required to incorporate under the IBCA. The DOG has issued Internet Gaming Technical Standards and guidelines; however, it is not clear whether these standards and guidelines are mandatory. Moreover, it is not clear if casinos and other gaming-related entities are subject to provisions of the IBCA or the MLPB. The GOAB is considering legislation and has drafted "Regulations for the Licencing of Interactive Gaming And Interactive Wagering in Antigua and Barbuda" to address possible money laundering through client accounts of Internet gambling operations.

Antigua and Barbuda is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. Antigua and Barbuda is a member of the Organization of American States Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS/CICAD) Experts Group to Control Money Laundering, and the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF). In 1999, Antigua and Barbuda became the first country in the eastern Caribbean to exchange the instruments of ratification to bring into force Mutual Legal Assistance and Extradition Treaties with the United States Government.

During the last two years, the GOAB has shown a clear commitment to the creation of a legal and regulatory anti-money laundering regime that will meet international standards. The GOAB is urged to fully implement and enforce all provisions of its anti-money laundering legislation. Moreover, the GOAB must ensure that its gambling sector is covered by anti-money laundering legislation and that it is adequately supervised.

Argentina (Concern). High-profile regional investigations have produced evidence that Mexican and Colombian drug cartels are infiltrating Argentina's banking sector, which is the sector most affected by money laundering activities. It is believed that contraband and bribery also contribute to the money laundering occurring in Argentina, and that the use of companies, shell companies, trusts, financial advisors, accountants and notaries facilitate money laundering.

New money laundering legislation, Law 25.246, was passed in May 2000. While the October 1989 law applied only to the proceeds of illicit drug trafficking activities, the new law extends the money laundering offenses to include all existing crimes in the Penal Code and makes it a crime to launder proceeds of crimes committed in other countries. The new law sets a stricter regulatory framework for banks and a wide range of other entities. Under previous central bank regulations, the requirements for record-keeping customer identification, recording of cash transactions over US $10,000, and reporting of suspicious transactions applied only to banks, financial companies, credit unions, savings institutions, credit card issuers and money exchange dealers. Law 25.246 expands the customer identification, record-keeping and suspicious transactions reporting to a wide range of entities including foreign exchange houses, money remitters, gambling outlets, exporters/importers of jewels and precious metals, property registration agents, stock brokers, insurance companies, art dealers, notaries, accountants, and travelers' checks companies. The law forbids these financial and commercial entities to notify their clients of the filing of suspicious financial transaction reports, and provides a safe harbor from liability for reporting the transactions.

To aid Argentina in its fight against money laundering, Law 25.246 creates a financial intelligence unit (FIU), an autonomous agency under the administration of the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights responsible for receiving, analyzing and disseminating to the Office of the Attorney General information to prevent and impede money laundering. The FIU is not yet operational.

One money laundering case is currently being prosecuted under the 1989 legislation.

Argentina is party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Argentina is an active participant in international anti-money laundering groups. Following their September 1999 admission as an observer member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Argentina underwent an evaluation by the FATF in early 2000 and became a full member in June 2000. Argentina is a member of the Organization of American States Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS/CICAD) Experts Group to Control Money Laundering. Argentina also played a leading role in the creation of the South American Financial Action Task Force in December 2000. Argentina and the United States have a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty that entered into force in 1993.

The government of Argentina is encouraged to issue implementing regulations for Law 25.2456, and make its FIU operational as soon as possible to enable it to participate in the Egmont Group. This will enable it to cooperate more comprehensively in domestic and international efforts to combat money laundering.

Armenia (Other). Armenia is not a major financial center, however its status as a transit country for narcotics trafficking and smuggling, combined with lax border controls, creates a favorable money-laundering environment. High unemployment, low salaries, corruption, a large underground economy, and the presence of organized crime also increase Armenia's vulnerability to money laundering. Armenian authorities are generally not cognizant of the threat of money laundering and have devoted inadequate resources to the problem. Schemes used to launder funds include the under-invoicing of imports, double bookkeeping, and misuse of the banking system.

Armenia currently has no anti-money laundering statutes. However, the new draft Armenian criminal code includes a statute that for the first time would criminalize money laundering. The Government of Armenia expects the new draft criminal code to pass its third and final reading in parliament in early 2001.

Armenia is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

Aruba (Concern). Aruba has a growing offshore industry, casinos, and free zones that make it both attractive and vulnerable to money launderers. However, the Government of Aruba (GOA) is establishing a solid anti-money laundering program. Money laundering is a crime in Aruba, and money-laundering offenses extend to all predicate criminal offenses, including tax offenses.

The GOA has developed a comprehensive anti-money laundering program, and further strengthened its legislation this year. The GOA's new anti-money laundering initiatives include four State Decrees: a State Decree listing suspicious activity indicators for casinos, which will take effect in April 2001; a State Decree on the supervision of captive insurers, and one on the supervision of insurance underwriters, both of which will be introduced in February 2001; and a State Decree, which becomes effective January 1, 2001, that will permit the Central Bank of Aruba to supervise insurance companies. The Central Bank of Aruba is in charge of implementing this Decree, which provides the legal basis for supervision of onshore or offshore insurance companies operating in Aruba.

In March 2001, a State Ordinance is expected to be issued that will extend reporting and identification requirements to casinos.

In October 2000, a State Ordinance was enacted requiring life insurance agents to report unusual transactions, based on indicators. As of January 1, 2000, the Government of Aruba began working on the principles of the law, which will be implemented during the first half of the year 2001.

On July 4, 2000, the Aruban Parliament unanimously approved the State Ordinance Free Zones Aruba, which will implement standards for the sector. Aruba is also working with its counterparts in the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) to develop regional standards for free zones, since none currently exist. Once developed, CFATF members have agreed to implement these standards.

In June 2000, Aruba enacted a State Ordinance making it a legal requirement to report both the importation and exportation of currency in excess of 20,000 Aruban guilders (approximately US $11,235). The State decree to implement the law will be introduced in the early part of 2001.

The GOA has prepared a State Ordinance for the Supervision of Trust Companies. The draft ordinance provides for the oversight of thrift companies to ensure that they follow "Know Your Customer" procedures. The draft was submitted to an advisory committee. After the committee completes its review and provides comments, the draft will be returned to the government officials responsible for the law and then submitted to parliament for approval. Aruban officials are striving to enact the Ordinance early in 2001.

All financial institutions report unusual transactions to the Meldpunt Ongebruikelijke Transacties (MOT), Aruba's financial intelligence unit. The MOT is a member of the Egmont Group. A draft law, which would authorize the MOT to share information with foreign counterpart organizations with a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), is now with the central committee.

Aruba has a small offshore sector compared to more established offshore jurisdictions. Services include finance companies, offshore banks, investment and holding companies and the Aruba Exempt Company (AEC). There are approximately 4700 AECs that are permitted to offer bearer shares. AECs pay an annual registration fee of approximately US $280, and must have a minimum authorized capital of US $6,000. AECs cannot participate in the economy of Aruba, and are exempt from several obligations-they are exempt from all taxes and currency restrictions, and need not file annual financial statements. Trust companies provide a wide range of corporate management and professional services to AECs, including looking after the interests of its shareholders, stockholders, or other creditors. In May 2000, the GOA issued Guidance Notes on sound corporate governance practices.

On August 31, 2000, the United States signed a multilateral agreement, with Aruba, Colombia, Panama and Venezuela, to establish an international task force to fight the money laundering that occurs through the "Black Market Peso Exchange"(BMPE). The BMPE is believed to be the largest money laundering system in the Western Hemisphere, and the primary money laundering method used by Colombian drug cartels. The task force will develop policy options and recommend enforcement actions to detect, prevent and prosecute money laundering by the BPME. The agreement also provides for enhanced information sharing among the signatories. The first task force meeting was held in Aruba on October 21, 2000 and was chaired by the director of the Aruba Free Zone. The next meeting will take place in March 2001.

Aruba, which has autonomous control over its internal affairs, is a part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and, as such, is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).

Aruba has signed a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) with the Unite States. Aruban judicial authorities have maintained an excellent record of cooperation under the MLAT.

Aruba's anti-money laundering legislation largely adheres to the recommendations of FATF and the CFATF. Furthermore, Aruba's efforts this year culminated in their first money laundering prosecution for drug trafficking. The Government of Aruba has shown a commitment to combating money laundering. With continued vigilance Aruba's vulnerability to money laundering should decrease.

Australia (Primary). The Government of Australia (GOA) has in place a balanced, comprehensive system to detect, prevent, and prosecute money laundering. In 1995, a comprehensive money laundering study commissioned by the GOA estimated that each year approximately US $2.8 billion is laundered in or through Australia, or offshore. The major sources of criminal proceeds laundered in Australia are narcotics trafficking and financial fraud.

The Government of Australia (GOA) has enacted comprehensive anti-money laundering legislation that criminalizes money laundering related to serious crimes, and mandates various forms of reporting. Moreover, the legislation provides for assistance to other governments with asset seizure and forfeiture. Three pieces of legislation form the basis of Australia's anti-money laundering regime: the Financial Transaction Reports Act (FTR) of 1988; the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act (MACMA) of 1987; and the Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) of 1987.

The FTR was enacted in 1988 to combat tax evasion, money laundering and serious crime. The FTR requires that the following entities report suspicious transactions, cash transactions in excess of Australian $10,000, and international funds transfers to the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Center (AUSTRAC), Australia's financial intelligence unit: financial institutions; insurance businesses; securities dealers; trustees; sellers of monetary instruments; bullion dealers; gaming establishments and services; persons who collect, hold, or deliver currency on behalf of others; and persons who prepare payrolls for others in whole or in part from collected currency. AUSTRAC was established under section 35 of the FTR, and was given a regulatory role vis-a-vis Australia's financial services sector. The MACMA allows Australian authorities to assist other countries in identifying, freezing, seizing, and confiscating the proceeds of crime. The POCA criminalized money laundering for all serious crimes, and contains provisions to assist investigations and prosecutions in the form of production orders, search warrants, and monitoring orders.

Australia is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), the South Pacific Forum, and the Commonwealth Secretariat. AUSTRAC is a member of the Egmont Group. Australia continues to promote the adoption of effective anti-money laundering measures by countries in the Asia/Pacific region, through its funding and hosting of the Secretariat of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering and by raising the issue of money laundering to a priority concern at the Asia/Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum. In September 1999, a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty between Australia and the United States entered into force. AUSTRAC and FinCEN have signed a Memorandum of Understanding for the exchange of information. AUSTRAC also has bilateral agreements allowing the exchange of information with the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Belgium, France, Hungary, and Denmark.

Australia is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Australia continues to have a comprehensive and effective anti-money laundering regime that adheres to the FATF Forty Recommendations. Australia's approach to combat money laundering and its demonstrated ability to adapt to change, serve as a model for other countries to emulate. The GOA should continue to support the APG and provide money laundering training and technical assistance for the Asia/Pacific region.

Austria (Primary). Austria is not a major financial center. Money laundering has been a criminal offense in Austria since 1993. A major risk for money laundering in Austria has been the existence of anonymous bank accounts known as Sparbuch (savings book) accounts. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) threatened to suspend Austria's membership if Austria did not terminate these accounts by June 15, 2000.

In June 2000, the Government of Austria (GOA) approved legislation, the Banking Act Amendment, that addressed the FATF's concerns. Beginning November 2, 2000, applicants for new passbook accounts must be identified. In addition, if deposits are made to an existing passbook account, the holder must be identified-except for deposit transfers from anonymous securities accounts opened prior to August 1, 1996. After June 30, 2002, if a withdrawal is made from an existing passbook account-and the holder has not previously been identified-the holder must be identified. A June 15, 2000 press release indicates that the FATF will closely monitor Austria's implementation of these measures. The GOA in 1996 abolished anonymous securities accounts. Although new deposits are not allowed, customers can continue to make withdrawals and sales from these accounts without identification until June 2002.

In June 2000, the Ministry of Finance sent a circular to Austrian banks advising them to use special diligence in splitting passbook account balances-except among family members-exceeding one million Austrian schillings (approximately US $68,500). Austrian banks are required to continue exercising this enhanced diligence until anonymous accounts are completely phased out in June 2002.

The GOA imposes customer identification requirements for bank transactions exceeding Austrian shillings 200,000 (approximately US $13,700) for customers without a permanent business relationship with the bank. Bank records must be maintained for a minimum of five years after the business relationship has terminated. Banks, insurers, and foreign exchange bureaus are required to report suspicious transactions. Austria's financial intelligence unit, the Central Department for Combating Organized Crime, receives and analyzes financial disclosures, and is a member of the Egmont Group.

Austria has not enacted domestic legislation that provides for sharing narcotics-related assets with other governments. However, a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) has been in force since August 1, 1998 between the GOA and the United States, which contains an asset-sharing provision. The GOA has been cooperative with US law enforcement investigations. Austria has a bilateral agreement with Hungary concerning the exchange of information related to money laundering. Austria is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Austria is a member of the FATF and the European Union.

The GOA should continue to develop a comprehensive anti-money laundering regime. By enacting legislation to eliminate anonymous passbook accounts, the GOA has taken an important step toward combating money laundering. The GOA should ensure full implementation of this new law. Continued diligence on the part of the GOA will be instrumental in helping to thwart money laundering in Austria.

Azerbaijan (Other). Azerbaijan's banking system is rudimentary; and its banking laws change frequently. Several banks have been closed as part of a government effort to consolidate the banking sector. Available information suggests that non-bank financial institutions probably are used to launder money related to tax evasion and avoidance of customs fees. The transportation of illegal source currency falls within the purview of the Organized Crime Division of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of National Security. However, these agencies probably are more concerned with stopping the transportation of funds used for anti-state activities such as anti-government propaganda and terrorism than funds generated from narcotics trafficking. Azerbaijan does not have anti-money laundering legislation.

Azerbaijan is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Bahamas (Primary). The Commonwealth of The Bahamas is an important regional financial center; its well-developed offshore financial center, strong bank secrecy laws, weak regulation of international business companies (IBCs), and inadequate customer identification requirements have made it vulnerable to money laundering and other financial crimes. The offshore financial industry includes trust companies, 413 banks, 580 mutual funds, 30 insurance companies, and approximately 100,000 International Business Companies (IBCs).

In June 2000, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) identified The Bahamas as "non-cooperative in the fight against money laundering." In its report, FATF stated cited the following concerns:

Although The Bahamas has comprehensive anti-money laundering legislation, there are serious deficiencies in its system. In particular, there is a lack of information about the beneficial ownership as to trusts and IBCs, which are allowed to issue bearer shares. There is also a serious breach in identification rules since certain intermediaries can invoke their professional code of conduct to avoid revealing the identity of their clients. International cooperation has been marked by long delays and restricted responses to requests for assistance and there is no room to cooperate outside of judicial channels.

In July 2000, the US Treasury Department issued an advisory to US financial institutions warning them to give enhanced scrutiny to financial transactions involving The Bahamas, particularly those transactions that do not involve established and adequately identified commercial or investment enterprises.

Under legislation in force prior to December 2000, The Government of the Commonwealth of The Bahamas (GOCB) supervisory officials had to seek a court order to obtain access to customer information held by Bahamian banks and trust companies. Moreover, the failure of Bahamian banks to obtain identifying information about customers limited their effectiveness in recognizing and avoiding money-laundering transactions. Banks were not required to verify the identity of customers whose accounts were opened by Bahamian lawyers and certain other intermediaries. It is unclear whether these entities' legal obligation to report suspicious transactions was preempted by their professional secrecy obligations.

The GCOB has taken significant steps to address the shortcomings in its anti-money laundering regime. In May 2000, the GCOB enacted legislation requiring that individuals declare currency in excess of US $10,000 when entering or leaving the country. Moreover, in December 2000, the GCOB enacted the following legislation and regulations: Proceeds of Crime Act No. 44 of 2000, Dangerous Drugs Act 2000, Criminal Justice (International Co-Operation) Act 2000, Financial Transactions Reporting Act 2000, the Central Bank of the Bahamas Act 2000, Banks and Trust Companies Regulation Act 2000, Financial and Corporate Service Providers Act 2000, International Business Companies (IBC) Act 2000, Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) Act 2000, Criminal Justice (International Co-operation) Regulations Act of 2000, and Financial Transactions Reporting Regulations of 2000.

The Proceeds of Crime Act 2000, which supersedes the amended Money Laundering (Proceeds of Crime) Act, also expands the number of predicate crimes for money laundering to include drug trafficking, bribery, public corruption, and other serious crimes; expands the definition of the money laundering offence by introducing the concept of "reasonable suspicion," rather than requiring actual knowledge of the nature of the proceeds; and provides immunity from civil liability for disclosure of information to the Supervisory Authority or the Attorney General. In addition, for the first time, the new Proceeds of Crime Act 2000 provides for seizure, detention and forfeiture of the proceeds of crime, including money laundering; establishes penalties for failure to disclose knowledge or suspicion of money laundering; and, authorizes enforcement of domestic and external confiscation orders.

The International Business Companies Act (IBC), 2000, ends anonymous ownership of IBCs. The new legislation requires IBCs to have a registered office and agent in The Bahamas, to hold general meetings at least annually, to maintain a register of officers and directors that is available to the public, and to maintain a share register containing the names and addresses of the beneficial owners of shares, along with other information that is accessible by supervisory authorities. The Act also eliminates bearer shares and requires current owners of bearer shares to convert them to regular shares within a specified time frame. IBCs that fail to comply with these provisions will be struck from the register of companies.

The Financial and Corporate Service Providers Act 2000 regulates lawyers, accountants, and business managers engaged in the registration or management of IBCs.

The Financial Intelligence Unit Act 2000 establishes the GCOB's Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU). The Act gives the FIU authority to compel production-without a court order-of information and documents, and to exchange information with foreign FIUs. The Act also permits the lifting of financial secrecy provisions for inquiries concerning money laundering. Moreover, the FIU-in consultation with financial regulators-will issue specific guidelines to financial institutions for the mandatory reporting of suspicious transactions. The Act also establishes "safe harbor" protection from criminal, civil, and professional sanctions for individuals who provide information to the FIU. The GCOB has consulted with the Caribbean Anti-Money Laundering Programme for guidance in the establishment of an FIU. More recently, the GCOB requested that the United Nations Global Program Against Money Laundering provide it with a list of candidates from which to select a long-term mentor to assist with the development of its FIU. As currently envisioned, the FIU will have a staff of ten. Managerial positions have been filled, and the FIU is expected to become fully operational in 2001.

The Financial Transactions Reporting Act 2000 establishes "know your customer" requirements for banks, trust companies, securities broker-dealers, casinos, real estate brokers, insurance companies, co-operative societies, counsel/attorneys/accountants relative to certain transactions and others. These entities will be required to verify the identities of existing customers within 12 months, and report suspicious transactions to the FIU. The Act also creates a Compliance Commission to ensure the financial sector's compliance with the Act by institutions other than banks and trust companies. In accordance with the Act, in December 2000, the Ministry of Finance issued the Financial Transactions Reporting Regulations 2000. These regulations require institutions to verify the identity of persons conducting transactions of $10,000 or more.

The Banks and Trust Companies Regulation Act 2000 provides for cross-border supervision by banking regulators of foreign banks and trust companies with branches or subsidiaries operating in The Bahamas consistent with the principles established by the Basle Committee. The Central Bank of Bahamas Act 2000 expands the powers of the central bank to respond to requests for information from foreign regulatory authorities. The Act also grants the central bank governor the authority to deny licenses to banks or trusts that are deemed unfit to conduct business in The Bahamas.

The Bahamas is party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and is a member of the CFATF and the Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors. The Attorney General has established an International Affairs Unit to deal specifically with mutual legal assistance matters. The Bahamas has a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty with the United States, which entered into force in 1990.

The GCOB continues to further its anti-money laundering efforts with enactment of new laws, establishment of an FIU, and its stated intention to join the Egmont Group. The GCOB has enacted substantial reforms that could reduce its financial sector's vulnerability to money laundering. The GCOB now needs to focus on fully implementing its new legislation.

Bahrain (Concern). Bahrain is vulnerable to money laundering because it is a regional financial and offshore center. The most common sources of illegal proceeds in Bahrain include narcotics trafficking, fraud, and evasion of international sanctions. Bahrain recently passed legislation that reportedly criminalizes money laundering.

Bahrain has 19 commercial banking institutions-seven locally incorporated and 12 subsidiaries of foreign banks-and has 48 offshore banking units (OBUs). The Bahrain Monetary Authority (BMA) licenses OBUs. The BMA requires that OBUs be audited yearly by outside firms that have been approved by the BMA. OBUs cannot do business with residents of Bahrain-except for agencies of the GOB-and must conduct all transactions in foreign currency. However, OBUs may participate in domestic development projects with the approval of the BMA. OBUs also must be fully staffed, and a majority of the staff must be Bahraini nationals. The books and records of OBUs must be available for examination by the BMA at all times. OBUs are required to submit statistical reports to the BMA twice yearly. OBUs are exempt from taxes and are not subject to restrictions regarding foreign exchange payments or receipts.

Bahrain also permits formation of two forms of international business companies (IBCs): offshore resident companies and offshore non-resident companies. Offshore resident companies must have a principal office in Bahrain and a minimum capitalization of US $54,000. The company must obtain a license from the BMA if it conducts financial activities. Offshore non-resident companies are exempt from the requirement of maintaining an office in Bahrain, and may instead appoint a law or auditing firm in Bahrain as their resident address. Non-resident companies must have a minimum capitalization of US $6,750, but cannot engage in insurance or other financial activities. Registration of an IBC can take as little as seven days, and there are no restrictions on remittances sent abroad.

In January 2001, new legislation went into effect by Amiri decree that reportedly criminalizes money laundering for a number of predicate offenses, requires the reporting of large transactions, provides specific guidelines for accepting transactions, and increases monitoring of banking activity.

Legislation in force prior to the enactment Bahrain's new anti-money laundering legislation obligates financial institutions to report suspicious transactions greater than Bahraini dinars (BD) 10,000 (approximately US $26,000) to the BMA. However, the BMA has not provided guidance to Bahraini banks on how to identify suspicious transactions.

Bahrain is a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council, which represents it before the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). In June 2000, Bahrain underwent a FATF mutual evaluation. Bahrain is a member of the Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors and has agreed to undergo a mutual evaluation by this body. Bahrain is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

Bahrain should ensure that its offshore sector is subject to adequate supervision.

Bangladesh (Other). Bangladesh is not an important financial center. Money laundering in Bangladesh is primarily related to income tax evasion and the illegal importation of consumer goods. There is no evidence that the proceeds of drug trafficking are laundered in Bangladesh. However, Bangladesh has not criminalized money laundering and banking regulation is weak and sporadic. Corruption among officials is believed to be high.

Bangladesh is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and is a member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering.

Barbados (Concern). The Government of Barbados (GOB) has taken several steps in recent years to strengthen its anti-money laundering regime.

The Money Laundering (Prevention and Control) Act (MLPCA) 1998 criminalizes transactions that involve the proceeds of unlawful activities that are punishable by at least one-year imprisonment. The legislation also authorized creation of the Anti-Money Laundering Authority (AMLA) to supervise financial institutions' compliance with the Act. However, the AMLA was not established until 1 August 2000, and its financial intelligence unit (FIU) was not established until 1 September 2000. The FIU is now fully staffed and operating. The AMLA also may issue training requirements and regulations for financial institutions. Money laundering is punishable in Barbados by a maximum of 25 years in prison and a maximum fine of Barbadian (BB) $2 million, (approximately US $1 million). The law also contains asset seizure and forfeiture provisions.

The MLPCA applies to a wide range of institutions, including domestic and offshore banks, international business companies (IBCs), and insurance companies. These institutions are required to identify their customers, to cooperate with domestic law enforcement investigations, to maintain records of all transactions exceeding BB $10,000, and to report suspicious transactions to the AMLA. The AMLA forwards this information to the Commissioner of Police if it has reasonable grounds to suspect money laundering.

The GOB initially criminalized money laundering in 1990 through the Proceeds of Crime Act, No. 13. This law also authorizes asset confiscation and forfeiture and provides a disclosure protection safe harbor for individuals reporting suspicious activities. In 1997, the central bank issued Anti-Money Laundering Guidelines for Licensed Financial Institutions.

Barbados is an offshore center and offers offshore banking, international trusts, exempt insurance companies, IBCs, and foreign sales corporations (FSCs)-specialized companies that permit persons to engage in foreign trade transactions from within Barbados. Unofficial sources report Barbados has approximately 51 offshore banks, 376 exempt insurance companies, 3,855 IBCs and 2,975 foreign sales corporations.

The Offshore Banking Act (1980) gives the central bank authority to supervise and regulate offshore banks, in addition to Barbados's nine domestic commercial banks. Barbadian, Canadian-parent, and United Kingdom-parent banks operate on equal terms in Barbados. The Ministry of Finance issues licenses after the central bank receives and reviews applications, and recommends applicants for licensing. Offshore banks must submit quarterly statements of assets and liabilities and annual balance sheets to the central bank. Profits from offshore banks are subject to a 2.5 percent tax rate for profits of BB $10 million or less, and not less than 1 percent for profits exceeding BB $10 million.

The International Business Companies Act (1992) provides for general administration of IBCs. The Ministry of International Trade and Business vets and grants licenses to IBCs after applicants register with the Registrar of Corporate Affairs. Barbadian IBC's must pay a 2.5 percent tax on profits up to BB $20 million, with decreasing tax rates on additional profits. Bearer shares are not allowed, and financial statements of IBCs are audited if total assets exceed BB $1 million. Barbados has bilateral tax treaties that eliminate or reduce double taxation with the UK, Canada, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States. Canada's treaty allows IBC and offshore banking profits to be repatriated to Canada tax-free after paying the 2.5 percent tax in Barbados.

In 1996, the United States and Barbados signed a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty and an extradition treaty. Both treaties were brought into force in 2000 by an exchange of instruments of ratification. Barbados is a member of the Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors, the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force, and the Organization of American States Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS/CICAD) Experts Group to Control Money Laundering. Barbados is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

The GOB needs to maintain strict control over vetting and licensing of offshore entities. The establishment of the AMLA should provide Barbados the necessary resources to enforce compliance by financial and commercial sectors, and enable it to fully cooperate with foreign authorities to investigate and prosecute money laundering and other financial crimes.

Belarus (Other). Money laundering does not seem to be a major problem in Belarus. However, Belarus has no anti-money laundering laws, and does not have in place significant laws, regulations, or other procedures to detect it. Banks are more inclined to focus on protecting the secrecy of their clients than on discovering and reporting irregular or unaccounted-for deposits. The growing number of casinos also could become venues for money laundering.

Belarus faces problems with organized crime that plague other countries of the former Soviet Union. The lack of anti-money laundering laws could lead organized crime to engage in more substantial money laundering in Belarus.

Belgium (Concern). Belgium's financial system is vulnerable to money laundering; approximately 60 percent of the suspicious transactions reports filed by Belgian financial institutions are related to drug trafficking. Illicit funds are laundered in Belgium through the diamond industry, real estate, front companies, gambling or amusement halls, currency exchange bureaus, international wire transfers, and banks. Belgium has a comprehensive anti-money laundering regime.

The Government of Belgium (GOB) in 1990 criminalized money laundering related to all crimes, and in 1993, passed additional legislation that mandated reporting of suspicious transactions by financial institutions and created a financial intelligence unit (FIU), Financial Information Processing Center (CTIF-CFI), to analyze them. As of June 2000, the CTIF-CFI had created 8,094 distinct case files since becoming operational in 1993, and 2,020 between July 1999 and June 2000. The CTIF-CFI is member of the Egmont Group.

Belgian financial institutions are required to maintain records on the identities of clients engaged in transactions that are considered suspicious, or that involve an amount equal to or greater than EUR 10,000 (approximately US $9,400). Financial institutions also are required to train their personnel in the detection and handling of suspicious transactions that could be linked to money laundering. No civil, penal, or disciplinary actions can be taken against institutions or individuals for reporting such transactions in good faith.

In 1998 and 1999, the GOB adopted legislation that mandates the reporting of suspicious transactions by notaries, accountants, bailiffs, real estate agents, casinos, cash transporters, external tax consultants, certified accountants, and certified accountant-tax experts. Casinos also are required to report certain other transactions.

The Judicial Police have primary responsibility for investigating money laundering in Belgium. However, the Gendarmerie also can investigate money laundering if the predicate offense is one over which the Gendarmerie has jurisdiction.

Belgium is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the European Union. Belgium is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Belgium has a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty with the United States, which entered into force on January 1, 2000. The GOB exchanges information with other countries through international treaties and with foreign FIUs that have secrecy obligations similar to those of CTIF/CFI.

Belize (Concern). Belize is vulnerable to money laundering because of its growing offshore sector, which has two banks, an unknown number of international trusts, and over 16,000 international business companies (IBCs). Belize also has one Internet gaming site.

In 2000, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) conducted a review of Belize's anti-money laundering regime against 25 specified criteria. Belize was not identified by the FATF as a noncooperative country in the international fight against money laundering. However, the FATF in its June report noted the following about Belize's anti-money laundering regime:

Since criminalizing money laundering in 1996, Belize has generally pursued policies in law and regulation aimed at fostering a sound anti-money laundering regime. Belize has, nonetheless, certain deficiencies with regard to IBCs, particularly in the identification of beneficial owners and in ascertaining other information that could prove useful in protecting against criminal abuse of its offshore sector.

The International Business Companies Act of 1990 (Amended 1995) established a licensing system and a regulatory body, the International Financial Services Commission (IFSC), for Belize's offshore sector. The IFSC is comprised primarily of individuals with ties to the offshore industry. IBCs can no longer issue bearer shares, and the Government of Belize (GOB) reportedly is considering ways to abolish or immobilize bearer shares that are already in existence. IBC records are maintained by the Belize International Services Limited, a subsidiary of CHI Corporation, a company traded on the NASDAQ and formerly known as BHI Corporation. Offshore trusts are prevalent in Belize because they do not have to be registered with any regulatory body.

Belize's Offshore Banking Act (OBA), which regulates offshore banks, and the Money Laundering Prevention Act (MLPA) have been in force since 1996. The MLPA criminalizes money laundering related to many serious crimes; mandates reporting of suspicious transactions by banks and non-bank financial institutions; specifies penalties for banks, non-bank financial institutions, and intermediaries who assist and collaborate in money laundering; and authorizes international cooperation in money laundering cases. The OBA and the Financial Institutions Act require financial institutions to report the identities of customers who engage in currency transactions of a large, complex, or unusual nature.

The Ministry of Finance has the authority to examine financial institutions' records. Financial institutions are required to retain records for a minimum of five years, and can lose their licenses and face a maximum fine of US $50,000 for failing to do so. Individual bankers can be held responsible if their institutions are caught laundering money. However, bankers can be protected from prosecution if they cooperate with law enforcement.

In 2000, the GOB reportedly issued the International Financial Services Commission (Licensing) Regulations 2000, which specifies licensing requirements for Belize's offshore financial services providers. Under the regulations, only lawyers, accountants, and companies registered under the Company Act as financial institutions would be eligible for such a license. The GOB has proposed draft legislation, the Customs Regulation Act, which would require individuals to declare cross-border movements of currency that exceed US $5,000.

The GOB has not prosecuted a single money laundering case under the MLPA, and in 2000, made no money laundering arrests. The GOB has an investigative unit within the National Criminal Investigation Branch that works with the central bank on financial cases.

Belize is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. Belize is a member of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), and the Organization of American States Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS/CICAD) Experts Group to Control Money Laundering. In August 2000, the GOB made a ministerial-level commitment to adhere to the minimum performance standards agreed to at the March 2000 UN Global Program Against Money Laundering. The United States and Belize have signed a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT), but it is not yet in force.

The GOB should pass legislation that requires offshore trusts to be registered with a central authority. Moreover, the GOB should take appropriate steps to ensure that its oversight of IBCs is conducted free of undue influence from the industry.

Benin (Other). Benin is not a major financial center. However, Beninese officials believe their country is being used by narcotics traffickers to launder profits. Although the exact nature of money laundering is unknown, Beninese officials suspect that the primary method is through the purchase of assets such as real estate, the wholesale shipment of vehicles or items for resale, and front companies. In addition, some laundering seems to occur through the banking system.

A 1997 anti-narcotics law criminalizes narcotics-related money laundering, and provides penalties of up to 20 years in prison as well as substantial fines. The law requires that all financial institutions report transactions they believe may be narcotics-related; they enjoy safe harbor protection if they do so. Financial institutions that fail to comply are subject to prison terms for their officials and fines. However, the government has not taken any significant steps to address the problem of money laundering not related to narcotics trafficking.

Benin is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Bermuda (Other). Bermuda has a large offshore financial services sector that may be attractive to money laundering. However, the Government of Bermuda has taken a number of measures to aid in the detection, investigation, and prosecution of financial crimes. As with the other British Caribbean Overseas Territories, Bermuda underwent a thorough evaluation of its financial regulation in 2000, co-sponsored by the local and British governments.

Bermuda's offshore financial sector is dominated by its nearly 1,300 insurance (mainly captive and reinsurance) companies. The sector also has approximately 11,000 "exempt companies" (international business companies). The Bermuda Monetary Authority (BMA) is the main regulator and requires disclosure and vetting of proposed beneficial owners before registering exempt companies.

The Proceeds of Crime Act 1997 criminalizes money laundering related to all "relevant offenses," including drug trafficking, corruption, counterfeiting, and fraud. The Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) Regulations 1998 contain a number of obligations for regulated institutions, including customer identification, record keeping, and reporting of suspicious transactions. The government also issued guidance notes in 1998 to assist financial institutions to recognize suspicious transactions and comply with their obligations.

The Financial Investigation Unit (FIU), within the Bermuda Police Service, serves as Bermuda's financial intelligence unit. It receives, analyzes, and investigates suspicious activity report (SARs). Through the end of 1999, the unit had received approximately 2,400 SARs. The FIU is a member of the Egmont Group.

Bermuda is subject to the US/UK MLAT and the US/UK extradition treaty. Bermuda is a member of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), and through the UK, is also a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. Bermuda is also a member of the Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors (OGBS).

Continued supervision and enforcement of regulations in the financial sector are necessary to discourage infiltration by organized crime and money launderers. Bermuda should also consider devoting additional resources toward investigative efforts to combat money laundering to more thoroughly deter international criminals.

Bolivia (Concern). Bolivia is not major financial center, and does not have an offshore sector. However, Bolivia has had a long tradition of banking secrecy that has facilitated money laundering, particularly the profits of contraband smuggling, organized crime, and drug trafficking.

The Government of Bolivia (GOB) criminalized money laundering related to organized criminal activities and public corruption through the 1988 Controlled Substances Law (No. 1008) and Law 1768 of March 1997, which amended Bolivia's Penal Code. Law 1768 also authorized creation of the Financial Investigations Unit (FIU) within the Office of the Superintendent of Banks and Financial Institutions to be responsible for implementing anti-money laundering controls. Decree 24771 of July 1997 requires banks, brokerages, and insurance companies to identify their customers, retain records of transactions for a minimum of 10 years, and report unusual and suspicious financial transactions to the FIU. The FIU has established mechanisms for sharing information with Bolivia's Public Ministry and the Special Counter-Narcotics Force (FELCN). However, personnel shortages within the Public Ministry, law enforcement, and the FIU, as well as the FIU's inability to monitor the activities of certain financial institutions, have hindered full implementation and enforcement of Bolivia's anti-money laundering controls.

The FIU is a member of the Egmont Group. Bolivia is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Bolivia is a member of the Organization of American States Inter-American Commission on Drug Abuse Control (OAS/CICAD) Experts Group to Control Money Laundering, and is a member of the South America Financial Action Task Force (GAFISUD). The GOB and the United States in 1995 signed an extradition treaty, which entered into force in 1996.

The GOB is urged to extend provisions of its anti-money laundering legislation to cover all financial institutions and to ensure that anti-money laundering bodies are sufficiently staffed.

Bosnia and Herzegovina (Other). Bosnia and Herzegovina is neither a financial center nor a money-laundering center. Laundering the proceeds of criminal activity through financial institutions is widespread, although narcotics proceeds tend to be diverted outside Bosnia. Neither US currency nor proceeds of drug sales in the US are significantly involved. Bosnia is a significant consumer of and transit point for a variety of illegal goods traded on the black market and has experienced an alarming increase in alien smuggling, which is conservatively estimated to amount to US $50 million per year. Money laundering has not been criminalized, but is now prohibited in the civil code.

Regulatory supervision of the banking sector is largely vested at the local rather than the federal level through two separate but roughly parallel banking agencies. Although legislation generally reflects the Basle Committee's core principles, including suspicious transaction reporting and due diligence requirements, in practice banking standards do not conform to international norms, as recent bank failures have demonstrated. Some safe harbor protection has now been afforded to banking officials for actions taken in the course of their professional duties. However, Bosnia's laws remain an unwieldy combination of communist-era statutes and internationally imposed reforms. Enforcement is tenuous at best in this cash-based, largely unregulated economy, thereby creating widespread potential for financial crime.

In addition, ambiguous lines of responsibility among investigative and regulatory agencies have aggravated already rampant political interference in investigations and direct intimidation of officials.

Bosnia is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention and in December 2000 it signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Botswana (Other). Botswana is neither a major financial center nor a money-laundering center; it is, however, an offshore financial center. The Government of Botswana has enacted strict legislation against drug production and trafficking, as well as narcotics-related money laundering. The Bank of Botswana has the discretion to provide information on large currency transactions to law enforcement agencies.

Because of concerns that Botswana's status as an offshore financial center could increase its vulnerability to money laundering, regulations reportedly have been drafted that would regulate Botswana's International Financial Services Center (IFSC).

Botswanan officials have expressed interest in obtaining training to combat bank fraud and money laundering.

Botswana is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention and is expected to sign the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group's Memorandum of Understanding in 2001.

Brazil (Primary). Money laundering that is related to drug trafficking and white-collar crime continues to occur in Brazil despite the Government of Brazil's (GOB) efforts to introduce regulatory and investigative measures to address the problem. A highly developed financial sector and an increasing problem with local drug consumption and trafficking have made Brazil a money-laundering center. In December 2000, a Brazilian Congressional Investigative Committee (CPI) probing narcotics trafficking released a 1,200-page report that detailed a vast network of drug-related organized crime, corruption, and money laundering. The report implicated over 800 people, including two federal congressmen, former state governors and other officials. The CPI estimates that approximately $50 billion is laundered in Brazil annually.

The GOB has a comprehensive anti-money laundering regulatory regime in place. Law 9613 of March 3, 1998 criminalized money laundering related to drug trafficking and other offenses, and penalizes offenders with a maximum of 16 years in prison. The law expanded the GOB's asset seizure and forfeiture provisions and exempts "good faith" compliance from criminal or civil prosecution.

The law also created the GOB's financial intelligence unit (FIU), the Council for the Control of Financial Activities (COAF), which is housed within the Ministry of Finance. The COAF includes representatives from regulatory and law enforcement agencies-including the central bank and Federal Police-and has a staff of 16 people with plans to expand to 22 in 2001. The COAF regulates those financial sectors not already under the jurisdiction of another supervising entity. In 1999, the COAF issued regulations that addressed real estate, factoring companies, gaming and lotteries, dealers in jewelry and precious metals, bingo, credit cards, commodities trading, and dealers in art and antiques. The regulations require customer identification, record keeping, and reporting of suspicious transactions directly to the COAF. In 2000 the COAF issued regulations slightly amending the bingo, lotteries, and gaming regulations.

As of October 2000, the COAF indicated that it had received, since its inception, 5,208 suspicious transactions reports (STRs), involving approximately 5 million reais (approximately US $2.5 million). Nearly 1000 of these reports were generated from bingo, leading the COAF to speculate that this sector may be experiencing the largest expansion in money-laundering activity. By the end of 2000, the COAF reported that it had received 6,673 STRs, leading to over 130 ongoing investigations and 100 prosecutions.

In 1999, the GOB's other regulatory bodies, the central bank, the Securities Commission (CVM), the Examiner of Private Insurance Companies (SUSEP), and the Office of Supplemental Pension Plans (PC), issued parallel regulations to covered institutions that spell out requirements for customer identification and reporting of suspicious transactions. All of these regulations include a list of guidelines that help institutions identify suspicious transactions. The central bank also established the DECIF (Departamento de Combate a Ilícitos Cambiais e Financeiros) to implement anti-money laundering policy, receive suspicious activity reports from financial institutions, and forward information to the COAF. Current bank secrecy provisions, however, protect specific account information, and thus the COAF receives only partial information from the central bank. All other government agencies-except for congressional investigative committees-must get a court order to access detailed bank account and subject information. International requestors may only obtain this information through a letter rogatory. In early January 2001, however, President Fernando Henrique Cardoso signed into law a measure that will give all regulatory bodies direct access to complete banking information without court approval. However, some Brazilian legal scholars and legislators predict that the legislation will face judicial review that is likely to render it unconstitutional.

Regulations issued in 1998 require that individuals transporting more than 10,000 reais (approximately US $5,000) in cash, checks or traveler's checks across the Brazilian border must fill out a customs declaration that is sent to the central bank. Financial institutions remitting more than 10,000 reais (approximately US $5,000) also must make a declaration to the central bank.

In August 2000, Brazil hosted a summit of South American presidents; the agenda of which included signing a memorandum of understanding creating the South American Financial Action Task Force (GAFISUD). In December 2000, Brazil and the other member countries of MERCOSUR signed an agreement outlining cooperation among central banks in money laundering investigations.

The GOB continues to investigate and prosecute large money laundering operations. A joint investigation by the Federal Police, the central bank, the Federal Revenue Office, and the COAF uncovered a network that allegedly laundered 30 billion reais (approximately US $15 billion) between 1998 and 1999. Most of the laundered funds were the proceeds of drug trafficking, and trafficking in weapons and goods. Illicit funds from several Brazilian states were sent primarily to Foz de Iguaçu, a city near the border with Paraguay, where the launderers used exchange houses, more than 100 large companies, 300 "laranjas," (individuals who allow their names to be used for a fee), and special non-resident "CC-5" accounts to transfer the money abroad. The Federal Police-who are cooperating with international authorities to track down the funds-have made several arrests and secured over 300 indictments in the case.

The Brazilian press has reported extensively on the investigation of Judge Nicolau dos Santos Neto, who is accused of embezzling 169 million reais (approximately $85 million) in funds earmarked for construction of a city courthouse. Nicolau allegedly used a system of front companies in offshore havens to transfer money and buy property abroad, including the United States. Brazilian authorities have been working with foreign authorities to track down these assets, and thus far, have identified bank accounts in the United States and Switzerland-the latter totaling approximately $4 million-and an apartment in Miami worth approximately $1 million. In December, Judge Nicolau turned himself in to authorities and now awaits trial on charges of embezzlement, corruption, tax evasion, and money laundering.

The COAF has been a member of the Egmont Group since May 1999. In June 2000, Brazil became a full member of FATF. The GOB and the United States signed a bilateral Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty in October 1997. The Brazilian Congress approved this treaty in December 2000, and the treaty will enter into force upon the exchange of instruments of ratification. Brazil is a member of the Organization of American States Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS/CICAD) Experts Group to Control Money Laundering. Brazil is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. The GOB has bilateral information exchange agreements with Belgium, France, Paraguay, Portugal, Paraguay, and Spain.

Although the laundering of proceeds from drug trafficking and other crimes remains a major problem in Brazil, the GOB has taken important regulatory and investigative steps to address the problem. However, the GOB should ensure that all regulatory bodies have appropriate access to financial disclosure information. This would facilitate analysis, coordination, and cooperation among domestic and international authorities in their efforts to investigate and prosecute money laundering and other financial crimes.

British Virgin Islands (Concern). The British Virgin Islands (BVI) is a Caribbean Overseas Territory (COT) of the United Kingdom (UK). The BVI is vulnerable to money laundering because of an offshore sector that is one of the largest in the Caribbean. Financial services and tourism account for approximately 50 percent of the BVI's economy. The BVI's offshore sector offers incorporation and management of offshore companies, and provision of offshore financial and corporate services. The BVI has 13 banks (four of which are commercial), and approximately 1800 mutual funds, 140 captive insurance companies, 900 registered vessels, 90 licensed trust companies, and 360,000 international business companies (IBCs). Approximately 40 percent of the IBCs are resident in Hong Kong.

According to the International Business Companies Act of 1984, BVI-registered IBCs cannot engage in business with BVI residents, provide registered offices or agent facilities for BVI-incorporated companies, or own an interest in real property located in BVI, except for office leases. BVI's 90 registered agents are licensed by the Financial Services Unit (FSU), and are required to complete certification programs. Registered agents must verify the identities of their clients. The process for registering banks, trust companies, and insurers is governed by legislation that requires more detailed documentation such as a business plan and approval of the appropriate supervisor within the Financial Services Inspectorate.

The BVI criminalized drug money laundering through the Drug Trafficking Offences Act, 1987, amended 1990, and the Criminal Justice (International Co-operation) Act, 1993. The Proceeds of Criminal Conduct Act, 1997 expanded predicate offenses for money laundering to all criminal conduct, and created a financial intelligence unit, the Reporting Authority-BVI (RA-BVI), which is a member of the Egmont Group. The Financial Investigations Unit (FIU) is responsible for investigating fraud and money laundering cases, and is comprised of three police officers. Most of its investigations have involved IBCs and other offshore entities.

The Anti-Money Laundering Code of Practice (AMLCP), 1999 establishes procedures to identify and report suspicious transactions. The AMLCP requires covered entities to create a clearly defined reporting chain for employees to follow when reporting suspicious transactions, and to appoint a reporting officer to receive these reports. The reporting officer must conduct an initial inquiry into the suspicious transaction and report it to the authorities if sufficient suspicion remains. Failure to report could result in criminal liability. The FIU reportedly reviews approximately 30 suspicious transaction report (STRs) annually. In 1999, the FIU conducted 278 company inquiries, and in 2000, conducted approximately 1200. None of these queries has resulted in prosecutions. To date, the BVI has prosecuted only one money laundering case.

The Joint Anti-Money Laundering Coordinating Committee (JAMLCC) was established in 1999 to coordinate all the BVI's anti-money laundering initiatives. It is a broad-based, multi-disciplinary body comprised of private and public sector representatives. The JAMLCC has drafted Guidance Notes based on those of the UK and Guernsey.

In 2000, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) reviewed BVI's anti-money laundering regime against 25 criteria. The FATF did not identify the BVI as a noncooperative jurisdiction in the international fight against money laundering. However, the FATF raised certain issues in its June 2000 report:

The BVI allows certain intermediaries, and individuals, which are subject to the same anti-money laundering standards and supervision as financial institutions, to introduce business to banks and financial institutions on the basis that the introducers themselves verify the identify of the customer. In addition, the BVI allows certain institutions based in certain overseas countries, subject to equivalent anti-money laundering systems, to introduce business, without separately verifying the identity of the customer. The banks and the financial institutions are only required to know the name of the client but not to verify the identity separately. There is concern as to whether such a system is consistent with FATF Recommendations and provides sufficiently rigorous checks on the identity of clients of banks and financial institutions, especially in cases where the introducer is not a financial institution.

The BVI also has a large number of IBCs, the formation of which by intermediaries is subject to fewer identification requirements than applied to the company sector as a whole.

In 2000, the BVI passed the Criminal Justice (International Cooperation) (Amendment) Act, 2000, criminalizing the act of acquiring, using, or possessing drug proceeds, and "tipping off" individuals under investigation. The BVI also has proposed the Code of Conduct (Service Providers) Act (CCSPA) and the Information Assistance (Financial Services) Act (IAFSA). The CCSPA would encourage professionalism, enhance measures to deter criminal activity, promote ethical conduct, and encourage greater self-regulation in the financial sector. The CCSPA also would establish the Council of Service Providers, a body that would regulate the conduct of individuals within the financial services industry. The Council also would formulate policy, procedures, and other measures to regulate the industry, advise the government on legislation and policy matters, and monitor compliance within the industry. The IAFSA would increase the scope of cooperation between BVI's regulators and regulators from other countries.

The BVI is a member of Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) and, through the UK, is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. The BVI is subject to the US/UK Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty.

The BVI should fully implement and enforce all provisions of its recently passed legislation. The BVI also is urged to eliminate any legal and regulatory impediments to international cooperation and exchange of information.

Brunei (Other). Brunei is not known to be a money-laundering center. It is however, an offshore financial center. The Government of Brunei has drafted anti-money laundering legislation and has evinced a strong interest in learning about methods to combat money laundering. Although Brunei has asset forfeiture laws they have not yet been applied to narcotics-related cases. Brunei's Narcotics Control Board has taken part in courses offered by ILEA in Bangkok, and recently attended a money-laundering seminar hosted by DEA in Singapore.

Earlier this year, the Sultanate of Brunei brought into effect a series of laws that established the International Financial Center: the International Business Companies Order 2000; the International Banking Order 2000; the Registered Agents and Trustees Licensing Order 2000; the International Trusts Order 2000; and the International Limited Partnerships Order.

This new offshore financial services center will offer banking services, provide for the formation of IBCs, trusts and limited partnerships. Supervisory authority is reportedly vested in a separate unit of the Ministry of Finance-referred to simply as the "Authority." Reports indicate that this entity, however, will combine both regulatory and marketing responsibilities.

Brunei is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. Brunei is an observer jurisdiction to the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering.

Bulgaria (Concern). Bulgaria, particularly its financial system, is vulnerable to money laundering related to narcotics trafficking and financial crimes such as bank and corporate fraud, embezzlement, tax evasion, tax fraud, and the illegal conversion of state-owned property. The proceeds of drug trafficking, contraband smuggling, vehicle theft, alien smuggling, prostitution, and extortion also are laundered in Bulgaria. The source and destination for much of the illicit funds include Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, Turkey, and the Middle East. The presence of organized criminal groups and official corruption contribute to Bulgaria's money laundering problem. Small-scale change bureaus also may play a role. The Government of Bulgaria (GOB) has declared the eradication of organized crime, corruption, and money laundering a national priority.

Bulgaria's anti-money laundering legislation, the Law on Measures Against Money Laundering, entered into force in July 1998. Money laundering is criminalized by Articles 253 and 253a of the Bulgarian Criminal Code; the law applies to the proceeds of all serious crimes. Anti-money laundering measures include customer identification and record keeping requirements, suspicious transaction reporting, and internal rules for financial institutions on implementation of an anti-money laundering program. Banks, securities brokers, auditors, accountants, insurance companies, investment companies, and other businesses are subject to these reporting requirements. Bank information can be obtained by law enforcement through a court order and an instruction from the prosecutor general. The money laundering legislation does not apply to casinos, which are an increasingly important mechanism for laundering money in Bulgaria.

The Ministry of Finance's Bureau of Financial Intelligence (BFI) is Bulgaria's financial intelligence unit. Since its establishment, the BFI has suspended 21 suspicious funds transfers to foreign banks, and has opened seven money-laundering investigations.

The GOB is considering legislation that would address forfeiture and seizure of criminal assets, allow indictment of legal persons on money laundering charges, and prohibit funds of dubious or criminal origin from being used in the acquisition of banks and businesses through the privatization process.

Bulgaria is a member of the Council of Europe (COE) and participates in the COE's Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures (PC-R-EV). In November 1999, Bulgaria underwent a mutual evaluation by the PC-R-EV, and has been implementing changes to its anti-money laundering regime based on recommendations in the group's report. Bulgaria is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Bulgaria has no bilateral agreements on money laundering.

The GOB is urged to further strengthen its anti-money laundering regime through approval and full implementation of proposed measures that would address seizure and forfeiture of criminal assets; allow indictment of legal persons on money laundering charges; and prohibit funds of dubious or criminal origin from being used in the acquisition of banks and businesses through the privatization process.

Burma (Primary). Burma's economy continues to be vulnerable to drug money laundering because of its under-regulated financial system, weak anti-money laundering regime, and policies that facilitate the funneling of drug money into commercial enterprises and infrastructure investment.

Political and economic constraints on the flow of legitimate capital into Burma have increased the importance of narcotics-derived funds to the Burmese economy. As a result of cease-fire agreements, the Government of Burma (GOB) has encouraged former insurgent groups to invest money into legitimate commercial ventures. This policy has the effect of facilitating the laundering of illegal drug proceeds by some of the former insurgent groups through investments in banks, hotels, and construction companies. Businesses owned by family members of former or present drug traffickers also have invested heavily in infrastructure projects such as roads and port facilities, banks, hotels, casinos, and other real estate development projects.

In 1993, the GOB adopted the Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Law. This law criminalizes narcotics-related money laundering and allows for seizure of assets that are derived from the drug trade. The GOB has been slow to implement provisions of this law, and has targeted few, if any, traffickers or their assets. GOB officials admit to having difficulty in implementing provisions related to money laundering because of their lack of expertise in money laundering and financial crimes investigations. The GOB reportedly is drafting new anti-money laundering legislation that would address deficiencies in its present legislation.

Burma does not have a financial intelligence unit, and is not active in international or regional anti-money laundering fora. Burma is an observer jurisdiction to the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering. Burma is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. The GOB has bilateral drug control agreements with India, Bangladesh, Vietnam, Russia, Laos, and the Philippines. It is not known whether these agreements cover cooperation on money laundering issues.

Burma must increase the regulation and oversight of its banking system, and end policies that facilitate the investment of drug money into the legitimate economy. Burma also should step up efforts to enforce existing money laundering legislation by investigating and prosecuting money launderers. Moreover, Burma is urged to pass new legislation that would expand predicate crimes for money laundering and provide additional tools to authorities for the detection and prosecution of money laundering.

Cambodia (Concern). Cambodia is not a major financial center, and does not have an offshore sector. Cambodia is vulnerable to money laundering because it is a transit country for heroin trafficking from the Golden Triangle. Crime, corruption, and money laundering reportedly are on the increase in Cambodia.

Cambodia in 1996 criminalized money laundering related to narcotics trafficking through the Law on Drug Control. The law includes provisions for customer identification, suspicious transaction reporting, and the creation of the Anti-Money Laundering Commission (AMLC) under the Prime Minister's Office. The composition and functions of the AMLC were to be promulgated through a separate decree. The provisions of this law have yet to be fully implemented and enforced.

In December 1999, Cambodia passed legislation, "The Law on Banking and Financial Institutions," that imposed capital and prudential requirements on financial institutions. Capital requirements for commercial banks will increase from US $5 million to US $13.5 million. Commercial banks also must maintain 20 percent of their capital on deposit with the National Bank of Cambodia (NBC) as reserves. The law required the NBC to review all banking licenses within one year. Only four banks-all foreign-owned-have received licenses under the new law. An additional 15 banks will have a one-year grace period to meet licensing requirements.

Money laundering offenses are investigated by the same entities that have jurisdiction over the underlying predicate crimes. However, these entities are not trained to detect, investigate, and prosecute money laundering cases.

Cambodia has assisted neighboring countries with money laundering investigations. Cambodia is not a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

The Government of Cambodia (GOC) should fully implement and enforce its anti-money laundering legislation. Moreover, the GOC should better educate officials and financial institutions about anti-money laundering methods.

Cameroon (Other). Cameroon is not a regional financial center. Although illicit drugs transit Cameroon, there is no information indicating significant money-laundering activity. Cameroon's banking system is supervised by the Bank of Central African States (BEAC), a regional central bank that serves six countries of Central Africa.

In November 2000, Cameroon and the BEAC hosted a conference for BEAC member countries to devise joint structures and legal strategies for fighting money laundering.

Cameroon has not criminalized money laundering.

Cameroon is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000 signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Canada (Primary). Canada is neither a regional nor an offshore financial center. However, Canada remains vulnerable to money laundering because of its advanced financial services sector and heavy cross-border flow of currency and monetary instruments. Canada has financial institutions that engage in currency transactions involving international narcotics proceeds that include significant amounts of US dollars. Canada's financial institutions have been used to launder the proceeds of Latin American and Asian drug trafficking, and Asian organized crime. As a result of the common border between our two countries, strong and effective anti-money laundering enforcement is essential. The US Government is particularly concerned about the cross-border movements of currency.

The Government of Canada (GOC) continues to strengthen its anti-money laundering regime. In July 2000, the GOC passed the Proceeds of Money Laundering Control Act (PMLCA), which adopted enhancements recommended by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in 1999. The full effectiveness of this new legislation will not be known, however, until strong implementing regulations are put into place and enforced.

The PMLCA established the Financial Transaction and Reports Analysis Center (FinTRAC) on July 5, 2000. Under implementing regulations, FinTRAC will collect and analyze suspicious activities reports (SARs) from financial institutions and financial intermediaries, and determine which suspicious transactions merit further investigation. In addition, money service businesses, casinos, lawyers, and accountants handling third-party transactions are required to file SARs. The GOC expects that FinTRAC will be fully operational by mid-2001. The GOC presently is identifying managers and other staff for FinTRAC, and purchasing computer hardware and software. The GOC intends to have FinTRAC recognized by the Egmont Group as a Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU). FinTRAC will have the authority to negotiate and set guidelines for sharing information with foreign counterparts. US law enforcement has expressed concerns that there may be legal impediments restricting FinTRAC's ability to share information. The PMLCA also mandates reporting of cross-border movements of currency or monetary instruments as will be defined in implementing regulations.

Canada is a member of the FATF, and underwent a second FATF mutual evaluation in May 1997. Canada is a member of the Organization of American States Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS/CICAD) Experts Group to Control Money Laundering. Canada also participates in the CFATF as a Cooperating and Supporting Nation. Canada is an observer jurisdiction to the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG). Canada has long-standing agreements with the United States on law enforcement cooperation, including treaties on extradition and mutual legal assistance. Canada is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

The GOC should ensure that the FinTRAC meets Egmont standards for FIUs, especially with regard to sharing information with other FIUs. The GOC also is urged to adopt and fully implement regulations that define cross-border currency reporting requirements.

Cayman Islands (Primary). The Cayman Islands, a United Kingdom (UK) Caribbean Overseas Territory (COT), remains vulnerable to money laundering because of its significant offshore sector that provides a wide range of services such as private banking, brokerage services, mutual funds, various types of trusts as well as company formation and company management. In March 2000, Cayman Islands authorities reported that approximately 570 banks and trust companies, 2,238 mutual funds, and 499 captive insurance companies were licensed in the Cayman Islands.

In addition, approximately 45,000 offshore companies are registered in the Cayman Islands.

In June 2000, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) identified the Cayman Islands as non-cooperative in international efforts to fight money laundering. The FATF in its report cited several concerns:

The Cayman Islands does not have any legal requirements for customer identification and record keeping. Even if in the absence of a mandatory requirement, financial institutions were to identify their customers, supervisory authorities cannot, as a matter of law, readily access information regarding the identity of customers. Moreover, the supervisory authority places too much reliance on home country supervisors' assessment of management of bank branches.

Although the Cayman Islands has criminalized the laundering of the proceeds of all serious crimes and its system encourages reporting of suspicious transactions (by providing a safe harbor from criminal liability for those who report), it lacks a mandatory regime for the reporting of suspicious transactions. Moreover, a large class of management companies-including those providing nominee shareholders for the purpose of formation of a company or holding the issued capital of a company-is unregulated.

At the same time, the Cayman Islands has been a leader in developing anti-money laundering programs throughout the Caribbean region. It has served as president of CFATF, and it has provided substantial assistance to neighboring states in the region. It has demonstrated co-operation on criminal law enforcement matters, and uncovered several serious cases of fraud and money laundering otherwise unknown to authorities in FATF member states. In addition, it has closed several financial institutions on the basis of concerns about money laundering.

In July 2000, the US Treasury Department issued an advisory to US financial institutions warning them to pay special attention to give "enhanced scrutiny for certain transactions or banking relationships" involving the Cayman Islands.

In 1999, the Cayman Islands and the other UK COTs agreed to undergo a comprehensive review of their financial regulation, and implement recommended changes. The results of this review were published in October 2000 and indicate that although the Cayman Islands has made progress, its current regulatory structure was still not fully in accordance with international standards. The primary recommendations of the report were:

* Full operational independence for the Cayman Islands Monetary Authority.

* Improved supervision of the Cayman Islands Stock Exchange.

* Increased on-site visits by banking regulators.

* Improved supervisory process of company service and trust service providers.

* Strengthened regulation of partnerships.

* Improved international cooperation.

* Enhancements to the Misuse of Drugs Law.

* A review of the Code of Practice to ensure that it takes account of the Money Laundering Regulations 2000.

The report also stressed the importance of addressing bearer shares, and noted that the Cayman Islands in 2001 plans to introduce legislation that would immobilize bearer shares. The report lauded the Cayman Islands' efforts to date in strengthening its anti-money laundering regime.

In 2000, the Cayman Islands approved regulations and legislation that were intended to address deficiencies in it anti-money laundering regime. Regulations that entered into force in September 2000 specified record keeping and customer identification requirements for financial institutions. The regulations specifically cover individuals who establish a new business relationship, engage in a one-time transaction over Cayman Islands (CI) $15,000, or may be engaging in money laundering. The customer identification requirements do not apply to existing accounts with financial intermediaries.

Amendments to the Proceeds of Criminal Conduct Law (PCCL) make failure to report a suspicious transaction a criminal offense that could result in fines or imprisonment. The law does not specify a time frame in which suspicious transaction reports must be made, but instead, states that the transaction should be reported within a "reasonably practicable" timeframe once it comes to the person's attention.

Amendments to the Monetary Authority Law (MAL) grant the Cayman Islands Monetary Authority (CIMA) the power to obtain information from a person regulated under the laws of the Cayman Islands, a connected person, or a person reasonably believed to have information relevant to an inquiry by CIMA. The amendment includes provisions for identification of account holders and beneficial owners. However, CIMA can only obtain information about the identity of a client through a court order, which hinders CIMA's ability to detect, investigate, and take action against money laundering and the underlying offense. Further amendments to the MAL grant CIMA the authority to assist certain overseas regulators by sharing information in its files and obtaining client and other information from regulated and unregulated persons. CIMA's assistance is limited to overseas regulatory authorities that have the same functions as CIMA or those authorities "as may be specified in regulations" that have yet to be promulgated.

Also in 2000, the Cayman Islands passed the Banks and Trust Companies (Amendment) (Access to Information) Law, 2000, and the Companies Management (Amendment) (Access to Information) Law, 2000.

The Cayman Islands published a non-binding money laundering Code of Practice pursuant to Section 20 of the Proceeds of Criminal Conduct Law (1999 Revision) to coincide with its hosting of the UN Offshore Plenary Forum of International Money Laundering. The Code of Practice is intended to give Cayman Islands financial service providers guidance about preventing and detecting money laundering. The code outlines procedures for identifying clients, training staff, documenting evidence, and maintaining records consistent with international standards. However, the Code does not create a legal obligation; therefore, failure to comply with its provisions does not constitute a legal offense.

The Cayman Islands cooperates with US law enforcement in money laundering cases. In 1999, the Cayman Islands did not prosecute anyone for money laundering; however, it did arrest several individuals on suspicion of money laundering.

The Cayman Islands, through the UK, is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. The Cayman Islands is a member of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) and the Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors (OGBS). In addition, there is a 1986 US-UK Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) covering the Cayman Islands.

The Cayman Islands has made progress toward strengthening its anti-money laundering regime, and is urged to fully address all deficiencies that have been identified in its anti-money laundering regime. In particular, the Cayman Islands should follow through on its stated plans to immobilize bearer shares.

Chile (Concern). Chile has a well-developed financial sector, but is not considered a major regional financial center. Chile does not have an offshore sector. Chile continues to be vulnerable to money laundering because it lacks key legal provisions that aid in the prevention and detection of money laundering. According to press reports in April 2000, a Chilean Senate Finance Committee estimated that approximately US $10 billion is laundered annually through Chile. Money launderers reportedly exploit Chilean banks, commodities brokerages, and currency exchange businesses. Moreover, large real estate projects and casinos also are vulnerable to money laundering.

In 1995, Chile criminalized money laundering related to narcotics trafficking through the Counternarcotics Law. The law allows banks to voluntarily report suspicious or unusual financial transactions. However, the legislation has no "safe harbor" provisions that protect banks from potential civil or criminal liability. As a result, reporting of such transactions has been extremely low. Moreover, the legislation does not require reporting of large currency transactions. In December 1999, the Government of Chile (GOC) proposed legislation that would amend the Counternarcotics Law by mandating reporting of suspicious financial transactions, and creating a new financial intelligence unit to replace the existing FIU. However, the proposed legislation would not expand predicate crimes for money laundering. The Chilean Congress has not approved the legislation.

Chile's Judicial Reform Law of 1997 gives both the Council for the Defence of the State (CDE) and the Public Ministry responsibility for investigating money laundering cases. This joint arrangement will continue for at least two years. The pending amendments to the Counternarcotics Law would give the Public Ministry sole responsibility for implementing the new law when it is promulgated.

Chile is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Chile is a member of the Organization of American States Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS/CICAD) Experts Group to Control Money Laundering, and the newly created South American Financial Action Task Force (GAFISUD). Chile's current financial intelligence unit, the Departmento de Control de Trafico Ilicito de Estupefacientes, is a member of the Egmont Group.

In August 2000, Chile and the United States signed an agreement for cooperation and mutual assistance in narcotics-related matters. Chile has similar agreements in force with the United Kingdom, Spain, and the Czech Republic. Bilateral agreement negotiations are underway with France, Germany, Russia, Poland, Romania, Ukraine, Turkey, Tunisia, Guatemala, and Honduras.

The GOC is urged to pass anti-money laundering legislation that would mandate reporting of both suspicious and large currency transactions by financial institutions, provide "safe harbor" protections to entities that report such transactions, and expand predicate offenses for money laundering to include all serious crimes. Moreover, the COG should ensure that its FIU has the authority and resources necessary to make it an effective force against money laundering, and that it can readily share information with international counterparts.

China, People's Republic of (Primary). In response to the growing threat of money laundering, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has begun to focus greater attention on improving the country's anti-money laundering regime. The State Council (Cabinet) has directed various government agencies to examine their current anti-money laundering measures and to draft new regulations for the commercial banking, regulatory, and enforcement sectors. The government views an enhanced anti-money laundering regime as a means to stem the rise in financial crime and corruption. Narcotics trafficking, smuggling, extortion, alien smuggling, and the counterfeiting of currency and goods remain major sources of illegal proceeds in the PRC. Foreign and domestic organized criminal activity, endemic corruption at the provincial and local levels, and the continued presence of anonymous bank accounts contribute to the PRC's money-laundering problem.

The PRC's efforts to address money laundering began in 1990, when the National People's Congress (NPC) adopted the country's first law criminalizing narcotics-related money laundering and allowed the confiscation of narcotics proceeds. In 1997, the NPC adopted the PRC's current Criminal Code, Article 191, which makes it a crime to launder the proceeds of narcotics trafficking, organized criminal activity, and smuggling. Efforts are underway to draft amendments to the Code that would expand the definition of predicate offenses for money laundering to include the proceeds of all criminal activity. In addition to Article 191, Article 312 of the Criminal Code criminalizes complicity in concealing the proceeds of criminal activity.

As in many civil law-based countries, the PRC charges each offense separately, and defendants who have laundered the proceeds of a predicate crime usually are prosecuted for the predicate offense rather than money laundering because the predicate offense generally carries a heavier penalty and is easier to prove. The sentences handed down by tribunals in 2000 illustrate the severity of punishment. Several dozen senior officials at both the national and provincial levels were sentenced to death for corruption and smuggling.

The PRC took additional steps in 2000 to combat money laundering. In April 2000, the PRC passed a statute that requires anyone opening a new bank account to do so in his or her true name. When opening or depositing money into a new account, the customer must produce an identification card to verify his or her identity. Existing anonymous accounts may remain open for five years from the time of the account's establishment. After five years, the account holder must re-register the account in his or her true name only. Anonymous accounts will be phased out in 2005.

The People's Bank of China (PBOC)--China's central bank--has issued internal regulations that require currency transaction reports for all transactions involving Renminbi (RMB) 50,000 (US $6,000) or more. The PBOC also has issued rules concerning the recording and reporting of currency transactions at the county level, as well as a circular to Chinese banks regarding the reporting of suspicious transactions. Withdrawals of RMB 200,000 (US $24,000), deposits of RMB one million (US $120,000), or a series of aggregate transactions totaling RMB one million must be reported to the PBOC. At the county level, withdrawals of RMB 50,000 (US $6,000) require picture identification. However, central bank supervisors do not verify compliance with these rules.

In addition, the PRC has foreign currency exchange controls. Commercial banks require PRC citizens to justify the exchange of RMB into a foreign currency. The maximum amount of foreign currency that a PRC citizen may take out of the PRC is US $2,000. For foreigners, the threshold is US $5,000. Requests for exchanges of currency above these thresholds require advance certification through documentation of the need for the foreign currency, such as for foreign travel or commerce.

The United States and the PRC continue to discuss cooperation on money laundering and other law enforcement topics under the auspices of the US-PRC Joint Liaison Group (JLG) on law enforcement cooperation. The last JLG meeting took place in June 2000 in Beijing. In 2000, US enforcement and regulatory agencies hosted several law enforcement delegations from China to discuss money laundering and financial crimes. In addition, the US Departments of Treasury and Justice conducted various training seminars in the PRC featuring the enforcement and prosecutorial aspects of money laundering.

In October 2000, an interagency US Government team visited the PRC to assess the need for training to help PRC authorities combat money laundering. The team will make recommendations on future training.

The United States and the PRC in June 2000 signed a Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement (MLAA), which contains general obligations to cooperate in criminal matters. The agreement is not yet in force. The PRC is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. The PRC is a member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering.

As the PRC examines ways to enhance its anti-money laundering regime, consideration should be given to criminalizing money laundering for all serious crimes, and abolishing anonymous accounts prior to 2005. The PRC also should adopt comprehensive anti-money laundering legislation that establishes appropriate mechanisms for prevention, detection, and enforcement.

Colombia (Primary). Colombia has financial institutions that engage in currency transactions involving international narcotics proceeds that include significant amounts of US dollars. As the world's largest production and distribution source for cocaine and a significant supplier of heroin to the United States, Colombia has a natural vulnerability to drug money laundering. Pervasive commercial smuggling for tax and import duty avoidance, arms trafficking related to violent paramilitary groups and guerrilla organizations, along with continued capital flight from Colombia's fragile economy, are among additional factors that exacerbate the money laundering threat in Colombia. Trade-based money laundering, such as the Black Market Peso Exchange (BMPE), through which money launderers furnish narcotics-generated dollars in the United States to commercial smugglers, travel agents, investors and others in exchange for Colombian Pesos in Colombia, is a prominent method for laundering narcotics proceeds. Colombia also appears to be a significant destination and transit location for bulk shipment of narcotics-related United States currency, while the use of wire remitters and transactions involving precious metals and stones are believed to play significant roles in drug money laundering through Colombia. Smart cards and other financial sector technology represent growing challenges to money laundering enforcement in Colombia.

Although important reforms are needed to enhance law enforcement efforts, Colombia has significant legal authority to combat money laundering. Colombia has criminalized the laundering of the proceeds of extortion, illicit enrichment, rebellion, and drug trafficking. Colombia's 1996 extinction of domain forfeiture legislation provides for criminal forfeiture of drug money laundering proceeds, in rem forfeiture when assets are held in the name of a nominee or have been transferred, and forfeiture of substitute assets. Originally created by executive decree in 1998, Colombia formally adopted legislation in 1999 to establish a unified central Financial Information and Analysis Unit (UIAF) within the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit with broad authority to access and analyze financial information from public and private entities in Colombia. Additional forfeiture authority in criminal prosecutions is more generally available elsewhere in the Colombian criminal code.

In addition, the Superintendency of Banks has instituted "know your customer" regulations for the entities it regulates, including banks, insurance companies, trust companies, insurance agents and brokers, and leasing companies. Among other things, the Superintendency of Banks also has authority to rescind licenses for wire remitters. As a result of regulations issued in 2000, the Superintendency of Securities, which oversees Colombia's three stock exchanges, also will soon begin instituting anti-money laundering compliance procedures. However, the Colombian central bank's new External Resolution No. 8 issued in May 2000 relaxed certain requirements on individuals conducting currency exchange services, enabling them simply to identify this service when registering their business but eliminating the need for them to become fully licensed. Financial institutions and wire remitters are required to file suspicious activity reports, while currency transactions and cross-border movements of currency in excess of US $10,000 must also be reported. In addition, casas de cambio must file currency reports for transactions involving US $700 or more, while wire remitters must pay withdrawals over US $3000 by check.

The Prosecutor General's office established a specialized task force unit of agents and prosecutors to investigate and prosecute money laundering cases and forfeiture actions under the 1996 Extinction of Domain statute. Recent reductions in the rate of turnover among members of the unit may bring some stability to the office and increase its effectiveness. Including convictions under prior offenses of criminal reception and illicit enrichment, this unit has obtained criminal sentences in 33 money laundering related cases and has more than 200 active cases pending. Colombian authorities have seized more than 10,000 properties in more than 250 forfeiture actions, although Colombia has obtained forfeiture judgments in just twelve cases.

The UIAF receives an average of 500 suspicious activity reports (SARs) per month, totaling nearly 15,000 received since December of 1998. However, only thirteen of these SARs have been forwarded to the Prosecutor General's office for enforcement and only a handful of those forwarded have been accepted for further investigation or prosecution.

Colombia played a significant role in multilateral efforts to combat money laundering in 2000. In December, Colombia was the host of the inaugural meeting of GAFISUD, a South American regional anti-money laundering organization modeled after the Financial Action Task Force. Colombia also participated in a multilateral initiative with the Governments of the United States, Venezuela, Panama, and Aruba designed to address the problem of trade-based money laundering through the BMPE among the participating countries. In addition, in 2000 Colombia's UIAF became a new member of the Egmont Group.

During 2000, the United States and Colombia have continued to expand bilateral cooperation against money laundering. Among the eleven Colombian citizens extradited to the United States in 2000 were two wanted on money laundering charges. An additional seven persons indicted on money laundering charges were provisionally arrested in Colombia pursuant to United States requests for extradition. Colombia has also provided important continuing assistance to United States civil forfeiture actions against accounts in Colombia restrained in 1998 and 1999 in response to United States formal requests for assistance in Operations Juno and Casablanca. Colombia's Tax and Customs Directorate (DIAN) also provided valuable case-related assistance and training to United States prosecutors and agents in 2000.

In 2000, Colombia adopted a new criminal and criminal procedure code. These measures expand money laundering predicates to include conspiracy and corruption. However, this legislation, which does not come into effect until June of 2001, is under constitutional challenge. Additional legislation still pending would permit the disclosure of tax information to law enforcement for criminal investigation purposes.

The United States' July, 2000 appropriations in support of Plan Colombia are anticipated to provide meaningful assistance for money laundering and forfeiture prosecutions in 2001. These funds are expected to provide significant training and equipment investments for the Office of the Prosecutor General, the UIAF, the asset management program of the National Drug Directorate (DNE), and DIAN, among other things.

Colombia is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention and in December 2000 signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Colombia is a member of the Organization of American States Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS/CICAD) Experts Group to Control Money Laundering. The United States and Colombia have signed a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty but it is not yet in force.

Colombia has established a comprehensive legal and regulatory program and has demonstrated an international commitment to combat money laundering. The Government of Colombia (GOC) should ensure that judges and prosecutors are adequately trained in order to fully enforce Colombia's anti-money laundering laws. The GOC also is urged to improve coordination among its law enforcement agencies by clarifying ambiguous lines of authority with respect to the sharing of information. The GOC should also undertake measures to improve its ability to successfully prosecute the predicate offenses for money laundering.

Cook Islands (Concern). The Cook Islands is a self-governing group of islands in the South Pacific that maintains a free association with New Zealand. Cook Islanders are citizens of New Zealand and are part of the British Commonwealth. The Cook Islands is vulnerable to money laundering because of an offshore sector that offers banking, insurance, international trusts, and formation of international companies, (the equivalent of international business companies, IBCs ). Marketers of offshore services on the Internet promote the Cook Islands as a favored jurisdiction for establishing asset protection trusts.

The International Companies Act of 1981 (amended 1982) allows formation of IBCs. It permits issuance of bearer shares, marketing of shelf companies, and prohibits public access to registers of corporate directors or managers or the disclosure of beneficial owners. This legislation is substantially similar to legislation that was enacted by Samoa and is based on a British Commonwealth and South Pacific Forum model. A corporation must grant prior approval before its records in the Companies Office Registry can be examined. Corporate entities may be listed as officers and shareholders of companies-except for companies engaged in banking and insurance, unless specifically licensed to do so-because corporations have the legal powers of a natural person. Corporate directors are not required to be residents. However, companies must maintain in the Cook Islands a registered office and company secretary. Companies must file annual returns, but are not required to have their accounts audited.

In June 2000, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) listed the Cook Islands as a non-cooperative jurisdiction in the international fight against money laundering. FATF in its report noted:

In particular, the government has no relevant information on approximately 1,200 international companies that it has registered. The country has also licensed seven offshore banks that can take deposits from the public but are not required to identify customers and keep their records. Its excessive secrecy provisions guard against the disclosure of relevant information on those international companies as well as bank records.

During the FATF review process, the government expressed its intention to propose to the Parliament, before October 2000, two bills which would criminalize money laundering and establish a suspicious transaction reporting system with a financial intelligence unit (FIU). However, the authorities indicated that those bills would not likely introduce a customer identification requirement, nor would they relax the excessive secrecy provisions.

Following the FATF non-cooperative countries and territories exercise, the US Treasury Department issued an advisory to US financial institutions advising them to "give enhanced scrutiny" to all financial transactions involving the Cook Islands.

In August 2000, the Government of the Cook Islands (GOCI) passed legislation, the Money Laundering Prevention Act 2000 (MLPA), that criminalizes all money laundering; creates an FIU; mandates the reporting of suspicious transactions by financial institutions; and defines records retention and customer identification requirements for financial institutions. Money laundering is defined by the Act as engaging directly or indirectly in a transaction that involves the proceeds of crime; or receiving proceeds of a crime, including property that may be co-mingled with the proceeds of crime. Penalties for money laundering include a maximum fine of New Zealand $20,000 (approximately US $8,600) and maximum prison sentence of five years.

The MLPA imposes certain reporting obligations on financial institutions such as banks, offshore banking businesses, offshore insurance businesses, casinos, and gambling services. Financial institutions are required to report transactions if there is reasonable cause to suspect that the transaction involves the proceeds of a crime. Financial institutions are required to maintain for a minimum of five years all records that are related to the opening of accounts, and business transactions that exceed NZ $30,000 (approximately US $12,900). The records must include sufficient documentary evidence to prove the identity of the customer. Financial institutions are required to develop procedures to audit their compliance with these provisions.

The MLPA establishes a Money Laundering Authority (MLA) that is comprised of the financial secretary, the commissioner for offshore financial services, and the commissioner of the police. The MLA currently constitutes the financial intelligence unit. The MLA receives suspicious transactions reports; sends reports to the solicitor general when money laundering is suspected; instructs financial institutions to cooperate with investigations; compiles statistics and records for use by domestic and international regulatory and law enforcement; issues guidelines to financial institutions; and creates and provides to financial institutions training on record keeping and reporting requirements. The MLPA also requires that individuals declare cross-border movements of currency or negotiable securities greater than the equivalent of NZ $10,000 (approximately US $4,300) to a police, customs, or immigration officer. Failure to declare cross-border movements of currency or negotiable instruments can result in a maximum fine of NZ $1,000 (approximately US $430) and a maximum prison sentence of one year.

The Cooks Islands has also drafted regulations (The Money Laundering Prevention Regulations 2000) which specify the documentation required for satisfactory customer identification, details to be included in suspicious transaction reports (STRs) and time lines for filing STRs. These had yet to come into legal effect by year's end.

The Offshore Industry (Criminal Provisions) Act 1995-96 requires officers and employees of the Cook Islands' six trustee companies to report to the Cook Islands Commissioner for Offshore Financial Services (COFS) suspicious activities related to narcotics trafficking or transactions where there is actual knowledge that a serious crime has been committed. Trustee companies must provide information to the COFS to substantiate their suspicions. The COFS can petition the High Court to rescind the license of or strike from the corporate register offshore entities found to be involved in such crimes. Moreover, the High Court also may dispose of the assets of the business entity.

The MLPA authorizes the MLA to cooperate with foreign governments that have entered into bilateral or multilateral mutual assistance arrangements with the GOCI. However, Section 21 of the MLPA makes provision for ad hoc requests, granting the Minister of Finance the power to approve cooperation with a foreign government without an agreement in place. Money laundering is an extraditable offense.

The Cook Islands is an observer jurisdiction to the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering. The Cook Islands is not a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

The GOCI should fully implement and enforce the provisions of the recently passed MLPA. Moreover, the GOCI should eliminate excessive bank and corporate secrecy provisions, and expand oversight of the offshore sector.

Costa Rica (Concern). Costa Rica is vulnerable to money laundering because of increased drug trafficking in the region and a lack of stringent regulatory and supervisory controls for its offshore sector. Anecdotal information suggests that Costa Rica's financial institutions, currency-exchange businesses, casinos, and real estate market have been used to launder money.

Costa Rica's domestic banking sector is comprised of approximately 25 banks, 15 finance companies, and 27 savings and loan institutions, and is supervised by the General Superintendent of Financial Entities (SUGEF). Low taxes and strong secrecy laws have created in recent years a growing offshore sector that offers banking services, and corporate and trust formation. The central bank must approve applications for offshore banks. Costa Rica has approximately 20 foreign financial institutions and 24 offshore branches of domestic financial institutions. Foreign banks must adhere to regulations established by their parent banks, but are not subject to effective local supervision. Foreign offshore banks are required only to provide monthly balance statements and year-end audited statements to the SUGEF. Nonresidents can hold US dollar bank accounts. Although Costa Rica does not allow bearer shares, secrecy provisions can prevent access to ownership information of corporations. Trusts also can be shareholders of corporations. This arrangement provides tax advantages and additional secrecy.

Costa Rica's telecommunications system, lax regulatory regime, and an abundance of English speakers have made it a haven for Internet gaming companies. The number of Internet gaming licenses issued by Costa Rica has increased from three to 70 in the span of three years.

Law No. 7786 on Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances of May 1998 reformed a previous drug law and criminalized money laundering related to drug trafficking. Drug money laundering is punishable by eight to 20 years in prison. However, Costa Rica has not successfully prosecuted anyone under its current anti-money laundering laws.

Costa Rican law also obligates all financial institutions to identify their clients, record and report currency transactions that exceed US $10,000 to regulators, report suspicious transactions, and maintain records for a minimum of five years. Covered financial institutions include those supervised by SUGEF, the General Superintendent of Securities, and the Superintendent of Pensions, money exchangers and remitters, and dealers in traveler's checks and money orders. Other businesses such as dealers in jewelry and consumer goods, casinos, and credit card companies must report cash transactions that exceed US $10,000 to the Joint Counternarcotics Intelligence Center (CICAD). These businesses also must report suspicious transactions. Individuals are required to report cross-border movements of currency that exceed US $10,000. The law exempts good faith compliance from criminal, civil, or administrative liability.

The law also created the Unidad de Analisis Financiero (UAF), Costa Rica's financial intelligence unit, to receive and analyze suspicious financial transaction reports and investigate cases of money laundering. Financial institutions are required to report suspicious financial transactions to SUGEF, which forwards disclosures to the UAF. In June 1999, the UAF joined the Egmont Group. The UAF exchanges information with its counterparts.

Costa Rica's Legislative Assembly is considering legislation that would extend the predicate offenses for money laundering beyond drug trafficking.

Costa Rica is a member of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), and the Organization of American States Inter-American Drug Abuste Control Commission (OAS/CICAD) Experts Group to Control Money Laundering. Costa Rica is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. An extradition treaty is in force between the United States and Costa Rica. US law enforcement agencies work effectively with Costa Rican public security forces in counternarcotics and money laundering investigations.

The growth of Costa Rica's offshore sector-especially the rapid expansion of Internet gaming operations-and the absence of an effective regulatory and supervisory regime for it are causes for concern. The Government of Costa Rica (GOCR) should increase the resources necessary to implement its current anti-money laundering legislation. The GOCR also should increase its oversight of non-bank financial institutions. Moreover, the GOCR is urged to pass comprehensive anti-money laundering legislation that would expand the predicate offenses for money laundering to include all serious crimes. These measures would help Costa Rica protect its financial and offshore sectors from being abused by money launderers and other international criminals.

Côte d'Ivoire (Other). Côte d'Ivoire is an important regional financial center in West Africa. To the extent money laundering occurs, a significant portion relates to the proceeds of trafficking in narcotics, particularly heroin and cocaine. Money laundering is concentrated in the banking system and is controlled by organizations other than local traffickers.

Financial fraud is mostly limited to Nigerian-operated scams aimed at foreigners. Endemic smuggling of contraband does not generate funds sufficiently large enough to require laundering. Côte d'Ivoire is not an offshore financial center.

Laundering of money related to any criminal activity is a criminal offense. Banks are required to maintain records of large currency transactions and to report this data to the government. Banks are required to maintain the records necessary to reconstruct significant transactions through financial institutions. The government requires financial institutions to report suspicious transactions. Bankers' protection under the law is contingent on their cooperation with law enforcement entities. Money laundering controls are not applied to non-banking institutions.

Côte d'Ivoire has not addressed the problem of international transportation of illegal-source currency and monetary instruments although there are controls on the amount of currency that can be brought in and taken out. There were no arrests or prosecutions reported for money laundering in 2000.

Cote d'Ivoire's asset seizure and forfeiture law applies to both mobile and immobile property, including bank accounts and businesses used as conduits for money laundering. The Ivoirian Government is the designated recipient of any narcotics-related asset seizures and forfeitures. It is not known whether legal loopholes exist to permit traffickers and others to shield assets. The law does not allow for civil forfeiture or for the sharing of assets with other governments. No recent changes have been made to the law and no new legislation is being considered.

Côte d'Ivoire does not take part in any international anti-money laundering fora. It is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

Croatia (Other). Croatia is not a regional financial or money laundering center. Much of the money laundering that does occur is related to financial crimes such as tax evasion and business-related fraud. The proceeds of narcotics trafficking tend to be laundered through the purchase of real estate, luxury goods, and automobiles.

In 1997, Croatia criminalized money laundering related to serious crimes. The legislation established reporting requirements for banks and non-bank financial institutions for transactions that exceed US $17,500. It also authorized establishment of a financial intelligence unit (FIU) within the Ministry of Finance. Croatia's FIU is a member of the Egmont Group. In 2000, Croatia's Parliament strengthened the country's penal code to ensure that all those indicted can be charged with the money laundering offense where applicable. Prior to this change, a person could not be charged with money laundering if the predicate offense carried a maximum penalty of fewer than five years in prison. The Government of Croatia (GOC) plans to introduce legislation in 2001 that will require banks to transmit data to supervising agencies electronically instead of by mail. The GOC also plans to establish a National Center for the Prevention of Corruption and Organized Crime within the State Prosecutor's Office.

Croatia does not have limitations on providing and exchanging information with international law enforcement on money laundering investigations. Croatia's anti-money laundering efforts are hindered by weak enforcement and a lack of adherence to the law.

Croatia is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Cuba (Other). Cuba is not an important regional financial center. The Government of Cuba (GOC) controls all financial institutions, and the Cuban peso is not a freely convertible currency. The GOC has not prosecuted any money-laundering cases since the National Assembly passed legislation in 1999 that criminalized money laundering related to trafficking in drugs, arms, or persons. The Cuban central bank has issued regulations that encourage banks to identify their customers, investigate unusual transactions, and identify the source of funds for large transactions. Cuba also has cross-border currency reporting requirements. Cuba has solicited anti-money laundering training assistance from the United Kingdom, Canada, France, and Spain.

Cuba is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000 signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Cyprus (Primary). Cyprus is a major regional financial center, and as such remains vulnerable to international money laundering activities. Russian organized crime, fraud, burglary and theft, are the major sources of illicit proceeds that are laundered in Cyprus. Credit card and bank card fraud also pose major problems for Cyprus. In 2000, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) conducted a review of Cyprus's anti-money laundering regime against 25 specified criteria. Cyprus was not identified by the FATF as a non-cooperative country in the international fight against money laundering. However, the FATF in its June report raised a concern regarding customer identification in respect to all forms of trusts.

In 1996, the Government of Cyprus (GOC) passed the Prevention and Suppression of Money Laundering Activities Law. This law criminalized non-drug related money laundering; provided for the confiscation of proceeds from serious crimes; codified actions that banks and non-bank financial institutions must take, including customer identification; and mandated the establishment of a financial intelligence unit (FIU). Previously enacted legislation criminalized drug-related money laundering. A 1998 amendment to the 1996 anti-money laundering legislation extended the list of predicate offenses to include trafficking in women, terrorism, trafficking in human organs, attempted murder, and nuclear proliferation. The amendment also addressed government corruption, and facilitated the exchange of financial information with other FIUs, as well as the sharing of assets with other governments.

A law passed in 1999 criminalized the counterfeiting of bank instruments such as certificates of deposit and notes. In November 2000, the GOC further amended its 1996 money laundering law by eliminating the separate list of predicate offenses. This amendment, coupled with the central bank's guidance note to commercial banks reminding them of the importance of reporting any suspicious transaction to the FIU, may enable the Attorney General's office to increase the number of successful prosecutions for money laundering.

The GOC in January 1997 established its FIU, the Unit for Combating Money Laundering (UCML). The 14-member UCML is comprised of representatives from the Attorney General's Office, Customs, law enforcement, and support staff. The UCML's statutory authority directs it to evaluate evidence generated by its member organizations and other sources to determine if an investigation is necessary. The UCML also conducts anti-money laundering training for Cypriot police officers, bankers, accountants, and other financial professionals. In 2000, the UCML opened 123 cases and closed 142. The Unit issued 90 Information Disclosure Orders and froze $3 million in assets. During 2000, recorded two convictions under the 1996 Anti-Money Laundering law, while five cases were pending at the end of the year.

The GOC places restrictions on foreign ownership of property and transportation of currency and bullion. Cypriot law requires that all cash entering or leaving Cyprus in the amount of US $1,000 or greater must be declared. Declarations over US $10,000 are sent directly to the Investigations Section of Cypriot Customs. All banks and non-bank financial institutions-insurance companies, stock exchange, cooperative banks, lawyers, accountants and other financial intermediaries-must report suspicious transactions to UCML. Banks are required to report cash deposits in excess of US $10,000 to the central bank. A declaration form must accompany all foreign currency deposits. In 1998, the central bank instructed banks and financial institutions to pay special attention to complex, unusually large transactions, and to report cumulative electronic funds transfers that exceed of US $500,000 per month for a single customer. There are no statistics available on compliance with these regulations.

Cyprus's offshore sector includes 29 banks, 116 financial services companies, 20 companies that manage collective investment schemes, and 15 offshore trustee companies. The central bank has in place a strict regulatory framework aimed at preventing abuses within the offshore sector. Offshore banks are required to adhere to the same legal, administrative, and reporting requirements as domestic banks. The central bank requires that prospective offshore banks face a detailed vetting procedure to ensure that only banks from jurisdictions with proper supervision are allowed to operate in Cyprus. Offshore banks must have a physical presence in Cyprus and can not be brass plate operations. Once an offshore bank has registered in Cyprus, it is subject to a yearly on-site inspection by the central bank. Offshore banks in Cyprus may accept deposits and make foreign-currency denominated loans to residents of Cyprus if the resident has obtained an exchange control permit from the central bank.

There are approximately 47,000 international business companies (IBCs) registered in Cyprus; however, the central bank reported in June 1999 that only 12,000-14,000 of these companies filed mandatory annual reports. Only 1,057 have a physical presence in Cyprus. According to post reporting, Russian IBCs constitute a "significant" share of the total number of IBCs. The names of beneficial owners of IBCs can be released to law enforcement by court order and Cyprus does not permit bearer shares. The popularity of the offshore sector can be explained in part by the GOC's dual-tax treaties with 26 nations, including Russia. Profits of Cypriot offshore companies are taxed at a rate of only 4.25 percent. Moreover, there is no tax on dividends and foreign employees are required to pay only half the normal Cypriot income tax rate. IBCs may keep freely transferable currency accounts both abroad and in Cyprus. If an IBC is registered as an offshore partnership, profits are not taxed.

Cyprus is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Cyprus is a member of the Council of Europe's PC-R-EV, and is a member of the Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors. The UCML is a member of the Egmont Group. Cyprus and the United States have signed a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, but it is not yet in force. In 1997, the GOC entered into a bilateral agreement with Belgium for the exchange of information on money laundering.

In light of the GOC's stated commitment to combat money laundering, the central bank needs to continue to focus on meeting the increasing supervisory challenges of the offshore sector and on increasing the offshore sector's transparency. In particular, it should ensure that the identities of beneficial owners are easily accessible by law enforcement. In addition, the central bank should change its guidance note, which allows banks to open accounts for all forms of trusts without identifying the beneficial owner of the trust. The GOC should also take steps to ensure that all financial and non-financial institutions and entities report all suspicious transactions to the FIU, and thereby overcome commercial banks' reluctance to share information with the central bank.

(Cyprus has been divided since the Turkish military intervention of 1974, following a coup d'etat directed from Greece. Since then, the southern part of the country has been under the control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus. The northern part is controlled by a Turkish Cypriot administration that in 1983 proclaimed itself the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" The US government recognizes only the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.)

It is more difficult to evaluate anti-money laundering efforts in the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" ("TRNC") but there continues to be strong evidence of a growing trade in narcotics between the "TRNC" and Turkey and Britain, as well as significant money laundering activities.

"TRNC" authorities have enacted a money laundering law for northern Cyprus, which went into effect in November 1999. The main thrust of the law was to reduce the amount of cash transactions in the "TRNC" as well as to improve the tracking of any transactions above US $10,000. The law also provides for the creation of an experts committee to advise "TRNC" authorities on combating money laundering as well as for the seizure of assets.

The law is an adjunct to the "TRNC's" existing Exchange Control Law of 1997, which requires banks to report to the "Central Bank" any movement of funds in excess of $100,000. Such reports must include information identifying the person transferring the money, the source of the money, and its destination. The law also proscribes individuals entering or leaving the "TRNC" from transporting more than US $10,000 in currency. Under the new law, banks, non-bank financial institutions, and foreign exchange dealers must report all currency transactions over $20,000 and suspicious transactions in any amount. Banks must follow a know-your-customer policy and require customer identification. Banks must also submit suspicious transactions to a central multi-agency committee that will function as an FIU and have investigative powers.

"TRNC" officials believe that its 24 essentially unregulated casinos are the primary vehicles through which money laundering occurs. There is also an offshore sector, consisting of 40 banks and 12 IBCs. The offshore banks may not conduct business with "TRNC" residents and may not deal in cash. However, these banks are not audited and their records are not publicly available. Reportedly, a new law will restrict the granting of new bank licensees only to those banks already having licensees in an OECD country.

In spite of a growing awareness in the "TRNC" of the danger represented by money laundering, it is clear that "TRNC" regulations are far less stringent than those in the Republic of Cyprus are. The new law of the "TRNC" provides better banking regulations than were previously in force. The major weakness continues to be the "TRNC's" many casinos, where a lack of resources and expertise leave that area, for all intended purposes, unregulated, and therefore, especially vulnerable to money laundering abuse.

Czech Republic (Concern). The Czech Republic is vulnerable to money laundering because of geographic and economic factors. Narcotics trafficking, smuggling, auto theft, arms trafficking, tax fraud, embezzlement, racketeering, prostitution, and trafficking in illegal aliens are the major sources of funds that are laundered in the Czech Republic. Domestic and foreign organized crime groups target Czech financial institutions for laundering activity; banks, currency exchanges, casinos and other gaming establishments, investment companies, and real estate agencies have all been used to launder criminal proceeds.

Money laundering was criminalized in September 1995 through the addition of Articles 251 and 251a to the Czech Criminal Code. Although the Criminal Code does not explicitly mention money laundering, the criminal provisions apply to financial transactions involving the proceeds of all serious crimes. The Czech Republic's anti-money laundering legislation, Act N°61/1996 Concerning Some Measures Against Legalization of Proceeds of Criminal Activity and Amending Legislation Thereto, became effective on July 1996.

Ministry of Finance Decree N°183 formally established the Czech Republic's financial intelligence unit, the Financial Analysis Unit (FAU), and outlines how financial institutions are to comply with the reporting of unusual transactions. The FAU is a member of the Egmont Group.

The Czech Parliament has failed to pass legislation that completely eliminates anonymous passbook accounts. However, establishment of new anonymous accounts was prohibited beginning in mid-2000. Czech officials argue that the existing accounts are of limited use for money laundering because customer identification is required for deposits and withdrawals that exceed 100,000 Czech crowns (approximately US $2,700).

The Czech Republic participates in the Council of Europe's Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures (PC-R-EV), and in 1998, underwent a mutual evaluation by the Committee. The Czech Republic plans to implement changes to its anti-money laundering regime based on the results of the mutual evaluation. The United States and the Czech Republic have a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, which entered into force in May 2000. The Czech Republic is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

The Czech Republic is encouraged to pass legislation to adopt the suggestions of the PC-R-EV mutual evaluation report and to eliminate all anonymous passbook accounts.

Denmark (Other). Banking procedures in Denmark are transparent and are subject to government review, which discourages prospective money launderers and minimizes the likelihood of improper use of the banking system. Despite this, in response to a growing concern surrounding economic crimes in general, Denmark created the Serious Economic Crime Unit in 2000. The unit reports to the National Police Commissioner and consists of public prosecutors and police officers specifically trained in fighting economic crimes.

Money laundering is a criminal offense in Denmark. This applies to any type of money laundering, not just narcotics-related. Banks and other financial institutions are required to know, record and report the identity of customers engaging in significant transactions and maintain those records for an adequate amount of time. There are no secrecy laws in Denmark that prevent disclosure of financial information to competent authorities, and there are laws that protect bankers and others who cooperate with law enforcement authorities. Denmark has cooperated fully with US authorities with regards to money laundering investigations.

Denmark has regulations in place that ensure the availability of adequate records in connection with narcotics investigations. Denmark is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention and in December 2000 it signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. It participates in European Union anti-money laundering efforts, and its financial intelligence unit (FIU) takes part in the Egmont Group of FIUs. Denmark has endorsed the 1997 Basle Committee Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision. Denmark is also a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).

Dominica (Primary). Like many Caribbean jurisdictions, Dominica has sought to attract offshore dollars by offering a wide range of financial services and promises of confidentiality, low fees, and minimal government oversight. A rapid expansion of this sector without proper supervision has made Dominica attractive to international criminals, and has prompted public criticism from international organizations.

Dominica has greatly expanded its offshore services in the past several years, and offers offshore banks, international business companies (IBCs), exempt insurance, and exempt trusts. The International Exempt Trust Act 1997 allows establishment of Asset Protection Trusts that greatly restrict seizure, expropriation, or confiscation of assets by foreign authorities. Dominica also offers Internet gaming and rapid processing of Internet gaming license applications. IBCs can be registered on-line within 24 hours and using bearer shares, providing complete anonymity for the beneficial owners. In 1999, Dominica's Ministry of Finance (MOF) reported that since the establishment of its offshore sector, Dominica had incorporated 5,800 IBCs, six offshore banks, six exempt trusts, and 20 Internet gaming companies. By December 2000, Dominica's successful marketing of IBCs had increased the number to approximately 6,600. In addition to its marketing duties, the MOF's International Business Unit grants licenses and supervises the offshore sector, thereby violating the Basle Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision.

For the past several years, as part of its offshore services, Dominica has offered economic citizenship, a program that enables individuals to acquire Dominican citizenship, a passport, and possibly a new name in exchange for a direct payment of US $50,000 or government bonds worth US $75,000. This process has been loosely regulated, and Government of Dominica (GOD) officials appear not to have maintained adequate control of the program. Between 1996 and 2000, the GOD issued approximately 500 economic citizenships. The program has come under fire as a means for individuals from the Peoples' Republic of China (PRC) and other foreign countries to become Dominican citizens and enter the United States via Canada without visas. One widely reported case involved a group of 11 PRC nationals who tried to enter Canada on Dominican passports after spending only one month in Dominica. Upon taking office in January 2000, Prime Minister (PM) Roosevelt Douglas suspended passport sales, but in April 2000, reversed his decision. In August 2000, the GOD claimed to have suspended the program in the face of international pressure-in particular, the Government of Canada threatened to impose visa requirements on Dominican passport holders. The GOD indicated that in the first quarter of 2000 it had earned approximately US $1.9 million from sales of passports. The future of this program remains in question following the recent death of PM Douglas.

The Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB) supervises Dominica's five domestic banks, and has issued guidance notes against money laundering. However, these guidance notes do not have the force of law. In February 2000, the GOD announced that supervision of the offshore sector also would be transferred to the ECCB. However, it is unclear how this supervisory arrangement will function.

In June 2000, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) identified Dominica as noncooperative in international efforts to combat money laundering. The FATF in its report noted:

Dominica has outdated proceeds of crime legislation, which lacks many features now expected, and very mixed financial services legislation currently on the books. In addition, company law provisions create additional obstacles to the identification of ownership. The offshore sector in Dominica appears to be largely unregulated although it is understood that responsibility for its regulation is to be transferred to the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank.

The US Department of Treasury has also issued an advisory to US financial institutions warning them to "give enhanced scrutiny" to financial transactions involving Dominica.

In response to the FATF report, the GOD has taken a number of steps to improve its anti-money laundering regime. In July 2000, the Finance Minister announced a comprehensive review of all offshore banks and the establishment of an Offshore Financial Services Council (OFSC). In December 2000, the OFSC issued guidelines for processing offshore banking licenses and administrative procedures for supervising offshore bank and trust companies.

In January 2001, the Dominican Government brought into force new legislation to strengthen its anti-money laundering regime: The Money Laundering (Prevention) Act of 2000, The International Business Corporation (Amendment) Act of 2000, The International Exempt Trust (Amendment) Act of 2000, The Exempt Insurance (Amendment) Act of 2000, and The Offshore Banking (Amendment) Act of 2000.

The Money Laundering (Prevention) Act (MLPA) of 2000 expands the predicate offenses for money laundering beyond drug trafficking and allows regulators to inspect the financial transactions of offshore entities. The MLPA establishes a Money Laundering Supervisory Authority (MLSA) that will issue guidelines to financial institutions and scheduled activities under the Act. The MLPA also requires a wide range of financial institutions-including offshore institutions-to report suspicious transactions to the MLSA, which will then send the reports to the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU). Moreover, the MLPA requires persons to report and cross-border movements of currency that exceed US $10,000 to the FIU. The FIU will analyze these reports, forward appropriate information to the Director of Public Prosecutions, and liaison with other jurisdictions on financial crimes cases.

In addition, the other legislative changes should strengthen the GOD's regulation of its offshore sector. The International Business Corporation (Amendment) Act of 2000 reportedly requires accountants and financial institutions to maintain the names and addresses of the owners of bearer shares and track subsequent transfers of ownership. The Offshore Banking (Amendment) Act of 2000 reportedly requires banks to know the beneficial owners of all accounts.

Dominica criminalized money laundering related to drug trafficking through the Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) of 1993. The POCA required financial institutions to maintain records related to the opening and closing of accounts, and of all transactions equal to or greater than Eastern Caribbean (EC) $5,000 (approximately US $1,900) for a minimum of seven years. The POCA also authorized banks to report transactions to the police or the Director of Public Prosecutions if the bank had reasonable grounds to suspect that the transaction was related to an offense. The POCA, however, did not mandate suspicious transactions reporting, and its provisions applied only to domestic institutions. The GOD has not prosecuted anyone for money laundering.

Dominica is a member of the Organization of American States Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS/CICAD) Experts Group to Control Money Laundering. Dominica is also a member of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF). In May 2000, a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty with the United States entered into force. Dominica is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

The GOD should fully implement and enforce the provisions of the MLPA and other recently enacted legislation; provide additional resources for regulating offshore entities; and establish the FIU in order to coordinate its own anti-money laundering efforts, as well as cooperate with foreign authorities. Such measures will help protect Dominica's financial system from further abuse by international criminals, and help avoid possible additional sanctions by the international community.

Dominican Republic (Primary). The Dominican Republic has financial institutions that engage in currency transactions involving international narcotics proceeds that include significant amounts of US dollars. The Dominican Republic is a burgeoning commercial exporter, and in 2000, remittances to the Dominican Republic from abroad were approximately US $1.7 billion. The Dominican Republic is a transshipment point for narcotics destined for the United States and Europe, and is vulnerable to narcotics-related money laundering. The primary methods for moving illicit funds from the United States to the Dominican Republic include smuggling bulk cash by couriers and wire transfer remittances. Dominican banks and casinos also are used to launder funds. However, currency exchange houses and money remitters remain the primary mechanisms for laundering money.

The Government of the Dominican Republic (GODR) has taken steps to address money laundering. The GODR has enacted laws that criminalize money laundering related to narcotics trafficking, and allows preventative seizures and criminal forfeiture of drug-related assets. The legislation also authorizes international cooperation in forfeiture cases.

In 1996, the GODR issued Decree No. 288-96, which requires financial institutions such as banks, currency exchange houses, casinos, and stock brokers to record currency transactions equal to or greater than the equivalent of US $10,000 in either domestic or foreign currency. Financial institutions are required to make this information available to law enforcement upon request. The Decree also obligates financial institutions to identify customers and report suspicious financial transactions (STRs), and designates the Superintendency of Banks as the recipient of STRs.

In 1997, the GODR established the Financial Analysis Unit (FAU) within the Superintendency of Banks. The FAU analyzes and disseminates STRs to the Financial Investigative Unit (FIU) within the National Drug Control Directorate (DNCD). The FAU has supervisory and information gathering authority over all financial institutions. The FIU investigates narcotics-related money laundering, and has authority to compel cooperation from other GODR agencies. In 1998, the GODR passed legislation that allows extradition of Dominican nationals on money laundering charges.

During 2000, the GODR authorities confiscated $82,749 in US currency, $88,632 in Dominican currency, ninety-six vehicles, and twenty residential and business properties linked to narcotics trafficking. However, there has never been a successful money laundering prosecution. In 2000, the GODR proposed legislation that would expand the predicate offenses for money laundering beyond drug trafficking to other serious crimes such as arms trafficking; trafficking in humans or human organs; kidnapping; extortion; car theft; forgery of currency, bills, or securities; illicit enrichment; embezzlement; and bribery. The legislation also would require financial institutions to report to the FAU cash transactions that are greater than or equal to the equivalent of US $10,000 in domestic or foreign currency. Moreover, the legislation will require individuals to declare cross-border movements of currency that are greater than or equal to the equivalent of US $10,000 in domestic or foreign currency. The Dominican Republic's legislature is expected to pass this legislation in early 2001.

The FAU is a member of the Egmont Group, and is authorized to exchange information with other financial intelligence units. The GODR is an active member of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), and the Organization of American States Inter-American Commission on Drug Abuse Control (OAS/CICAD) Experts Group to Control Money Laundering. The Dominican Republic is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. The GODR cooperates with the US Government on counternarcotics and fugitive matters.

The GODR should quickly enact its proposed anti-money laundering legislation, and continue to develop a financial regulatory system that is consistent with international standards. Moreover, the Superintendency of Banks and the DNCD are encouraged to improve the flow of information between their organizations.

Ecuador (Concern). Ecuador is vulnerable to money laundering because of its proximity to drug-producing countries, its adoption of the US dollar as legal tender, and its ineffective oversight of the banking system. The GOE has no controls on cross-border movements of currency, and regulation of currency exchange businesses is weak. These factors most likely will make Ecuador an increasingly attractive venue for placing illicit currency into the international financial system. Several Ecuadorian banks also maintain offshore offices. Although these institutions have come under tighter control as a result of banking legislation passed in 1994, they continue to be used to channel funds through Ecuador.

Narcotics-related money laundering was criminalized through the 1990 Narcotics and Psychotropic Substance Act (No. 108). The Act requires financial institutions to report to the National Drug Council (CONSEP) large transactions in cash or stocks. The Government of Ecuador (GOE) in 1999 implemented electronic reporting of this information. However, a contradictory legal framework continues to place severe constraints on the information that financial institutions can release to law enforcement. The Banking Procedures Law limits the release of information on private bank accounts to the Superintendency of Banks, and the Criminal Defamation Law imposes sanctions on banks and other financial institutions that provide account information to law enforcement or advise law enforcement of suspicious transactions.

As a result of these conflicting laws, the Ecuadorian National Police (ENP) must obtain a court order to search for and obtain financial information from banks. However, banks, as a matter of practice, do not honor such orders, and claim that banking regulations make them answerable only to the Superintendency of Banks (SOB). Furthermore, the SOB will not accept requests for information directly from the ENP, but instead requires the request be handled through the CONSEP. Similarly, the ENP is not able to obtain information on private corporations from the Superintendency of Companies or information on stock market transactions from the Ministry of Finance. The GOE has not yet taken forceful efforts to remedy such limitations on the sharing of information, and as a consequence, has not conducted a serious money laundering investigation in the past five years.

The ENP has a financial investigation unit that recently received additional personnel and US-sponsored financial investigation training. The CONSEP also has a financial unit, and the SOB is considering establishment of one.

Ecuador is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Ecuador is a member of the Organization of American States Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS/CICAD) Experts Group to Control Money Laundering, and the South American Financial Action Task Force (GAFISUD).

The GOE must revise its financial secrecy laws to encourage reporting by financial institutions, and eliminate any conflicts that prevent the sharing of information between financial institutions and law enforcement. Moreover, the GOE should take immediate steps to improve bank oversight in the wake of dollarization, and pass legislation establishing cross-border currency reporting requirements. The GOE also is encouraged to establish a joint financial-investigative task force in order to foster better interagency working relationships.

Egypt (Concern). Egypt is not considered a major financial center, and does not have an offshore sector. Moreover, Egypt does not have a significant black market. Most of the illicit funds that are laundered in Egypt are the proceeds of drug trafficking, organized crime, and terrorism. Narcotics-related money laundering usually involves investment in real estate or business ventures. In a typical scheme, a money launderer will invest through an intermediary, usually a relative or a trusted friend. Egyptian money launderers rarely use the banking system because of their cultural mistrust of banks and fears that banking records-despite Egypt's secrecy laws-could provide authorities with incriminating information.

Egypt does not have customer identification requirements or reporting requirements for financial institutions. Presidential Decree Law No. 205 of 1990, concerning the secrecy of bank accounts, states that "all accounts, deposits, trusts, and safes" in banks are to be "maintained secret." No access is to be allowed, or any information to be divulged, except with the written permission of the account's owner or agent. This prohibition remains in force after the banking relationship is terminated. The identities of account owners are known only to bank officials; the only exception is that the Egyptian Attorney General may seek from the Cairo Court of Appeal access to account information when there is "serious" proof that a felony or misdemeanor has been committed. The Egyptian Anti-Narcotics General Authority (ANGA), which maintains a unit that investigates financial crimes related to narcotics trafficking, states that bank authorities cooperate fully with law enforcement when such a court order is obtained, and that the records are adequate for a thorough investigation.

The Egyptian Parliament continues to consider passage of anti-money laundering legislation. However, the specifics of this legislation are not known at this time. Absent anti-money laundering laws, prosecutors have made use of a 1971 law, the Law of the Socialist Prosecutor, that targets individuals who have made money through any illegal activity. The law enables prosecutors to impound for a maximum of five years cash and property that belongs to the accused and the accused's immediate family. The highest Egyptian criminal court, the Court of Ethics, determines whether the impounded property was obtained as a result of illegal activity and should be forfeited. Forfeited assets go directly to the Egyptian treasury.

The United States and Egypt signed a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty in May 1998, which is expected to enter into force in 2001. Egypt is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Crime.

Egypt should move swiftly to pass, implement, and enforce comprehensive new anti-money laundering legislation that is consistent with international standards in order to protect its growing economy from abuse by criminals.

El Salvador (Concern). El Salvador has one of the largest banking systems in Central America; its banks maintain important financial contacts with those of neighboring countries, Mexico, the Caribbean, and the United States. El Salvador does not have an offshore sector. The growth of El Salvador's financial sector and the increase in narcotics trafficking in the region continue to make it vulnerable to money laundering. In addition, the Government of El Salvador's (GOES) decision in November 2000 to dollarize its economy-dollars will be permitted to freely circulate beginning in January 2001-increases the risk of money laundering.

The GOES in 2000 made considerable progress in implementing its 1998 "Law Against Laundering of Money and Assets." The Unidad de Investigación Financiera (UIF), the financial investigation unit within the Attorney General's Office, and separate anti-money laundering units within the Policía Nacional Civil (PNC) and the central bank enforce the law's provisions. The legislation criminalizes money laundering related to drug trafficking and any other criminal activity. Financial institutions such as banks, exchange companies, stock exchanges, insurance companies, credit card companies, casinos, and real estate companies must identify their customers, maintain records for a minimum of five years, train personnel in money and asset laundering, and establish internal auditing procedures. Covered institutions also must report suspicious transactions and transactions that exceed 500,000 colones (approximately US $57,000) to the UIF. Although a provision of this law provides for asset identification and seizure, asset sharing with non-Salvadoran agencies has not yet been approved.

In 2000, the GOES-in particular, the office of the Attorney General-worked closely with US Government agencies such as the Department of Treasury to develop and implement the UIF. The UIF has been operational since January 2000, and officially opened its new, modernized facilities in December 2000. The UIF currently is comprised of six individuals-three prosecutors (fiscales), one analyst, one computer technician and one secretary. The UIF has received approximately 100 reports of suspicious activities; opened 48 investigations that have resulted in two asset seizure actions; and begun judicial proceedings in three cases. The GOES has arrested several persons on charges of money laundering and counterfeiting.

The UIF has prepared draft regulations that would lower the threshold for filing currency transactions reports to US $20,000, and is seeking ways to tighten regulation of casinos and exchange houses. The US Government is working with the GOES to establish a Money Laundering Working Group that will improve information sharing, and in light of the GOES' decision to dollarize, will seek to provide specialized money laundering training to a broader spectrum of Salvadoran law enforcement and banking officials.

The UIF has applied for membership in the Egmont Group, and in January 2001, will participate in the Egmont Group's first training course. El Salvador is party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. El Salvador is a member of the Organization of American States Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS/CICAD) Experts Group to Control Money Laundering.

The GOES is encouraged to continue building upon the progress that it has made in implementing its anti-money laundering measures, and demonstrate that it is a regional leader in the fight against money laundering and financial crime. In particular, the GOES is urged to implement draft regulations that would lower the threshold for reporting currency transactions.

Eritrea (Other). Eritrea has a poorly developed financial system; there are no reports of money laundering. Eritrea is not a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

Estonia (Other). Estonia has one of the most developed banking systems of the former Soviet Union. Estonia permits credit institutions to participate in a variety of activities such as leasing, insurance, and securities. Russian organized crime groups are suspected of using financial institutions in the Baltic countries to launder money.

In 1999, Estonia implemented anti-money laundering legislation, and established the Information Bureau (IB) and a separate police unit to fight money laundering. Estonia's legislation requires financial institutions to report suspicious or unusual transactions to the IB. The reporting thresholds are: the equivalent of approximately US $11,000 for non-currency transactions; and the equivalent of approximately US $5,500 for currency transactions. However, Estonia has no formal system for ensuring that financial institutions comply with the reporting requirements. Moreover, the IB lacks authority to compel banks to disclose additional information.

More than 50 investigations have been opened based on reports of suspicious or unusual transactions. The anti-money laundering police unit recently initiated its first criminal anti-money laundering case against an employee of a credit institution who did not comply with reporting requirements. In November 2000, Estonia, along with other Baltic countries, signed a protocol that places special emphasis on the exchange of information related to organized crime, drug trafficking, and smuggling.

Estonia is a member of the Council of Europe (COE) Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures (PC-R-EV). A COE delegation in 2000 visited Estonia to review its anti-money laundering regime. The IB is a member of the Egmont Group. Estonia became a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention in July 2000, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. A Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty between the United States and Estonia entered into force in October 2000.

Ethiopia (Other). Money laundering is not considered to be a problem in Ethiopia. Its underdeveloped financial infrastructure and lack of economic development make it unlikely that it will become a financial center of any type in the foreseeable future. The banking sector is small and has no links to the international financial community.

Ethiopia has no anti-money laundering legislation in place. It is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized crime.

Fiji (Other). There are no reports of money laundering in Fiji. Money laundering is criminalized under the Proceeds of Crime Act, 1997. In addition, the Reserve Bank of Fiji has issued anti-money laundering guidelines to licensed financial institutions that require them to develop programs and procedures for customer identification, record-keeping, and the monitoring and reporting of suspicious financial transactions. These guidelines are to come into effect 1 January 2001.

There is no formal agreement between Fiji and the United States for cooperation on law enforcement matters or mutual legal assistance; however, Fiji has responded positively to all such requests from the United States.

Fiji is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. Fiji is a member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, a regional FATF-style anti-money laundering body.

Finland (Other). Finland is not a regional financial or money laundering center. However, Finnish authorities are concerned about possible money laundering by Russian organized crime, and money laundering arising from fraud and other economic crimes.

In 1994, Finland enacted legislation criminalizing money laundering related to narcotics trafficking and other serious crimes. Legislation enacted in 1998 compels financial institutions and most non-bank financial institutions-excluding accountants and lawyers-to report suspicious transactions. The number of suspicious transactions reports (STRs) appear to be on the rise: the Finnish police in 1999 investigated 348 STRs, but reported 255 investigations in the first six months of 2000 alone. (Final statistics for 2000 were unavailable for inclusion in this report.) In 1999, narcotics-trafficking was the predicate offense for 13 percent of money laundering convictions.

Finland in 1998 established a financial intelligence unit, the Money Laundering Clearing House (MLCH), to receive STRs from financial institutions. The MLCH is a member of the Egmont Group.

Finland is a member of the Financial Action Task Force and the Council of Europe. Finland is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

France (Primary). France remains an attractive venue for money laundering because of its large economy, strong currency, political stability, central location, and sophisticated financial system. Common methods of laundering money in France include the use of bank deposits, foreign currency and gold bullion transactions, corporate transactions, and purchases of real estate, hotels, and works of art. France has enacted legislation that codifies the FATF Forty Recommendations concerning customer identification, record keeping requirements, suspicious transaction reporting, internal anti-money laundering procedures, and training for financial institutions.

France criminalized money laundering related to all crimes with the adoption of Act Nº 93-392 of 13 May 1996, "On the Fight against Money Laundering, Drug Trafficking and International Cooperation in Respect of Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds of Crime." Prior to passage of this Act, the French Penal Code and the French Customs Code only criminalized money laundering related to narcotics trafficking and other serious crimes. Even though Act No. 93-392 made money laundering in itself a general offense, some French courts do not allow joint prosecution of individuals on both money laundering charges and the underlying predicate offense because judges in those courts consider money laundering and the predicate crime to be the same offense.

France's financial intelligence unit, the Treatment of Information and Action Against Clandestine Financial Circuits (TRACFIN), is responsible for analyzing suspicious transaction reports (STRs) that are filed by French financial institutions. TRACFIN is a member of the Egmont Group, and may exchange information with foreign counterparts that observe similar rules regarding confidentiality of information. TRACFIN is establishing and leading France's Liaison Committee against the Laundering of the Proceeds of Crime. This committee will be comprised of representatives from reporting professions and institutions, regulators, and law enforcement authorities. In September 2000, TRACFIN hosted a regional workshop on Money Laundering and the Euro Changeover.

In 2000, the Government of France (GOF) proposed additional anti-money laundering measures:

* Casino directors and managers, high-value goods dealers, and eventually, gatekeepers such as accountants and independent legal professions would have to report suspicious transactions directly to TRACFIN.

* Financial institutions would automatically report to TRACFIN certain financial transactions such as those involving jurisdictions identified as noncooperative in the international fight against money laundering by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).

* Public authorities at the state and local level would be able to send money laundering related information directly to TRACFIN.

France is a member of the FATF and the European Union, and a Cooperating and Supporting Nation to the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force. France is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. France and the United States in December 1998 signed a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, which is expected to enter into force in 2001. TRACFIN has information-sharing agreements with Austria, Italy, the United States, Belgium, Monaco, Spain, the United Kingdom, Argentina, Mexico, the Czech Republic, and Portugal.

France has established a comprehensive anti-money laundering regime. The GOF should further enhance it by adopting pending legislation that would expand suspicious transaction reporting requirements.

Georgia (Other). Georgia is not an important regional financial center, and its economy is too small to cover large flows of illicit foreign funds. Commercial banks are small but capable of clearing and transferring funds electronically. Small-scale money laundering schemes involve funds generated domestically through illegal activities, most of which are not connected with narcotics. Reportedly, some commercial banks have become involved in laundering funds generated by the smuggling of alcohol and cigarettes, but these proceeds are generally held in dollars outside the banking system. Although corruption is an issue in Georgia, no government official has been publicly linked to money laundering. The National Bank of Georgia (the central bank) plays a growing role in regulating the banking industry.

Georgia's new criminal code became effective in June 2000. Although it does not criminalize money laundering, it does make it a crime to "transform illegal money into legal income" or to conceal the source, location or owner of property acquired illegally. Violators are subject to imprisonment. No requirement exists to report suspicious transactions, and there are no legal safeguards to protect banks and other financial institutions that cooperate with law enforcement agencies. Georgian law enforcement agencies have not investigated commercial banks or other businesses for possible involvement in money laundering. There are no controls on the amount of money that may be brought into the country. The money-laundering controls that do exist are not applied to non-bank financial institutions. Most financial transactions in Georgia are conducted in cash.

USAID provides both technical assistance and training to the Georgian tax inspectorate in support of improvements in tax policy and regulation, such as the ability to identify underreporting of income, including questionable gains from illegal sources. The Constitutional Court, however, has declared asset forfeiture and seizure legislation to be unconstitutional.

Georgia is a party to the UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Germany (Primary). Germany has the largest economy in Europe and a well-developed financial services industry. Russian organized crime groups, the Italian Mafia, and Albanian and Kurdish drug trafficking groups continue to launder money through German banks, currency exchange houses, business investments, and real estate.

The Government of Germany (GOG) in 1992 criminalized money laundering related to drug trafficking, fraud, forgery, and embezzlement. In November 1993, the GOG enacted the Money Laundering Act. This legislation imposes due diligence and reporting requirements on financial institutions, such as obtaining customer identification for transactions exceeding deutsche marks (DM) 30,000 (approximately US $14,500) that are conducted in cash or precious metals, and maintaining records necessary to reconstruct transactions of DM 30,000 or more. In addition, German banks are legally obligated to report suspicious transactions to state authorities. To assist in this process, the GOG established a central database to record these suspicious transactions. The database became operational in June 2000. Each state is responsible for ensuring that suspicious transactions reports (STRs) are entered into the database.

Since 1998, money transmitters have been required to be licensed and supervised by the Federal Banking Supervisory Office, which has issued anti-money laundering guidelines to the industry. Germany also has a law, which entered into force in 1998, that gives border officials the authority to compel individuals to declare imported currency of DM 30,000 or more.

The GOG has 12 Joint Financial Investigations Groups (JFIGs), comprised of customs and police officials, that are located in 11 cities throughout Germany. The JFIGs analyze and investigate STRs that have been filed by German banks. The US Customs Service maintains a liaison relationship with several of these units, and initiates joint investigations when suspicious financial transactions involving the United States are identified. These investigations often are related to fraud rather than narcotics trafficking. Although one of the JFIGs has participated in Egmont Group activities, the JFIGs are not considered FIUs and are not members of the Egmont Group.

The GOG has established procedures to effectively enforce its asset seizure and forfeiture law. The number of asset seizures and forfeitures remains low because of the high burden of proof that prosecutors must overcome in such cases. German law requires a direct link to drug trafficking before seizures are allowed. German authorities cooperate with US efforts to trace and seize assets to the extent that German law allows, and the GOG investigates leads from other nations. However, German law does not allow for sharing forfeited assets with other countries.

The GOG cooperates fully with the United States on anti-money laundering initiatives, even though it does not have a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty with the United States. The GOG exchanges information through bilateral law enforcement agreements such as the Customs Mutual Assistance Agreement.

Germany is a member of the Financial Action Task Force, the European Union, and the Council of Europe. Germany is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

The GOG has taken an important step in developing a centralized database for recording suspicious transactions. However, Germany is encouraged to develop a centralized reporting unit that would further enhance the effectiveness of this system.

Ghana (Other). Ghana is not a regional financial center. However, non-bank financial institutions such as foreign exchange bureaus are suspected of being used to launder the proceeds of drug trafficking, and the illegal trade in diamonds and gold. In addition, donations to religious institutions allegedly have been used as a vehicle to launder money.

Ghana has criminalized money laundering related to drug trafficking and other serious crimes. However, financial institutions are not required to report large cash transactions. Law enforcement can compel disclosure of bank records for drug-related offenses, and bank officials are given protection from liability when they cooperate with law enforcement investigations. Ghana has cross-border currency reporting requirements. Moreover, the attorney general may require disclosure of assets sent out of the country.

The Government of Ghana in 2000 made no arrests or prosecutions related to money laundering. In April 2000, the US Government organized and financed a two-week anti-money laundering seminar in Accra. The seminar was organized in cooperation with the West African Institute for Financial and Economic Management (WAIFEM), and bankers from Ghana and four other West African countries were in attendance.

Ghana took part in the formation of the Inter-Governmental Action Group Against Money Laundering (GIABA) at the November 2000 meeting of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Dakar. Ghana is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. Ghana has bilateral agreements for the exchange of money laundering-related information with the United Kingdom, Germany, Brazil, and Italy.

Gibraltar (Concern). Gibraltar is a largely self-governing, dependent territory of the United Kingdom, which assumes responsibility for Gibraltar's defence and international affairs. Gibraltar's offshore sector remains vulnerable to money laundering.

The Financial Services Commission (FSC) is responsible for regulating and supervising Gibraltar's financial services industry. It is obliged statutorily under its founding ordinance to match UK supervisory standards. Both onshore and offshore banks have the same legal and supervisory requirements. Gibraltar has 21 banks-11 of which are incorporated in Gibraltar-and all except for one are subsidiaries of major international financial institutions. The FSC also is responsible for overseeing the activities of the GOG offshore sector in the areas of trust and company management companies, insurance companies, collective investment schemes, and the formation of IBCs (of which there were 8300 registered by June 2000). Internet gaming is permitted by the GOG.

The Drug Offences Ordinance (DOO) of 1995 and Criminal Justice Ordinance of 1995 criminalize money laundering related to all crimes and mandate reporting of suspicious transactions by entities such as banks, mutual savings companies, insurance companies, financial consultants, postal services, exchange bureaus, attorneys, accountants, financial regulatory agencies, unions, casinos, charities, lotteries, car dealerships, yacht brokers, company formation agents, dealers in gold bullion, charities, and political parties.

In 1996, Gibraltar established its financial intelligence unit (FIU), the Gibraltar Coordinating Centre for Criminal Intelligence and Drugs (GCID). The GCID is comprised primarily of police and customs officers, but is independent of law enforcement. The GCID receives, analyzes, and disseminates information on financial disclosures filed by institutions covered by the provisions of Gibraltar's anti-money laundering legislation. The GCID has applied to join the Egmont Group.

In 2000, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) conducted a review of Gibraltar's anti-money laundering regime against 25 specified criteria. Gibraltar was not identified by the FATF as a noncooperative country in the international fight against money laundering. However, the FATF in its June report raised certain concerns about Gibraltar's anti-money laundering regime:

Gibraltar...[has] in place a system for reporting suspicious transactions. Where the underlying criminal conduct is drug trafficking or terrorism, the obligation to report is a direct one. Where the underlying criminal conduct is another predicate offence, the reporting is an "indirect obligation"-failure to make a report potentially leaves one open to a charge of money laundering; making a report is a defence against such a charge...

Gibraltar...[allows] certain intermediaries, and individuals, which are subject to the same anti-money laundering standards and supervision as financial institutions, to introduce business to banks and financial institutions on the basis that the introducers themselves verify the identity of the customer. In addition, the jurisdiction allows certain institutions based in certain overseas countries, subject to equivalent anti-money laundering systems, to introduce business, without separately verifying the identity of the client. Banks and other financial institutions in Gibraltar...are only required to know the name of the client but not to verify the identity separately. There is concern as to whether such a system is consistent with FATF Recommendations and provides sufficiently rigorous checks on the identity of clients of banks and financial institutions, especially in cases where the introducer is not a financial institution...

The lack of a stringent scheme to apply the new rules of customer identification for accounts opened prior to their entry into force is also a source of concern. The new rules for customer identification verification were introduced in Gibraltar in 1995...

In response to the issues raised by the FATF in its June 2000 report, the GOG issued revised Guidance Notes pertaining to eligible introducers and anti-money laundering.

The Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom has not been extended to Gibraltar. However, the DOO of 1995 provides for mutual legal assistance with foreign jurisdictions on matters related to drug trafficking and related proceeds. Gibraltar has indicated its commitment, as part of the EU decision on its participation in certain parts of the Schengen acquis, to update mutual legal assistance arrangements with the EU and Council of Europe partners. Gibraltar has adopted EU Money Laundering Directive 91/308. The United Kingdom has not extended the application of the 1988 UN Drug Convention. Gibraltar is a member of the Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors.

The GOG took an important step in developing a centralized database for recording STRs. However, the GOG should develop a centralized reporting unit to further enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of their system. The GOG is urged to fully address the issues raised by the FATF in the June 2000 report.

Greece (Primary). The economy of Greece is vulnerable to money laundering related to drug trafficking, prostitution, arms smuggling, blackmail, and illicit gambling activities that are conducted by Russian and Albanian criminal groups. There have been reports in the Greek press of substantial money-laundering activity in Greece. Casinos are particularly susceptible to money laundering because of weak requirements for disclosing sources of foreign capital. Greece has five private and two state-owned casinos. Moreover, Greek authorities report that the cross-border movement of illicit currency and monetary instruments remains a problem.

In 1995, the Government of Greece (GOG) enacted anti-money laundering legislation, Prevention and Combating the Legalization of Income Derived from Criminal Activities, which criminalizes money laundering related to all crimes. The Bank of Greece is authorized to cooperate fully with EU central banks in matters relating to money laundering. The legislation also requires that banks and non-bank financial institutions file suspicious transaction reports (STRs) with Greece's financial intelligence unit, the Competent Committee (CC). The CC is a member of the Egmont Group, and is chaired by a senior judge with representatives from various government ministries, the central bank, and the stock exchange. STRs that merit further investigation are forwarded to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Unit (SDOE), a multi-agency group that functions as the CC's investigative arm. The CC is responsible for preparing money-laundering cases on behalf of the public prosecutor's office. The CC works with Interpol on investigations outside Greece. Greek law enforcement reportedly is investigating several money laundering cases. However, few of the cases have reached the public prosecutor's office.

Banks and brokerage firms must require identification from customers-internal identification documents or passports-when opening accounts or conducting transactions that exceed EUR 15,000 (approximately US $16,000). Greek citizens must provide a tax registration number in order to conduct exchanges of foreign currency that are equal to or greater than EUR 1,000 (approximately US $950), and proof of compliance with tax laws in order to conduct exchanges of foreign currency that are equal to or greater than EUR 10,000 (US $9,400).

Greece is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the European Union, and the Council of Europe. Greece is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

The GOG should extend and implement suspicious transaction reporting requirements for gaming and stock market transactions, and is urged to adopt more rigorous standards for casino ownership or investments.

Grenada (Primary). Money laundering and other financial crimes are concerns in Grenada because of the Government of Grenada's (GOG's) rapid and relatively unsupervised venture into providing offshore services. Although the GOG has taken some legislative steps toward building a comprehensive anti-money laundering regime, the measures thus far have proved inadequate as evidenced by the scandal surrounding the collapse in 2000 of the First International Bank of Grenada, a licensed offshore bank.

Like many other Caribbean jurisdictions, the GOG has tried to raise revenue by luring offshore dollars through promises of low fees, banking and corporate secrecy, and minimal supervision. Since 1996, the GOG has raised approximately US $6 million through its offshore sector. In 1996, the GOG enacted the Offshore Banking Act, the Offshore Insurance Act, and the Company Management Act. The Minister of Finance reviews applications and issues licenses for offshore banks. Grenada amended its International Companies Act in 1996 to permit issuance of bearer shares. Through the International Trust Act 1996, Grenada allows formation of asset protection trusts, which hinder seizure of assets by foreign authorities. Grenada's International Betting Act 1998 provides for licensing of international gaming companies. As of 1999, the GOG had granted licenses for 16 offshore banks and six Internet gaming companies. Press reports indicate that approximately 2,200 International Business Companies (IBCs) have been formed in Grenada.

The Grenada Citizenship Amendment Act of 1997 enables foreign nationals to purchase citizenship for a family of five for approximately US $40,000. The Act does not impose a residency requirement. Moreover, new citizens can legally change their names, which increases the possibility that international criminals will take advantage of the program. Grenada has issued approximately 300 economic citizenships, and claims that proper background checks are made.

The GOG has enacted some anti-money laundering legislation and regulations for its offshore sector. The Proceeds of Crime Act 1992 criminalizes drug-related money laundering and establishes asset forfeiture provisions. However, no prosecutions have taken place under this Act. The Money Laundering Prevention Act (MLPA) of 1999, which came into force in 2000, additionally criminalizes money laundering related to any other crime that, had it been committed in Grenada, would have been punishable by at least five years in prison. Violators face maximum fines of US $1 million and prison sentences not to exceed 27 years. Individuals who "tip off" or aid and abet money launderers may be punished by a maximum fine of US $500,000 and five years in prison.

The MLPA imposes reporting responsibilities on financial institutions such as onshore and offshore banks, money transmitters and exchanges, issuers of credit cards and traveler's checks, insurance businesses and trust businesses. The MLPA established the Supervisory Authority (SA) to supervise financial institutions' compliance with the Act. Covered institutions must identify customers; maintain transaction records for a minimum of seven years; permit on-site inspections; report transactions to the SA if money laundering is suspected; and comply with regulations issued by the SA. The SA may forward information received from financial institutions to the Director of Public Prosecutions if there are reasonable grounds to suspect money laundering. Individuals leaving Grenada with more that EC $100,000 (approximately US $37,000) in currency must file a declaration form with the SA. The SA has the authority to establish training requirements and guidelines for financial institutions, and disseminate information internationally. The Ministry of Finance has the authority to issue a code of practice that would help covered institutions comply with provisions of the MLPA. Other provisions of the MLPA exempt good faith compliance with the Act from criminal or civil liability, and override bank secrecy in money laundering investigations. The GOG has not yet implemented certain provisions of the MLPA, including establishment of the SA and issuance of guidelines and a code of practice.

The GOG in 2000 restructured the Offshore Services Registry to create a semi-autonomous Financial Services Authority (FSA) with a staff of 13 personnel, including clerical and administrative personnel, to monitor and regulate the offshore sector. The FSA also is responsible for "promoting" Grenada's sector.

The GOG's anti-money laundering measures have thus far proven inadequate, as evidenced by the apparent fraudulent operation and ultimate collapse of the offshore First International Bank of Grenada (FIBG). The FIBG was founded in 1998 by US citizen Van A. Brink, who had declared bankruptcy in the United States, changed his name, and purchased a Grenadian passport. The FIBG lured investors with promises of 250 percent returns. Investigators allege Brink used new depositors' money to pay previous investors the impossibly high rate of return. In its first year, the bank claimed to have acquired assets of approximately US $26 billion.

In March 1999, an independent auditor of the FIBG warned the GOG of serious irregularities such as a lack of real assets and Brink's obstruction of the audit. Brink subsequently moved to Uganda and began to conduct business with rebel leaders in Congo. In January 2000, the FIBG hosted a conference of 60 Congolese rebel leaders and signed a deal promising them millions in aid.

In August 2000, the GOG stepped in to take control of the bank. Auditors claim that millions of dollars were transferred to international accounts belonging to officers of the bank, including Van Brink in Uganda. Later that month, local police arrested and charged two bank officers with fraud, attempting to defraud, and aiding and abetting. In October, the GOG reinstated FIBG as the First International Bank of Grenada 2000 on the condition that it would be properly supervised and reimburse depositors. The bank reportedly owes its approximately 6,000 depositors nearly US $150 million.

In the wake of international criticism surrounding the failure of FIBG, and at the time several other eastern Caribbean nations were determined by the FATF to be non-cooperative in international efforts to combat money laundering, the GOG initiated efforts to overhaul offshore legislation and regulations. In September 2000, the GOG named a new chairman for the FSA, sought international assistance, and announced plans to create a new financial crimes unit (FCU) within its police force. The FCU has not yet been established.

Since 2000, the GOG has had in force mutual legal assistance and extradition treaties with the United States. Grenada is a member of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), and in November 1999, underwent a CFATF mutual evaluation. Grenada is a member of the Organization of American States Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS/CICAD) Experts Group to Control Money Laundering, and is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

The GOG is urged to implement more stringent oversight of the offshore sector, in particular the economic citizenship program, and bring all provisions of the MLPA into full force. The GOG also should establish, fully staff, train, and fund the SA to operate as a financial intelligence unit. In addition, supervision should be strengthened by removing the marketing function from the FSA. Such measures will enable the GOG to better detect and investigate financial crime locally and cooperate with international law enforcement to prevent additional abuse of its financial sector by international criminals and fraud schemes.

Guatemala (Concern). Guatemala's geographic location and absence of comprehensive anti-money laundering legislation continues to make it vulnerable drug money laundering. Moreover, money laundering related to kidnapping, tax evasion, vehicle theft, and corruption is believed to be on the rise. Real estate transactions and the financing of large commercial development projects are particularly vulnerable to money laundering. Guatemala does not have an offshore sector. Ineffectiveness, intimidation, and corruption within Guatemala's judiciary and law enforcement agencies continue to be serious problems and hinder the government of Guatemala's (GOG) ability to control money laundering.

In January 2001, the GOG published legislation, the Law for the Free Use of Currency, which allows foreign currency such as the US dollar to become legal tender in Guatemala. Free circulation of the dollar will make Guatemala's financial institutions even more vulnerable to the placement of drug-derived currency.

The GOG in November 2000 ratified the Central American Convention for the Prevention of Money Laundering and Related Crimes. However, the GOG needs to strengthen its anti-money laundering legislation in order to implement its obligations under the Convention. Article 45 of Guatemala's 1992 Narcotics Law makes it illegal to participate in any transaction known to involve the proceeds of drug trafficking. The GOG also has issued regulations that require banks to record certain information regarding the origin of currency transactions that exceed US $5,000. The GOG has not made serious efforts to enact more stringent anti-money laundering controls because of the banking sector's resistance. Guatemala has strict bank secrecy laws, and its corporate code also offers considerable secrecy to the owners of corporations.

In 1999, the Secretariat for the Commission Against Addictions and Illicit Drug Trafficking (SECCATID) drafted legislation that would require reporting of suspicious or unusual financial transactions and declaration of cross-border currency movements; prohibit the use of anonymous bank accounts; and create a Financial Investigative Department (FID) that would investigate money laundering cases. The legislation has not yet been passed.

In April 2000, the GOG's Public Ministry, with US Government assistance, opened a new anti-corruption prosecutor's office. The office to date has initiated approximately 1,000 cases against government officials.

Guatemala is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Guatemala is a member of the Organization of American States Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS/CICAD) Experts Group to Control Money Laundering.

The GOG must adopt comprehensive anti-money laundering legislation that meets international standards, implement such legislation, and develop effective enforcement mechanisms so that it can protect its economy and financial system from financial crimes.

Guernsey (Primary). The Bailiwick of Guernsey (BOG) covers a number of the Channel Islands (Guernsey, Herm, Alderney, and Sark being the largest). Guernsey is a Crown Dependency of the United Kingdom. Its sophisticated offshore center continues to be vulnerable to money laundering, particularly at the layering and integration stages.

The Financial Services Commission (FSC) is responsible for regulating the BOG's offshore industry. The FSC conducts on-site visits and analyzes assessments by auditors. There are approximately 79 offshore banks that offer deposit taking and custodial, trust, company, and fiduciary services. The BOG also has 413 registered offshore insurance companies, approximately 15,450 IBCs, and 15 bureaux de change.

In January 2000, the Proceeds of Crime Law and Regulations 1999 (All-Crimes Legislation) came into force, along with the corresponding regulations, the Criminal Justice (Proceeds of Crime) (Bailiwick of Guernsey) Regulations 1999. The legislation extends predicate offenses for money laundering to all serious crimes and creates a system for reporting suspicious transactions. Suspicious transactions reports are filed with the Joint Police and Customs Financial Investigation Unit (JPCFIU). The JPCFIU is a member of the Egmont Group.

In 2000, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) conducted a review of Guernsey's anti-money laundering regime against 25 specified criteria. Guernsey was not identified by the FATF as a noncooperative country in the international fight against money laundering. However, the FATF in its June report noted the following about Guernsey's anti-money laundering regime:

...Guernsey...[has] in place a system for reporting suspicious transactions. Where the underlying criminal conduct is drug trafficking or terrorism, the obligation to report is a direct one. Where the underlying criminal conduct is another predicate offence, the reporting is an "indirect obligation"-failure to make a report potentially leaves one open to a charge of money laundering; making a report is a defence against such a charge....

...Guernsey...[allows] certain intermediaries, and individuals, which are subject to the same anti-money laundering standards and supervision as financial institutions, to introduce business to banks and financial institutions on the basis that the introducers themselves verify the identity of the customer. In addition, the jurisdiction allows certain institutions based in certain overseas countries, subject to equivalent anti-money laundering systems, to introduce business, without separately verifying the identity of the client. Banks and other financial institutions in ...Guernsey...are only required to know the name of the client but not to verify the identity separately. There is concern as to whether such a system is consistent with FATF Recommendations and provides sufficiently rigorous checks on the identity of clients of banks and financial institutions, especially in cases where the introducer is not a financial institution.

The lack of a stringent scheme to apply the new rules of customer identification for accounts opened prior to their entry into force is also a source of concern. The new rules for customer identification verification were introduced in...Guernsey in 1999....

Proposed drug trafficking legislation would consolidate legislation passed in 1988 and 1992, and also would include a new offense of acquiring, possessing, or using the proceeds of drug trafficking. Moreover, this legislation would introduce an offense of failing to disclose the knowledge or suspicion of drug money laundering. Passage of this legislation reportedly would be an important step towards putting the UK in a position to extend the application of the 1988 UN Drug Convention to the BOG.

The BOG also is considering legislation that would regulate bureaux de change and cheque cashers to ensure that these entities are formally identified and comply with BOG Guidance Notes.

The BOG cooperates with international law enforcement on money laundering cases. The BOG is a member of the Offshore Group of Bank Supervisors.

The BOG has made strides toward developing a comprehensive anti-money laundering regime. The BOG should further strengthen its anti-money laundering program by approving and implementing pending legislation that would consolidate the drug trafficking law, regulate bureaux de change and cheque cashers, and expand regulation of trust companies.

Guyana (other). Guyana is not an important regional financial and offshore banking is not permitted. Nevertheless, there is concern that both narcotics and non-narcotics related money laundering takes place. A largely unregulated banking sector, several independent currency exchanges and growing illicit trade in licit goods (particularly gold and diamonds) facilitate money laundering activities.

Guyanese law requires that funds over US $10,000 imported into or exported out of Guyana be reported, but mechanisms have not yet been put into place to facilitate such reporting. The Financial Institutions Act of March 1995 designated the Bank of Guyana, the central bank, as the sole financial regulator and extended the coverage of legislation, regulations and penalties to all deposit-taking institutions. However, there are no laws in force at this time that require financial institutions to know, record, or report the identities of customers engaging in large currency transactions, suspicious transactions or to maintain transaction records.

Although a money laundering prevention bill was passed by the Guyanese National Assembly in February 2000, the legislation is not yet in force. The new law will criminalize money laundering related to narcotics and other serious crimes and will allow for the expansion of predicate offenses. The legislation also will establish requirements for reporting suspicious transactions by banks and non-bank financial institutions, and cross-border currency transactions. Moreover, other provisions of the legislation will require confidentiality in the reporting process, provide for good faith reporting, and contain provisions for asset forfeiture, international cooperation, and extradition for money laundering. The legislation authorizes creation of a supervisory authority to receive financial disclosure information and supervise financial institutions' activities to prevent and detect money laundering. However, the legislation appears to fall short of Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Forty Recommendations and the revised Organization of American States (OAS) Model Regulations on Money Laundering.

Guyana is a member of the Organization of American States Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS/CICAD) Experts Group to Control Money Laundering. Guyana has not joined the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) by signing the CFATF Memorandum of Understanding. It would benefit by doing so and by actively participating in CFATF activities, including undergoing a mutual evaluation.

Guyana is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention

Haiti (Concern). Haiti is vulnerable to money laundering because of a dramatic rise in drug trafficking, official corruption, and ineffective bank supervision. Drug traffickers use Haiti as a transit country for moving bulk currency. Moreover, criminals launder funds through Haiti's exchange houses, and via wire transfers through banks and money remitters.

In August 2000, the Central Bank of Haiti (BRH) issued Circular 95, which requires banks, exchange brokers, and transfer bureaus to obtain declarations identifying the source of funds for transactions exceeding 200,000 gourdes (approximately US $ 9,600) or the equivalent in foreign currency. Covered entities must report to the competent authorities such transactions on a quarterly basis. Failure to comply can result in fines of 100,000 gourdes (approximately US $4,800). The BRH also can revoke the license of banks that fail to comply. The Ministry of Justice reported in August 2000 that it had created a body to receive and analyze financial disclosures. However, no additional details were provided. Several Haitian banks have organized anti-money laundering seminars to increase awareness.

In January 2001, Haiti reportedly passed anti-money laundering legislation. However, at this time, the specifics of the legislation have not been provided.

Haiti is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Haiti is a member of the Organization of American States Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS/CICAD) Experts Group to Control Money Laundering. The GOH in September 2000 began the process of applying for membership in the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF). In December 2000, a CFATF team traveled to Haiti for a preliminary visit and evaluation.

The new GOH, which will be seated in February 2001, should build upon previous efforts and ensure that it enacts and fully enforces anti-money laundering legislation that meets international standards such as criminalizing the laundering of proceeds related to all serious crimes, including corruption, and requiring suspicious transactions and cross-border currency reporting. The GOH also is urged to establish, train, and adequately fund and staff a financial intelligence unit that would coordinate the GOH's anti-money laundering efforts and work with foreign governments to help protect the Haitian economy from criminal abuse. Moreover, the GOH is urged to continue its efforts to join and work more closely with the CFATF, which will help provide additional regional guidance, support, and coordination in the fight against money laundering.

Honduras (Concern). Honduras is not a major regional financial center, and does not offer offshore financial services. However, Honduras is vulnerable to drug money laundering because of increased drug-trafficking activity throughout the region. The illicit proceeds of auto theft, kidnappings, bank fraud, alien smuggling, and corruption also are believed to be laundered in Honduras. Money launderers use Honduran banks, casinos, exchange firms, and front companies.

Honduras's anti-money laundering regime is inadequate, and there have been no successful money laundering prosecutions under its present legislation. Law No. 27-98 of December 1997 criminalized narcotics-related money laundering, and requires banks and non-bank financial institutions to report suspicious financial transactions (STRs) to the National Banking and Insurance Commission (NBIC). The NBIC analyzes STRs and forwards those that it suspects are linked to narcotics trafficking to the Public Ministry. Even though financial institutions and their employees are protected from civil and criminal liability when filing STRs, compliance remains low. In 2000, a joint commission of the Public Ministry, NBIC, and other Government of Honduras (GOH) institutions drafted new legislation that would expand predicate crimes for money laundering to include all criminal activity, and promote more effective investigation of STRs. The National Congress has not yet approved this legislation.

Corruption is a serious impediment to implementing more effective anti-money laundering controls in Honduras. The Ministry of Security has proposed a series of measures that would target corruption in the judiciary and law enforcement, but the National Congress has yet to enact these measures.

Honduras is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Honduras is a member of the Organization of American States Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS/CICAD) Experts Group to Control Money Laundering. Honduras cooperates with the US Government in narcotics-related investigations.

Honduras is urged to pass comprehensive anti-money legislation that would expand the predicate crimes for money laundering to include all serious crimes.

Hong Kong (Primary). Hong Kong is an important international financial center and is vulnerable to money laundering through its traditional banking, remittance, and money transfer networks, as well as through the offshore financial services it offers and its extensive underground banking system. Narcotics trafficking, fraud, illegal gambling and bookmaking, alien smuggling, and tax evasion generate much of the illicit proceeds that are laundered in Hong Kong. Hong Kong has developed a strong anti-money laundering regime and is a regional leader in the area of financial regulation and supervision.

Hong Kong's banking system is a three-tier system of deposit-taking institutions: licensed banks, restricted license banks, and deposit-taking companies. As of October 2000, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) regulated 267 financial institutions. The Insurance Authority and the Securities and Futures Commission regulate the insurance and securities industries, respectively. All three groups impose licensing requirements and conduct background checks on applicants.

Hong Kong's offshore services include exempt companies in the form of registered, private, limited companies (PLCs). These companies can be formed using nominee shareholders and directors, but cannot issue bearer shares. Hong Kong allows public access to registers of corporate directors, managers, and members, but does not require disclosure of beneficial owners of the more than 470,000 such companies. PLCs generally are not taxed or required to file tax returns because Hong Kong taxes only income earned in Hong Kong. The HKMA requires authorized financial institutions to obtain written statements from company formation agents certifying that they have recorded and retained information that identifies the source of funds.

In 1989, Hong Kong criminalized money laundering related to drug trafficking through the Drug Trafficking (Recovery of Proceeds) Ordinance (DTROP), and in 1994, criminalized money laundering related to indictable offenses through the Organized and Serious Crime Ordinance (OSCO). In 1995, the GOHK passed amendments to the OSCO and the DTRPO that require banks, non-bank financial institutions, and financial intermediaries, such as lawyers and accountants, to file suspicious transactions reports (STRs). New legislation came into force in 2000 that requires remittance and money transfers agents to maintain records and identify customers for cash transactions equal to or greater than US $2,500.

Hong Kong also has implemented regulations that require financial institutions to record the identities of customers, or the identities of the customers' legal nominee, and to release this information to authorities upon request. Financial institutions are required to maintain these records for a minimum of five to seven years and to report suspicious transactions to the Joint Financial Intelligence Unit (JFIU) for review and possible investigation. The JFIU is a member of the Egmont Group and is able to share information with its international counterparts. Hong Kong law provides that the filing of an STR shall not be regarded as a breach of restrictions imposed by contract or law on the disclosure of information. The JFIU provides periodic feedback to financial institutions on STRs that they have filed and also makes available to financial institutions trend reports and sanitized case histories.

In the first ten months of 2000, the banking sector filed 4,969 suspicious transactions reports, the securities sector filed 24, and the insurance sector filed 11. Through November 2000, Hong Kong had prosecuted 13 money-laundering cases. Hong Kong reports that it has not detected an increase in financial crimes over the past year and has found no indications of narcotics proceeds funding smuggling activities.

In November 2000, Hong Kong reintroduced to the legislature amendments to the DTROP and the OSCO that would reduce the threshold for filing STRs. Under current law, financial institutions must file an STR if there are reasonable grounds to believe that money laundering is taking place. The proposed amendment to the DTROP, however, would require banks to file an STR when there are reasonable grounds to suspect money laundering. The amendment also would increase the maximum penalties for money laundering from 14 to 20 years in prison and for failure to report suspicious transaction from 3 to 12 months in prison. Bankers and accountants have expressed some reservations about this legislation, but its prospects for passage without major change reportedly are good.

Hong Kong is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. It is a member of the Asia/Pacific Group against Money Laundering (APG) and the FATF. Honk Kong will assume the FATF's presidency in 2001. Hong Kong also is a member of the Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors. In January 2000, Hong Kong's treaty on mutual legal assistance with the United States came into force. Hong Kong has signed similar agreements with Australia, France, United Kingdom, New Zealand, Italy, the Republic of Korea, and Switzerland. Hong Kong has initialed agreements on mutual legal assistance with Portugal, Canada, the Philippines, Israel, and India that will provide for the exchange of information for all serious crimes, including money laundering.

Hong Kong could further strengthen its anti-money-laundering regime by requiring financial institutions to report transactions that exceed specified large amounts and by putting into place measures that would help prevent structuring of deposits. Hong Kong also should establish cross-border currency reporting requirements and encourage increased suspicious transaction reporting in the securities and futures industry. Moreover, Hong Kong should tighten offshore company registration procedures to discourage formation of shell companies.

Hungary (Primary). Hungary is vulnerable to money laundering because of its strategic location, modern financial services industry, and the presence of organized criminal groups in the country. In particular, organized crime groups from the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have established a strong presence in Hungary and use Hungarian financial institutions such as banks, casinos, and currency exchange businesses to launder their illicit proceeds. Hungarian banks may be particularly vulnerable to money laundering because of their issuance of anonymous bearer passbook accounts. These passbooks can be used to make cash deposits and withdrawals that do not exceed 200,000 Hungarian forints (approximately US $700). All currency transactions that exceed two million forints require some form of customer identification. Narcotics trafficking, smuggling, arms trafficking, auto theft, tax evasion, financial fraud, bribery, alien smuggling, and racketeering are the major sources of criminal proceeds laundered in Hungary.

In 1994, the Government of Hungary (GOH) criminalized money laundering related to all crimes through an amendment to Section 303 "Money Laundering" of the 1978 Hungarian Criminal Code. Other money laundering legislation became effective at the same time, notably Act XXIV of 1994 on the Prevention and Impeding of Money Laundering. Hungarian financial institutions such as banks, insurance companies, securities brokers/dealers, investment fund management companies, currency exchange houses, and casinos are required to file suspicious transaction reports (STRs). Real estate agencies are not subject to STR reporting requirements, but have been used to launder money. The GOH limits the import and export of the forint to 200,000 forints (approximately US $700). There are no limitations on the amount of foreign currency that can be imported; however, amounts exceeding 50,000 forints (approximately US $170) must be declared. Exports of foreign currency cannot exceed the amount of currency that was brought into the country.

Hungary's legislature in May 2000 began consideration of a proposal that would require executives, attorneys, and accountants of insurance companies to file STRs.

Hungary's financial intelligence unit is the Anti-Money Laundering Section (AMLS) of Hungary's National Police. The AMLS receives STRs from financial institutions, and is a member of the Egmont Group. Hungary in 2000 established a criminal investigation bureau within the Tax and Financial Inspection Service to investigate tax evasion and money laundering.

Hungary has recently entered the offshore financial services market and has licensed 300 international business companies (IBCs). It does not provide offshore banking.

Hungary has a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty with the United States. Hungary also has information sharing agreements with Austria, Slovakia, and Cyprus for the exchange of information related to money laundering. In January 2000, Hungary and the United States signed a non-binding information-sharing agreement that enables US and Hungarian law enforcement to work together more closely on organized crime and related illicit transnational activities. Hungary has signed similar cooperation agreements with 22 other countries. In May 2000, Hungary and the US Federal Bureau of Investigation established a joint task force to combat Russian organized crime groups.

Hungary is a member of the Council of Europe's (COE) Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures (PC-R-EV), and underwent a mutual evaluation by this group that was published in June 1999. Hungary is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

The Government of Hungary (GOH) has initiated only four major money laundering investigations in the last several years, and has not yet had a successful prosecution. The GOH is urged to remove any legal and institutional impediments that prevent it from bringing money-laundering investigations to a successful conclusion. Moreover, the GOH should approve and fully implement legislation that requires executives, attorneys, and accountants of insurance companies to file STRs. The GOH also should eliminate anonymous bearer passbooks. However, none of these measures will be effective until the GOH devotes more resources to investigate money-laundering allegations and to tighten oversight of organizations that are required to file STRs.

India (Primary). Money laundering is a growing concern in India because of its large population and emergence as a regional financial center. The hawala (or hundi) alternative remittance system reportedly is used by criminals to launder money generated from drug trafficking, alien smuggling, corruption, and financial fraud.

The Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (NDPSA) of 1985, amended in 1988, calls for the tracing and forfeiture of assets that have been acquired through narcotics trafficking, and prohibits attempts to transfer and conceal those assets. This legislation seems to have the effect of criminalizing drug money laundering. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Chapter XXXIV (sections 451-459) establishes India's basic framework for confiscating the proceeds of crime. The Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance (CLAO) of 1944 allows for the attachment and forfeiture of money or property obtained through bribery, corruption, criminal breach of trust, or theft, and of assets that are disproportionate to an individual's known sources of income.

The Indian Parliament continues to consider draft legislation that would explicitly criminalize money laundering, impose reporting requirements on financial institutions and intermediaries, and provide for seizure and confiscation of assets related to the proceeds of crime. The bill was referred to a select committee of the upper house of India's parliament, which has made certain recommendations. These are currently under review by the executive branch.

The GOI does not have a financial intelligence unit (FIU); and legislation currently before the parliament does not call for the establishment of an FIU. The Central Economic Intelligence Unit (CEIB) is the Government of India's (GOI) lead organization for fighting financial crime. Other organizations such as the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, Customs and Excise, and the Reserve Bank of India also play a role in the enforcement of India's anti-money laundering laws.

India is a party to the UN 1988 Drug Convention, and is a member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering.

The GOI should adopt comprehensive anti-money laundering legislation, and create an FIU that would analyze suspicious transactions reports and cooperate with FIUs from other countries.

Indonesia (Primary). Indonesia's strategic geographic location, strict bank secrecy, and inadequate legislation against money laundering and corruption have made its economy vulnerable to money laundering. Indonesia is not an offshore center. Most money laundering in Indonesia is believed to be related to domestic narcotics trafficking, fraud, and corruption. In recent years, several Indonesian banks have become the targets of fraud schemes and corruption that may have been prevented if adequate safeguards had been in place, indicating that the country's financial regulatory system also is inadequate.

In July 2000, Indonesian police officials at a cyber crime conference described recent cases that have involved credit card fraud, computer hacking, and other financial crimes. Despite their ongoing efforts, the Indonesian National Police still lack the appropriate resources, training, and expertise to mount complex investigations. In August 2000, the US Government provided anti-money laundering training to representatives of Indonesian law enforcement.

Draft legislation that is the subject of discussion between the administration and parliament, the Eradication of Criminal Acts of Money Laundering (ECAML), would criminalize money laundering and establish suspicious transactions reporting for financial institutions, currency transactions reporting, and cross-border currency reporting. ECAML also would establish the Commission for the Eradication of Criminal Acts of Money Laundering (CECAML). CECAML would receive and analyze currency and suspicious transactions reports, and offer assistance in criminal money laundering investigations.

Indonesia is a member of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG). Indonesia is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

The lack of an adequate anti-money laundering and enforcement regime will continue to put Indonesia's financial system at risk to financial crime. Indonesia should pass comprehensive anti-money laundering legislation and enact bank supervisory practices that are consistent with accepted international standards. In addition, the GOI should investigate the use of non-bank facilities that are frequently used to launder money.

Iran (Other). Iran is not a regional financial center. Iranian law enforcement officials reportedly carry out financial investigations in the context of drug crimes. Iran does not have legislation that criminalizes money laundering.

Iran's real estate market is widely used as an alternative remittance system. For example, real estate transactions take place in Iran, but no funds change hands there; rather, payment is made overseas. This typically is done because of the difficulty in transferring funds out of Iran and the weakness of Iran's currency, the rial. The real estate market, in at least one instance, has been used to launder narcotics-related funds.

Iran is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Ireland (Concern). The primary sources of funds laundered in Ireland are derived from tax offenses, fraud, and drug trafficking. Money laundering occurs in financial institutions and bureaux de change, the latter of which are not regulated. Additionally, investigations in Ireland indicate the continued use of professionals specializing in the creation of legal entities as a means for laundering money. Trusts are also established as a means of transferring funds from Ireland to offshore locations. It is difficult to establish the true beneficiary of the funds, which makes it difficult to follow the money trail and establish a link between the funds and the criminal.

Ireland's offshore banking is concentrated in Dublin's International Financial Services Centre (IFSC). The IFSC has a preferential 10-percent corporate tax rate. Approximately 400 international financial institutions and companies operate in the IFSC. Services offered include fiscal management, re-insurance, fund administration and foreign exchange dealing. The IFSC companies are regulated by the Central Bank of Ireland.

The Criminal Justice Act 1994 criminalized money laundering relating to drug trafficking and other offenses. It also required financial institutions to report suspicious transactions and currency transactions exceeding approximately US $15,000, implement customer identification procedures and retain records of financial transactions. Subsequent legislation added requirements for the implementation of anti-money laundering programs and for training in the identification of suspicious transactions.

A number of the suspicious transaction reports, as well as requests for assistance from Financial Action Task Force (FATF) members, have cited the use of solicitors, accountants and company formation agencies in Ireland to create shell companies. Investigations have disclosed that these companies are used to provide a series of transactions connected to money laundering, tax offenses, and other fraudulent activity. The difficulties in establishing the beneficial owner of such a company are complicated by the fact that the directors are usually nominees and are often principals of a solicitors' firm or of a company formation agency.

Ireland has recently proposed a new Finance Act and a new Company Law Act to address these concerns. The new Company Act will require all newly registered Irish companies to engage, at least in part, in business dealings within the State. It also contains a general requirement that at least one director reside in Ireland.

New legislation has recently been introduced to combat money laundering by terrorist organizations. This legislation contains provisions addressing the forfeiture of property when it is used by or connected with a terrorist organization.

The Bureau of Fraud Investigation serves as Ireland's financial intelligence unit. The Bureau analyzes financial disclosures and is a member of the Egmont Group.

To date, 30 individuals have been charged with money laundering in Ireland, and 17 have been convicted in Irish courts.

Ireland is a member of the European Union (EU), Council of Europe and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Ireland is also a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Isle of Man, The (Primary). The Isle of Man (IOM) is a Crown Dependency of the United Kingdom. Its sophisticated offshore center continues to be vulnerable to money laundering, particularly at the layering and integration stages.

In 2000, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) conducted a review of the IOM's anti-money laundering regime against 25 specified criteria. The IOM was not identified by the FATF as a noncooperative country in the international fight against money laundering. However, the FATF in its June report raised certain concerns about the IOM's anti-money laundering regime:

...the Isle of Man...[has] in place a system for reporting suspicious transactions. Where the underlying criminal conduct is drug trafficking or terrorism, the obligation to report is a direct one. Where the underlying criminal conduct is another predicate offence, the reporting is an "indirect obligation"-failure to make a report potentially leaves one open to a charge of money laundering; making a report is a defence against such a charge....

...the Isle of Man ...[allows] certain intermediaries, and individuals, which are subject to the same anti-money laundering standards and supervision as financial institutions, to introduce business to banks and financial institutions on the basis that the introducers themselves verify the identity of the customer. In addition, the jurisdictions allow certain institutions based in certain overseas countries, subject to equivalent anti-money laundering systems, to introduce business, without separately verifying the identity of the client. Banks and other financial institutions in the ...Isle of Man ... are only required to know the name of the client but not to verify the identity separately. There is concern as to whether such a system is consistent with FATF Recommendations and provides sufficiently rigorous checks on the identity of clients of banks and financial institutions, especially in cases where the introducer is not a financial institution...

The lack of a stringent scheme to apply the new rules of customer identification for accounts opened prior to their entry into force is also a source of concern. The new rules for customer identification verification were introduced in ...the Isle of Man in 1998....

Much of the IOM's offshore financial services industry consists of "exempt companies" that are not permitted to conduct business on the island and are generally owned by individuals who are not residents of the island. These companies are not required to disclose the identities of beneficial owners, and can issue bearer shares. In the IOM, bearer shares are registered with the name and address of the initial holder. There are approximately 24,300 exempt companies registered in the IOM.

The IOM in 1987 criminalized money laundering related to drug trafficking, and in 1990, added terrorism as a predicate offense. The Criminal Justice (Money Laundering Offenses) Act 1990 extended the government's confiscation powers to all crimes, and was amended in 1998 to criminalize money laundering related to all serious crimes. In addition, this legislation contains a requirement for reporting suspicious transactions related to drugs or terrorism. The IOM also has enacted the Anti-Money Laundering Code 1998, which (as amended in 1999) imposes reporting and "know your customer" obligations on financial businesses such as lawyers, registered legal practitioners, and accountants holding accounts on clients' behalf; company service providers; and trust service providers. However, there is an exemption from the identification of customers requirement for business relationships that were formed prior to December 1998. The Code is supplemented by Guidance Notes that define the obligations of the institutions under the revised Code. The insurance sector also has issued Guidance Notes.

Suspicious transactions reports are reported to the Fraud & Financial Investigation Unit (FFIU), the IOM's financial intelligence unit. The FFIU belongs to the Egmont Group.

The IOM has announced its intention to end the use of bearer shares, and to require companies to certify to the Financial Services Commission (FSC)-the entity that regulates the IOM's financial institutions-that they have created accounts. However, companies will not be required to reveal actual figures to the FSC.

The IOM is a member of the Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors. The IOM cooperates with international anti-money laundering authorities on regulatory and criminal matters. Application of the 1988 UN Drug Convention was extended to the IOM in 1993.

The IOM has made progress toward developing a comprehensive anti-money laundering regime. The IOM should consider further strengthening its anti-money laundering program by making its customer identification rules retroactive.

Israel (Primary). Israel is not considered a regional financial center, offshore center, or tax haven. In the past, Israel's banking system had been vulnerable to money laundering because of its bank secrecy laws. Israeli law enforcement officials report that it has no information that confirms the existence of organized criminal groups laundering money in Israel. However, foreign law enforcement reports indicate that organized crime groups launder money in Israel. Moreover, US law enforcement has seen the use of Israeli-based or linked accounts or targets in a variety of money laundering undercover operations.

In June 2000, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) identified Israel as a noncooperative country in the international fight against money laundering. The FATF in its report cited:

The absence of anti-money laundering legislation causes Israel to fall short of FATF standards in the areas of mandatory suspicious transactions reporting, criminalization of money laundering arising from serious crimes and establishment of a financial intelligence unit. Israel also is partially deficient in the area of record keeping, since this requirement does not apply to all transactions. However, Israel already meets FATF standards in the areas of regulation of financial institutions, licensing, and screening procedures for banking corporations, and the international cooperation in regulatory investigations. Israeli banking regulations address the issue of customer identification.

The US Treasury Department issued an advisory to US financial institutions advising them to "give enhanced scrutiny" to all financial transactions involving Israel.

In August 2000, Israel enacted legislation, the Prohibition on Money Laundering Law (PMLL), 5760-2000, that criminalizes money laundering, and imposes on financial services providers the obligation to identify, report, and keep records of specified transactions. The law establishes possession of unlawful property, publication of pornography, public corruption, copyright violation, counterfeiting, gambling, trafficking in persons, fraud, drug smuggling, and auto theft as predicate offenses for money laundering. The PMLL also prescribes an obligation on persons entering or leaving Israel to report monies brought into or taken out of the country. These obligations will come into effect on a date to be set by the Minister of Justice, but not later than 18 months after the law's enactment. The full effect and value of these legislative changes cannot be determined, however, until the implementing regulations are fully in place and enforced.

In November 2000, Israeli police issued the Reporting to Police Regulation, which establishes mechanisms for reporting transactions that involve prohibited property.

In early January 2001, the Israeli Knesset Constitution, Law and Justice Committee approved regulations that address customer identification, transactions reporting requirements, and records retention. The regulations will become effective one year from the date they are signed into law. Under these new regulations, Israeli banks must report the following transactions:

* Deposits and withdrawals of currency equal to or greater than Israeli New Shekel (NIS) 200,000 (approximately US $49,500).

* Cash transactions equal to or greater than NIS 200,000 that are not conducted via the customer's account.

* Exchange of currency equal to or greater than NIS 50,000 (approximately US $12,400).

* Issuance of bank checks equal to or greater than NIS 200,000. Checks issued against a home loan of NIS 1 million (approximately US $247,500) or less are exempted.

* Purchase of travelers' checks equal to or greater than NIS 200,000.

* Deposit of foreign-currency checks equal to NIS 1 million.

* Transfers to and from Israel equal to or greater than NIS 1 million.

Banks will not be required to report such transactions that are conducted by public institutions, banks, credit card companies, insurance companies, or similar entities.

Israel also is in the process of establishing a Money Laundering Authority that will include a financial intelligence unit (FIU), and will coordinate information and activities with Israeli law enforcement, customs, banks, and other relevant entities.

Israel and the United States have a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty. Israel does not have bilateral agreements with other countries concerning money laundering. Israel has signed the 1988 UN Drug Convention, but has not yet become a party to it. In December 2000, Israel signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Effective implementation and enforcement of anti-money laundering legislation is critical to protecting Israel's financial system from continued abuse by criminals and criminal organizations. In particular, the GOI should establish its FIU as quickly as possible, and ensure that it has the necessary equipment and personnel to operate effectively.

Italy (Primary). Italy's large financial sector is vulnerable to money laundering; in 1997, money laundering in Italy was estimated to exceed US $50 billion. Italy is a drug consumption country and a transshipment point for moving illicit narcotics into western Europe. Italian organized criminal groups-particularly those in the southern part of the country-continue to engage in narcotics and alien smuggling, contraband cigarettes smuggling, extortion, usury, and kidnapping, and launder the proceeds of these activities through Italian banks, casinos, real estate, and the gold market. For example, Italian, Albanian and Montenegrin criminal organizations form offshore companies to purchase bulk cigarettes that are marked for export, and smuggle them into Italy where they are sold tax-free throughout the European Union. This highly lucrative trade is made more attractive by relatively light penalties-a maximum of five years in prison. In 1999, actual seizures of contraband merchandise by the Government of Italy (GOI) indicate that Italy lost more than US $1 billion in tax revenue.

In May 2000, Swiss police arrested alleged organized crime kingpin Gerardo Cuomo in a joint operation with Italian anti-Mafia police. The Government of Switzerland in November 2000 approved Cuomo's extradition to Italy where he will face charges of smuggling, criminal conspiracy, and money laundering.

Italian law criminalizes money laundering related to any crime. A wide range of financial institutions-including stock brokerages, exchange houses, and insurance companies-must identify their customers, record and report transactions above 20 million lire (approximately US $9,800), and report suspicious transactions. In addition, institutions and individuals must report cross-border movements of currency that exceed 20 million lire. The GOI also has in place a system for tracing, freezing, seizing, and confiscating assets. In accordance with Council of Europe procedures, the GOI is committed to sharing these assets with cooperating countries.

Decree No. 153/97 designates the Ufficio Italiano dei Cambi (UIC) as the recipient of suspicious transactions reports (STRs); provides a "safe harbor" provision for individuals who report suspicious transactions; and creates an inter-ministerial commission to coordinate anti-money laundering among Italian law enforcement and regulatory agencies. The decree also establishes organizational links among agencies that are involved in the fight against organized crime, and encourages international cooperation against money laundering.

Italy's financial intelligence unit, the UIC, is a member of the Egmont Group. The UIC receives and analyzes financial disclosures, and forwards them to the appropriate law enforcement agency-the Anti-Mafia Directorate or the Guardia di Finanza-for further investigation when deemed necessary. The UIC also performs supervisory and regulatory functions such as issuing decrees, regulations, and circulars.

Italy is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), and held its presidency from 1997 to 1998. In 1997, Italy underwent a second-round FATF mutual evaluation. Italy also is a member of the European Union (EU). Italy is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Italy and the United States have a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty and an extradition treaty in place, and cooperate on money laundering cases. Italy has information sharing agreements with other countries for the exchange of information related to money-laundering cases. Moreover, the GOI has a number of bilateral agreements with foreign governments in the area of investigative cooperation on drug trafficking and organized crime.

Although the GOI has comprehensive internal auditing and training requirements for its financial sector, implementation of these measures by non-bank financial institutions still lags behind that of banks, as evidenced by the relatively low number of suspicious transactions reports that have been filed by non-bank financial institutions. The GOI should therefore increase its training efforts and supervision in the area of non-bank financial institutions to decrease their vulnerability to money laundering.

Jamaica (Concern). Jamaica has not developed into a significant regional financial center or offshore banking center. However, money laundering does occur, primarily through the purchase of assets such as cars and real estate. The laundering of proceeds through Jamaican banks and financial institutions does not appear to be prevalent.

The Government of Jamaica (GOJ) passed the Money Laundering Act (MLA) in December 1996, but it was not implemented until January 5, 1998. The financial sector complained that the process of reporting threshold transactions-involving US $10,000 or more in cash-was an onerous burden. In March 1999, an amendment raised the reporting threshold to US $50,000 for all financial institutions except persons licensed to operate an exchange bureau (or cambio), who have a reporting threshold of US $8,000. In addition, the amendment introduced suspicious transaction reporting. In February 2000, the Act was further amended to expand the predicate offenses to include fraud, firearms trafficking, and corruption.

In accordance with powers contained in the MLA, the Director of Public Prosecutions sent a letter to local banks, cambios, and building societies, requesting implementation of a new suspicious transaction reporting form that details why a transaction is considered suspicious. The form, which was distributed to the local financial sector in October 2000, will help investigators in analyzing whether a reported transaction is the result of money laundering.

The Government of Jamaica (GOJ) recently submitted to Parliament a package of bills intended to strengthen regulation of the country's financial sector. The bills include amendments to the Bank of Jamaica (BOJ) Act that are designed to strengthen the authority of the BOJ's financial institutions supervisory division. Other proposed legislation would establish an independent, non-bank supervisory agency-the Financial Services Commission (FSC)-which would become operational on April 1, 2001 (the beginning of the next fiscal year). FSC would regulate financial markets, insurance companies, pension funds, and financial advisors.

In addition to the proposed legislation, the GOJ is taking administrative steps to establish a regulatory policy council that would coordinate the regulatory functions of the BOJ, FSC, and the Jamaica Deposit Insurance Company. The GOJ also plans to establish a commercial court and a financial crimes investigation unit. These steps are part of the GOJ program to rehabilitate the Jamaican financial sector after its 1996-1997 collapse and to prevent future banking crises.

Jamaica has established a Financial Analysis Unit (FAU) to assist in the implementation of its anti-money laundering program. The unit is responsible for receiving, analyzing, and developing information from suspicious activity reports. At the request of the US Embassy in Jamaica and the GOJ, FinCEN visited the FAU on September 5, 2000 to determine its training and technical assistance needs. The unit is in its initial stage of development; however, it is expected to be operational in early 2001. The unit has been collecting threshold reports since 1998. The total number of reports received is unknown because they are too numerous to count easily, although they have received at least 5,000 reports from one bank. The unit has been collecting Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) since 1999, and has received 22 SARs to date.

Two data entry clerks will be detailed to the FAU from the Organized Crime Unit to enter the collected threshold reports and SARs once the FAU receives a software package for the collection and analysis of SARs. After the financial data has been entered, two analysts from the Organized Crime Unit will also be detailed to the FAU for a period of six months. The analysts will be responsible for analyzing the data and forwarding financial reports to the financial crimes investigation unit for a more thorough investigation.

Jamaica is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. Jamaica is a member of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) and the Organization of American States Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS/CICAD) Experts Group to Control Money Laundering. Jamaica and the United States have a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty that entered into force in 1995.

The GOJ continues to make progress in bringing its anti-money laundering regime in line with international standards. There is a genuine commitment on the part of the GOJ and the Public Prosecutors Office to combat money laundering and to cooperate with regional and international governments. The GOJ should take steps to further strengthen its money laundering law by extending it to cover the laundering of proceeds from all serious crimes and require declarations of large cross-border movements of currency or monetary instruments. The GOJ should also ensure that the FAU is sufficiently staffed and resourced and is brought into operation as soon as possible.

Japan (Primary). Japan is an important world financial center and is believed to be a major money laundering center. The principal sources of laundered funds are drug trafficking and financial crimes (illicit gambling, extortion, abuse of legitimate corporate activities, and all types of property related crimes) as well as the proceeds from violent crimes, mostly linked to Japan's criminal organizations, e.g., the boryokudan. The Japanese National Policy Agency estimates that the boryokudan's illegal activities generate annually several billion dollars in proceeds. US law enforcement reports that drug-related money laundering investigations initiated in the US periodically show a link between drug-related money laundering activities in the U.S and bank accounts in Japan.

Prior to 1999, Japanese law only criminalized narcotics-related money laundering. The Anti-Drug Special Law, enacted in 1991, criminalized drug-related money laundering, mandated suspicious transaction reports for the illicit proceeds of drug offenses, and authorized controlled drug deliveries. This legislation also created a system to confiscate illegal profits gained through drug crimes. The seizure provisions apply to tangible and intangible assets, direct illegal profit, substitute assets, and criminally derived property that has been commingled with legitimate assets. The limited scope of the law and the burden required of law enforcement to prove a direct link between money and assets to specific drug activity severely limited the law's effectiveness. As a result, Japanese police and prosecutors have undertaken few investigations and prosecutions into suspected money laundering.

Pursuant to the 1999 Anti-Organized Crime Law, which came into effect in February 2000, Japan expanded its money laundering law beyond drug trafficking to include money-laundering predicates such as murder, aggravated assault, extortion, theft, fraud, and kidnapping. The new law also extended the confiscation laws to include the additional money laundering predicate offenses and to include value-based forfeitures, and authorized electronic surveillance of organized crime members.

To facilitate exchange of information related to suspected money laundering activity, the law established the Japan Financial Intelligence Office (JAFIO) as Japan's financial intelligence unit. Financial institutions in Japan report suspicious transactions to the JAFIO as instances of suspicious transactions are discovered. The number of suspicious transaction reports continued to increase during the first eleven months of 2000, rising from 900 in 1999 to over 4,000 in 2000.

Japanese banks and financial institutions are required by national laws to record and report the identity of customers engaged in large currency transactions. There are no secrecy laws that prevent disclosure of client and ownership information to bank supervisors and law enforcement authorities. Under the 1998 Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law, banks and other financial institutions must report transfers abroad of five million yen (approximately US $44,579) or more. Domestic laws also require banks and financial institutions to maintain records for an adequate period of time should they be needed to reconstruct significant transactions. This requirement is not specifically narcotics-related.

Japanese financial institutions have cooperated, when requested, with law enforcement agencies, including US and other foreign government agencies investigating financial crimes related to narcotics. Japan has not adopted "due diligence" or "banker negligence" laws that make individual bankers responsible if their institutions launder money, but there are administrative guidelines in existence that require due diligence. The law does, however, protect bankers and other financial institution employees who cooperate with law enforcement entities.

The 1998 Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law required travelers entering and departing Japan to report physically transported currency and monetary instruments exceeding one million yen (approximately US $8,916) or its equivalent in any other foreign currency to customs authorities. The reporting requirement is virtually ignored by travelers, however, because there is no meaningful penalty (i.e. seizure of currency) for failure to report.

Japan is a party to the 1988 UN Convention and has adopted formal articles of ratification. In December 2000 Japan signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Japan is a member of and also chaired the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) from June 1998 to June 1999. The JAFIO joined the Egmont Group of FIUs in 2000. Japan is also a member of the Asia/Pacific Group against Money Laundering (APG). Japan has endorsed the September 1997 Basle committee's "Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision."

Japan has not enacted laws that allow for sharing of seized narcotics assets with other countries. However, the Japanese Government cooperates with efforts by the US and other countries to trace and seize assets, and makes use of tips on the flow of drug-derived assets from foreign law enforcement efforts to trace funds and seize bank accounts.

The government of Japan should stringently enforce the Anti-Organized Crime Law, which will enhance Japan's ability to combat a wide range of money laundering activities. The Government of Japan has many legal tools and agencies in place to successfully detect, investigate and combat money laundering. Japan could strengthen its anti-money laundering regime by enacting penalties for non-compliance with the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Law, adopting measures to share seized assets with foreign governments, and strongly enforcing banker "due diligence" provisions.

Jersey (Primary). The Bailiwick of Jersey, one of the Channel Islands, is a Crown Dependency of the United Kingdom. Jersey's sophisticated offshore services industry continues to be vulnerable to money laundering at the layering and integration stages. Jersey's financial sector is regulated by the Jersey Financial Services Commission (FSC), which has responsibility for Jersey's banks, building societies, insurance companies, and collective investment schemes. The Company Registry also falls under the purview of the FSC.

The Drug Trafficking Offenses Law of 1988 criminalized money laundering related to drug trafficking, and the Prevention of Terrorism Law of 1996 did the same for money laundering related to terrorist activity. The Investment Business (Jersey) Law 1998 brings investment advice, management, and dealing into regulation. The FSC is authorized to issue Codes of Practice, and to inspect institutions to ensure that businesses are in compliance. The reporting of suspicious transactions is mandatory under the drug trafficking and terrorism anti-money laundering laws. The Proceeds of Crime (Jersey) Law 1999 extended the predicate offenses for money laundering to all offenses that are punishable by at least one year in prison. Offenses committed abroad are covered in cases where the conduct, if it had occurred in Jersey, would have constituted a predicate offense. There is no exception for fiscal offenses.

In August 2000, the FSC issued an Anti-Money Laundering Guidance Update that provides guidance to the financial services industry, particularly in doing business with sensitive sources. The Guidance instructs Jersey financial institutions to familiarize themselves with each advisory issued by the US Department of Treasury. The Guidance also advises financial services businesses to exercise a higher degree of awareness of the potential problems associated with taking on politically sensitive clients from jurisdictions where bribery and corruption is widely considered to be prevalent.

In May 2000, Jersey approved the Financial Services (Extension) (Jersey) Law 2000. This legislation amended the Investment Business (Jersey) Law by extending Jersey's financial regulations to Jersey's approximately 300 trust and company services providers. Businesses that provide company administration, trustee, or fiduciary services are subject to the law. Secondly, in the course of providing such services, the person must provide any one of a number of services, such as being a company formation agent, a director, a secretary, the provider of registered office, or the provider of accommodation address or acting as trustee. Under the new law, the FSC can visit businesses to ensure they are fully compliant with the law's standards.

The proposed International Co-operation (Jersey) Law would follow the Financial Services (Extension) (Jersey) Law, and provide Jersey with additional authority to assist other law enforcement agencies in pursuing criminals where an offense has been identified and is being investigated.

The Joint Police and Customs Financial Investigation Unit (JPCFIU) is responsible for receiving, investigating and disseminating suspicious transaction reports (STRs). The Unit includes Jersey Police and Customs officers, as well as a financial crime analyst. The JCPFIU is a member of the Egmont Group.

Jersey's large offshore industry includes approximately 20,000 "exempt companies," many of which act solely as asset holding companies; all are limited to transacting business outside Jersey. Exempt companies pay no Jersey taxes. The offshore industry also consists of bank deposits of US $150 billion, mutual funds of US $100 billion, insurance companies (which are largely captive companies), investment advice, dealing and management companies (US $30 billion under management); and trust and company administration companies. The total value of funds administered in Jersey exceeds US $300 billion. These services and facilities combine to offer other services such as private banking for high net worth individuals and corporate services, such as share option schemes and securitizations. Jersey does not distinguish between offshore and onshore banks. Its 74 banks are supervised by the FSC and can be accessed by both residents and non-residents alike.

The FIU recently redesigned the format of Jersey's STRs; filers may select from a broad list of suspected crimes such as drugs, terrorism, fraud, tax fraud, revenue fraud, insider dealing, corruption, unknown/undetermined, regulatory matters, and "other."

The Offshore Group of Bank Supervisors (of which Jersey has been a member since its formation in 1979) carried out a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style mutual evaluation of Jersey. The final report, approved in September 2000, concluded that Jersey was "close to complete adherence" to the FATF 40 Recommendations.

In 2000, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) conducted a review of Jersey's anti-money laundering regime against 25 specified criteria. Jersey was not identified by the FATF as a noncooperative country in the international fight against money laundering. However, the FATF in its June report noted the following about Jersey's anti-money laundering regime:

...Jersey...[has] in place a system for reporting suspicious transactions. Where the underlying criminal conduct is drug trafficking or terrorism, the obligation to report is a direct one. Where the underlying criminal conduct is another predicate offence, the reporting is an "indirect obligation"-failure to make a report potentially leaves one open to a charge of money laundering; making a report is a defence against such a charge....

...Jersey...[allows] certain intermediaries, and individuals, which are subject to the same anti-money laundering standards and supervision as financial institutions, to introduce business to banks and financial institutions on the basis that the introducers themselves verify the identity of the customer. In addition, the jurisdiction allows certain institutions based in certain overseas countries, subject to equivalent anti-money laundering systems, to introduce business, without separately verifying the identity of the client. Banks and other financial institutions in ...Jersey...are only required to know the name of the client but not to verify the identity separately. There is concern as to whether such a system is consistent with FATF Recommendations and provides sufficiently rigorous checks on the identity of clients of banks and financial institutions, especially in cases where the introducer is not a financial institution.

The lack of a stringent scheme to apply the new rules of customer identification for accounts opened prior to their entry into force is also a source of concern. The new rules for customer identification verification were introduced in...Jersey in 1999...

Application of the 1988 UN Drug Convention was extended to the Bailiwick of Jersey on July 7, 1997. Jersey formally endorsed the FATF recommendations on July 21, 1997.

Jersey has established a comprehensive anti-money laundering program, and has demonstrated its commitment to fighting financial crime. Jersey officials cooperate with international anti-money laundering authorities. Jersey should ensure full and timely implementation of its anti-money laundering legislation, and continue to monitor its anti-money laundering program, in order to deter criminals from using the island to launder money.

Jordan (Other). Jordan is not a regional financial center, and the Government of Jordan (GOJ) regulates foreign exchange transactions.

The GOJ has not yet criminalized any form of money laundering. Jordanian law enforcement officials report that some financial institutions cooperate with prosecutors' requests for information related to drug trafficking cases. Jordan's central bank has instructed financial institutions to be on the lookout for customers engaging in "dubious" transfers, and to be particularly careful when handling foreign currency transactions, especially if the amounts involved are large or if the source of funds is in question. Depositors are not required to disclose the origin of large currency deposits or transactions.

Jordan is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

Kazakhstan (Other). Kazakhstan's relatively advanced financial infrastructure, combined with a significant organized crime presence, puts it at risk for money laundering. More than 200 organized crime groups with ties to similar groups in the United States and Europe are believed to exist in the country.

Kazakhstan has criminalized money laundering for narcotics and other serious crimes. However, inadequate financial controls make detection of money laundering difficult. Bank examiners are not trained to look for evidence of money laundering, but rather focus on traditional safety and soundness concerns. Furthermore, new banking laws went into effect in 2000 that require tax police and investigators to go through local prosecutors in order to obtain bank records. Records may be released only if the prosecutor deems an investigation is warranted.

The United States intends to continue to work closely with local authorities to provide Kazakhstani financial institutions with money laundering and fraud related training and assistance. The US will also continue to consider the government's request for a memorandum of cooperation in fighting economic crimes and fiscal offenses.

Kazakhstan is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention and in December 2000, it signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Kenya (Other). Kenya's capital, Nairobi, has approximately 50 banks and is a regional financial center for East Africa. Kenya does not have an offshore sector.

The Government of Kenya (GOK) criminalized money laundering related to drug trafficking through Section 49 of the Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Control) Act, 1994. Narcotics-related money laundering is punishable by a maximum prison sentence of 14 years. The GOK has not made any arrests for money laundering; however, Kenyan authorities in 2000 seized the assets of several individuals implicated in a drug trafficking scheme.

The GOK requires banks to maintain records on customers who conduct large transactions. In 1999, the President of Kenya issued a statement denouncing money laundering and granted the Central Bank of Kenya authority to supervise all Kenyan banks. Kenya does not have in place strong cross-border currency controls.

Kenya is expected to sign the memorandum of understanding for the newly formed Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG). In November 2000, GOK officials attended an anti-money laundering conference that was co-sponsored by the Government of Tanzania and the East Africa Community Secretariat. The conference's objectives were to help government officials identify different types of money laundering, and the threat that they pose to their country's financial institutions and economies.

Kenya is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

Korea (Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea) (Concern). The exact money-laundering situation within North Korea is unknown. What little that is known of North Korea's money laundering operations is that it continues to use Macau as a base of operation for money laundering and other criminal activities. The link with Macau provides international access to financial systems for individuals within the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). North Korea's state-owned mint is also alleged to print counterfeit US dollars for laundering in Macau.

Korea (Republic of Korea) (Concern). The Republic of Korea (South Korea) has been used as a transit country for international narcotics trafficking. The Republic of Korea's domestic consumption of narcotics is also on the rise. Organized crime is beginning to gain a hold in the business sector due to corruption and cronyism. Estimates of the amount of money laundered vary. According to the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP) study, some 48-147 trillion won (US $8-33 billion) in funds were illegally laundered in 1998 (11-33% of GDP), although other figures set it between 54-169 trillion won (25 % of GDP). Another 25-50 trillion won in illegal capital offshore transfers are expected once the foreign exchange liberalization goes into effect in January 2001.

In 1995, the Republic of Korea criminalized the laundering of narcotics proceeds with the adoption of the Act against Illicit Trafficking in Drugs. An amendment made to this act in 1997 requires financial institutions to report transactions known to be connected to narcotics trafficking to the Prosecutor's Office. Two other pieces of legislation address money laundering in the Republic of Korea. The Act on Real Name Financial Transaction and Guarantee of Secrecy, enacted in late 1997, banned all financial transactions using anonymous, fictitious, and nominee names. The Anti-Public Corruption Forfeiture Act of 1994 provided for the forfeiture of the proceeds of assets derived from corruption.

The government's financial investigations continue to focus on preventing the illegal transfer of funds out of the country. On January 1, 2001, the Korean government implemented the second phase of foreign exchange liberalization. In conjunction with this, the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE) launched a preparatory organization for a financial intelligence unit (FIU) on April 2000 and drafted two related laws. They are the so-called "Law for Reporting and Using Information of Specific Financial Transactions" and "Law for Prohibition and Punishment of Hiding Criminal Gains." These bills contain various anti-money laundering provisions; however, no action was taken on these measures in 2000.

The Republic of Korea is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention and in December 2000 signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. The Republic of Korea is a member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering. In 1998, the United States and the Republic of Korea signed an extradition treaty, which entered into force in December 1999. The United States and the Republic of Korea cooperate in judicial matters under a 1993 Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, which entered into force in 1997.

The Republic of Korea needs to enact and enforce legislation that will criminalize the laundering of proceeds from all serious crimes, require the reporting of all suspicious transactions, and establish a financial intelligence unit to work with domestic and international authorities to combat the threat of money laundering.

Kuwait (Other). Kuwait is not a major regional banking sector; it has six commercial banks, two specialized banks, one Islamic bank, and a branch of a Bahrain-based bank. Kuwait does not have anti-money laundering legislation. Kuwait's central bank in June 1997 ordered domestic banks to take measures to prevent money laundering such as checking clients' identities and the nature of their business. Banks also are to inform the central bank of all cash deposits that exceed the equivalent of US $33,000, and funds transfers that are "irregular." In 1999, the Government of Kuwait (GOK) proposed anti-money laundering legislation that has not yet been approved by Kuwait's National Assembly.

Kuwait is represented before the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) by the Gulf Cooperation Council. Kuwait in December 2000 became a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention and signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

The GOK should develop and implement anti-money laundering legislation that meets accepted international standards.

Kyrgyzstan (Other). Kyrgyzstan is not a financial center, and money laundering is not considered a major problem. However, Kyrgyzstan has not criminalized money laundering and has no anti-money laundering legislation. The central bank has provisions that require customer identification procedures and make an exception to bank secrecy rules for suspicious transaction reporting, but these provisions are believed to be generally ignored by the commercial banks. Oversight of the banking sector remains weak and Kyrgyzstan's law enforcement agencies do not have the resources to conduct effective financial investigations.

The major sources of illegal proceeds remain narcotics trafficking, embezzlement of foreign aid by government officials, smuggling of consumer goods, official corruption and tax evasion.

Kyrgyzstan is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention and in December 2000, it signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Laos (Other). Laos is not a regional financial center and has no anti-money laundering legislation. Effective anti-money laundering legislation will first require an underlying body of banking law and regulation, most of which currently does not exist. The country does have strict laws on the export of its currency, the Lao kip. The proceeds of drug trafficking most likely are sent to other countries in the region through alternative remittance systems.

The Government of Laos (GOL) is a party to the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances and has stated its goal to become a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. The GOL is working with the United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention and other foreign consultants to develop the fundamental regulatory framework necessary to bring Laos into compliance with the 1988 Convention. In the interim, the GOL sends its officials to relevant Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) conferences on regional anti-money laundering practices. In addition, GOL officials have participated in anti-money laundering and white-collar crime training at the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Bangkok.

Latvia (Concern). Money laundering continues to be a major concern in Latvia, largely because Russian organized crime groups use Latvian banks to launder money. Internet gambling may also increase the risk for money laundering.

Money laundering was criminalized for all serious crimes in 1998. There are requirements for customer identification, the maintenance of records on all transactions, and the reporting of large cash transactions (40,000 lats, or approximately US $64,600) and suspicious transactions to the Control Service, which is Latvia's financial intelligence unit. Between June 1998 and January 2000, the Control Service received 1,438 disclosures.

In May 2000, a European Union (EU) inspection team visited Latvia and conducted a study of their money laundering situation. The team's report is said to be very positive, although the results cannot be disclosed until the report is final. The final report is expected early in 2001.

On November 7, 2000, the President of Latvia promulgated a law for a public regulator. Previously, the central bank regulated banks, with separate regulators for the Securities & Exchange Commission and insurance companies. The new law establishes one, united regulator, which will bring Latvia in line with the British/Swedish model. This change will take effect in July 2001.

This year, a World Bank report rated all Eastern European countries for corruption. Latvia was rated positively in terms of administrative corruption, but negatively regarding state capture (because of conflict of interest of high level officials.) Latvia is establishing an independent anticorruption unit to deal with corruption among high level officials. They are working with OECD on a joint antibribery convention.

Latvia's financial intelligence unit (FIU) is the Office for the Prevention of the Laundering of Proceeds Derived from Criminal Activity (Control Service). The Control Service is a member of the Egmont Group. In addition to its existing software, the Latvian FIU has created new software that collates the data from the internal Control Service database containing information on customers who have conducted unusual or suspicious transactions.

Interagency cooperation between Latvian law enforcement agencies tends to be best at the highest governmental levels, but weaker at the working level. Much of the problem stems from lack of financial, material, and human resources.

Latvia is a member of the Council of Europe's Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures (PC-R-EV) and, as a member, underwent a mutual evaluation in March 2000. A Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty has been in effect between the US and Latvia since 1999. Latvia is a party to the UN Drug Convention and in December 2000 Latvia signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

The Government of Latvia should research ways to improve cooperation between Latvian law enforcement agencies at the working level. The key to Latvia's success in combating money laundering will be based on the swiftness and forcefulness with which they continue to strengthen their anti-money laundering program.

Lebanon (Primary). The current legal, supervisory, and regulatory systems of Lebanon create significant opportunities for the laundering and protection of the proceeds of crime. Weaknesses in these systems allow criminals to evade effective investigation and punishment. Sources of laundered funds include narcotics, counterfeiting and smuggling. Laundering in Lebanon takes place through the layering of transactions in banks and through the purchase of property and businesses. The Lebanese banking system is frequently used by Syrians who find it difficult to conduct transactions in their own country because of heavy government restrictions. Lebanon's commitment to bank secrecy and the absence of certain key supervisory and enforcement mechanisms aimed at preventing and detecting money laundering increase the possibility that transactions involving Lebanese entities and accounts will be used for illegal purposes. Lebanon has not to date prosecuted or investigated any cases of money laundering.

An antinarcotics law that came into effect in 1998 criminalized drug-related money laundering, but it is considered inadequate since it does not require the reporting of suspicious or large transactions. It does provide for asset seizure and for piercing bank secrecy in very limited circumstances.

The Banking Control Commission (BCC) supervises and examines commercial banks. BCC examiners may not review individual deposit accounts, and have no access to depositors' names. They are to report any "unusual" activity to the central bank. A customer may waive bank secrecy by giving permission for a third party to review account information. International firms, as required by law, audit ninety percent of commercial banks. Non-bank financial institutions such as exchange houses, stock brokerages, money couriers and insurance companies are not required to report unusual activity, but the amount of money they handle is not significant.

Citing the lack of a legal anti-money laundering framework to combat money laundering, in June 2000 the Financial Action Force (FATF) named Lebanon among its list of 15 jurisdictions that were non-cooperative in international efforts to combat money laundering. The report criticized Lebanon's strict bank secrecy that restricts access to relevant information, both by administrative and investigative authorities, and also compromises international cooperation.

The United States (US) Treasury has issued an advisory to US financial institutions, indicating they "should give enhanced scrutiny to any transaction originating in or routed to or through Lebanon, or involving entities organized or domiciled, or persons maintaining accounts in Lebanon." In addition to the concerns outlined in the FATF report, the advisory also noted the fact that money laundering is only a crime in Lebanon with respect to narcotics and public corruption, and that financial institutions operating in Lebanon are not required to report suspicious transactions.

Lebanese officials have indicated an awareness of deficiencies in Lebanon's anti-money laundering systems, while maintaining that Lebanon is not a significant venue for such illicit activity. The Lebanese cabinet approved a draft law in December 2000 addressing some of the deficiencies outlined in the advisory. The draft law broadens the definition of money laundering to include proceeds obtained from organized crime, illegal arms trafficking, embezzlement of public funds, and counterfeiting of currencies and official documents. If passed by parliament and implemented effectively, the law would significantly strengthen Lebanon's ability to combat money laundering by:

* Requiring banks, financial institutions, and non-banking financial institutions-such as exchange houses, insurance and leasing companies, mutual funds, real estate developers, and merchants of high-value commodities-to (a) ascertain through official documents the identity and address of their clients and (b) maintain official records of clients and transactions for a period of no less than five years.

* Permitting the government to confiscate the proceeds derived from illegal arms trafficking, embezzlement of public funds and counterfeiting of currencies and official documents.

* Imposing prison terms and cash penalties on persons who disguise, conceal, or participate in money laundering operations or fail to report suspicious transactions.

* Establishing an independent "Special Investigation Commission" and "Financial Investigation Unit" to investigate money laundering operations. The Special Investigation Commission would have the power to lift Lebanon's stringent bank secrecy laws in order to find the source of illicit proceeds.

In 2000, the Lebanese Bankers Association also made mandatory its formerly voluntary system for self-regulation, the Due Diligence Convention, a set of requirements designed to combat the laundering of money obtained from illegal drug trade. The Convention addresses such issues as customer identification and record keeping. According to the Lebanese Minister of Finance, the Banking Control Commission has formed an anti-money laundering unit, but it is still not operational and it is unclear what its function will be.

In 2000 Lebanese authorities also repealed a law authorizing offshore banking and required all banks to establish internal audit units and procedures. Lebanon has informed the United States that it will officially terminate its membership in the Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors in 2001.

Lebanon is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. However, the Lebanese government expressed reservations over the sections of the Convention pertaining to bank secrecy. Lebanon has endorsed the Basle Core Principles and is in the process of implementing them.

Lebanon should enact comprehensive anti-money laundering legislation that meets international standards. Specifically, Lebanon should criminalize the laundering of proceeds from all serious crimes, and require financial institutions to report suspicious transactions to a central authority that will act on these reports and share this information with foreign governments.

Liberia (Other). Liberia is not a major financial center. However, the country increasingly has become a transshipment point for illicit drugs, diamonds, and other commodities. Liberia's offshore activity is concentrated in the ship registry business. Offshore companies are permitted to issue bearer shares. Liberia reportedly has 16 banks, but only a small number are open to the public.

In November 2000, Liberia was one of 14 West African countries that created the Intergovernmental Group of Action against Money Laundering (GIABA).

Liberia is not a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

Liechtenstein (Primary). The Principality of Liechtenstein is an important financial center, primarily because of its well-developed offshore financial services sector. The country's low tax rate, loose incorporation and corporate governance rules, and traditions of strict bank secrecy have contributed significantly to the ability of financial intermediaries in Liechtenstein to attract funds from outside the country's borders. The same factors have made the country attractive, and vulnerable, to money launderers.

Liechtenstein has chartered 15 banks, three non-bank financial companies, and 16 public investment companies, as well as insurance and reinsurance companies. Its 230 licensed fiduciary companies and 60 lawyers serve as nominees for, or manage, more than 75,000 entities (primarily corporations, anstalts, or trusts), most for non-Liechtenstein residents; approximately one-third of these entities hold the controlling interest in other entities, chartered in countries other than Liechtenstein. The Principality's laws permit the corporations it charters to issue bearer shares, and until recently at least, the Principality's banking laws permitted banks to issue numbered accounts (about whose true ownership only at most a handful of banking officials know).

Fees paid to Liechtenstein by the corporations and other entities it charters for non-residents account for at least 35 per cent of the Principality's revenues. Liechtenstein does not tax funds earned by its domiciliary corporations from sources outside of Liechtenstein (a fact that increases its attractiveness to offshore customers for financial services), and the revenue flow from corporation fees allows Liechtenstein's taxes on income earned within the country to be relatively low by developed country standards.

Banks, finance companies, and investment businesses chartered or licensed to do business in Liechtenstein are supervised by the Principality's Financial Services Authority (FSA). The FSA is responsible for supervising all banks and fiduciaries licensed to operate in Liechtenstein and has the authority to conduct on-site spot checks and request information as required; however, reliance is placed on a financial institution or intermediary's approved external auditors for regular compliance examinations and for monitoring implementation of anti-money laundering controls (for example, with respect to an institution's observance of its due diligence obligations).

Drug-related money laundering has been a criminal offense in Liechtenstein since 1993, but the first general anti-money laundering legislation was added to Liechtenstein's laws in 1996. Although the 1996 legislation sought to apply some money laundering controls to financial institutions and intermediaries operating in Liechtenstein, the anti-money laundering regime embodied in the legal, supervisory, and regulatory system of Liechtenstein at that time suffered from serious systemic problems and deficiencies.

In June 2000, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) named Liechtenstein as one of the 15 countries that had inadequate anti-money laundering regimes and failed to cooperate in international efforts to fight money laundering. The FATF report noted a number of deficiencies in the Principality's anti-money laundering regime, including: inadequate customer identification rules; a limited and inadequate suspicious transaction reporting system; the absence of a financial intelligence unit; inadequate and ineffective laws and procedures governing international cooperation and the exchange of information to assist in criminal investigations by officials of other countries; and an inadequate dedication of resources overall to anti-money laundering programs.

In July 2000, the United States Department of the Treasury issued an advisory on "Transactions Involving Liechtenstein." That document advised banks and other financial institutions operating in the United States "to give enhanced scrutiny to all financial transactions originating in or routed to or through" Liechtenstein, or "involving entities organized or domiciled, or persons maintaining accounts, in Liechtenstein." Other countries that participate in the FATF issued similar advisories concerning Liechtenstein.

After the FATF issued its report, the Government of Liechtenstein (GOL) took important legislative and administrative action to improve its anti-money laundering regime. The Principality amended its Due Diligence Act, and enacted a new law governing Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, on September 15, 2000. It also issued an Executive Order, on December 5, 2000, concerning implementation of the changes in the Due Diligence Act, as well as an Ordinance to establish a financial intelligence unit, and it has revised relevant portions of its Criminal and Criminal Procedure Codes, and its Narcotics Act (1993).

The latest legislative and regulatory changes became effective January 1, 2001. They affect the range of Liechtenstein's law criminalizing money laundering and the obligations of financial institutions to identify customers, to establish due diligence procedures relating to potentially questionable customer activity, and to report suspicious activity. The FSA issued a Directive 2001/1, "Concerning Indication of Money Laundering," in January 2001, which is intended "to sensitize financial intermediaries" to the need to recognize situations that call for further inquiry by intermediaries under the changes in Liechtenstein's due diligence legislation.

The changes to Liechtenstein's Criminal Code add a wide range of predicate crimes to the definition of money laundering and make other improvements to the Code's provisions. Of particular importance is a provision enacted in December 2000 that broadens Art. 165 of the Criminal Code to cover "own funds" money laundering offenses in non-narcotics offenses. However, Liechtenstein also added language to Art. 165 prohibiting punishment for money laundering of an individual who had already been punished for committing the relevant predicate offense. The latter provision is an unnecessary restriction that weakens the government's anti-money laundering enforcement powers. It is important that Liechtenstein fully apply its anti-money laundering efforts to own funds (as well as other forms of) money laundering.

The amendments to the Due Diligence Act eliminate a provision that allowed banks to rely on lawyers and trustees for identifying their clients and now requires banks and all other financial intermediaries to identify their clients and the beneficial owners of accounts. (Transactions of non-clients involving CHF 25,000 are exempted by statute from the requirement.) These "know your customer" provisions are effective January 1, 2001, although financial intermediaries are provided with a two year grace period to bring existing accounts into compliance. Liechtenstein's Banker's Association, however, requires that its members comply with the new rules within one year.

Under Liechtenstein's former law, financial institutions did not have to report suspicious transactions unless they had "a strong suspicion" of money laundering and a basis for believing that the funds were derived from narcotics trafficking. The new law permits financial institutions to report suspicious transactions for a broad range of offenses and based on a suspicion. The new provisions are potentially weakened, however, by the fact that before filing a suspicious transactions report (STR), the financial institution must clarify the economic background and purpose of the transaction as well as the origin of the assets, and then file the report only if the suspicion cannot be eliminated. Another perceived weakness in the law is a limitation on the "no tipping off" period that follows the filing of a report, so that financial institutions are permitted eventually to advise customers that they were the subject of a STR. A great deal will thus depend upon the manner in which the new suspicious transaction reporting rules are administered and enforced by Liechtenstein authorities.

The new laws also address the independence of accountants reporting to the FSA on anti-money laundering compliance. Future audits of compliance will cover both systems and individual transactions; individual transactions were not previously included in the permissible scope of compliance audits. The audits must now be conducted by independent accountants who are not the normal external auditors of the company, in contrast to the previous practice (under which the same auditors were routinely engaged). Furthermore, the results of the audits will be provided to the FSA for review.

In December 2000, Liechtenstein created a financial intelligence unit (FIU) within the FSA, and formed a state police unit, in May 2000, to combat white-collar crime. The FIU is scheduled to become an independent Liechtenstein agency later this year and plans to apply to join the Egmont Group. The Austrian Federal Police are currently training and assisting the Liechtenstein state police in connection with the work of the special police unit focusing on financial crime. The government has also hired additional prosecutors and judges.

The new law on mutual legal assistance took effect on November 6, 2000. The law streamlines the procedure for dealing with foreign requests for legal assistance and reduces from 12 to three the number of permitted appeals from decisions by the Liechtenstein authorities. Liechtenstein has recently appointed three new prosecutors and four new investigating judges who will concentrate initially on dealing with the backlog of cases where legal assistance requests have not yet been executed. Parliament has also approved the appointment of four new judges to process extradition cases through the courts.

The GOL appointed a special prosecutor, in early 2000, to investigate allegations of government collusion in money laundering. In a report in August 2000, the special prosecutor cited serious shortcomings in Liechtenstein's legislation. He noted that Liechtenstein courts had failed to bring money laundering cases to trial and had been extremely slow in responding to mutual legal assistance requests from other governments. However, the report did not substantiate any allegations of government collusion. The investigations led by the special prosecutor did, however, result in criminal charges being brought against several individuals. In May 2000, six officers and employees of fiduciary firms suspected of money laundering, including an opposition member of Liechtenstein's parliament, were arrested.

Liechtenstein has in place legislation to seize, forfeit, and share forfeited assets with cooperating countries. During 2000, Liechtenstein authorities blocked more than US $120 million smuggled out of Nigeria by former Nigerian dictator Sani Abacha. The final figures are expected to exceed US $150 million in frozen assets.

Liechtenstein is a member of the Council of Europe Select Committee on Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures (PC-R-EV), and has signed the 1990 Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search and Confiscation of Proceeds from Crime. (A September 1999 mutual evaluation of Liechtenstein's anti-money laundering programs by the Council of Europe Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures in September 1999 reflected many of the same criticisms voiced nine months later by the FATF.) In December 2001, Liechtenstein signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Liechtenstein has endorsed the Basle Committee Core Principles for effective banking supervision. In April 2000, Liechtenstein and the United States agreed to begin negotiation of a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT); those negotiations are expected to begin in 2001.

The GOL has adopted a number of new anti-money laundering measures in 2000 that could dramatically enhance the effectiveness of the country's anti-money laundering program. The GOL's success in combating money laundering will be contingent on its political will and on how forcefully and effectively the Principality implements its anti-money laundering program.

Lithuania (Other). Lithuania is vulnerable to money laundering; smuggling, narcotics trafficking, capital flight, profit concealment, and tax evasion most likely are the major sources of illicit funds flowing through Lithuania's financial system. Russian organized crime groups reportedly have used financial institutions in the Baltics to launder money.

Lithuania amended its criminal code in 1997 to criminalize money laundering related to all crimes. The Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering (LPML), which entered into force in January 1998, requires covered financial institutions to report suspicious transactions; identify customers whose transactions exceed litas (LTL) 50,000 (approximately US $12,500) or equivalent in foreign currency; maintain a register of customers who engage in transactions that exceed LTL 50,000 or equivalent in foreign currency; and retain certain documents for a minimum of 10 years. The LPML also specifies information that must be reported to the tax police. The Bank of Lithuania (BOL) issues currency transaction reporting requirements and regulations, and is required to share money-laundering violation information with law enforcement and other state institutions upon request. Non-bank financial institutions operate under guidelines similar to banks. The BOL has the authority to examine the books, records, and other documents of all financial institutions.

The Money Laundering Prevention Division (MLPD) of the Tax Police is Lithuania's financial intelligence unit. In 2000, the MLPD initiated three investigations. The United States provides anti-money laundering training to Lithuanian authorities.

Lithuania is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000 signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. There is a mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT) between the United States and Lithuania, which entered into force in 1999. Lithuania is a member of the Council of Europe's Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures (PC-R-EV), and the MLPD is a member of the Egmont Group.

Luxembourg (Primary). Luxembourg is a major world financial center, with over 200 international financial institutions that benefit from the country's strict bank secrecy laws and operate an unrestricted range of services and activities. The existence of bank secrecy laws, and the size and sophistication of Luxembourg's financial center, pose major risks for money laundering through Luxembourg's banks and offshore financial industry. Nevertheless, the Government of Luxembourg (GOL) plays an active role in the European Union (EU) efforts to combat money laundering.

Two laws, the Law of 7 July 1989, updated in 1998, and the Law of 18 December 1993, criminalize the laundering of proceeds for all offenses. These anti-money laundering laws also implement the customer identification, record keeping, and suspicious transaction reporting requirements mandated by the EU anti-money laundering directive.

The Parquet de Luxembourg/Service Anti-Blanchiment, which reports to the Public Prosecutor, serves as Luxembourg's financial intelligence unit (FIU), receiving and analyzing financial disclosures. The FIU is a member of the Egmont Group and has information sharing agreements with Belgium and France.

The Government of Luxembourg licenses offshore banks, non-bank financial institutions and international business companies (IBCs). Approximately 200 banks operate as "universal banks," with an unrestricted range of services. Foreign institutions seeking to become established in Luxembourg must demonstrate prior establishment in a foreign country, and meet stringent minimum capital requirements. Banks must undergo annual audits, but only the Commissioner of Bank Control can gain access to the identity of beneficial owners of accounts. In 1999 Luxembourg had 1,650 offshore investment funds, 118 insurance companies , 279 reinsurance companies and approximately 68,000 IBCs. Companies must maintain a registered office in Luxembourg and a government registry lists company directors. However, there is no requirement to identify the beneficial owner of the business and bearer shares are allowed.

Luxembourg is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000 Luxembourg signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Luxembourg is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Luxembourg and the United States exchanged instruments of ratification for a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) on December 20, 2000. The MLAT entered into force in February 2001.

The GOL has enacted laws and adopted practices that help to prevent the abuse of its bank secrecy laws, which are consistent with those of other EU members. However, legal provisions continue to limit or prevent access to information about beneficial ownership of accounts and businesses, which may hinder efforts to combat money laundering. The GOL should address these issues, and strengthen enforcement to prevent international criminals from abusing Luxembourg's financial sector.

Macau (Concern). Macau reverted to Chinese sovereignty in December 1999, and became a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of the People's Republic of China with substantial autonomy in all areas except defence and foreign affairs. The new Macau SAR government is implementing law enforcement reforms and is expected to restructure the important gambling industry. Macau has passed anti-money laundering legislation, but there is no active enforcement effort in practice. In a positive step, the Macau SAR government stated in December 2000 that it has agreed to a joint review of its anti-money laundering regime by the Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors (OGBS) and the Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG). Macau is an observer jurisdiction of the APG.

Macau's free port, offshore financial services, lack of foreign exchange controls, disaggregated law enforcement agencies, problematic (albeit improving) law and order situation, and nascent anticorruption efforts create an environment conducive to money laundering. Macau serves as a gateway to China, and can be used as a transit point to remit funds and criminal proceeds to and from China, Hong Kong, and other Asian countries. Organized crime groups based in Macau are believed to launder their proceeds through joint ventures and real estate purchases in China, or through cross border cash transfers, front companies, real estate purchases, currency exchanges, and alternative remittance systems. Gaming and related services play a critical role in the Macau economy. They account for approximately 40 percent of GDP. Direct taxes from gambling accounted for 43 percent of government revenue in 1999. Organized crime groups are associated with the gambling industry through such activities as racketeering, loan sharking, and prostitution. As a result, it is likely that the casino industry in particular provides an avenue for the laundering of illicit funds.

Macau has enacted three laws that deal with money laundering. These are: the Macau Financial System Act, approved by Decree Law Number 32/93/M on July 5, 1993; the Law on Organized Crime, approved by Decree Law Number 6/97/M on July 30, 1997; and Decree Law Number 24/98/M of June 1, 1998, which established preventive anti-money laundering measures.

The Macau Financial System Act lays out regulations to prevent the use of the banking system for money laundering. It requires the mandatory identification and registration of financial institution shareholders, customer identification requirements, and external auditing. These regulatory measures are applicable to credit institutions and financial companies headquartered in Macau and branches of credit institutions headquartered abroad. In June 1996, the Monetary and Foreign Exchange Authority of Macau issued anti-money laundering guidelines for banks. External audits include reviews of compliance with anti-money laundering statutes.

Article 10 of the Law on Organized Crime criminalizes money laundering for the proceeds of all domestic and foreign criminal activities and contains provisions for the freezing of suspect assets and instrumentalities of crime. Although legal entities may be civilly liable for money laundering offenses, their employees may be criminally liable. The preventive measures in Decree Law Number 24/98/M set forth requirements for reporting suspicious transactions to the Judiciary Police and other appropriate supervisory authorities. These reporting requirements apply to all legal entities supervised by the Monetary Authority, the Inspectorate of Gaming, the Department of Finance, and the Inspectorate of Economic Activities. These entities include pawnbrokers, antique dealers, art dealers, jewelers, and real estate agents.

Macau does not have a standard suspicious transactions report form. Only a minimal number of suspicious transactions reports have been filed since the implementation of Decree Law 24/98/M. None has led to prosecution. Concern in the banking industry about possible retribution from criminal elements is apparently one reason for the small number of suspicious transactions reports from this sector. There have been no reports filed on possible suspicious transactions occurring in the casinos. The Inspectorate of Gaming does not play an active role in preventing money laundering in the casinos. Especially removed from official scrutiny are activities and transactions that occur within quasi-private VIP rooms that cater to clients seeking-and willing to pay for-anonymity within Macau's gaming establishments. Given the important economic role of the casino industry, there is a concern in Macau about the economic effects of any efforts to combat money laundering. Macau has no financial intelligence unit.

The Monetary and Foreign Exchange Authority of Macau started participating in meetings of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG) five years ago, but Macau is not an official member. Macau is a member of the OGBS.

Macau offers two types of limited liability company formation that have implications for money laundering: public corporations with the suffix designation "SARL" and quota companies with suffix designation "Lda." Quota companies are more popular with foreign investors. Both types of limited liability companies allow for shielding the identity of beneficial owners since shareholders in quota companies may be nominees and SARLs are allowed to issue bearer shares. Although these commercial entities are subject to Macau's anti-money laundering legislation, the characteristics allowing for anonymity are attractive for money laundering activities.

The Macau SAR government should place increased priority on the anti-money laundering issue and increase resources devoted to enforcement. It should also consider adopting more effective anti-money laundering legislation, including measures specifically designed to combat money laundering in the casinos and measures that provide for bulk currency and threshold reporting. It should also review provisions in its company formation statutes that prevent authorities from identifying the beneficial owners of businesses that might serve as conduits for money laundering.

Macedonia, Former Yugoslav Republic of (Other). The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) is not a regional financial center. The country's economy is heavily cash-based because of the population's distrust of the banking, financial, and tax systems. Money laundering in the FYROM most likely is connected to financial crimes such as tax evasion, financial and privatization fraud, bribery, and corruption rather than narcotics trafficking.

Article 273 of the FYROM's criminal code, which came into force in 1996, appears to criminalize money laundering related to all crimes. The legislation specifically identifies narcotics and arms trafficking as predicate offenses, and contains an additional provision that covers funds that are acquired from other punishable actions. The Ministry of Finance reportedly has proposed legislation that would require covered financial institutions to identify customers; to retain records for a minimum of five years; and to report suspicious transactions. The legislation also would establish a financial intelligence unit (FIU).

The FYROM is a member of the Council of Europe's (COE) Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures (PC-R-EV), and in October 1999, underwent a mutual evaluation by the group. The US Government has provided anti-money laundering training to FYROM law enforcement authorities. The FYROM is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Madagascar (Other). Madagascar is not a regional financial center. Article 102 of Madagascar's 1997 drug law criminalized money laundering related to drug trafficking.

Madagascar is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, it signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Malawi (Other). Malawi has one of the least-developed economies in the world. The country has seven licensed commercial banks (five of which are operational), which are supervised by the Reserve Bank of Malawi, Malawi's central bank. In 1994, the Government of Malawi eliminated its foreign exchange controls.

In 2000 Malawi became a member of the newly formed Eastern and Southern African Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG). Malawi is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Malaysia (Concern). Malaysia is not an important regional financial center and the extent of money laundering in Malaysia is unknown. However, Malaysia offers a wide range of financial services (in the traditional financial sector as well as through alternative remittance systems) that are potentially attractive to money launderers. In particular, the country's offshore center, Labaun, has conditions conducive to money laundering and other financial crimes. The Government of Malaysia has indicated its desire to enact comprehensive anti-money laundering legislation in 2001.

The Dangerous Drugs (Forfeiture of Property) Act 1988 (FOPA) and the Anticorruption Act 1998 criminalized the laundering of proceeds from these crimes, however, neither statute has been successfully used in a criminal case. The FOPA also authorizes assistance to foreign countries in relation to matters connected with drug trafficking. The Government of Malaysia (GOM) has a well-developed regulatory framework, including licensing and background checks, to oversee onshore financial institutions. In 1993, the Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM), the Malaysian central bank, issued "Guidelines on Money Laundering and 'Know Your Customer Policy" to educate financial institutions on money laundering issues. Under the guidelines, banks should identify customers, maintain transaction records, train their staffs on money laundering controls, and report suspicious transactions to the BNM. The guidelines also provide a list of suspicious indicators to help banks determine which transactions to report. However, these guidelines do not have the force of law.

Notwithstanding Malaysia's strict bank secrecy laws, Malaysian authorities do have access to banking information when conducting a criminal investigation. However, the lack of a comprehensive anti-money laundering statute makes money laundering an area of concern. Malaysia does have an asset forfeiture law that allows seizure of criminal assets. Led by the BNM, Malaysia is now actively engaged in drafting a comprehensive anti-money laundering bill, and has requested technical assistance from the US government.

In 1998, Malaysia imposed foreign exchange controls that restrict the flow of the local currency, the ringgit, to outside Malaysia. Some smugglers of currency have since been arrested. Under these exchange control laws, onshore banks must note cross-border transfers of over 10,000 ringgit (approximately US $2,630).

The potential for money laundering activities at the Malaysian offshore banking facility in Labuan is of particular concern. The Labuan Offshore Financial Services Authority (LOFSA, often referred to simply as "Labuan") provides a wide range of financial services such as offshore banking and trust partnerships, which are restricted to the fields of accounting, actuarial science, engineering and law. There are 60 offshore banks (52 foreign-owned), approximately 79 insurance companies, 4 mutual funds, 6 fund managers, and 20 trust companies operating in Labuan. There are no reporting requirements for individual financial transactions. Because there is no requirement to register offshore trusts, their number is not known. Nominee accounts are permitted in Labuan, as are nominee directors of Labuan's approximately 2,574 international business companies equivalents. There is no requirement to disclose the beneficial owner of a corporation. There is, however, a government registry of corporate directors and shareholders, although this information is not available to the public. Malaysia has several pieces of legislation dealing specifically with Labuan.

Malaysia has no bilateral agreements for the sharing of information on money laundering, but does allow foreign countries to check the operations of their banks' branches. Malaysia is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. In 2000, Malaysia joined the Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG) and agreed to participate in an APG mutual evaluation in July 2001. Malaysia will host the next plenary of the APG in May 2001. Malaysia has endorsed the Basle Committee "core principles" and adheres to them. Malaysia became a member of the Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors (OGBS) in 1999.

The Government of Malaysia (GOM) should enact and enforce comprehensive anti-money laundering legislation. Further expansion of Malaysia's participation in multinational anti-money laundering organizations would also be helpful in ensuring that money launderers do not abuse Malaysian financial institutions, including those in Labuan.

Maldives (Other). There is no significant financial activity or evidence of money laundering in the Maldives. However, the Maldives does not have in place legislation that specifically addresses money laundering or procedures or policies such as a suspicious transaction reporting system that would detect money laundering.

Although some officials in the Government of the Maldives want to establish an offshore financial center, the Maldives's antiquated banking laws and regulations, and currency controls have hindered progress in this area.

The Maldives became a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention in September 2000.

Mali (Other). Mali is one of the world's poorest countries, and has a poorly developed financial infrastructure. In November 2000, Mali was one of 14 West African countries that attended a meeting to establish the Intergovernmental Group of Action Against Money Laundering (GIABA).

Mali is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

Malta (Other). Malta does not appear to have a serious money laundering problem. The Maltese Financial Services Center (MFSC), the regulatory agency responsible for licensing new banks and financial institutions, also monitors financial transactions going through Malta.

The GOM criminalized money laundering in 1994. Maltese law imposes a maximum fine of approximately US $2 million and/or 14 years in prison for those convicted. Also in 1994, the Central Bank of Malta issued the Prevention of Money Laundering Regulations, applicable to financial and credit institutions, life insurance companies, and investment and stock firms. These regulations impose requirements for customer identification, record keeping, the reporting of suspicious transactions, and the training of employees in anti-money laundering topics. In 1996,the central bank issued guidance notes to assist the banking sector in implementing the regulations. In accordance with the regulations, suspicious transaction reports are filed with the competent authority that supervises an institution (in the case of banks, the Maltese central bank), which then forwards them to the Economic Crimes Unit of the Maltese Police. The GOM is establishing a financial intelligence unit (FIU) to receive and analyze these reports.

Bank secrecy laws are completely lifted by law in cases of money laundering (or other criminal) investigations. Bearer shares or anonymous accounts are no longer permitted in Malta.

Malta is a member of the Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors but has publicly announced that offshore business will completely cease by 2004. No further offshore registration of banks or IBCs has been possible since January 1997. In 2000, four offshore banks continued to operate (two of which are subsidiaries of local banks) and 757 IBCs, which continued to act as nominee companies, were registered. The FATF, which reviewed Malta's financial regime via the FATF Non-cooperative Countries and Territories exercise, did not determine that Malta was a non-cooperative jurisdiction but did urge Malta "to accelerate the phasing-out of the nominee company system."

In July 2000, the FBI gave a formal training course in basic money laundering and asset forfeiture investigations to 40 GOM officers of the Economic Crimes Unit who will be part of the new FIU.

Malta is a member of the Council of Europe' Select Committee of Experts on the Subject of Anti-Money Laundering Measures (PC-R-EV). Malta is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Marshall Islands (Concern). The Republic of the Marshall Islands, located in the North Pacific Ocean, in a group of atolls, with a population of approximately 65,000, is a constitutional government in free association with the United States. In June 2000, the FATF listed the Marshall Islands as a non-cooperative jurisdiction. In response, the Marshall Islands has adopted comprehensive anti-money laundering legislation to address most of the deficiencies identified by the FATF. However, inadequate commercial law requirements still leave the Marshall Islands vulnerable to financial crime and money launderers.

Marshall Island non-resident corporations (NRCs)-the equivalent of international business companies (IBCs)-are of the greatest concern. The Association Law of the Republic of the Marshall Islands of 1990 is the legislative basis for establishing NRCs, of which, by December 2000, there were reportedly 4000 registered, half of which are companies formed for the purpose of registering ships. NRCs are allowed to offer bearer shares. Corporate officers, directors, and shareholders may be of any nationality and live anywhere, and their names need not be disclosed on incorporation records. Corporate entities may be listed as officers and shareholders and although NRCs must maintain a registered office in the Marshall Islands, the Associations Law of 1990 allows for corporations to transfer domicile into and out of the Marshall Islands with relative ease. Marketers of offshore services via the Internet promote the Marshall Islands as a favored jurisdiction for establishing NRCs. All NRCs are formed and registered by an American company that has the exclusive contract to do so on behalf of the GRMI. In addition to NRCs, the Marshall Islands offers non-resident trusts, partnerships, unincorporated associations, and domestic and foreign limited liability companies. Under the law of the Republic, NRCs are prohibited from engaging in any "financial institutions" type of activities such as those defined in section two of the Banking (Amendment) Act 2000. Offshore banks and insurance companies are not permitted in the Marshall Islands.

Citing many of the deficiencies in its anti-money laundering program, the FATF in June 2000 listed the Marshall Islands as one of 15 jurisdictions that were non-cooperative in international anti-money laundering efforts. The report noted:

It lacks a basic set of anti-money laundering regulations, including the criminalization of money laundering, customer identification and a suspicious transaction reporting system. While the size of the financial sector in the Marshall Islands is limited with only three onshore banks and no offshore banks, the jurisdiction has registered about 3,000 IBCs. The relevant information on those international companies is guarded by the excessive secrecy provision and not accessible by financial institutions.

Following the FATF exercise, the US Treasury Department, citing similar concerns, issued an advisory to US financial institutions advising them to "give enhanced scrutiny" to all financial transactions involving the Marshall Islands.

In response, the Marshall Islands has adopted some important anti-money laundering measures. In October 2000, the Marshall Islands parliament adopted the Banking (Amendment) Act of 2000, which requires customer identification for accounts, mandates the reporting of suspicious transactions to a central authority, and criminalizes money laundering relating to serious offenses. However, the Act contains no additional requirements for NRCs such as annual reports or disclosure of beneficial ownership.

In November 2000, the GRMI approved the establishment of a financial intelligence unit that will be empowered to exchange information with international law enforcement agencies and financial regulators, as well as assist in investigations.

The GRMI needs to draft and issue regulations to implement its new anti-money laundering legislation, and needs to assert supervisory authority over its limited financial services sector with particular emphasis paid to company formation.

Mauritius (Other). Money laundering occurs in Mauritius; however, there is no concrete information as to its amount or origin. Mauritius has an offshore sector.

In 2000, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) conducted a review of Mauritius's anti-money laundering regime against 25 specified criteria. Mauritius was not identified by the FATF as a noncooperative country in the international fight against money laundering. However, the FATF in its June report noted the following about Mauritius's anti-money laundering regime:

Mauritius has a range of legislation governing the domestic and offshore financial services industries. Some concerns have been identified regarding the identity of directors and beneficial owners of offshore trusts but the Economic Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act, passed on 13 June 2000, reinforces the existing legislation in the prevention of and fight against money laundering.

The Economic Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Law (ECAMLL) requires financial institutions, cash dealers, and professionals to report suspicious transactions to the country's central bank, the Bank of Mauritius, which forwards the reports to the independent Economic Crimes Office (ECO). The ECO is responsible for investigating suspicious transactions reports (STRs). Members of professions who deal with financial transactions, including notaries and lawyers, are required to file STRs directly with the ECO. By year's end, the ECO had initiated more than 20 investigations based on STRs. The ECAMLL also authorizes international cooperation in money laundering investigations, and requires financial institutions to maintain adequate records of financial transactions.

Since passage of the Mauritius Offshore Business Activities Act in 1992, approximately 15,000 offshore businesses have been formed, (of which 10,700 are currently active) and 11 offshore banks have been granted licenses. Applications to form offshore companies are reviewed by the Mauritius Offshore Business Activities Authority (MOBAA), which provides a recommendation to the Ministry of Finance. The Banking Act of 1988 subjects all offshore banking activities to the supervision of the central bank. The central bank's prior approval is required to open foreign currency accounts at offshore banks. Offshore insurance companies and other non-banking businesses fall under the supervisory authority of the MOBAA. The Government of Mauritius (GOM) has announced its intention in 2001 to create a Financial Services Authority that will supervise all of Mauritius's financial services entities.

Mauritius is a signatory to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, but has not yet ratified the convention. In December 2000, Mauritius signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Mauritius is a member of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG), and the Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors.

Mexico (Primary). Mexico's financial institutions engage in currency transactions involving international narcotics trafficking proceeds that include significant amount of US dollars. Mexican drug trafficking organizations continue to exploit Mexican banks and money exchange institutions by transferring illicit proceeds to financial systems worldwide. The smuggling of bulk shipments of US currency into Mexico and the movement of the cash back into the United States via couriers and armored vehicles, as well as through wire transfers, remain favored methods for laundering drug proceeds. Although drug trafficking continues to be the principal source of the laundered proceeds, other crimes including kidnapping, corruption, firearms trafficking, and immigrant trafficking are also major sources of illegal proceeds. President Fox has publicly pledged to attack government corruption, which in the past has hindered anti-money laundering efforts and compromised criminal investigations and prosecutions.

During 2000, the Government of Mexico (GOM) increased its efforts at combating narcotics trafficking and money laundering. The Secretariat of Finance and Public Credit (Hacienda), the National Banking Commission and the Office of the Attorney General (PGR) not only made greater efforts at enforcing the measures available to them under the existing law, but also sought to close loopholes by expanding preventive measures. These included new regulations issued in December 2000 that extended reporting, record keeping, and customer identification requirements to non-bank financial institutions. The regulations entered into force February 1, 2000.

Substantively, the Mexican anti-money laundering system contains the essential elements to meet international standards such as those of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Forty Recommendations. Article 400 bis of the Federal Penal Code (in effect since 1996) extends the money laundering offense to all criminal activity and applies as well to the proceeds of offenses committed in foreign jurisdictions. Official corruption has been addressed with Mexico's anti-money laundering laws; penalties are increased by 50 percent when the crime involves a government official in charge of the prevention, investigation or prosecution of money laundering. Banks and other financial institutions (e.g. mutual savings companies, insurance companies, financial advisers, currency exchange houses, stock market, credit institutions) are required to know and identify customers, and maintain records of transactions. They must report currency transactions over $10,000, and transactions considered suspicious or unusual to Hacienda's Attached General Directorate for Transactions Investigations (DGAIO), Mexico's financial intelligence unit (FIU).

In 2000, the DGAIO began automated filing of transaction reports from the financial sector and instituted a series of checks to ensure integrity. Through the end of the year, the DGAIO processed more than 6.5 million currency transaction reports, nearly 1,500 suspicious activity reports; and opened over 100 new investigations.

The DGAIO and the banking community continue to expand access to the automated filing network and have sponsored seminars and conferences for the entire banking community (bankers, regulators, and examiners). Overall, industry compliance with reporting has improved. At the November 2000 annual meeting of the Mexican Banking Association, self-imposed reporting requirements were promulgated within the banking sector.

In 1998, the PGR established a special prosecutorial unit that continues to develop a staff of in-house expert investigators to strengthen the money laundering cases presented to the judiciary. In 2000, Mexico initiated 27 prosecutions involving some 53 individuals under its money laundering laws. Of these, 31 have been arraigned but none sentenced. In 2000, three convicted individuals were sentenced in cases dating from 1998.

In January 2000, the US Department of the Treasury and the Mexican Hacienda entered into a Memorandum of Understanding for the exchange of information on the cross-border movement of currency and monetary instruments. The responsible authorities for the implementation of this MOU are the US Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) and the DGAIO. In December 2000, Mexico amended its Customs Law to reduce the threshold for reporting inbound cross border transportation of currency or monetary instruments from $20,000 to $10,000. At the same time, it established a requirement for the reporting of outbound cross-border transportation of currency or monetary instruments of $10,000 or more.

Mexico is a full and active partner in the Money Laundering Group of the US/Mexico High-Level Contact Group. Mexico and the United States continue to implement their bilateral treaties and agreements for cooperation in law enforcement issues, including the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT), the Executive Agreement on Asset Sharing, and the Financial Information Exchange Agreement (FIEA). Mexico has also entered into bilateral agreements with other countries that provide for international cooperation on money laundering matters.

In June 2000, Mexico was accepted as a full FATF member, and joined the Caribbean FATF as a cooperating and supporting nation. Through membership and participation in the FATF, the Egmont Group of FIUs and the OAS/CICAD Experts Group to Control Money Laundering, Mexico continues to expand its presence at international anti-money laundering fora. Mexico is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Through workshops with industry representatives, the Mexican Secretariat of Finance and Public Credit has sought to clarify the implementation procedures of the 1998 regulations for transaction reporting. Substantial progress has been made in the past year but there is still misunderstanding throughout the financial sector of what is required to be reported. Mexico is positioning itself to guard against electronic money laundering and the use of "smart cards" by examining domestic industry standards. Although no investigations have been initiated, these new technologies may present the greatest challenge as Mexico integrates into a global economy.

Mexico has established a sound legislative basis for its anti-money laundering policies, and has demonstrated an international commitment to combat money laundering. However, one weak area that remains is that customer identification provisions do not apply to third party beneficiaries, which affects high value transactions made by individuals on behalf of the principal account holders. Identifying the true owners of the bulk cash that transits the US-Mexican border must remain a priority item for both governments to stem transactions involving international narcotics trafficking proceeds.

Mexico also continues to lack sufficient qualified and experienced personnel in the regulatory agencies and within the banking community to implement and enforce oversight and compliance programs. Additional efforts also need to be directed towards developing cooperative relationships among law enforcement, financial regulators and the financial sector to reduce vulnerabilities. Finally, Mexico needs to follow through on recent pledges and efforts to combat corruption to ensure that its anti-money laundering program is successful.

Micronesia (Other). The Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) is a constitutional government in free association with the United States. It is not a regional financial center. There are four financial institutions in the country-two local banks and two foreign branches. There have been no known money laundering schemes related to narcotics proceeds. Financial crimes, such as bank fraud, do not appear to be increasing in frequency. Contraband smuggling, centered on alcohol and tobacco products, may generate illicit proceeds. The FSM does not permit offshore banking.

Moldova (Other). Moldova is not a significant financial or money laundering center. Awareness of money laundering among government officials and financial institutions has been aided by the assistance of US experts from the Treasury Department, who provided training, advice and consultation related to the prevention of money laundering. In addition, the FBI is presenting an ongoing series of courses on fighting organized crime and corruption in Moldova. Moldova has drafted a statute on money laundering, however, it is currently in the legislative process and has not been approved.

Moldova is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. In December 2000, Moldova signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Moldova is a member of the Council of Europe Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures (PC-R-EV), a FATF-style body.

Monaco (Concern). The Principality of Monaco is not a regional financial center. However, it is considered vulnerable to money laundering because of its strict bank secrecy laws and extensive network of casinos. Russian organized crime and the Italian Mafia reportedly have laundered money in Monaco.

Monaco has 70 financial institutions, 37 of which are banks. Most of the banking sector is concentrated in portfolio management and private banking. The subsidiaries of foreign banks operating in Monaco can withhold customer information from the parent bank. Monaco also has an offshore sector, and permits the formation of both trust and international business companies (IBCs). Monaco permits the formation of five different types of IBCs: limited liability companies; branches of foreign parent companies; partnerships with limited liability; partnerships with unlimited liability; and sole proprietorships. Ready-made "shelf companies" are not permitted. The incorporation process generally takes 4 to 9 months. Monaco does not maintain a central registry of IBCs, and authorities have no legal basis for seeking information on the activities of offshore companies.

In 2000, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) conducted a review of Monaco's anti-money laundering regime against 25 specified criteria. Monaco was not identified by the FATF as a noncooperative country in the international fight against money laundering. However, the FATF in its June report noted the following about Monaco's anti-money laundering regime:

The anti-money laundering system in Monaco is comprehensive. However, difficulties have been encountered with Monaco by countries in international investigations on serious crimes that appear to be linked also with tax matters. In addition, the FIU of Monaco (SICCFIN) suffers a great lack of adequate resources. The authorities of Monaco have stated that they will provide additional resources to SICCFIN.

Money laundering in Monaco is a criminal offense. Banks, insurance companies, and stockbrokers are required to report suspicious transactions and to disclose the identities of those involved. Casino operators must alert the government to gambling payments suspected to be derived from drug trafficking or organized crime. Another law imposes a 5-10 year jail sentence for anyone convicted of using ill-gotten gains to purchase property (which is itself subject to confiscation).

Monaco established its financial intelligence unit, the Service d'Information et de Controle sur les Services Financiers (SICCFIN), to collect information on suspected money launderers. The SICCFIN is a member of the Egmont Group.

Monaco is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Mongolia (Other). Mongolia is not a regional financial center. However, Mongolia's vulnerability to transnational crimes such as money laundering most likely has grown with the country's increased levels of international trade and tourism. Mongolia's long, unprotected borders with Russia and China make it particularly vulnerable to smuggling and narcotics trafficking. Illegal money transfers and public corruption are other sources of illicit funds in Mongolia. In 2000, Mongolian police seized approximately $1 million in counterfeit US currency. Mongolia does not have anti-money laundering legislation. Moreover, Mongolia's ability to fight all forms of transnational crime is hampered by a weak legal system, and an inability to effectively patrol its borders, to detect illegal smuggling, and to conduct transnational criminal investigations.

The Government of Mongolia (GOM) has made protection of its borders a priority. The GOM has increased its participation in regional and international fora that focus on transnational criminal activities. For example, Mongolia is working with other countries in the region to join the Asia-Pacific Group on Money Laundering. US Government assistance to the GOM includes international visitor programs on transnational crime and counter narcotics measures, and joint operations and training by regional representatives of the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Internal Revenue Service, and the Secret Service.

Montserrat (Other). Montserrat is a Caribbean Overseas Territory of the United Kingdom. Volcanic activity between 1995 and 1998 greatly reduced the population and business activity on the island, although an offshore financial services sector remains that may attract money launderers. As with the other British Caribbean Overseas Territories, Montserrat underwent a thorough evaluation of its financial regulation in 2000, co-sponsored by the local and British governments.

Montserrat's offshore sector consists of 15 offshore banks and 22 international business companies (IBCs). The Financial Services Centre (FSC) regulates offshore banks, whereas the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank supervises Montserrat's three domestic banks. IBCs may be registered using bearer shares, providing for anonymity of corporate ownership.

The Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) 1999 criminalized the laundering of proceeds from any indictable offense and mandated the reporting of suspicious transactions to a Reporting Authority. However, the Reporting Authority has not yet been established. Although the Act directs the Governor to issue a code of practice establishing further regulations for financial institutions, the code of practice has not yet been issued.

US law enforcement cooperation with Montserrat is facilitated by a treaty with the UK that governs mutual legal assistance in criminal matters with several of the UK's overseas territories. Montserrat is a member of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), and through the UK, is subject to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

Montserrat should issue regulations to implement the POCA and establish the Reporting Authority to act as a financial intelligence unit. It should enact measures to identify and record the beneficial owners of IBCs. It should also increase resources to financial supervision, especially as it looks to again expand its offshore sector, to help ensure that money launderers do not abuse Montserrat's financial services.

Morocco (Other). Morocco is not a regional financial center and the extent of money laundering in Morocco is unknown. However, Morocco remains an important producer and exporter of cannabis, which generates proceeds that must be laundered in Morocco or abroad. Moroccan government officials have indicated that they believed money was being laundered through bulk smuggling of cash and the purchase of smuggled goods. Banking officials have indicated that the country's system of unregulated money exchanges provides a venue for launderers. Morocco has not criminalized money laundering.

The Moroccan banking system is modeled after the French system and consists of 16 banks, five government-owned specialized financial institutions, approximately 30 credit agencies, and 12 leasing companies. The monetary authorities in Morocco are the Ministry of Finance and the central bank, Bank Al Maghrib, which monitors and regulates the banking system. Bank Al Maghrib has decreed that all financial institutions must institute a customer identification policy and maintain certain transaction records for a certain (unspecified) period of time.

A mutual legal assistance treaty entered into force between the United States and Morocco in 1993. Morocco is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. In December 2000, Morocco signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Mozambique (Other). Mozambique is not a regional financial center and does not have an offshore sector. Although the extent of money laundering in Mozambique is not known, it most likely is limited because of the country's small commercial banking sector. However, lax oversight and weak banking regulations, as demonstrated by recent bank scandals, suggest that Mozambique's financial institutions are vulnerable to money laundering. In particular, there is concern that the proceeds of arms trafficking and stolen vehicles sales may be laundered through Mozambique's financial institutions.

Mozambique criminalized money laundering related to narcotics trafficking through the 1997 antinarcotics law. In a 2000 address to Parliament, the attorney general underscored the importance of passing new anti-money laundering legislation that conforms to the 40 FATF Recommendations. The Parliament reportedly is considering additional anti-money laundering legislation.

Mozambique is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and a member of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG).

Namibia (Other). Namibia is not a financial center. There are indications of drug trafficking and abuse, but no evidence of narcotics-related money laundering. Namibia currently has no laws against money laundering in place, nor does it have the necessary procedures to detect it.

Namibia is not a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. In December 2000 Namibia signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Namibia is a member of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG), a FATF-style regional body.

Nauru (Primary). Nauru is a small central Pacific Island nation with a population of approximately 10,600. It is an independent republic, an associate member of the British Commonwealth, and recently joined the United Nations. The legal, supervisory, and regulatory processes in Nauru present significant opportunities for the laundering of the proceeds of crime, and allow criminals who make use of those systems to increase significantly their chances to evade effective investigation or punishment.

Nauru is an established "zero" tax haven-it does not levy any income, corporation, capital gains, real estate, inheritance, estate, gift, sales, or stamp taxes. It is an offshore banking center with a number of weaknesses in its regulatory structures. The Nauru Agency Corporation (NAC) licenses offshore banks, and in turn, acts as a shareholder or director of the banks it licenses. The government-owned Bank of Nauru acts as the central bank for monetary policy; but it has no regulatory function over offshore banks. Nauruan authorities are unable to verify information provided by applicants for offshore banking licenses or those registering corporations on the island. The required documentation is routinely processed through registered agents. Even though bank applications require a certified police record stating that the applicant has no criminal record, Nauruan authorities do not have the ability to check the bona fides of such documents.

Citing many of these deficiencies, including excessive bank secrecy provisions that guard against the disclosure of the relevant information, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) identified Nauru as a non-cooperative country and territory in its June 2000 report. The FATF report criticized the lack of basic anti-money laundering regulations, including the criminalization of money laundering. The FATF report cited the poor supervision of Nauru's offshore banks. Specifically, the report criticized the fact that Nauru's 400 offshore banks are not required to obtain identification information from its customers, maintain customer identification or transaction records, or report suspicious transactions. Nauru banks are known for dealing in bearer shares, which provide for secrecy of operations and anonymity.

Following the FATF determination, the US Treasury Department issued an advisory to US financial institutions advising them to "give enhanced scrutiny" to all financial transactions involving Nauru.

Russian organized crime has exploited Nauru's offshore financial sector. Nauru gained notoriety in 1999 because of allegations that several billions of dollars of Russian financial transactions had passed through banks chartered in Nauru. Nauru's Russian clientele reportedly use this route to avoid scrutiny by Russian officials. A number of transactions, initiated by Russian and Asian organizations with alleged ties to organized crime, are assumed to be criminally derived. In April 2000, the Government of Nauru asked Russian officials to provide evidence of money flowing from Russia through Nauru and claimed that it would take available steps to prevent Nauru's banking system from being used in money laundering operations, once it received such evidence.

The Bank of New York case illustrates how a bank in Nauru can be used for money laundering purposes. To conceal the true source of the funds, Russian accomplices in this case used a number of offshore banks in the Pacific. In 1996 these individuals acquired control of "Sinex Bank Inc."-a registered offshore bank in Nauru. From 1996 to 1999, Sinex Bank was identified as the ordering party for more than $3 billion in funds transferred from Russian bank correspondent accounts at the Bank of New York to various shell corporation accounts. Although Sinex Bank conducted no actual banking operations in Nauru, it was used as a front to facilitate the illegal transfer of money out of Russia.

Nauru has confirmed its awareness of the impact of the deficiencies in its anti-money laundering processes, taken some steps to address these concerns, and expressed a willingness to cooperate with the international efforts to combat money laundering. It has cooperated with officials from the United States and other countries in certain criminal investigations involving Nauruan institutions. It has recently suspended the licenses of a large number of institutions pending a review of their ownership. It has blocked the registration of any new banks on behalf of any Russian individual or entity and cancelled contracts with a number of agents. The Government of Nauru is considering legislative changes that could redress a number of the problems in its banking laws, and has requested relevant technical assistance in order to do so.

The Government of Nauru facilitated on-site inspections of its financial system by US officials in 2000. It is a member of the South Pacific Forum and has participated in its efforts to establish a regional financial intelligence center. However, Nauru has not made any advances toward its commitment to the Honiara Declaration, which calls on Forum countries to implement the FATF 40 Recommendations.

Nauru needs to pass and enforce comprehensive anti-money laundering legislation and enact bank supervisory practices that are in accord with accepted international standards so that it can protect its financial services industry and economy from criminals and criminal organizations. Despite verbal commitments by Nauru to reform its offshore sector, no concrete action has been forthcoming.

Nepal (Other). Nepal is not a regional financial center. Nepal currently does not have an offshore sector. However, the Government of Nepal (GON) has explored the development of an offshore sector. There are no indications that Nepal is used as an international money-laundering center. US Government officials have offered assistance to the GON to help it develop a proper legal framework to deter money laundering.

The GON has not criminalized money laundering, and in 2000, legislative action on money laundering, mutual legal assistance, and witness protection remained stalled.

The GON exchanges information in connection with international narcotics investigations and proceedings. Regulations to ensure the availability of adequate records do not meet international standards.

Nepal is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. Nepal is an observer jurisdiction to the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering.

The Netherlands (Primary). The Netherlands is a major regional financial center and, as such, provides opportunities for laundering funds generated from a variety of illicit activities, including narcotics trafficking and financial fraud. Narcotics proceeds are often related to the sale of heroin, cocaine or cannabis. Some narcotics proceeds are derived from the local, illegal production and sale of cannabis products or designer drugs such as ecstasy. Money laundering in The Netherlands is believed to occur through the banking system, money exchange houses (bureaux de change), casinos, credit card companies, insurance and securities firms, stockbrokers and money transfer offices. Money laundering in The Netherlands is most likely controlled by major drug cartels and other international criminal organizations.

The Netherlands' anti-money laundering regime is in compliance with FATF and other international standards. Money laundering relating to any crime has been an offense in The Netherlands since 1994, although prosecutors must first prove the underlying offense before prosecuting for money laundering. The Dutch parliament is currently debating draft legislation that would make money laundering a separate offense. This bill also includes provisions that would ease somewhat the government's burden of proof regarding the criminal origins of proceeds, as the government believes the current standard is too high and can adversely affect money laundering prosecutions. Under the new bill, it should be sufficient to prove that the proceeds "apparently" originated from a crime.

Since 1996, organizations providing commercial services, such as accountants, lawyers and notaries, have applied money laundering reporting procedures within their professions. The Money Transfer and Exchange Offices Act will be submitted to Parliament this spring. If passed, it will replace the existing Exchange Offices Act, and as such it will also require money transfer offices, in addition to exchange offices, to obtain a permit to operate.

The Office for the Disclosure of Unusual Transactions (MOT), which was established in 1994, is The Netherlands' financial intelligence unit (FIU). The MOT reviews and analyzes unusual transactions. Because of the conversion of national banknotes and coins into Euro, which will take place between January 1, 2002 and January 28, 2002, the indicators have been adjusted in order to disclose transactions related to the conversion. Suspicious transactions are provided, with preliminary investigative information, to the National Public Prosecutor. The MOT is currently negotiating with notaries to implement suspicious activity indicators for disclosure in connection with the activities of this professional group, in preparation to implement the Second EU Directive on Money Laundering. The MOT is a member of the Egmont Group and has information sharing agreements with eight other countries.

In December 2000, The Netherlands signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. The Netherlands is also a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention and the 1990 Strasbourg Convention on Money Laundering and Confiscation. The Dutch participate in the Basle Committee, and have endorsed the Committee's September 1997 "Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision." There is a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty in effect between The Netherlands and the US, as well as a forfeiture cooperation and asset sharing agreement. The Netherlands is a member of the Financial Action Task Force and participates in the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force as a Cooperating and Supporting Nation.

The Netherlands should continue to refine its anti-money laundering regime, particularly with respect to increasing its ability to prosecute money laundering and financial crimes.

Netherlands Antilles, The (Concern). The Netherlands Antilles consists of the Caribbean islands of Curacao, Bonaire, the Dutch part of Sint Maarten/St. Martin, Saba and Sint Eustatius. The growing offshore financial services industry, gaming industry, and lack of border controls between Sint Maarten and St. Martin creates opportunities that could be exploited by money launderers. However, the Netherlands Antilles Government has made it a priority to develop a comprehensive anti-money laundering program and continues to strengthen its anti-money laundering legislation.

In 2000 the Government expanded the anti-money laundering law to include suspicious activity reporting requirements for gems and real estate dealers. Also, senior government officials reached agreement on the "underlying crime" portion of the money laundering law. As a result, prosecutors no longer are required to prove that a suspected money launderer also committed an underlying crime (such as theft) in order to obtain a money-laundering conviction. It is now sufficient to establish that a money launderer knew, or should have known, of the money's illegal origin.

Recommendations for more specific indicators of suspicious activity for financial reporting await the Finance Minister's approval. There already has been a substantial increase in the number of unusual transaction reports submitted by the offshore sector, largely because of increased training. A proposal to bring credit card and currency transactions into the reporting system for unusual financial transactions also awaits the Finance Minister's approval.

At the request of the Committee Against Money Laundering, the Gaming Control Board of Curacao is currently reviewing a ministerial proposal to extend suspicious transaction reporting to casinos. If the Board provides no comments within the specified two-month comment period, the Finance Minister will implement this proposal.

The central bank has completed development of guidelines on detecting and deterring money laundering; these will be issued to the banking sector soon.

In 2000, the Association of Public Notaries introduced a list of indicators that will be used to report unusual transactions.

Progress on tightening oversight of trusts has been slowed by complications arising from the new fiscal framework being developed by the Netherlands and Netherlands Antilles. The Netherlands Antilles had proposed legislation that included provisions allowing the establishment of a type of closed corporation, which would be taxed at a zero-rate. The Netherlands has modified the legislation proposed by the Netherlands Antilles and, until a final version is enacted, new regulations cannot be established and enforced.

On August 1, 2000, the Netherlands Antilles Asset Seizure Law became effective. This law allows a public prosecutor to seize the proceeds of any crime once the crime is proven in a court of law.

In July 2000 cross border currency reporting legislation was presented to the Parliament, but it was not enacted by year's end. This legislation is expected to be approved in 2001.

Unusual transactions must by law be reported to the Netherlands Antilles Reporting Center, Meldpunt Ongebruikelijke Transacties (MOT NA), which collects and analyzes them. Some concern has been expressed over the ability of the MOT NA's small staff to handle a large influx of unusual transaction reports. The staff at the MOT NA, however, has worked diligently to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of their reporting system. New software has been developed to enable institutions to send reports to the MOT NA electronically. In addition, legislation providing for the exchange of information between MOT NA and other financial intelligence units is now in the Central Committee of Parliament. The MOT NA is a member of the Egmont Group.

Law enforcement statistics improved in the Netherlands Antilles this year. Where previously there were no prosecutions for money laundering, Antillean courts convicted 14 individuals of money laundering this year and investigations are underway in another 11 cases.

The Netherlands Antilles has a large number of offshore financial service providers, including 42 offshore banks, mutual funds, international finance companies, and trust companies. Nearly 21,000 international business companies (IBCs) are registered in the Netherlands Antilles and may be registered using bearer shares. The law on bank supervision states that offshore banks must have a physical presence on the islands, hold their records there, and not give or receive payments in cash. The central bank supervises offshore banks, and some mutual funds are supervised by other entities. None of the other institutions are supervised by Netherlands Antilles authorities. The central bank also indicates that banks on Curacao usually maintain copies of bearer share certificates for IBCs maintaining accounts, which include information on the beneficial owner.

As part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Netherlands Antilles is a member of the Financial Action Task Force. It also is a member of the Caribbean Financial Action Force. The Netherlands Antilles operates under the Netherlands's Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty with the United States. Cooperation is excellent. The MOT NA has an information sharing agreement with its counter-part in the Netherlands, the MOT.

The Netherlands Antilles has implemented most of its anti-money laundering legislation. The Netherlands Antilles should move expeditiously to enact new proposals that would further strengthen its anti-money laundering program such as those measures related to casinos, cross-border currency reporting, and extension of unusual transactions reporting to additional types of financial institutions. The Netherlands Antilles must continue to exercise due diligence and supervision over its offshore sector, including identification of the beneficial ownership of business accounts, so that its financial institutions and services industry are not used to launder money. Success for the Netherlands Antilles will be contingent upon continued vigilance and forceful implementation of its anti-money laundering regime.

New Zealand (Other). Evidence exists that money laundering takes place in New Zealand, although not to a significant extent. Narcotics proceeds and commercial crime are the primary sources of illicit funds. International organized criminal elements are also present in New Zealand.

New Zealand has been active in promoting efforts to combat money laundering in the South Pacific region. In September 2000, it hosted a workshop that brought together representatives from Pacific Island Forum nations, the IMF, World Bank and other interested parties to discuss general money laundering issues as well as specific plans to set up a regional financial intelligence unit (FIU). This initiative built on the New Zealand Government's "Forum Islands Road Show" series of visits to 13 South Pacific island nations that took place between May and November 1998 to discuss the regional dimensions and risks of financial crime. The September workshop recommendations were subsequently adopted at the 31st Pacific Islands Forum held in Kiribati in October 2000. Specifically, the Forum recognized the importance of information and intelligence sharing among its members and welcomed the proposal to establish a Project Office within the Forum Secretariat. The main function of the Project Office will be to work on details of a Regional Financial Intelligence Information Sharing Facility, as well as to assist Forum members countries in establishing domestic FIUs.

A 1995 amendment to New Zealand's Crimes Act 1961 criminalized the laundering of proceeds knowingly derived from a serious offense. The Financial Transaction Reporting Act 1996 contains obligations for a wide range of financial institutions, including banks, credit unions, casinos, and real estate agents, lawyers, and accountants. These entities must identify clients, maintain records, and report suspicious transactions. The Act also contains a "safe harbor" provision and requires the reporting of large cross-border currency movements.

New Zealand is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. New Zealand is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), and the South Pacific Forum. Its financial intelligence unit is a member of the Egmont Group.

Nicaragua (Concern). Nicaragua is not considered to be a regional financial center, and it does not have an offshore sector. Nicaragua's financial system is particularly vulnerable to drug money laundering because of the drug-trafficking activity in the region.

An area of specific concern is Nicaragua's weak regulation and oversight of its banking system, as highlighted by local media reports that have alleged massive fraud in the recent collapse of Intercontinental Bank (Interbank).

Nicaragua has criminalized money laundering related to drug trafficking, and requires banks to report cash deposits that exceed US $10,000 to the Commission of Financial Analysis (CFA). However, the CFA has not yet been established because the Government of Nicaragua (GON) does not have the resources and technical expertise to do so. Once operational, the CFA will be subordinate to the Ministry of Government, and will be comprised of representatives from various elements within the government, such as law enforcement and the Superintendency of Banks. Nicaragua has not successfully prosecuted a money laundering case.

Nicaragua is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Nicaragua is a member of the Organization of American States Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS/CICAD) Experts Group to Control Money Laundering, and the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force.

The GON is urged to allocate the resources necessary for the establishment of the CFA to ensure that the country's financial institutions comply with relevant anti-money laundering controls. Moreover, the GON should create a system for reporting suspicious transactions once the CFA has been established.

Niger (Other). The extent of money laundering in Niger is not known. However, in 2000, officials from the United Nations indicated that the West African region may be fertile ground for money laundering because of drug trafficking, corruption, networks of contraband arms and precious stones, and weak mechanisms of control that can be abused by international criminals. Seven small commercial banks and one modest-sized local bank operate in Niger. The Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO) is the central bank for Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo, all of which use the French-backed CFA franc currency.

In November 2000, Niger participated in a meeting of officials from 14 West African countries in Senegal. The group established the Intergovernmental Group for Action Against Money Laundering (GIABA) to coordinate their governments' actions against money laundering and other transnational crime.

Niger is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

Nigeria (Primary). The Federal Republic of Nigeria is a hub of money laundering and criminal financial activity, not only for the West African sub-region but also increasingly for the entire continent. It is the most populous Sub Saharan country, dominating the West African sub-region economically and militarily. Nigeria is also Africa's most significant narcotics transshipment point. Nigerian criminal organizations utilize sophisticated global networks to ship narcotics via Nigeria to markets in the United States, Europe, and other African countries. Nigerian money laundering is directly linked to narcotics trafficking as well as corollary activities such as document, immigration, and financial fraud. The proceeds from these illegal activities are repatriated to Nigeria and are often used to fund subsequent criminal operations.

The combination of the narcotics trafficking activity and money laundering, and the fact that Nigeria has failed to adequately address corruption among law enforcement, customs, immigration, other government agencies, and the society at large makes it unusually difficult to have an effective anti-money laundering program.

Nigeria is notorious for the various financial schemes that originate there. Nigerian Advance Fee Fraud, commonly known as "Four-one-nine Scams," (419 is the reference to fraud in Nigeria's criminal code) has become highly lucrative for criminal enterprises. With the help of phone books, business directories, and email lists, Nigerian criminal organizations fax, mail, and email targeted businesses and individuals around the world with enticing "get rich quick" offers. The proposed schemes take various forms, for example, by promising a transfer of funds "from an over-invoiced contract" in Nigeria to a target's bank account. The cash in question might be profit from a crude oil sale that a business person "needs help in transferring out of the country" or the disbursement of funds for a specific charity from the estate of a recently deceased individual. Often, these 419 letters and schemes are written on "official" letterhead stationary. An elaborate system may be utilized to provide bogus references. Advance Fee Fraud perpetrators may request bank account information to gauge the targeted victim's level of trust and provide the impression that a funds transfer is imminent. All 419 Scams eventually request payment of a fee (or fees) so that the alleged transfer of funds can be facilitated. While actual monetary losses by US citizens are difficult to gauge-many victims are reluctant to report such activity to law enforcement agencies-conservative estimates place such losses by American citizens and businesses in the hundreds of millions of dollars annually. Substantial proof exists that narcotics traffickers have utilized 419 Scams to fund their illicit smuggling efforts.

The current anti-money laundering law, Money Laundering Decree No. 3 of 1995, criminalizes narcotics-based money laundering, but is useful only if the predicate offense is narcotics trafficking. It requires banks to identify customers, maintain records, and report large and suspicious transactions to the central bank. It also provides for the seizure and forfeiture of drug-related assets, although forfeiture requires a conviction and thus is seldom and ineffectively used. Enforcement of the legislation is inconsistent because corruption, bureaucracy, and lack of training in the preparation of money laundering cases slow the enforcement structures.

The National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), through the Money Laundering Surveillance Unit (MLSU) of the Bank Examination Department of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), has the power to demand, and obtain and inspect the books and records of a financial institution to confirm compliance with the provisions of the money laundering decree. Banks are required to make transaction records available for review by NDLEA officials. There have been no money laundering convictions.

In response to international concerns, the GON has taken some steps to combat criminal activity and has become closely involved with US law enforcement agencies in an attempt to address the problem of financial crime and money laundering. In 1998, the GON began cooperating with the US Postal Inspection Service to identify and crack down on fraud operations through the mail. In addition, the US Secret Service has maintained an office in the US Consulate General in Lagos since 1995, and in June 2000, opened a separate office to assist in the effort to combat Advanced Fee Fraud and other illegal operations, including US dollar counterfeiting operations. In May 1999, a decree was issued that, according to the NDLEA, altered the burden of proof in money laundering cases to facilitate prosecution. In October 2000, representatives from Nigeria and two other African countries attended an African Summit on Money Laundering at the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN). The purpose of the summit was to review and discuss the anti-money laundering legislation of each jurisdiction, the need to establish a financial intelligence unit, and training and technical assistance needs. The DEA is working closely with the NDLEA to develop competencies in drug and drug-related money-laundering investigations.

The CBN has announced that it is upgrading Money Laundering Decree No. 3 of 1995 to expand its scope beyond narcotics-related money laundering. It also has announced plans to supervise enforcement of the additional offenses, leaving the enforcement of narcotics-related money laundering to the NDLEA.

Nigeria is a party the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Nigeria urgently needs to enact and implement changes to its anti-money laundering legislation so that it can meet international standards and protect itself against financial crimes and money laundering. Nigeria also needs to demonstrate its ability to take action against corruption and fraud. In addition, Nigeria should move to quickly create a centralized financial intelligence unit that would receive and analyze information and cooperate with foreign counterparts in money laundering investigations so that Nigeria can protect its financial system from widespread abuse by criminals and criminal organizations.

Niue (Concern). Niue is a self-governing parliamentary democracy in free association with New Zealand. Niue retains jurisdiction over its internal affairs and New Zealand assumes responsibility for Niue's external affairs. Legislation from the mid-1990s created an offshore financial center that is heavily dependent upon international business companies (IBCs). The Proceeds of Crime Act 1998 criminalizes the laundering of proceeds from any offense punishable by at least one year in prison. Niue recently passed new anti-money laundering legislation that, when implemented, should assist the country in its fight against financial crime. Regulatory weaknesses involving banks and IBCs remain, however.

In June 2000, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) identified Nuie as non-cooperative in the international fight against money laundering. The FATF in its report cited numerous deficiencies in Niue's anti-money laundering regime:

* Niue has no ongoing process of supervising the licensed banks. The fact that the offshore banks have no physical presence in Niue complicates the regulation of that sector.

* Contrary to international standards, the central bank's Monetary Board has delegated to a foreign private firm the responsibility of issuing banking licenses and conducting due diligence for offshore banks.

* Niue lacks mandatory rules for financial institutions concerning customer identification and the disclosure of beneficial owners of accounts; in addition, Niue allows financial institutions to issue anonymous accounts.

* Niue has no mandatory suspicious transaction reporting system in place.

* Niue's law contains no provisions for the exchange of information between domestic and foreign regulators.

* Niue does not have a financial intelligence unit.

* The International Business Companies Act of 1994, as amended in 1996, which establishes IBCs, contains inadequate requirements for the registration and filing of information with the Registrar of companies.

* Niue has devoted inadequate resources to fight money laundering.

Following the FATF exercise, the US Treasury Department issued an advisory to US financial institutions advising them to "give enhanced scrutiny" to all financial transactions involving Niue.

In July 2000, Niue suspended consideration to register new offshore banks until the new Financial Transactions Reporting Act (FTRA) became effective. Niue passed and immediately enacted the FTRA in November 2000. The FTRA imposes reporting and record-keeping obligations upon banks, insurance companies, securities dealers and futures brokers, money services businesses and persons administering or managing funds on behalf of IBCs. Specifically, the FTRA requires financial institutions to report suspicious transactions, verify the identity of its customers, and keep records of financial transactions for six years. The FTRA also calls for the establishment of a financial intelligence unit (FIU) within the office of the Attorney General. To date the FIU has not been established. Niuean officials have said that the establishment of the FIU will depend upon the outcome of ongoing discussions among the Pacific Islands Forum of a proposed regional FIU for Forum member countries. Niue supports the establishment of a regional FIU to share information among Pacific Island states.

The International Business Companies Act of 1994 is the legislative basis for establishing IBCs. Marketers of offshore services promote Niue as a favored jurisdiction for establishing IBCs for a variety of reasons. Niue does not require the disclosure of beneficial ownership of IBCs, permits bearer shares, allows the marketing of shelf companies, and does not require IBCs to keep a register of directors. Internet marketers also offer shelf companies complete with associated offshore bank accounts and mail-drop forwarding services. Regardless of how the IBCs are marketed, all are legally formed and registered by a Panamanian law firm on behalf of the GON. Because of strict secrecy laws, Niuean IBCs remain vulnerable to illicit use in international money laundering schemes.

Although IBCs are the most attractive feature of Niue's offshore sector, Niue also offers trusts, partnerships, financial management, and insurance services. Whether Niue has lifted its suspension to register new offshore banks is not known. Niue allows the creation of asset protection trusts that are impervious to many types of legal claims arising in other jurisdictions. In addition, trusts in Niue are exempt from taxation if the parties to the trust are not residents of Niue.

The Niuean Government has expressed a willingness to cooperate with international efforts to combat money laundering. Niue has participated in some international meetings concerning money laundering, including a workshop hosted by New Zealand in September 2000.

In 1998 Niue passed the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act, which authorizes the Attorney General of Niue to provide certain types of legal assistance to other countries involved with criminal investigations. Niue has no bilateral cooperation agreements to fight money laundering.

The lack of adequate supervisory and regulatory systems in Niue creates opportunities for the laundering and safe protection of the proceeds of crime. Niue needs to implement its anti-money laundering legislation to protect its financial services industry and economy from abuse by criminals and criminal organizations. Recent reforms address some of the deficiencies in Niue's anti-money laundering regime. Particular emphasis needs to be directed towards regulation of its offshore financial sector.

Norway (Other). Norway is not an important regional financial center; there are only 20 commercial banks in the country and about 130 savings banks. Money laundering in Norway is related mainly to funds generated by the smuggling of liquor and cigarettes. According to OKOKRIM, Norway's special unit on economic fraud, Norway has been experiencing an increase in financial crime such as bank fraud. These types of crimes overshadow narcotics-related money laundering in Norway.

Most money laundering in Norway takes place outside its financial system because financial institutions are obliged by law to report large and suspicious transactions to OKOKRIM. The structuring of deposits appears to be a problem for financial institutions. Large cross-border cash transactions by banks are routinely reported to the central bank and kept on file.

All forms of money laundering are criminal offenses, according to the Norwegian Penal Code. Norway's anti-money laundering legislation has been strengthened in recent years to conform to the FATF Forty Recommendations. OKOKRIM has set up a money laundering unit that receives suspicious transaction reports and serves as Norway's financial intelligence unit. OKOKRIM is a member of the Egmont Group.

Norway is a member of the Council of Europe and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Norway is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the United Nations Convention against Organized Crime.

Oman (Other). Oman is not known to have a significant money laundering problem. Its small banking sector is supervised by the Central Bank of Oman (CBO), which has the authority to suspend or reorganize a bank's operations. In May 2000, the CBO organized and hosted a three-day seminar on the prevention and detection of money laundering.

Large cash transactions must be reported to the CBO and the Police. Oman has not criminalized money laundering. However, in February 2000, Oman announced that it was in the process of drafting comprehensive anti-money laundering legislation that would conform to international standards. It is expected that this legislation will be approved sometime in 2001.

Oman is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Oman is scheduled to undergo a FATF mutual evaluation sometime in 2001. In May 2000, GCC members met for a four-day seminar on combating money laundering and pledged to enhance communication and cooperation to fight international crime.

Pakistan (Primary). The three principal sources of illicit funds in Pakistan are narcotics trafficking, corruption and smuggling. There is currently little production of narcotics in Pakistan. However, Pakistani narcotics-trafficking organizations are active in the huge Afghan drug trade and transship drugs through Pakistan. The proceeds are laundered abroad by means of the hawala (also called "hundi") alternative remittance system.

Pakistan has criminalized the laundering of narcotics trafficking proceeds. The Control of Narcotics Substances Act (1996) calls for the reporting of transactions believed to be associated with narcotics trafficking and also contains provisions for the freezing and forfeiture of assets associated with narcotics trafficking. The Musharraf caretaker government has established new ordinances addressing various financial crimes, particularly tax evasion and corruption.

Pakistan does not have a financial intelligence unit. Several agencies-in particular, the Antinarcotics Force and Pakistan Customs-play a major role in the investigation of financial crimes cases in Pakistan.

Pakistan became a member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering in 2000. Pakistan is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

In order to establish an effective anti-money laundering regime, Pakistan needs to enact legislation that criminalizes money laundering beyond drug trafficking. A system of reporting suspicious transactions by all financial institutions operating in Pakistan must also be implemented. Finally, given the significant role that hawala plays in money laundering, Pakistan should develop and implement "anti-hawala" countermeasures.

Palau (Concern). The North Pacific Island of Palau is not a major financial center. However, reports that offshore banks in Palau have carried out large-scale money laundering activities prompted a few international banks to ban financial transactions with Palau in late 1999 and early 2000. In response, Palau established a banking commission that intends to introduce financial control legislation to the National Congress in early 2001. Palau reportedly established two offshore banks in 2000 and enacted legislation that permitted the establishment of two Internet gaming operations.

Palau has sought assistance from US officials, the Pacific community, the United Nations, and the International Monetary Fund in its effort to develop an anti-money laundering regime. In addition, Palau participated in international meetings and conferences on financial crime in 2000, including a US-sponsored conference in Fiji and the UN Offshore Forum conference in the Cayman Islands. Palau has become a signatory to Pacific Island Forum anti-money laundering initiatives and has made significant advances to abide by the Honiara Declaration, which calls for Forum countries to implement the FATF 40 Recommendations.

After a few international banks restricted financial transactions with Palau in late 1999, the Government of Palau began its own investigation into alleged money laundering activities involving Palau-registered offshore banks. Palauan officials discovered that a few shell banks had been established through a mechanism in which entities in Palau applied for certificates of incorporation and business licenses in a local-in lieu of national-level jurisdiction. None of these so-called banks was ever given foreign investment approval or any approval to do business in Palau. Nonetheless, a few of these shell banks reportedly gained access to the international financial community and carried out almost $2 billion in suspicious transactions during the past two years.

The Government of Palau needs to enact and implement comprehensive anti-money laundering legislation that meets international standards and establish a financial intelligence unit to work with foreign counterparts to combat financial crime. It should pay special attention to supervising its offshore financial and gambling sector to prevent abuse by criminal entities.

Panama (Primary). Panama continues to be an attractive venue for laundering drug money because of its proximity to major drug-producing countries; its sophisticated international banking sector; US dollar-based economy; and the Colon Free Zone's (CFZ) role as an originating or transshipment point for goods purchased with narcotics dollars through the Colombian Black Market Peso Exchange. Panama has financial institutions that engage in currency transactions involving international narcotics proceeds that include significant amounts of US dollars. Panamanian press reports also indicate that Panama's National Security Council is concerned that the Russian Mafia may be laundering the proceeds of arms and drugs trafficking through Panamanian bank accounts.

In June 2000, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) identified Panama as noncooperative in international efforts to combat money laundering. The FATF in its report cited:

Panama has not yet criminalised money laundering for crimes other than drug trafficking. It has an unusual and arguably inefficient mechanism for transmitting suspicious transaction reports to competent authorities. Panama's FIU [financial intelligence unit] is not able to exchange information with other FIUs. In addition, certain outdated civil law provisions impede the identification of the true beneficial owners of trusts.

The US Treasury Department issued an advisory to US financial institutions advising them to "give enhanced scrutiny" to all financial transactions involving Panama.

In October 2000, the GOP enacted two laws and issued two executive decrees to address FATF's concerns about its anti-money laundering regime:

* Law No. 41 of October 2, 2000, amends the Penal Code by expanding the number of predicate offenses for money laundering beyond drug trafficking to include criminal fraud, arms trafficking, trafficking in humans, kidnapping, extortion, embezzlement, corruption of public officials, terrorism, and international motor vehicle theft or trafficking.

* Law No. 42 of October 2, 2000, expands the types of financial institutions that are required to report currency transactions in excess of US $10,000 and suspicious financial transactions to include banks, trust companies, money exchangers, savings and loans associations, stock exchanges and brokerage firms, and investment administrators. Law 42 also mandates reporting to the Financial Analysis Unit (UAF) of currency or quasi-currency transactions that exceed US $10,000 by casinos, CFZ businesses, the national lottery, and insurance/reinsurance companies. Furthermore, Law 42 requires Panamanian trust companies to identify to the Superintendency of Banks the real and ultimate beneficial owners of trusts

* Executive Decree No. 163 of October 3, 2000, amends the June 1995 decree that created the UAF to permit the UAF to share information with FIUs of other countries, subject to entering into Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) or other information exchange agreements. The UAF has contacted other members of the Egmont Group seeking to foster information exchange between FIUs. Executive Order No. 163 also allows the UAF to provide information related to possible money laundering directly to the Office of the Attorney General for investigation.

* Executive Order 213 of October 3, 2000, amends Executive Order 16 of 1984 relative to trust operations, and provides for the dissemination of information related to trusts to appropriate administrative and judicial authorities.

Furthermore, in October 2000, Panama's Superintendency of Banks issued a document, Agreement No. 9-2000, that defines requirements that banks must follow for identification of customers, exercise of due diligence, and retention of bank records.

The Government of Panama has not successfully prosecuted a money laundering case. However, in September 2000, US and Panamanian investigations of CFZ jewelry wholesaler "Speed Joyeros" culminated in the first-ever US indictment of a CFZ company. "Speed Joyeros" allegedly was part of an international network that used gold, false invoicing, and electronic transfers to launder drug money.

Panama's large offshore sector is comprised of international business companies (over 370,000 currently registered in Panama), trusts, captive insurance companies (corporate entities created and controlled by a parent company, professional association, or group of businesses), and offshore banks (approximately 34 banks). There are three categories of banking licenses: a general license for local and foreign operations, an international license for offshore banks, and a representation license for establishing representative offices. A large portion of Panama's legal profession subsists on creating and maintaining these diverse offshore products. Panama adopted legislation to regulate captive insurance companies-also called offshore insurance companies-through Law 60 of July 1996. Captive insurance has become one of the most important sectors of Panama's offshore financial industry, and is second only to banking.

Panama participates in the multilateral Black Market Peso Exchange Group (BMPEG) directive. Panama is a member of the Organization of American States Inter-American Commission on Drug Abuse Control (OAS/CICAD), the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force, (CFATF), and the Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors (OGBS). Panama is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. The UAF is a member of the Egmont Group. In May 2000, Panama hosted the Egmont Group's annual meeting. In August 2000, Panama also hosted the Fourth Hemispheric Congress on the Prevention of Money Laundering. Panama and the United States have a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty that entered into force in 1995.

Panama has taken meaningful and effective steps forward in 2000 to address deficiencies in its money-laundering regime. Panama should focus on fully implementing and enforcing its new anti-money laundering legislation, and promptly enter into information exchange agreements between the UAF and other FIUs.

Papua New Guinea (Other). Papua New Guinea has no significant exposure to money laundering or other financial crime. Its banking sector is very small, and it has no offshore financial sector. However, there are no laws against money laundering.

Papua New Guinea is not a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

Paraguay (Primary). Paraguay is a transit country for cocaine trafficking, and remains one of Latin America's major money laundering centers. Paraguay is vulnerable to money laundering because of endemic official corruption, weak regulation of its financial sector, and poor implementation of anti-money laundering legislation. The Government of Paraguay's (GOP) implementation of anti-money laundering legislation has been hindered by scarce resources, a lack of political commitment, poor coordination among the various government agencies, and a lack of understanding and reporting by the financial sector.

In 2000, the GOP, for the first time, approved a budget for the country's anti-money laundering secretariat, Secretaría de Prevención del Lavado de Dinero y Bienes (SEPRELAD), and participated in international efforts to combat money laundering. Although GOP officials believe that as much as 65 percent of Paraguay's money laundering is linked to narcotics trafficking, US Government experts believe that 20 percent probably is a more accurate figure. The multi-billion dollar re-export contraband trade that is centered in Ciudad del Este generates significant illegal proceeds.

Paraguay was in the past considered an important tax haven for residents of Brazil because Paraguay has no personal income tax. Paraguay does not license offshore banks; foreign banks are registered in Paraguay and non-residents are allowed to hold bank accounts. However, current banking regulations forbid banks to advertise or otherwise seek deposits from outside the country, and a string of bank failures between 1995 and 1998 has made Paraguay a less attractive venue for foreign deposits. All banks that operate in Paraguay-both national or foreign-are supervised under the same rules and regulations by the appropriate Paraguayan authorities.

Paraguay's anti-money laundering law 1015/97, "Preventing and Suppressing Illegal Acts Committed for the Purpose of Laundering Money or Assets," was promulgated in January 1997. The legislation criminalizes money laundering related to drug trafficking or a criminal organization, or other offenses that are punishable by an average of at least two years imprisonment. Participation in contraband trafficking and tax evasion is penalized through fines only, and thus proceeds from these offenses are not covered by the law. The law obliges a wide range of financial institutions to identify customers, maintain records, and record transactions exceeding US $10,000. The law also mandates reporting of suspicious transactions, establishes asset forfeiture provisions, and provides for cooperation with domestic and international law enforcement. However, GOP officials estimate that only 10 percent of covered institutions actually report these transactions to the SEPRELAD.

The law established SEPRELAD as an inter-agency secretariat to implement the money laundering legislation, issue regulations, and receive financial disclosures. SEPRELAD is comprised of the Minister of Industry and Commerce-the Ministry of Industry and Commerce is SEPRELAD's parent agency-a member of the Central Bank Directorate, the Superintendent of Banks, the Commissioner of Securities, and the heads of the National Police and the National Anti-Drug Secretariat (SENAD). SEPRELAD also oversees Paraguay's financial analysis unit (UAF), a body that collects, analyzes, and processes financial disclosures. When the UAF determines that there are reasonable grounds to warrant further investigation, SEPRELAD forwards its findings to the Financial Crimes Investigation Unit (UIDF) of the SENAD. However, SEPRELAD rarely meets and is susceptible to influence by political concerns because its members are from various government agencies. This impedes the flow of information from the UAF to investigative authorities.

In the spring of 2000, the UAF received its first budget and acquired a larger, permanent office. The UAF increased its staff from six to 10, and has plans to further expand the staff to 14. In September 2000, the US Government delivered to the UAF more than $50,000 in computer equipment. The new software and databases should help the UAF more thoroughly analyze the suspicious transactions reports-once they have been digitized-it has received thus far. The majority of these reports are large currency transactions that have no other suspicious nature, and have come from only a few banks. In 2000, the GOP produced one money-laundering case for prosecution, and in 1999, did not prosecute any cases.

Paraguay has two laws that authorize asset forfeiture. A 1988 law provides a basic system for forfeiting narcotics-related assets; the more recent anti-money laundering legislation provides a system for forfeiting proceeds that are derived from narcotics trafficking and other serious crimes. Under both laws, instruments of crime and proceeds derived from drug trafficking-including bank accounts-may be seized. However, only the anti-money laundering law allows for seizure of a legitimate business derived from illicit proceeds. If the business was merely used to launder the proceeds, then it is subject to a fine or administrative sanctions. Both laws authorize the sharing of forfeited proceeds with another government. Under the 1988 law, proceeds from the narcotics-related seizures are deposited into an antinarcotics police account; under the anti-money laundering law, the proceeds of seizures are distributed at the discretion of the judge presiding over the case. The use of nominees is legal and widespread, and as a result, judges have returned assets because they were registered in the name of the nominee and not the defendant.

The GOP enforces its existing drug-related asset seizure and forfeiture laws, but its success is consistently minimal. A cumbersome judicial process prevents speedy forfeitures, and a conviction is required before a drug-related asset can be forfeited. Although the GOP is contemplating changes to its antidrug statute, the GOP in years past has given low priority to enacting new counternarcotics legislation.

The GOP continues to be active in international efforts to combat money laundering. Paraguay is a member of the South American Financial Action Task Force (GAFISUD), and a member of the Organization of American States Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS/CICAD) Experts Group to Control Money Laundering. In 2000, Paraguay entered into a bilateral agreement with Brazil for the exchange of information on money laundering, and has begun cooperating with Brazil on a number of cases. Paraguay is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. The UAF is a member of the Egmont Group.

Although the GOP appears to be committed to fighting money laundering, as evidenced by its funding and staffing of relevant agencies and its participation in international initiatives, it must address several deficiencies in its anti-money laundering program to produce results. The GOP now has legal and technical tools to fight money laundering, and must now coordinate efforts among its agencies and educate the banking industry on money laundering to increase their compliance with reporting requirements. The GOP also should make legislative or regulatory changes that would allow the UAF to communicate its findings directly to investigative agencies. Finally, the GOP should adequately train prosecutors and judges to effectively deal with financial crimes.

Peru (Concern). Peru is not a regional financial or offshore center; however, money laundering derived from narcotics trafficking and corruption exists. In fact, government of Peru (GOP) officials are currently attempting to recover over US $70 million deposited in Swiss bank accounts that are believed to be the proceeds of money laundering by the former director of the Peruvian National Intelligence Service, Vladimiro Montesinos. The GOP is pursuing possible Montesinos-related accounts elsewhere as well.

Peru's primary anti-money laundering tools are contained in Articles 296-A and B of Law 25428, which criminalize the laundering of proceeds associated with narcotics trafficking (since 1992), and narcoterrorism (since 1993). The law carries a penalty of life imprisonment for bank and finance officials convicted of money laundering. Since 1992, few money laundering cases have been prosecuted and none have yet resulted in a conviction. Additional anti-money laundering provisions were introduced with the passage in December 1996 of the General Law of the Financial and Insurance System and the Organic Law of the Superintendency of Banking and Insurance (No. 26702) and its implementing regulations, which went into effect in July 1998 (Resolution SBS 904-97). This law requires banks and other financial institutions to identify clients and to report unusual and suspicious financial transactions to the Office of the Attorney General (Fiscalia) with a copy provided to the Superintendent of Banks. Compliance by the financial institutions with the requirement to report suspicious transactions is low. The Fiscalia has allowed the Financial Investigations Unit of the Peruvian National Police access to the suspicious transactions reports, for the purpose of determining if the transactions have a connection to narcotics trafficking. The requirement for banks and financial institutions to record certain large cash transactions remains suspended since July 1998 (Resolution SBS 731-98).

During 2000, the GOP made efforts toward implementing an anti-money laundering program that would meet international standards. US Treasury Department officials have assisted in GOP efforts to develop a program that would include new legislation with broader laws and comprehensive regulations for the financial sector. Such a law would provide for the reporting of large currency transactions, and would make the information can be made available to law enforcement authorities upon request. Perhaps spurred by the Montesinos scandal, the new administration has just sent to Congress a bill that would establish a Financial Analysis Unit (FAU). However, this proposed legislation does not appear to address other fundamental deficiencies in Peru's existing anti-money laundering legislation. Absent fundamental reforms in the legal framework, the potential effectiveness of such a unit is questionable. An effort is now underway in the Peruvian executive and legislative branches to draft a more complete reform of Peru's anti-money laundering legislation that would bring it up to international standards.

Peru has been a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention since 1992. In December 2000, Peru signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Peru is a member of the Organization of American States Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS/CICAD) Experts Group to Control Money Laundering, and the newly established South American Financial Action Task Force (GAFISUD), a regional FATF-style anti-money laundering body.

Peru should adopt legal measures that enhance its anti-money laundering framework to ensure that it meets international standards in order to deter financial crimes and protect the integrity of its financial system.

Philippines (Primary). The Philippines is neither a major financial center nor a major offshore banking center. However, rising crime, the absence of anti-money laundering legislation, and strict bank secrecy have left the Philippines vulnerable to large-scale narcotics trafficking and allow for criminal proceeds to be easily laundered in the Philippines or transferred abroad. It has been reported in the past few years that illegal drug trade in the Philippines has become a billion-dollar industry. Part of the money flows into the pockets of corrupt government officials in the form of bribes, while part is invested in legitimate businesses. The Philippines has experienced an increase in foreign organized criminal activity from China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Insurgency groups operating in the Philippines fund their activities through narcotics and arms trafficking, and engage in money laundering through alleged ties to organized crime.

Citing many of the deficiencies in the Philippines' anti-money laundering regime, in June 2000, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) named the Philippines among its list of 15 countries that were non-cooperative in international efforts to combat money laundering. The report noted:

The country lacks a basic set of anti-money laundering regulations such as customer identification and record keeping. Bank records have been under excessive secrecy provisions. It does not have any specific legislation to criminalize money laundering per se. Furthermore, a suspicious transaction reporting system does not exist in the country.

The US Treasury Department has also issued an advisory reflecting many of the concerns noted in the FATF report, advising US financial institutions "to give enhanced scrutiny to transactions or banking relationships that do not involve established, and adequately identified and understood, commercial or investment enterprises" involving the Philippines. The advisory also noted that money laundering is not a crime under the law of the Philippines, and that the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), the Philippines central bank, had not issued any anti-money laundering regulations or guidelines.

The Government of the Philippines has introduced two pieces of legislation that would criminalize money laundering in cases of illegal drug transactions or other organized crime activities. The proposed legislation would allow the limited lifting of bank secrecy laws and allow criminal investigators to examine deposit records in such cases under court order. Separately, the proposed new Central Bank Act, as it currently stands, would lift bank secrecy on accounts with balances over 50 million pesos (US $1 million). However, the prospects for passage of any legislation in the near term are dim; it is also unclear whether the bank secrecy provisions of the new laws would be retained or whether the new law would apply to the fifteen offshore banks operating in the Philippines.

In the absence of new legislation, the BSP in July 2000 issued a series of circulars to entities under its jurisdiction to tighten money-laundering controls. Circular 251 instructed financial institutions to take "reasonable measures" to verify the identity of clients, maintain transaction records for at least five years, and pay special attention to all complex or unusual transactions. If an institution has reason to believe that funds are the proceeds of an illegal activity, it should, when the law permits, report these transactions to the "competent authority." The circular requires all banks to close any questionable deposit accounts believed to be linked to criminal or other illegal activity. General inspections found that the customer identification and record-keeping requirements under this circular are consistent with international standards, although they lack procedural regulations. Circular 253 instructed banks and non-bank financial institutions to report certain suspicious transactions to the BSP. This reporting includes purchases of foreign exchange, renting of safety deposit boxes, and performing remittances, but would not cover bank deposits and investments in government bonds, which are guarded by bank secrecy provisions.

The Philippines has adopted regulations that ensure the availability of records in response to US requests, but the system is untimely and cumbersome. In addition, officials believe there is a proliferation of businesses engaged in money-laundering activities (e.g. bars, pawnshops, foreign exchange dealers and casinos) that are not covered by central bank circulars. Officials are also hampered by a lack of ability to monitor casino payments to gamblers.

The Philippines does not yet have a financial intelligence unit. The National Law Enforcement Coordinating Committee (NALECC) serves as an information-sharing network for intelligence and law enforcement agencies.

The Philippines is a member of the Asia/Pacific Group (APG) on Money Laundering and is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. In December 2000 the Philippines signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. The Philippines and the United States have a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty that entered into force in 1996.

The Philippines should enforce recent regulations and enact and enforce other measures to bring the Philippines' anti-money laundering into compliance with international standards. This should include the establishment of a financial intelligence unit with the ability to cooperate internationally and share financial information with foreign counterparts. These measures will assist the Philippines' efforts to combat corruption, organized crime, and financial crime.

Poland (Concern). Poland's efforts to develop an anti-money laundering regime have not kept pace with its rapid political and economic transition since 1989. With Europe's economic expansion and open borders with former socialist countries, transnational crime has seen significant growth. Narcotics trafficking, organized crime activity, auto theft, smuggling, extortion, counterfeiting, burglary, tax fraud, tax evasion, and other crimes generate criminal proceeds in the range of US $2-3 billion annually according to Government of Poland estimates. Polish banks serve as transit points for the transfer of criminal proceeds. Polish currency exchange businesses and casinos also are venues for money laundering.

Various regulations have been enacted since 1992 to combat money laundering in Poland. In 1997, Poland criminalized money laundering with the enactment of Article 299 of the Penal Code. Polish prosecutors have investigated approximately 75 cases involving money laundering in the last five years. To date, none of the cases forwarded to the courts has resulted in a successful prosecution. Poland's current law allows for customer identification, record keeping and suspicious activity reporting. A major weakness of Poland's money laundering regime was that it did not cover many non-bank financial institutions that have been traditionally used for money laundering.

In December 2000, President Kwasniewski signed the "Law on Counteracting the Use of Material Assets from Illegal or Undisclosed Sources in Financial Transactions." Poland's Parliament had approved the bill in November 2000. The main feature of the law is the creation of a financial intelligence unit (General Inspectorate of Financial Information-GIIF) to collect and analyze reports of large and suspicious transactions. The GIIF will be housed within the Ministry of Finance and will become operational in July 2001. By July 2001, financial institutions will be required to report currency transactions, or a series of related transactions, over the equivalent of 10,000 Euros to the GIIF. They will also have to report any suspicious transactions regardless of the amount. The financial institutions subject to the reporting requirements include banks, brokerages, casinos, insurance companies, investment and pension funds, leasing firms, private currency exchange offices, real estate agencies, and notaries public. The GIIF will have the right to suspend a suspicious transaction for 48 hours. The Public Prosecutor will have the right to suspend the suspicious transaction for three months, pending a court decision.

The United States and Poland have signed a treaty on mutual legal assistance that came into force in 1999. Poland is very active in international anti-money laundering fora. Poland is a party to the UN Drug Convention, and signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime in December 2000. Poland is also a member of the Council of Europe (COE) and participates in the Council of Europe's Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures (PC-R-EV). In May 1999, Poland underwent a mutual evaluation by the PC-R-EV. The evaluation provided detailed suggestions to improve Poland's anti-money laundering program. In 2000, the Government of Poland ratified the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime. The Convention will enter into force with respect to Poland in April 2001.

Implementation of the new anti-money laundering law's provisions will give Poland an anti-money laundering regime that appears to meet international standards. Setting up the GIIF and the transaction reporting system are the next steps in 2001 towards creating an operational anti-money laundering regime.

Portugal (Concern). Government of Portugal (GOP) officials indicate that most of the money laundered in Portugal is drug-related. Drug traffickers channel money through bureaux de change, and use Portuguese offshore companies to wire funds to bank accounts in other offshore jurisdictions.

Portugal has a comprehensive anti-money laundering regime. Decree-Laws 15/93, 313/93, and 325/95 (amended by Decree-Law 65/98) criminalize money laundering related to narcotics trafficking and other serious offenses such as terrorism, arms trafficking, extortion, kidnapping, corruption, and serious economic offenses specified in a separate economic crimes law. Decree-Law 170/93 requires declaration of cross-border movements of currency that exceed Esc. 2.5 million (approximately US $12,000). All financial institutions-including insurance companies-must identify their customers, maintain records for a minimum of ten years, and demand written proof from customers regarding the origin and beneficiary of transactions that exceed Esc. 2.5 million (approximately US $12,000). Non-financial institutions such as casinos, property dealers, lotteries, and dealers in high-value assets must also identify customers engaging in large transactions, maintain records, and report suspicious transactions to the Public Prosecutor.

When money laundering is suspected, financial institutions must cease processing the transaction in question and report it to the judicial authority and the Office of the Public Prosecutor. However, Portugal's system for reporting suspicious transactions remains somewhat informal. Bank officials contact the anti-money laundering authorities and file a formal suspicious transaction report (STR) only if those authorities indicate that one is necessary. As a result, a relatively small number of formal reports are filed annually. However, the number of STRs has increased slightly each year.

The Public Prosecutor forwards STRs to the Judicial Police's Brigada de Investigação de Branqueamento de Capitais (BIB) for analysis. If further analysis indicates money laundering, the Judicial Police conduct an investigation. The eight-person BIB functions as Portugal's financial intelligence unit (FIU); it centralizes all information related to STRs and shares it with foreign counterparts. The BIB is a member of the Egmont Group.

Portuguese laws also call for the confiscation of property and assets connected to money laundering, and authorize the Portuguese Judicial Police (PJP) to trace illicitly obtained assets-including those passing through casinos and lotteries-even if the predicate crime is committed outside of Portugal.

Public and private sector regulators and organizations play important roles in Portugal's anti-money laundering program. The Bank of Portugal monitors financial institutions' compliance through inspections and annual internal control reports. The Portuguese Banking Association provides regular training courses on money laundering for employees of banks and other financial institutions. The Portuguese Insurance Institute, through Circular No. 27/97, monitors compliance of insurance-related businesses, educates the insurance sector on industry-specific risks, and alerts judicial authorities to evidence of money laundering. The Securities Commission (CMVM) regulates the securities industry; monitors compliance by financial intermediaries; provides training for brokers; and alerts judicial authorities to evidence of money laundering. The CMVM has cooperated with foreign authorities in two major investigations that involved funds laundered in Portugal.

The GOP has comprehensive legal procedures that enable it to cooperate with foreign jurisdictions and share seized assets.

The Portuguese islands of Madeira offer one of the few offshore centers in the European Union (EU). The Madeira International Business Center (MIBC) has a free trade zone, an international shipping register, and offshore banking, trusts, holding companies, stock corporations, and private limited companies. The latter two business entities are similar to international business corporations (IBCs), of which there are a combined total of 4,100 registered in Madeiria. All entities established in the MIBC will remain tax exempt until 2011. Companies also can take advantage of Portugal's double taxation agreements. Decree-Law 10/94 permits existing banks and insurance companies to establish offshore branches. Applications are submitted to the central bank of Portugal for notification, as in the case of EU institutions, or authorization, as in the case of non-EU or new entities. The law allows establishment of "external branches" that conduct operations exclusively with non-residents or other Madeiran offshore entities, and "international branches" that conduct both offshore and domestic business. Although Madeira has some local autonomy, its offshore sector is regulated by Portuguese and EU legislative rules, and is supervised by the competent oversight authorities. Bearer shares are not permitted.

Portugal is a member of the Council of Europe, the EU, and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Portugal held the FATF presidency from 1999 to 2000. Portugal is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Portugal has put into place comprehensive and effective measures to combat money laundering. The system for reporting suspicious transactions could be improved, however, by instituting a more formalized system, and by the increased involvement of and training for entities outside the banking sector. The GOP also should continue to exercise due diligence over its offshore sector, and more closely monitor domestic non-bank financial institutions.

Qatar (Other). Qatar is not a regional financial center. Its banking sector is small and primarily geared toward meeting domestic financial needs. It consists of six domestic banks, two Arab banks and six non-Arab foreign banks. The Qatar Monetary Authority (QMA) supervises and coordinates the banking system, and issues directives and regulations to financial institutions. In 1999 the QMA issued a circular directing banking officials to record any transaction exceeding approximately US $8,300 in an effort to address money laundering, even though money laundering is not currently a criminal offense in Qatar. Other regulations require customer identification policies and the maintenance of bank records.

Qatar is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. Qatar is a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which is a member of the Financial Action Task Force. GCC members met in May 2000 for a four-day seminar on combating money laundering and pledged to enhance communication and cooperation to fight international crime.

Romania (Concern). Romania has only recently begun to develop an anti-money laundering regime. Its geographic location makes it a transit country for trafficking in narcotics, arms, stolen vehicles, and illegal aliens. As in other Central and East European countries, corruption and the presence of organized criminal activity facilitate money laundering. Financial crimes, Internet fraud, and the smuggling of cigarettes, alcohol, coffee, and other dutiable commodities are other common predicate crimes for money laundering in Romania.

Romania criminalized money laundering with the adoption in January 1999 of Law No21/99-On the Prevention and Punishment of Money Laundering. Becoming effective in April 1999, the law mandated provisions for customer identification, record-keeping requirements, reporting transactions of a suspicious or unusual nature, currency transaction reporting over 10,000 Euros, a financial intelligence unit (FIU), and internal anti-money laundering procedures and training for all Romanian financial institutions covered by the law. The list of entities subject to the reporting requirements includes banks, non-bank financial institutions, attorneys, accountants, and notaries. While banking groups have not openly objected to the implementation of reporting requirements, there remains some discomfort on the part of the banking industry regarding requirements to assist law enforcement. In addition, there is mutual suspicion between law enforcement agencies and the banking industry.

The National Office for the Prevention and Control of Money Laundering (NOPCML) is Romania's FIU. The NOPCML receives and evaluates suspicious and unusual currency transaction reports. Since its establishment, the NOPCML has forwarded preliminary cases to the Public Prosecutor's Office for investigation. In 2000, Romanian prosecutors brought a complex case to trial, charging violations of the new money laundering law. The case involved an amount in excess of US $30 million.

Romania is a member of the Council of Europe (COE) and participates in the Council of Europe's Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures (PC-R-EV). It underwent a mutual evaluation of this group in April 1999. The PC-R-EV Mutual Evaluation Report pointed out a number of areas that should be addressed, including the high evidentiary threshold for reporting suspicious transactions, a potential conflict with bank secrecy legislation, and the lack of provisions for cases in which the reporting provisions are intentionally ignored.

The NOPCML is a member of the Egmont Group. The Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty signed in May 1999 between the United States and Romania is not yet in force. Romania has demonstrated its commitment to international anticrime initiatives by actively participating in regional and global anticrime efforts. Romania is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

While Romania is still in the implementation phase of its anti-money laundering regime, it appears to be on the right track. By taking into account the recommendations of the COE Evaluators, Romania has a sound guide to improve its anti-money laundering regime and allow it to effectively combat money laundering and its predicate crimes.

Russia (Primary). The absence of a legal and regulatory anti-money laundering framework remains the most serious impediment in Russia's ability to control the laundering of criminal proceeds internally and to cooperate in international anti-money laundering efforts. Although precise figures are not available, the magnitude of money laundering is likely to be large given the scale of contributing factors involved. Russia's wealth in natural resources, the extent of organized crime activity, corruption, and the numerous mechanisms used for capital flight provide a broad scope for laundering of domestically generated criminal proceeds. False invoicing schemes involving the export of oil, precious metals, raw materials and alcohol, and other fictitious trade transactions are used for capital flight and tax evasion, and to mask the laundering of criminal proceeds. According to Russian government officials, about 30-40 percent of the approximately US $20 billion that leaves Russia annually is of questionable origin.

In addition, Russia serves as a major transit route for narcotics trafficking to Europe. Porous borders and insufficient technical and financial support for regulatory and enforcement agencies hamper the government's ability to control conditions favorable to laundering the proceeds of narcotic trafficking and other criminal activity.

In the past, capital flight often has been confusingly associated with money laundering, since many of the same funds transfer methods are used to facilitate illegal laundering schemes and the transfer of capital derived from legal sources. The failure of last year's efforts to adopt anti-money laundering legislation can be attributed in part to the drafters' attempts to incorporate measures for capital flight control into the anti-money laundering legislation. The Russian government has expressed its intention to address the economic conditions that encourage capital flight separately from regulatory and enforcement measures to combat money laundering, which include reforms in Russia's taxation, customs, banking, and foreign exchange systems.

The Government of Russia undertook constructive steps in 2000 to draft anti-money laundering legislation that conform to international standards. The Ministry of Finance has led an interagency process for drafting the legislation. The current draft law addresses the weaknesses of the version vetoed in 1999 and includes strengthened provisions for customer identification, record keeping, and the creation of a financial intelligence unit. Its introduction into the Duma is expected in early 2001. Russia's efforts to draft anti-money laundering legislation have received widespread international support by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the Council of Europe, and the member countries of those organizations. Passage of this legislation will provide the legal basis to combat the proceeds of crime and those who assist in laundering them. Rapid implementation of the law will demonstrate Russia's resolve to mitigate its money laundering problems and become and effective partner in anti-money laundering efforts.

In 1999, the Central Bank of Russia instituted regulatory measures to scrutinize offshore financial transactions. In the following six months, wire transfers from Russian banks to offshore financial centers dropped threefold. In July 2000, President Putin vetoed the law "On Free Economic Zones." The law would have granted customs and tax advantages to various regions of the Russian Federation as a means to encourage economic development. A number of Russian businesses had flocked to these free economic zones in anticipation of passage of this and similar regional laws. Putin's veto of the law lays to rest what would have effectively provided offshore status to Russian registered businesses.

Citing the lack of a legal and regulatory framework to combat money laundering, the FATF in June 2000 named Russia among its list of 15 countries that were non-cooperative in international efforts to combat money laundering. The FATF report noted four major problems. These included: (1) the lack of anti-money laundering laws and regulations, (2) the failure to implement customer identification for many transactions, (3) the lack of suspicious transaction reporting and an operational financial intelligence unit, and (4) ineffective and untimely procedures for providing evidence for foreign money laundering investigations. These deficiencies also prompted the United States Treasury to issue an advisory to US financial institutions, advising them "to give enhanced scrutiny to transactions or banking relationships that do not involve established, and adequately identified and understood, commercial or investment enterprises, as well as to transactions involving the routing of transactions from Russia through third jurisdictions in ways that appear unrelated to commercial necessities." Other FATF member treasuries also issued similar advisories.

Russia submitted the Council of Europe's (COE) Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime (Strasbourg Convention) to the Duma for ratification and participates in the COE's Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures (PC-R-EV). In June 2000, Russia underwent a mutual evaluation by the PC-R-EV, which was reported to the plenary in January 2001. The evaluation report made detailed suggestions to improve Russia's anti-money laundering program.

Russia is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

US law enforcement and regulatory agencies are engaged in a number of technical assistance projects designed to further Russia's anti-money laundering efforts. Although formal and informal law enforcement cooperation is on the rise, differences in money laundering laws and regulations lead to frequent misunderstandings and misperceptions. This is especially true in the handling of Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement (MLAA) requests, the main tool for providing assistance in recovering laundered funds and criminal proceeds. US technical assistance programs focused on providing law enforcement, regulators, and prosecutors anti-money laundering training to combat financial crimes. In addition, technical teams assisted Russian drafters in developing legislation meeting international standards. The technical assistance teams encouraged the adoption and implementation of money laundering laws and improved methods of mutual cooperation in money laundering investigations, prosecutions and forfeiture actions.

Russia will need to pass and implement comprehensive legislation that will provide the legal basis to attack the proceeds of crime and those who assist in laundering them in order to mitigate successfully its money laundering problems and become an effective partner in global anti-money laundering efforts.

Samoa (Concern). Samoa is an independent country in the South Pacific. Its offshore financial services sector is vulnerable to money laundering. Samoa passed the Money Laundering Prevention Act in June 2000. This law criminalizes money laundering associated with numerous crimes, and sets measures for the prevention of money laundering and related financial supervision. The law compels financial institutions, offshore and onshore, to develop and apply internal policies, procedures, and controls to combat money laundering. It requires financial institutions to record new business transactions exceeding $30,000, to retain records for a minimum of seven years, and to identify all parties to the transactions; and should address previous concerns over the existence of anonymous accounts for onshore and offshore banks. It also requires financial institutions to report transactions considered suspicious to a Money Laundering Authority (MLA) to be appointed by the Minister of Finance. The MLA will receive and analyze these disclosures, and if it establishes reasonable grounds to suspect that a transaction involves the proceeds of crime, it will refer the information to the attorney general and the Commissioner of Police. However, there is nothing in the legislation that prohibits financial institutions from carrying out business transactions where the beneficial owner of the transactions is unknown, or represented by an intermediary who will not disclose the identity of the beneficial owner. Section 8 of the Money Laundering Prevention Act states that the new legislation will override all secrecy obligations for the purpose of money laundering prevention and enforcement. The law also requires individuals to report to the MLA if they are carrying with them $10,000 or more in cash or negotiable instrument upon entering or leaving Samoa.

Samoa currently has 10 offshore banks. Section 16 of the Offshore Banking Act does not prohibit persons, who have been sentenced for an offense involving dishonesty, to apply to be employed as a director or manager of any offshore bank. The Act only requires prior approval in writing, of the Minister before doing so without setting any criteria to guide the decision. In addition, there is no provision in the Act that specifies the qualifications for an owner/shareholder of an offshore bank.

In addition to offshore banks, Samoa's offshore sector includes insurance companies, trusts, and international business companies (IBCs), of which there are slightly more than 4,085 currently registered. IBCs may be registered using bearer shares and shelf companies that conceal the identity of the beneficial owner and the date of incorporation of these entities. Corporate entities may be listed as officers and shareholders because Samoan IBCs have all the legal powers of a natural person. There are no requirements to file annual statements or annual returns. These provisions make IBCs particularly attractive to money launderers and have not yet been addressed by Samoan authorities.

In 2000, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) reviewed Samoa's anti-money laundering regime and did not designate it as a non-cooperative jurisdiction. The FATF report noted that provisions in the recently enacted Money Laundering Prevention Bill addressed many of Samoa's deficiencies, but that others would need further steps. The FATF urged "the Government of Samoa to fully implement the enacted law and to strengthen the bank licensing procedure."

Samoa is a member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering and the South Pacific Forum.

Through the passage of the June 2000 Money Laundering Prevention Act, the Government of Samoa (GOS) has taken positive steps to strengthen its anti-money laundering regime. The GOS needs to move quickly to implement this legislative effort, to appoint the Supervisory Authority that will supervise the financial sector, and to issue guidelines to financial institutions so that they have a clear understanding of their obligations under this new law. Particular emphasis needs to be directed toward regulation of the offshore financial sector. The GOS should enact legislation to identify the beneficial owners of IBCs to help ensure that international criminals do not use them for money laundering or other financial crimes.

Saudi Arabia (Other). Saudi Arabia is not considered to be a major financial center. However, in recognition of world-wide money laundering activities, particularly those involving drugs, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) published in 1995 money laundering control guidelines to assist Saudi banks from being exploited as channels for illegal transactions and other criminal activity. During 1998, SAMA reviewed the FATF 40 Recommendations and agreed they should be implemented. Simultaneously, an inter-ministerial committee reviewed all Saudi laws related to money laundering and prepared amendments to bring them into conformance with the FATF recommendations. The proposed revisions, in the form of new legislation, were approved by the Saudi Council of Ministers in late 1999.

There is relatively strong bank supervision in Saudi Arabia and individuals or banks suspected of money laundering are subject to criminal prosecution under Shari'a (Islamic) law, the Banking Control law, and Saudi Arabian labor law. Money laundering cases are heard in a Shari'a court, which bases its jurisdiction on a Koranic passage which states that "assets arising from illegal acts shall be forbidden and confiscated." Pursuant to the new legislation, relevant Saudi ministries are formulating plans to implement the law. As part of that process, the Ministry of Interior will establish a committee that has the power to refer cases for criminal prosecution to the Saudi Board of Grievances. While Shari'a courts deal harshly with money launderers, the involvement of the Board of Grievances will allow cases to be heard in accordance with guidelines set forth in the new legislation.

SAMA requires that each bank establish internal money laundering control units to review policies, institute necessary investigations, and implement training programs. If money laundering is suspected, banks are required to notify SAMA and the police. SAMA officials and bank compliance officers meet on a monthly basis to share information on money laundering trends. The Ministry of Interior does not publicly disseminate statistics regarding money laundering investigations and prosecutions in Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Senegal (Other). The extent of money laundering in Senegal is not known. However, officials from the United Nations in 2000 indicated that the West African region may be fertile ground for money laundering because of drug trafficking, corruption, networks of contraband arms and precious stones, and weak mechanisms of control that can be exploited by international criminals. Article 102 of Senegal's 1997 drug code criminalizes drug laundering by providing punishment of up to 10 years imprisonment. Senegal has also enacted legislation against narcotics-related public corruption, but the law does not specifically address money laundering. The Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO), based in Dakar, is the central bank for Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo, all of which use the French-backed CFA franc currency.

In November 2000 Senegal hosted a meeting of officials from 14 West African countries. The group set up the Intergovernmental Group for Action Against Money Laundering (GIABA) to coordinate their governments' actions against money laundering and other transnational crime.

Senegal is a party to the 1998 UN Drug Convention. In December 2000 Senegal signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Seychelles (Concern). Seychelles is a developing offshore financial center and tourist destination. Currently, there is little evidence of money laundering.

The development of the offshore financial sector by the Government of Seychelles (GOS) is an attempt to diversify the economy and increase foreign exchange earnings. The GOS aggressively markets Seychelles as an offshore financial and business center that is capable of providing for the registration of non-resident companies. A major defect of the program is that it still permits the issuance of bearer shares, a feature that can facilitate money laundering by making it extremely difficult to identify the beneficial owners of an international business company (IBC). However, Seychelles officials stated in 2000 that they are reviewing the question of bearer shares and intend to outlaw them. In the interim, the GOS will not approve the issuance of any more bearer shares. The 4800 registered IBCs pay no taxes in Seychelles, and are not subject to foreign exchange controls. Seychelles has also created the Seychelles International Trade Zone (SITZ) which is managed by the Seychelles International Business Authority (SIBA). SIBA, part of the Ministry of International Trade, acts as the central agency for the registration of IBCs. IBCs are not required to file annual reports. Seychelles also permits offshore trusts (registered through a licensed trustee) and insurance companies.

Seychelles passed anti-money laundering legislation in 1996, the Anti-Money Laundering Act, which criminalized the laundering of funds from all serious crimes; provided for the reporting of suspicious transactions and safe harbor protection for individuals and institutions making the reports; mandated record keeping and "know your customer" requirements; and provided for the forfeiture of the proceeds of crime.

The major area of concern regarding anti-money laundering practices in the Seychelles related to the Economic Development Act (EDA) of 1995. The EDA contained immunity provisions, such as protection from asset seizure and extradition, that could clearly attract international criminal enterprises wishing to shelter themselves and their proceeds from pursuit by legal authorities. While the EDA never came into force, it represented a grave threat to efforts to combat money laundering.

Both the Financial Action task Force (FATF) and the United States reacted to the EDA. The FATF applied its Recommendation 21 on February 1, 1996. That same year, the US Treasury Department issued an advisory to US financial institutions warning them about the situation in the Seychelles. In February 2000, the FATF selected Seychelles for review as a possible non-cooperative jurisdiction. In its efforts to avoid being so-designated, the GOS, while maintaining that the EDA had never in fact gone into force, nevertheless agreed to officially repeal it, which it did on July 25, 2000. In October 2000 the FATF Plenary decided that Seychelles did not merit being named non-cooperative, and the FATF rescinded its Recommendation 21. The US Treasury has yet to rescind its advisory.

The Seychelles is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Seychelles is a member of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG).

The GOS should address the issue of bearer shares and require complete identification of beneficial ownership of IBCs. It should also establish a financial intelligence unit to collect, analyze and share financial data with foreign counterparts to effectively combat money laundering and other financial crimes.

Singapore (Primary). As a significant international financial center, Singapore attracts investors from around the world, including money launderers. Bank secrecy laws and the lack of routine currency reporting requirements may make Singapore attractive to drug traffickers seeking to launder and move their money. However, recent legislation and regulations significantly weaken bank secrecy in cases involving most serious criminal activity, including narcotics-related money laundering. To bolster law enforcement cooperation and facilitate information exchange, including information to combat narcotics related money laundering, Singapore and the US signed the Drug Designation Agreement (DDA) in November 2000, after three years of negotiations. It is expected to enter into force in early 2001. The DDA is the first such agreement Singapore has undertaken with another government and is also the first agreement made under the auspices of Singapore's Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act that was enacted early in 2000. The DDA, however, is only limited to narcotics cases and does not apply to non-narcotics related money laundering or financial fraud cases.

Singapore is a major offshore financial center. As of December 2000, there were 83 offshore banks in Singapore, all branches of foreign banks. There are no offshore trusts, although banks may open trust, nominee, and fiduciary accounts. All banks in Singapore, whether domestic or offshore, are subject to the same regulation, record keeping and reporting requirements. There are also hundreds of offshore international and financial service businesses. An offshore company must have a local registered office with a physical address and a minimum of two directors, at least one of whom must be a Singaporean citizen; permanent resident or employment pass holder. Bearer shares are not permitted. A company incorporated in Singapore has the same powers as a natural person.

The Corruption, Drug Trafficking and other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act 1999 (CDSA) criminalized the laundering of proceeds from narcotics and over 150 other offenses. Financial institutions must report suspicious transactions and positively identify customers engaging in large currency transactions. Banks are required to maintain adequate records to respond quickly to the Government of Singapore's (GOS) inquiries in money laundering cases. However, there are no reporting requirements on amounts of currency that can be brought into or out of Singapore.

The GOS enacted the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act (MACM) in March 2000. The MACM consolidated the existing mutual assistance provisions of the Drug Trafficking Act (DTA) of 1993 and ensured that the GOS could share records in connection with narcotics investigations and proceedings. The MACM applies to countries that have concluded treaties, memoranda of understanding or other agreements with Singapore.

The MACM paved the way for the signature of the Drug Designation Agreement (DDA) with the United States in November 2000. The DDA will facilitate the exchange of banking and corporate information on drug money laundering suspects and targets to include access to bank records, reciprocal honoring of seizure/forfeiture warrants to include the execution of these warrants and the freezing and/or forfeiture of the proceeds of the drug trafficking, testimony of witnesses, service of process, and the sharing of seized assets. Implementation and use of the DDA is expected to result in significant seizures of narcotics-related proceeds in the years ahead.

In February 2000, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) issued a series of regulatory guidelines (i.e., "Notices") requiring banks to apply "know your customer" standards, adopt internal policies for staff compliance, and cooperate with enforcement agencies on money laundering cases. Banks must obtain documentation, such as passports or identity cards, from all personal customers so that the bank can verify their names, permanent contact addresses, dates of birth, and nationalities, and conduct inquiries into the bona fides of company customers. The regulations specifically require that banks obtain evidence of the identity of the beneficial owners of shell companies or trusts. The guidelines also mandate specific record keeping and reporting requirements, outline examples of suspicious transactions that should prompt reporting, and establish mandatory intra-company point-of-contact and staff training requirements. MAS Notice 626 applies to banks; Notice 824 applies to Finance Companies; Notice 1014 applies to Merchant Banks; and Notice 314 to Direct Life Insurers and Brokers. MAS issued similar guidelines for securities dealers and investment advisors, and futures brokers and advisors.

The Suspect Transaction Reporting Office (STRO) began operating on 10 January 2000 and receives and analyzes suspicious transaction reports filed by financial institutions. It is also authorized to exchange intelligence derived from these reports with foreign counterparts.

Singapore is party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Singapore is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the Asia Pacific Group (APG) on Money Laundering, and the Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors (OGBS).

The GOS should continue close monitoring of its domestic and offshore financial sectors. It should also extend the DDA to cover non-narcotics related money laundering and financial fraud cases. As a major financial center, it should also consider measures to monitor large currency movements into and out of the country to ensure that international criminals do not abuse Singapore's financial system.

Slovakia (Concern). The geographic, economic, and legal conditions that shape the money laundering environment in Slovakia are typical of those in other Central European countries. Slovakia's location along the major lines of communication connecting Western, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe make it a transit country for smuggling and the trafficking in narcotics, arms, stolen vehicles, and illegal aliens. Organized crime activity and the opportunities to use gray market channels for laundering also lead to a favorable money laundering environment. Financial crimes such as fraud, tax evasion, embezzlement, and conducting illegal business have been particularly problematic for Slovak authorities. Money laundering schemes carried out in Slovakia are also typical of other countries in transition. These include the use of the financial sector for the movement of criminal proceeds, fictitious companies, false invoicing schemes, and false documentation of imports and exports. Banks, insurance companies, and casinos are employed as money laundering mechanisms. Non-bank financial institutions have been particularly susceptible to laundering because until recently (January 1, 2001) they were not subject to transaction reporting requirements.

Slovakia's anti-money laundering legislation, Act N°249/1994 as amended by Act N° 58/1996 "To Prevent the Laundering of Proceeds of Most Serious Crimes, Particularly of Organized Crime and to Amend Some Other Statutory Provisions Enacted by the Authority of the National Council of the Slovak Republic," became effective on October 1, 1994. Article 252 "Legalization of Proceeds from Criminal Activity" of the Slovak Criminal Code came into force at the same time. These measures criminalize money laundering, require customer identification and record keeping, and require banks to report suspicious transactions.

In October 2000, the Slovak Parliament adopted the law "On Protection Against the Legalization of Proceeds from Criminal Activities." It requires non-bank financial institutions to report suspicious transactions beginning January 1, 2001. Non-bank financial institutions subject to the new law are: casinos, post offices, brokers, stock exchanges, commodity exchanges, asset management companies, insurance companies, tax advisors, auditors, and credit unions. The law also abolishes anonymous passbook savings accounts.

The financial intelligence unit (OFiS) of the Bureau of Financial Police (UFP) has jurisdictional responsibilities for money laundering violations. In its role as Slovakia's financial intelligence unit, the OFiS-UFP receives and evaluates the suspicious transaction reports, and collects additional information to establish the suspicion of money laundering. Once enough information has been obtained to warrant suspicion that a criminal offense has occurred, the OFiS-UFP forwards the case to the State Prosecutor's Office for investigation and prosecution.

Slovakia is a member of the Council of Europe (COE) and participates in the Council of Europe's Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures (PC-R-EV). Slovakia became a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in December 2000, which will expand opportunities for multilateral engagement on combating money laundering. Slovakia underwent a mutual evaluation by this group in 1998 and has been implementing changes to its money laundering regime based on the report's recommendations. The OFiS-UFP is a member of the Egmont Group. Slovakia is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Slovakia continues to improve its anti-money laundering legislation. Implementation of the provisions of Slovakia's newly passed anti-money laundering legislation will give the Slovak financial system greater protection by helping it prevent and detect money laundering in all financial sectors, not just the banking system.

Slovenia (Other). Slovenia's economic stability and location on the Balkan drug route offer attractive opportunities for money laundering. Major sources of illegal proceeds are auto theft, narcotics trafficking, fraud, tax evasion, and alien smuggling. Organized crime activity is increasing, although it is less of a problem than in neighboring countries. Money laundering occurs through the banking system, currency exchange houses, casinos, real estate transactions, and the physical transport of currency across borders.

Slovenia's 1994 Law on Prevention of Money Laundering criminalized money laundering. It requires all financial institutions, casinos, and legal and natural persons to report suspicious transactions and currency transactions above US $22,000. Customer identification is mandatory for all single transactions, and for series of transactions, exceeding US $13,500. Records must be retained for a minimum of five years.

Slovenia has a financial intelligence unit (FIU), the Office for Money Laundering Prevention, which is a member of the Egmont Group. Slovenia underwent a mutual evaluation by the Council of Europe's Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures (PC-R-EV). Slovenia is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. In December 2000, Slovenia signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Solomon Islands (Other). Drug trafficking does not occur on a significant scale in the Solomon Islands. The Islands' banking system is small and has no offshore sector. The country has not criminalized money laundering.

The Solomon Islands is not a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

South Africa (Concern). South Africa's position as the major financial center in the region and its relatively sophisticated and unprotected banking and financial sector make South Africa a very attractive target for the criminal syndicates that have located there. The Russian Mafia, Chinese Triads, and Nigerian drug traffickers have been identified in South Africa, along with native South African criminal groups. Diamonds and weapons smuggling, trade in endangered species, narcotics trafficking, and money laundering are major criminal activities challenging local law enforcement. In late 2000, the Government of South Africa (SAG) sent new legislation, the Financial Intelligence Center Bill, to parliament that when passed and implemented will substantially increase the SAG's ability to combat these crimes.

Money laundering for all serious crimes was criminalized by the Proceeds of Crime Act, No. 76 of 1996. This Act was superceded by the Prevention of Organized Crime Act, No. 121 of 1998 (POCA), which also criminalizes money laundering, mandates the reporting of suspicious transactions, and provides a "safe harbor" for good-faith compliance. Subsequent regulations directed that these reports be sent to the commercial Crime Unit (CCU) of the South African Police. Both of these Acts contain criminal and civil forfeiture provisions. However, South Africa has been unsuccessful in implementing this existing anti-money laundering legislation. The POCA was amended several times, and several challenges to arrests and seizures are pending.

The Financial Intelligence Center Bill (FICB), submitted to Parliament in late 2000, provides for the establishment and staffing of a Financial Intelligence Center (FIC) that would coordinate policy and efforts to counter money laundering activities and act as a centralized repository of information. The bill would require a wide range of financial institutions to identify customers, maintain records of transactions for at least five years, and report transactions of a suspicious nature to the FIC. If it has reasonable grounds to suspect that a transaction involves the proceeds of criminal activities, the FIC will forward this information to the investigative and prosecutorial authorities. The bill would also establish a Money Laundering Advisory Council to advise the Minister of Finance on policies and measures to combat money laundering. The FICB is expected to be enacted in 2001.

South Africa has no offshore financial center.

South Africa is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention and in December 2000 signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. The United States and South Africa have concluded a bilateral extradition treaty and a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, both of which are expected to enter into force in 2001. South Africa is a member of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG) and is expected to sign the group's memorandum of understanding in 2001.

Enactment and implementation of the FICB, currently before Parliament, would significantly strengthen South Africa's anti-money laundering regime and help protect South Africa's banking sector from abuse by criminals and criminal organizations.

Spain (Primary). Money laundering occurs primarily in Spain's financial system, although there are indications that funds are also being laundered through the acquisition and sale of real estate. Spanish authorities have noted that traffickers continue to use courier networks to remit large amounts of bulk cash to South America and the Middle East. The one area that drug trafficking organizations may be able to exploit is the stock market because it falls outside of the money laundering legislation.

The Government of Spain (GOS) has been addressing the money-laundering problem through the 1993 Prevention of Money Laundering Act and its corresponding 1995 implementing regulations. The Act criminalizes the laundering of proceeds linked to the illicit drug trade, terrorism and organized crime. Subsequent to the 1993 Act, reforms made to the Penal Code in December 1995 extended the criminalization of money laundering to all serious crimes.

The financial sector, particularly the banking community, continues to respond positively to the requirements of the Act and the regulations that require the reporting of the identities of customers engaging in large currency transactions, the maintenance of records, and the reporting of suspicious financial transactions. These reporting requirements apply to other financial sectors including credit card companies, currency exchange houses, jewelers, dealers in antiques, art stamps and coins, credit unions, and companies dealing in investments, securities, and/or insurance. The Act established the Commission for the Prevention of Money Laundering and Monetary Offenses to coordinate all of Spain's anti-money laundering efforts, and the Executive Service of this Commission (SEPBLAC) functions as Spain's financial intelligence unit (FIU). SEPBLAC receives and analysis the reports of suspicious financial transactions and forwards those indicating money laundering activity to law enforcement. SEPBLAC is a member of the Egmont Group of FIUs.

Spain continues to provide training and promote institution-building programs aimed at increasing the effectiveness of the judicial and law enforcement sectors, particularly in South and Central America. Spain is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), and currently holds the presidency until June 2001. Spain is also an observer member of the newly created South American Financial Action Task Force (GAFISUD), and a Cooperating and Supporting Nation of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF). Spain is a member of the EU, a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000 it signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Spain has signed criminal legal assistance agreements with the United States, Australia, Chile, Canada, Argentina, Mexico, the Dominican Republic, Uruguay and Morocco. Spain's Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty with the United States has been in force since 1993. In addition, a number of Spain's bilateral agreements to fight drug trafficking and organized crime provide for cooperation through information exchange and mutual assistance in combating money laundering. The countries with which Spain has concluded agreements in these areas include France, Portugal, the United Kingdom, Turkey, Italy, Chile, the Russian Federation, Israel, Bolivia, Mexico, El Salvador, Venezuela, Uruguay, Malta and Panama.

The GOS should continue its strong enforcement of its anti-money laundering program and international leadership to combat money laundering. It should also consider measures to address possible money laundering in the stock market to ensure that this sector is not used for financial crimes.

Sri Lanka (Other). Sri Lanka is not considered to be money laundering center, and it is not a tax haven, offshore banking facility or important financial center in the region. The government neither facilitates nor encourages money laundering. Sri Lanka maintains strict currency controls that inhibit money laundering activity.

Sri Lanka's Bank Secrecy Act makes financial transactions relating to narcotics trafficking illegal. In 2000, the central bank assisted in formulating a draft anti-money laundering bill that contains know your customer provisions and would hold bank directors liable if their institutions are used for money laundering. This legislation has not yet been presented to Parliament.

Sri Lanka is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention and a member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money laundering (APG). In December 2000 Sri Lanka signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

St. Kitts and Nevis (Primary). St. Kitts and Nevis is a federation composed of two islands located in the eastern Caribbean Sea. It is at major risk for money laundering mainly because of the high volume of drug trafficking activity through and around the islands, the presence of known traffickers on the islands, and offshore services that protect client secrecy. A number of Russian organized crime figures have taken up residence in St. Kitts.

Although St. Kitts has an offshore sector that includes approximately 500 "exempt companies" (international business companies), most of the financial activity in the Federation is concentrated in Nevis, whose economy has become increasingly dependent upon the fees generated by the registration of offshore entities. One offshore bank and more than 19,000 offshore companies are registered in Nevis. St. Kitts and Nevis also offers offshore trusts, and as of mid-1999 had issued 10 Internet gaming licenses. As elsewhere in the Caribbean, St. Kitts and Nevis also provides an economic citizenship program by which one can buy St. Kitts and Nevis nationality and adopt a new name. St. Kitts and Nevis has the oldest economic citizenship program in the eastern Caribbean under the Citizenship Act of 1984. International law enforcement officials have criticized these programs, as they provide the opportunity for criminals to create new identities that are used to facilitate travel and create offshore companies for money laundering, financial fraud, and other illicit activities.

The anti-money laundering regime embodied in the legal, supervisory, and regulatory systems of St. Kitts and Nevis suffers from serious systemic problems. The Proceeds of Crime Act 1993 criminalized drug-related money laundering, mandated record keeping by financial institutions, and permitted reporting of suspicious transactions. But financial institutions operating in St. Kitts and Nevis are still not required to report suspicious transactions. Moreover, drug money laundering is punishable only by the imposition of fines. The bank secrecy laws of St. Kitts and Nevis also prohibit governmental authorities from obtaining financial information about customer identification and transactions that are collected and maintained by financial institutions. Offshore companies (including those that operate as financial institutions) registered in Nevis are not effectively supervised. Bearer shares allow anonymous corporate ownership, and entities do not require verification of the identity of customers, or maintenance of records relating to the identity of customers.

Citing these deficiencies, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) identified St. Kitts and Nevis as "non-cooperative" in the fight against money laundering.

The US Treasury Department issued an advisory on St. Kitts and Nevis in July 2000 advising banks and other financial institutions operating in the United States "to give enhanced scrutiny to all financial transactions originating in or routed to or through the Federation of St. Kitts and Nevis, or involving entities organized or domiciled, or persons maintaining accounts in St. Kitts and Nevis."

St. Kitts and Nevis is a member of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) and underwent a mutual evaluation in February 1999. After extended delays by the Kittian government, the report was finally discussed and adopted at the October 2000 CFATF Council meeting in Aruba.

In response to findings of the CFATF mutual evaluation, as well as the FATF designation, the Government of St. Kitts and the Nevis Island (GOSKN) established a task force that includes officials from both jurisdictions. The task force is working to revise offshore legislation and regulations as well as to establish a financial intelligence unit.

In November 2000, the GOSKN enacted several new measures to address some of the deficiencies in its anti-money laundering regime. The Proceeds of Crime Act 2000 criminalizes the laundering of proceeds from all serious offenses ("any offense triable on indictment or hybrid offences from which a person has benefited"). The Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) Act 2000 establishes the legislative basis for an FIU that will be able to cooperate with foreign counterparts, although it appears the unit would not be able to cooperate during the information phase. Rather, it could share information only after criminal proceedings against a subject have already begun. The Financial Services Commission Act 2000 creates the legal basis for the appointment by the Minister of Finance of a commission that will include one regulator for St. Kitts and one for Nevis for the islands' onshore sectors.

St. Kitts and Nevis has signed a mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT) with the United States, which entered into force in early 2000. St. Kitts and Nevis is a member of the Organization of American States Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS/CICAD) Experts Group to Control Money Laundering. St. Kitts and Nevis is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

The GOSKN needs to build upon its recent efforts to improve its anti-money laundering regime to meet international standards. New laws and regulations should be consistent in both islands of the federation. The GOSKN should enact legal measures to require registration of the beneficial owners of companies and bank accounts and provide adequate resources to enforce compliance by offshore entities. In addition, the GOSKN should quickly establish a financial intelligence unit and provide it the legal authority to share information with foreign counterparts during the information-gathering phase of an investigation. It should also institute better control and due diligence in its economic citizenship program to prevent possible abuse by international criminals.

St. Lucia (Concern). St. Lucia is not a major financial center. However, St. Lucia has recently developed an offshore financial services center that could make the island more vulnerable to money laundering and other financial crimes.

In November 1999 the Government of St. Lucia (GOSL) enacted the Money Laundering (Prevention) Act, which criminalizes the laundering of proceeds relating to 15 prescribed offenses, including drug trafficking, corruption, fraud, terrorism, gambling, and robbery. It contains know-your-customer provisions, suspicious transaction reporting requirements, and record keeping requirements. These obligations apply to domestic and offshore financial institutions, including credit unions, trust companies, and insurance companies. The Proceeds of Crime Act 1993 requires financial institutions to retain account opening information and details of transactions for seven years. The Money Laundering (Prevention) Act now imposes a duty on financial institutions to take "reasonable measures" to establish the identity of customers, and requires accounts to be maintained in the true name of the holder. In addition, the Act now requires an institution to take reasonable measures to identify the underlying beneficial owner when an agent, trustee, or nominee operates an account. In April 2000, the Financial Services Supervision Unit issued detailed guidance notes, entitled "Minimum Due Diligence Checks, to be Conducted by Registered Agents and Trustees."

The Act also established the Money Laundering (Prevention) Authority in early 2000. This Authority consists of five persons "who have sound knowledge of the law, banking or finance." The Authority's functions include receipt of suspicious transactions reports, the subsequent investigation of the transactions, dissemination of information within or outside of St. Lucia, and the monitoring of compliance with the law. The Money Laundering (Prevention) Act imposes a duty on the Money Laundering (Prevention) Authority to cooperate with foreign competent authorities. Assistance includes the provision of documents, giving of testimony, undertaking of examinations, execution of search and seizure, and the provision of information and evidential items. The legislation is new; therefore, there is no experience of its effectiveness.

In 1999 the GOSL also enacted a comprehensive inventory of offshore legislation, consisting of the International Business Companies (IBC) Act, the Registered Agent and Trustee Licensing Act, the International Trusts Act, the International Insurance Act, the Mutual Funds Act, and the International Banks Act. The sector presently has one offshore bank, three insurance companies, and approximately 100 IBCs.

The IBC Act does not provide for a licensing regime, but allows for a simple registration process, which is automatic upon submission of the correct documents and is controlled by a private sector company that also has responsibility for marketing the OFC. IBCs intending to engage in banking, insurance or mutual funds business may not be registered without the approval of the Minister. An IBC may be struck off the register on the grounds of carrying on business against the public interest.

As a member of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), St. Lucia underwent a first mutual evaluation in compliance with CFATF requirements. The report on the evaluation, which preceded the establishment of St. Lucia's offshore sector, was reviewed at the July 1999 CFATF Plenary.

The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) reviewed the anti-money laundering regime of St. Lucia in 2000, and although it did not determine St. Lucia to be non-cooperative in international efforts to combat money laundering, the FATF did make the following comments:

Although St. Lucia enacted relatively comprehensive new money laundering legislation early this year, it appears not to have structured its offshore financial services regulatory regime in such a way as to prevent conflicts of interest with the private sector in decision-making and operations. This conflict of interest has the potential of undermining the anti-money laundering system. It also appears as though the regulatory body may not be staffed sufficiently to oversee the rapidly developing offshore services sector. The FATF urges St. Lucia to remedy these deficiencies and will follow up progress in the matter.

St. Lucia is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention and a member of the Organization of American States Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS/CICAD) Experts Group to Control Money Laundering.. In February 2000, St. Lucia and the US brought into force, by an exchange of instruments of ratification, a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty and an extradition treaty.

The GOSL should strongly enforce the Money Laundering (Prevention) Act and establish the Money Laundering (Prevention) Authority to act as a financial intelligence unit. It should also move quickly to prevent the intermingling of the government's regulatory role and its responsibilities with respect to commercial marketing of the sector. The GOSL also needs to devote adequate resources toward regulating the new offshore financial sector to ensure that money launderers and other criminals do not abuse it.

St. Vincent and the Grenadines (Primary). St. Vincent and the Grenadines (SVG) has a growing offshore sector that is vulnerable to money laundering because of its inadequate regulation and strict secrecy laws. SVG is a transshipment point for cocaine, and marijuana production plays an important role in the local economy. However, the amounts do not reach the major-producer threshold nor do they significantly affect the United States.

SVG's offshore sector offers banks, trusts, insurance companies, international business companies (IBCs), mutual funds, international shipping companies, and Internet gaming licenses. SVG assures individuals who are seeking to protect their assets from civil judgement that SVG will not cooperate with foreign civil courts. Section 39 of the International Trust Act restricts recognition of foreign judgements against asset protection trusts established in SVG. IBCs may register on-line, issue bearer shares, and take advantage of pre-named "shelf-companies" that disguise the true dates of incorporation. IBCs also are not required to file accounts with any authority, and are exempt from taxes for 25 years.

Recently, SVG created the legislative framework for an economic citizenship program-and has publicly projected that it could earn approximately US $4.5 million in 2000 from passport sales.

In 1996, SVG passed legislation that created the Offshore Finance Authority (OFA) as the sole body regulating its offshore sector. The OFA also is engaged in marketing the offshore sector, thereby creating a conflict of interest. The OFA is responsible for appointing an offshore finance inspector, licensing and regulating offshore banks, and overseeing the activities of the Registrar of Companies, the entity responsible for approving IBC licenses. The OFA's staff of 11, which includes clerical staff, must supervise SVG's 28 offshore banks and approximately 11,000 IBCs.

The Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB) supervises SVG's five domestic banks. In 1995, the ECCB issued Anti-Money Laundering Guidance Notes that follow CFATF recommendations. However, the Guidance Notes apply only to the domestic banking sector and lack enforcement mechanisms. The ECCB Guidance Notes do not apply to SVG's non-bank financial institutions, businesses, or the offshore sector.

The Proceeds of Crime Act (PCA) 1997 criminalizes money laundering related to the proceeds of crime and organized fraud. However, the Act's definition of "proceeds of crime" is not clear. The PCA obliges financial institutions to maintain records related to the opening and closing of accounts and transactions that exceed Eastern Caribbean $5,000 (approximately US $1,800) for a minimum of seven years. The PCA also authorized financial institutions to voluntarily report transactions to a police officer or the Director of Public Prosecutions if the institution had reasonable grounds to believe that the transaction involved the proceeds of crime. According to SVG authorities, the Proceeds of Crime (Amendment) Act 1999 makes this reporting system mandatory, and obliges financial institutions to report currency transactions that exceed US $10,000 to the Anti-Money Laundering Committee (AMLC). SVG authorities, however, have not yet produced copies of this amended act. The AMLC is comprised of representatives from law enforcement, Customs, and the Offshore Finance Authority, and is tasked with reviewing reports from financial institutions and recommending further investigation if necessary. To date, the AMLC has not met.

In June 2000, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) identified SVG as one of 15 countries that are non-cooperative in international efforts to combat money laundering. The FATF cited several concerns in its accompanying report:

There are no anti-money laundering regulations or guidelines in place with respect to offshore financial institutions, and thus no customer identification or record-keeping requirements or procedures. Resources devoted to supervision are extremely limited. Licensing and registration requirements for financial institutions are rudimentary. There is no system to require reporting of suspicious transactions. IBC and trust law provisions create additional obstacles, and the Offshore Finance Authority is prohibited by law from providing international cooperation with respect to information related to an application for a license, the affairs of a licensee, or the identity or affairs of a customer of a licensee. International judicial assistance is unduly limited to situations where proceedings have been commenced against a defendant in a foreign jurisdiction.

The US Treasury Department issued an advisory to US financial institutions, indicating that they "should give enhanced scrutiny to any transaction originating in or routed to or through St. Vincent and the Grenadines, or involving entities organized or domiciled, or persons maintaining accounts, in St. Vincent and the Grenadines."

Since issuance of the FATF's report, SVG has addressed some of the deficiencies in its anti-money laundering regime. In July 2000, it revoked the license of six offshore banks for non-compliance with certain provisions of the Offshore Banking Act (OBA), such as refusal to make quarterly statements of accounts and submit audited financial statements. The owner of one of these banks subsequently demanded repayment of alleged loans that he claimed his bank had made to government officials. All the alleged recipients have denied procuring such loans. These loans would have been illegal under the OBA because offshore banks are prohibited from having business dealings with Vincentian citizens.

In August 2000, SVG amended the International Banks Act (IBA) to increase the OFA's oversight of offshore banks, and amended the Confidential Relationships Preservation Act to allow the offshore finance inspector greater access to banking information. However, there continue to be significant restrictions on the sharing of such information with international authorities. In October 2000, SVG again amended the IBA to allow the offshore financial inspector access to the name or title of an account of a customer and any other confidential information about the customer that is in the possession of a license.

SVG is a member of the CFATF and has undergone a mutual evaluation by that body. In addition, SVG is a member of the Organization of American States Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS/CICAD) Experts Group to Control Money Laundering. SVG is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

Current SVG law limits the exchange of financial information, the sharing of assets and the degree of cooperation with foreign authorities on financial investigations. For example, the Confidential Relationships Preservation (International Finance) Act of 1996 could impede international cooperation, although its most restrictive section has been removed. An updated extradition treaty and a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) between the United States and SVG entered into force in September 1999.

SVG must fully implement the recommendations of the CFATF mutual evaluation and address concerns identified by the FATF. SVG also should ensure that it properly supervises the offshore sector and adequately trains regulatory and law enforcement personnel on money laundering operations and investigations. SVG should put into place a mechanism to ensure separation between the offshore sector regulatory and marketing responsibilities. SVG is urged to exercise particular caution in implementing an economic citizenship program, since without proper due diligence, such a program could offer an avenue for international criminals to hide both themselves and their illicit profits.

Suriname (Other). Although money laundering is believed to occur in Suriname-primarily through the sale of gold purchased with illicit funds and manipulation of commercial and state-controlled bank accounts-no data is available for 2000 on its extent. Casinos also may facilitate money laundering. The police have created a financial investigative unit; however, Suriname's overall anti-money laundering regime is considered weak.

In mid-2000, Suriname resumed its participation in the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF). In November 2000, the CFATF conducted a mutual evaluation of Suriname's anti-money laundering regime. The results have not yet been presented to the CFATF Plenary. CFATF also has offered to assist the Government of Suriname in drafting new anti-money laundering legislation that would meet international standards.

Suriname is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and is a member of the Organization of American States Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS/CICAD) Experts Group to Control Money Laundering.

Swaziland (Other). International drug trafficking continues to grow in Swaziland, increasing the threat of money laundering. Swaziland's proximity to South Africa, lack of effective antidrug legislation; limited enforcement resources; a relatively open society; and a developed economic infrastructure contribute towards making Swaziland attractive as a regional base or transshipment point for trafficking organizations and increases the risk for money laundering.

Swaziland's 1929 narcotics law does not address conspiracy, asset seizure, or money laundering. However, the Swazi government plans to address these issues. Parliament is expected to review and pass a new Money Laundering Bill in the first quarter of 2001. The Money Laundering Bill outlines penalties for money laundering, designates the Central Bank of Swaziland as the supervisory authority, and provides conditions when assets may be frozen and forfeited. Unfortunately, the bill's penalties for money laundering appear relatively weak: six years imprisonment, a fine amounting to roughly $2,600, or both. Swaziland also has an extradition treaty with South Africa, as well as a protocol and mutual understanding on narcotics with Commonwealth Countries.

Swaziland is party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. In December 2000 Swaziland signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Swaziland is expected to sign the Memorandum of Understanding of the newly formed Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG), a FATF-style body, in the near future.

Sweden (Other). In 1999, Swedish anti-money laundering legislation was amended to cover all types of proceeds from criminal activity. Previously, money launderers were usually prosecuted for a receiving offense, such as receiving stolen goods. This tightening up of existing money laundering control was intended to allow Sweden to fulfill the recommendations of the Hague Forfeiture Convention.

Swedish law requires financial institutions, insurance companies, and currency exchange houses to verify customer identification, inquire into a transaction's background, and verify identities for each transaction, particularly in the case of new customers involving amounts above SEK 110,000 (US$ 13,250). Any suspicious individuals/transactions are required to be reported to the police financial intelligence unit (FIU). The law was changed in 1999 so that non-complying institutions would be sanctioned, rather than individual officers. Since 1999, the FIU has been entitled to demand customer information from dealers in antiques, jewelry, and art; companies buying and selling new and used vehicles; and firms dealing with gambling and sale of lottery tickets. Starting January 1, 2001, this requirement applies to money transfer companies as well. Swedish law also provides for the seizure of assets derived from drug-related activity.

Sweden has endorsed the September 1997 Basle committee "Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision." Sweden is a member of the Financial Action Task Force, the Council of Europe, and its FIU is a member of the Egmont Group. Sweden is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention and in 2000 it signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Switzerland (Primary). Switzerland is a major international financial center. The country is attractive to money launderers because of the strength of the Swiss Franc (SFR) and the sophisticated nature of financial services in Switzerland. Although Swiss bank secrecy rules may appear vulnerable to abuse by those transferring illegally obtained assets, Swiss authorities waive secrecy rules in the prosecution of money laundering and other criminal cases.

Switzerland is a transit point for drugs en route to other European countries, and the destination for narcotics deliveries, especially heroin and cocaine. Reporting indicates that criminals attempt to launder proceeds in Switzerland from a wide range of illegal activities conducted worldwide, particularly narcotics trafficking and corruption. Both Swiss and foreign individuals or entities conduct money laundering activities. However, narcotics-related money laundering proceeds are largely controlled by foreign drug-trafficking organizations.

Money laundering was criminalized by Article 305bis of the Swiss Penal Code. Articles 58 and 305ter of the Swiss Penal Code, CFB (Swiss Federal Banking Commission) Directive 91/3 of 1/7/98, and the Agreement on the Banks' Obligation of Diligence also address money laundering. Switzerland has implemented legislation for identifying, tracing, freezing, seizing and forfeiting narcotics-related assets.

On April 1, 1998, Switzerland enacted the Money Laundering Act (MLA), which extended money laundering regulations to non-bank financial institutions. The MLA mandated that all financial intermediaries join an accredited self-regulating body (SRB), or apply for direct supervision under the Money Laundering Financial Control Authority (MLCA) of the Federal Finance Administration, by April 1, 2000. The SRBs must be independent of the management of the intermediaries they supervise, and enforce compliance with due diligence obligations. Non-compliance can result in a SFR 200,000 fine, or a revoked license. Between 12,000 to 15,000 fiduciaries operate in this previously unregulated arena. Key non-bank intermediaries have failed to comply with the law. Some are challenging the law in court, others are lobbying to have the law weakened. Attorneys in the finance department ruled against prosecution of two precedent cases of non-compliance referred by the MLCA. Another 28 cases are on hold while the finance department decides how to deal with the lack of cooperation from approximately half of the country's financial intermediaries.

In December 1999, the Efficiency Bill was passed by parliament. The purpose of this bill is to make the prosecution of organized crime, money laundering, corruption and other white-collar crime more effective, by increasing personnel and financing of the criminal police section of the Federal police office. The new law gives the Federal police and Attorney General's Office the authority to handle cases with international scope, involve several cantons, or which deal with money laundering, organized crime, corruption, and white-collar crime. The law becomes effective January 1, 2002.

The Money Laundering Reporting Office Switzerland (MROS) is Switzerland's financial intelligence unit, and is a member of the Egmont Group. All financial intermediaries (banks, insurers, fund managers, currency exchange houses, securities brokers, etc) are legally obliged to establish customer identity when forming a business relationship. They also must notify the MROS, or a government authorized supervisory body, if a transaction appears suspicious. If financial institutions determine that the assets were derived from criminal activity, the assets must be frozen immediately until a prosecutor decides on further action. In June 2000, the MROS published its second annual report covering April 1999 through March 2000. During this reporting period, the MROS received 370 reports of suspicious activity concerning assets in the amount of US $15,500,000. Of these reports, 55 were for suspected money laundering. MROS reported that 63 percent of the reports forwarded to the prosecuting authorities the previous year actually resulted in criminal proceedings that are still underway.

Credit Suisse was among the Swiss banks to be severely rebuked by the Federal Banking Commission in the money laundering scandal concerning more than US $600 million {$4 billion} that were stolen from Nigeria by General Abacha during his dictatorship. Recently, the Swiss Federal Banking Commission filed a complaint with the Swiss Bankers Association (SBA) over the US $214 million that Credit Suisse had accepted from two sons of General Abacha. The SBA is studying whether to levy a fine, which could cost Credit Suisse up to SFR 10 million. In October 2000, eleven international private banks, including the Credit Suisse Group, agreed to voluntary anti-money laundering guidelines (known as the Wolfsberg Principles) for private banking developed in collaboration with the NGO Transparency International. Also, a recent anticorruption law makes bribery of foreign officials a predicate offense under Swiss law for money laundering.

Switzerland's banking industry offers the same account services for both residents and non-residents alike. These can be opened through various intermediaries who advertise their services. As part of Switzerland's international financial services, banks offer certain well-regulated offshore services, including permitting non-residents to form offshore companies to conduct business, which can be used for tax reduction purposes. Swiss law obliges financial intermediaries to verify the identity of customers in all cases.

The Swiss Commercial Law does not recognize any offshore mechanism per se and its provisions apply equally to residents and non-residents. The stock company and the limited liability company are two standard forms of incorporation offered by Swiss Commercial Law. The financial intermediary is required to verify the identity of the beneficial owner of the stock company. The financial intermediaries must also be informed of any change regarding the beneficial owner. The stock company requires that US $64,000 of share capital be deposited prior to formation of the company. From this capital, bearer shares may be issued. The Limited Liability Company requires share capital of US $12,800 to be on deposit before the company can be formed. This type of company cannot issue bearer shares, the identity of the beneficial owner must be disclosed, and is listed in the commercial register.

Switzerland cooperates with the US to trace and seize assets, and has shared a large amount of funds seized with the US government (USG) and other governments. The Government of Switzerland has worked closely with the USG on numerous money laundering cases. The banking community cooperates with enforcement efforts. In addition, new legislation permits "spontaneous transmittal"-allowing the Swiss investigating magistrate to signal to foreign law enforcement authorities the existence of evidence in Switzerland. For example, the Swiss used this provision to signal to Peru regarding accounts linked to former Peruvian presidential advisor Montesinos.

On December 4-5, 2000, the US-Swiss Joint Economic Commission consultations on International Economic Crime were held in Bern, Switzerland. The participants consisted of Swiss officials, US Justice, Treasury, State, Federal Reserve, Drug Enforcement Administration, and Federal Bureau of Investigation representatives. The purpose of the consultations was to identify steps towards closer cooperation.

In December 2000, Switzerland signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Switzerland has a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty in place with the US to exchange records and provide information in connection with narcotics investigations and proceedings. Switzerland has ratified the Council of Europe Convention on the laundering, search, seizure and confiscation of proceeds from crime. Switzerland is a member of the Financial Action Task Force on money laundering.

Switzerland has been vigilant in developing anti-money laundering policies, and allocating resources to thwart money laundering. The Government of Switzerland needs to resolve the problem of non-compliance with its MLA, on the part of the non-bank financial intermediaries, in order to more fully implement its anti-money laundering legislation.

Taiwan (Primary). Taiwan's location in Asia and its sizable shipping industry make it a crossroads for commerce throughout the Asia-Pacific region. The involvement of Taiwan-based organized crime groups in international narcotics trafficking exposes Taiwan's financial institutions to the associated threat of money laundering. Criminal proceeds derived from financial crime and corruption as well as from foreign sources are laundered through Taiwan's financial system.

An alarming trend recently identified by Taiwanese authorities is the increasing use of the stock market for money laundering. According to statistics published by Taiwan's financial intelligence unit (FIU), the Money Laundering Prevention Center (MLPC), 40 percent of money laundering cases prosecuted in Taiwan occurred through securities companies. In 50 percent of money laundering cases, criminal proceeds were transferred abroad. The US, Thailand, Hong Kong, and the People's Republic of China were the primary destinations for laundered proceeds, respectively.

The MLPC became operational on April 23, 1997. It processed 436 Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) in 1997; 1,218 in 1998; and 1,199 in 1999. SARs reported in 1998 resulted in 210 cases referred for investigation. 1999 SARs resulted in 238 cases referred for investigation. Taiwan has successfully prosecuted several money laundering cases based on SARs. In 2000 there were nine indictments and six convictions for money laundering.

Taiwan's Money Laundering Control Act (MLCA) of April 1997 criminalized money laundering for a wide variety of crimes, referencing specific predicate offenses. However, some concern has arisen because tax evasion and gaming were not among the predicate offenses referenced. The MLCA for the most part meets international standards for money laundering. However, Taiwan continues to consider various possible amendments to improve the effectiveness of the law. Currently, financial institutions are not prohibited from informing their clients about the reporting of client suspicious transactions to the MLPC. Discussions continue within the Taiwanese agencies to amend the MLCA to prohibit client notification of suspicious transactions. Another proposed amendment under consideration would require a number of non-bank financial institutions with known money laundering activity to report suspicious transactions to the MLPC. These include pawnshops, travel bureaus, antique dealers, auto dealers, and real estate businesses.

Taiwan is a founding member of the Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering and actively participates in the Group's meetings. The MLPC is a member of the Egmont Group.

The successful prosecutions of money launderers based on SAR reporting attest to the effectiveness of Taiwan's anti-money laundering regime. Taiwan should pass the proposed amendments to the MLCA, especially in the areas of client non-disclosure of suspicious transaction reporting and the inclusion of tax evasion as a predicate offense. These measures will enhance the admirable progress Taiwan has made thus far in combating money laundering.

Tajikistan (Other). Tajikistan is not a financial center, and its underdeveloped banking sector will likely keep it from being attractive for money laundering in the near future. However, with average monthly income in the country remaining at less than $10, the temptation to become involved in narcotics-related transactions remains high for many segments of the society. Tajikistan has not criminalized money laundering.

Tajikistan is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. It also has a bilateral cooperation agreement with the United States that facilitates the delivery of anti-money laundering training. In December 2000 Tajikistan signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Tanzania (Other). Money laundering is present in Tanzania, a fact confirmed by police and government officials. However, to date there have been no prosecutions for drug-related money laundering. A very weak financial sector and an under-trained, under-funded law enforcement apparatus make such crimes difficult to track and prosecute. Officials believe that real estate and used cars are areas where money laundering is present.

Money laundering is an illegal act under the Prevention of Corruption Act and the Proceeds of Crime Act 1991. The latter criminalizes drug-related money laundering and obliges financial institutions to maintain records of transactions exceeding 10,000 shillings (approximately US $12) for a period of 10 years. If the institution has reasonable grounds to believe that a transaction relates to money laundering, it may communicate this information to the police for investigation. A "safe harbor" provision protects such disclosure.

In November 2000, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania held a conference on money laundering under the auspices of the East African Community (EAC). Tanzania also hosted an April meeting of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG). The Government of Tanzania has played a leading role in the creation of this FATF-style regional body, and currently heads the Interim Ministerial Council and hosts the secretariat of the organization. Signatories of the ESAAMLG memorandum of understanding pledged to implement international standards to fight money laundering, including the FATF 40 Recommendations.

Thailand (Primary). Thailand's location makes it a major risk for money laundering, as it is a transit country for Southeast Asian narcotics. Northern Thailand forms part of the Golden Triangle with Burma and Laos. Although Thailand has taken significant steps towards reducing the production of illicit narcotics, its still serves as a major narcotics trafficking route for the Golden Triangle, because of its good transportation infrastructure and international connections. Thailand's banking system is used by drug traffickers to hide and move their proceeds. The underground banking system is also widely in use as a money laundering method. Money is transported in bulk from the United States to other Asian countries, and ultimately moved to Thailand. Gambling dens and underground lotteries account for a significant portion of Thailand's underground economy and are attractive mechanisms for money laundering

Thailand's anti-money laundering legislation, the Money Laundering Control Act B.E. 2542 (1999), came into effect in August 1999 and was implemented in October 2000. The Act criminalized money laundering for the following predicate offenses: narcotics trafficking, prostitution, pandering, arms trafficking, financial institution fraud, embezzlement, public corruption, smuggling, and other customs violations, extortion, and blackmail. Major provisions of the Money Laundering Control Act require customer identification, record keeping, and the reporting of large and suspicious transactions. Reporting requirements for most financial transactions (including purchases of securities and insurance) exceeding 2 million bath (roughly $50, 000) and property transactions exceeding 5 million bath (roughly $125,000) have been in place since October 2000. The Act also created three agencies to handle various aspects of the Money Laundering Control Board, the Business Transactions Committee, and the Money Laundering Control Office. The Money Laundering Control Board advises the Cabinet and formulates government policy on money laundering issues. It also monitors and evaluates the effectiveness of the Money Laundering Control Act and the performance of the Business Transactions Committee and Money Laundering Control Office.

The Business Transactions Committee executes operational aspects of the Act that address suspect transactions and the disposition of proceeds. It may audit and suspend suspect financial transactions related to money laundering for a period of up to ten days. The Committee may compel physical and juridical persons, as well as government agencies and officials, to provide oral or written testimony and documentation in money laundering investigations. It can conduct search and seizure operations for the purpose of investigating, monitoring, and freezing of assets or evidence of money laundering offenses. In addition, the committee may freeze assets related to a money laundering investigation for a period of up to ninety days if there is probable cause that the assets are perishable.

The Anti-Money Laundering Office (AMLO) is Thailand's financial intelligence unit (FIU). It receives, analyzes, and processes suspicious and large transaction reports as required by the Act. The Business Transactions Committee tasks the Office with administrative functions such as collecting evidence and identifying witnesses for money laundering investigations. The Office is also tasked with providing training to the public and private sectors concerning the provisions of the Act.

Licenses were first granted to Thai and foreign financial institutions to establish offshore units, known as Bangkok International Banking Facilities (BIBFs) in March 1993. BIBFs may perform a number of financial and investment banking services but can only raise funds offshore (through deposits and borrowing) for onward lending into Thailand or offshore. BIBFs were listed by the United Nations Drug Control Program and by the World Bank as potentially vulnerable to money laundering activities because they serve as transit points for funds. Thailand's 44 BIBFs are now subject to the recently enacted Money Laundering Control Act. Implementation of the Act may discourage the use of BIBFs as money laundering mechanisms.

The US-Thai Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty entered into force in 1993. Thailand is a member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG). It co-chairs the APG's Working Group on Alternative Remittance Systems. The MLPC has applied for membership in the Egmont Group.

In December 2000, the Thailand signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

The government of Thailand should continue to implement its strong anti-money laundering program and participation in international efforts. It should also consider additional measures to address underground financial systems to ensure that narcotics traffickers and other international criminals do not abuse these sectors of the economy.

Togo (Other). Togo's poor infrastructure and desperate economic conditions make it an unlikely venue for money laundering. Its porous borders, however, make it a transshipment point in the regional and subregional trade in narcotics. Togo Customs is charged with combating the laundering of narcotics proceeds.

Togo hosted the ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) Heads of State and Governments Conference in December 1999, which created an Inter-Governmental Group of Action Against Money-Laundering in West Africa. Togo's 1998 drug law penalizes drug money laundering with up to 20 years in prison.

Togo is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. In December 2000 Togo signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Tonga (Other). Tonga is not a regional financial center. However, Tonga's offshore sector licenses offshore banks. Tonga also sells economic citizenship. Both the banks and the selling of economic citizenship could be used by money launderers. In 2000, Tonga indicated it enacted the Money Laundering Act 2000, Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 2000, and Foreign Evidence Act 2000.

Tonga is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

Trinidad and Tobago (Other). Trinidad and Tobago has a well developed and modern banking sector, but it is not an important regional financial center, nor is it a tax haven or offshore center. Nevertheless, the country is experiencing an increase in financial crimes, mostly in the form of counterfeiting and credit card fraud. It is likely that some money laundering takes place in banks, credit unions, stock brokerages, insurance companies, casinos, and some retail and construction businesses.

In 2000, the GOTT enacted the Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) that expands money laundering predicate offenses to include all serious crimes and institutes reporting requirements for suspicious transactions. Failure to comply with the Bill's record-keeping and reporting requirements will result in a fine of 250,000 TT (approximately US $40,000) and imprisonment for two years for summary conviction, and a fine of 3,000,000 TT (approximately US $500,000) and seven years of imprisonment for conviction on indictment. Upon summary conviction for money laundering an offender shall be liable for a fine $10 million TT (approximately US $ 1,600,000) and imprisonment for 7 years; and upon conviction on indictment for money laundering an offender shall be liable for a fine of 25,000,000 TT (approximately Us $4,000,0000) and 25 years imprisonment. Furthermore, if an institution commits an offence under the POCA, any officer who aids and abets money laundering activities can be convicted of money laundering even if the institution itself has not been prosecuted or convicted. The POCA also enables the courts to seize the proceeds of all serious crimes.

The GOTT has legislation in place that allows it to trace, freeze, and seize assets, including intangible assets such as bank accounts. Authorities may seize legitimate businesses if they are used to launder drug money. GOTT customs regulations require that any sum above US$5000 (in currency or monetary instruments) entering or leaving the country be declared. Cash above US$10,000 may be seized, with judicial approval, pending determination of its legitimate source. The GOTT does not have legislation that allows the sharing of forfeited assets with other countries, but has done so in the past on a case-by-case basis through bilateral agreements.

The Government of Trinidad and Tobago (GOTT) approved a UNDCP plan that will draft updated guidelines for anti-money laundering legislation, exchange of information, record keeping, independent regulatory structures, suspicious transaction reporting, know your customer requirements, and international cooperation.

The central bank has set money laundering guidelines, including due diligence provisions, that apply to all financial institutions subject to the Financial Institutions Act of 1993. These include banks, finance companies, leasing corporations, merchant banks, mortgage institutions, unit trusts, credit card businesses, and financial services businesses. Credit unions and exchange houses are not subject to the guidelines.

The GOTT has an inter-ministerial counternarcotics/crime task force that investigates drug trafficking and related money laundering. To date, the GOTT has charged six individuals with money laundering-related offenses

Trinidad and Tobago is a member of the CFATF, which is headquartered in Port of Spain. It underwent a CFATF mutual evaluation in 1997 and the report was endorsed by CFATF's Council of Ministers in 1997. Trinidad and Tobago is also a member of the Organization of American States Inter-American Drub Abuse Control Commission (OAS/CICAD) Experts Group to Control Money Laundering. In 1999, an MLAT with the United States came into force. In June 2000, during the visit of Attorney General Janet Reno, the US and GOTT signed a joint statement on law enforcement cooperation which pledges in part to expand cooperation on the detection and prosecution of money laundering and related criminal activities.

At the GOTT's invitation, the IRS is providing technical assistance to the Board of Inland Revenue to develop a comprehensive criminal investigations system to reduce corruption enforce the criminal statutes relative to tax administration and related financial crimes. This is being done in order to achieve compliance with the GOTT Income Tax Act. The GOTT's international cooperation record in the area of information exchange on financial crimes has been excellent.

Trinidad and Tobago is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

Tunisia (Other). There is little information about possible money laundering in Tunisia. It is not a regional financial center, and the government keeps a close hand on the management of the economy. However, a number of factors make Tunisia vulnerable to money laundering. One is the presence of an offshore banking sector consisting of about 12 banks, reportedly closely regulated by the Tunisian Ministry of Finance and the central bank. There are also approximately 1,200 offshore manufacturing companies (regulated by the Ministries of Commerce and Industry) and 300 offshore trading companies (regulated by the Ministry of Commerce). The trading companies, as a rule, operate by matching up third country supply and demand and brokering trade deals, with no goods ever entering or leaving Tunisia.

There is no limit on the amount of foreign currency which may be brought into the country, but amounts over 1,000 Tunisian dinars (TND) or its equivalent must be declared (the current rate of exchange is approximately 1.4 TND to US$1.

Offshore companies may be 100 percent foreign-owned. Anonymous directors are not permitted, and the names of all directors and companies must be listed in the official government journal when the company is organized or when there is a change in directorship.

Tunisia has no anti-money laundering laws. The only material anti-money laundering legislation is contained in a 1992 counternarcotics law that makes it illegal to assist anyone involved in drug trafficking, including transferring funds for them, offering them services, or procuring facilities for them that enable them to invest or disguise drug trafficking income. The law applies even if the illegal activity takes place in another country.

Tunisia is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Turkey (Primary). Turkey is an important regional financial center for Central Asia and the Middle East. While narcotics trafficking is a source of illicit proceeds, most money laundering that takes place appears to involve tax evasion rather than narcotics transactions, and local narcotics trafficking organizations are responsible for only a small portion of the total of funds laundered in Turkey. Terrorist financing is also an issue. Money laundering takes place in both banks and non-bank financial institutions. According to information dating from early 1999, major money laundering methods in Turkey involve the cross-border smuggling of currency, bank transfers into and out of the country, and the purchase of high-ticket items such as real estate, gold and luxury automobiles. Illicit funds are also integrated into the economy through the financing of the construction of large apartment complexes and other buildings. Turkey is not an offshore financial center, and has no secrecy laws that prevent disclosure of client and ownership information to bank supervisors and enforcement officials.

The Government of Turkey (GOT) has been active in the fight against money laundering for several years. Turkey criminalized money laundering in 1996 for a wide range of predicate offenses, including narcotics-related crimes, smuggling of arms and antiquities, terrorism, counterfeiting, and trafficking in human organs and in women. The Council of Ministers subsequently passed a set of regulations that mandate the filing of suspicious transaction reports (STRs), and require customer identification and the maintenance of records for five years. These regulations are applicable to banks and a wide range of non-bank financial institutions, including insurance firms and jewelry dealers. The number of STRs being filed is steadily rising, as banks and financial institutions become more aware of what constitutes an STR. Turkey also has in place a system for identifying, tracing, freezing and seizing narcotics-related assets, although Turkish law allows for only criminal forfeiture. There were no major new developments in 2000 in the area of anti-money laundering laws or countermeasures.

The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), of which Turkey is a member, has conducted two reviews of Turkey's anti-money laundering program. The second review noted that while Turkey was making progress, several areas needed to be addressed. For example, the suspicious transaction reporting system is satisfactory, but the low number of reports being filed is a cause for concern. The report suggested that intensive training for the private banking sector is needed to improve compliance. The report also stated that another area of weakness is the lack of sufficient supervision by the government over financial institutions. In response, Turkey has undertaken intensive training programs to educate the private banking sector in recognizing suspicious transactions and has increased the frequency of banking inspections. The GOT is also working to broaden the definition of money laundering to include the proceeds of all serious crimes.

The 1996 anti-money laundering law established the Financial Crimes Investigation Board (FCIB), which receives and investigates suspicious transaction reports and serves as Turkey's financial intelligence unit (FIU). The GOT strongly supports the FCIB, which has increased its staff and the quality of its computer equipment. The FCIB cooperates closely with the United States in money laundering investigations, and has requested and received US assistance in obtaining information on several cases.

Turkey is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and the FCIB is an active member of the Egmont Group. Turkey has a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty in force with the United States. In December 2000 Turkey signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Based on its demonstrated commitment to fighting money laundering, the GOT now needs to maintain the momentum it has generated in setting up its anti-money laundering regime by expanding the definition of money laundering to include all serious crimes, and to continue measures to ensure increased reporting of STRs.

Turkmenistan (Other). Although Turkmenistan has only a few international banks and a small, underdeveloped domestic financial sector, the country's several foreign-owned hotels and casinos could be vulnerable to financial fraud and money laundering by organized criminal groups. In addition, the national currency, the manat, has a black market (but universally accepted) exchange rate that is four times the official rate, thus creating conditions favorable to money laundering. Moreover, the low salaries and broad general powers of Turkmen law enforcement officials raise issues of possible corruption. The Government of Turkmenistan has not reported any suspected cases of money laundering.

Turkmenistan has no specific law addressing money laundering. However, Presidential Resolution 0210/02-2 of 1995 gives the central bank authority over all international financial transactions. Under this resolution, any firm making an electronic transfer of funds to an account abroad must provide documentation that establishes the source of the funds.

Recognizing Turkmenistan's susceptibility to money laundering, the US Secret Service has scheduled a course on financial institution fraud and money laundering that will be held sometime in 2001.

Turkmenistan is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

Turks & Caicos (Concern). The Turks and Caicos Islands (TCI) is a Caribbean Overseas Territory of the United Kingdom (UK). The TCI is vulnerable to money laundering because of a large offshore financial services sector that offers tax advantages, as well as bank and corporate secrecy to conceal beneficial ownership.

The TCI's offshore sector has eight banks (five of which also deal with onshore clientele), approximately 2,000 insurance companies, 27,000 international business companies (IBCs), and 1,000 trusts. The offshore sector offers "shelf company" IBCs and all IBCs are permitted to issue bearer shares. Trust legislation allows establishment of asset protection trusts that protect personal assets from civil adjudication by foreign governments. The Financial Services Commission (FSC), which has a staff of 12, licenses and supervises domestic and offshore finance-related operating entities.

The Proceeds of Crime Ordinance (POCO) 1998 criminalized money laundering related to all crimes, and established extensive asset forfeiture provisions and "safe harbor" protection for good faith compliance with reporting requirements. The POCO also established a Money Laundering Reporting Authority (MLRA) that is to receive, analyze, and disseminate financial disclosures such as suspicious transactions reports (STRs). The MLRA is chaired by the attorney general. Its members also include the following individuals or their designees: Collector of Customs, the Superintendent of the FSC, the Commissioner of Police, and the Superintendent of the Criminal Investigation Department. The MLRA is authorized to disclose information that it receives to domestic law enforcement and foreign governments.

The Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) Regulations (POCMLR) were issued in 1999 and came into force in 2000. The POCMLR places additional requirements on the financial sector such as identification of customers, retention of records for a minimum of five years, training staff on money laundering prevention and detection, and development of internal procedures to ensure proper reporting of suspicious transactions. The Superintendents of Banking, Insurance, Trustees, and Mutual Funds also must report suspicious transactions (STRs).

Thus far, the MLRA has functioned only through specific actions of its constituent members. In 1999, the FSC issued non-statutory Guidance Notes to the financial sector that are to help educate the industry on money laundering and the TCI's anti-money laundering requirements, and provide practical guidance on recognizing suspicious transactions. The Guidance Notes instruct institutions to send STRs to either the Royal Turks & Caicos Police Force or the FSC. The Financial Crimes Unit of the Police already has received and begun investigating some of the reports.

The TCI and other British Overseas Territories in the Caribbean in 1999 agreed to undergo a comprehensive review of their financial regulations and implement subsequent recommendations. The review was published in October 2000, and indicated that although it has made steady progress, the TCI's current regulatory structure was still not fully in accordance with international standards. The report's primary recommendations included:

* Make the FSC an independent regulatory body and increase its staffing.

* Establish an off-site supervisory program and enhance off-site supervision.

* Allow regulators to have access to records of individual depositors.

* Increase enforcement powers of regulators.

* Create legal measures to identify and access information on the beneficial ownership, both domestically and internationally, of bearer shares.

The TCI is a member of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force, and underwent a mutual evaluation in April 1997. The TCI is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. The Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty between the United States and the UK was extended to TCI in November 1990.

The TCI cooperates with foreign governments-in particular, the United States and Canada-on law enforcement issues including narcotics-trafficking and money-laundering investigations.

The TCI should implement regulatory changes recommended by the independent review, and address the issue of bearer shares. The MLRA should prepare operating procedures that clarify its roles and functions to ensure that it can be fully staffed and operate as a financial intelligence unit. These measures will help the TCI fully coordinate local initiatives, and cooperate with international authorities to detect and investigate suspected financial crimes, and prevent abuse of its financial sector by international criminals.

Uganda (Other). Although money laundering most likely occurs in Uganda, there are no good estimates of its extent. Ugandan law enforcement agencies suspect that Uganda's banks are used to launder money, but thus far have been unable to prove their suspicions because of the country's inadequate legal framework.

Although money laundering is not currently a criminal offense in Uganda, the Government of Uganda (GOU) in 2000 participated in regional anti-money laundering fora. In November 2000, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania held a conference on money laundering under the auspices of the East African Community (EAC). Uganda is a member of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG), and in April 2000, representatives of the GOU attended the ESAAMLG's first formal meeting.

Uganda is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Ukraine (Concern). Money laundering plagues Ukraine's financial and commercial sectors and is a symptom of high levels of corruption, organized crime, smuggling and tax evasion. Transparency International, a non-governmental organization that studies corruption, rated Ukraine the third most corrupt country in 2000. It also named Ukraine along with Russia at the top of the list among countries that transfer illicit proceeds abroad. In October 2000, President Kuchma noted that the fuel and energy industry was the most criminalized sector in Ukraine. He also noted that financial crime, tax evasion, and corruption plague the metallurgy and agriculture sectors as well. These factors contribute to make Ukraine vulnerable to large-scale money laundering.

The Ukrainian government has recently begun to take steps to create a legal and regulatory framework to specifically address money laundering. In November 2000, the Ukrainian Cabinet passed a bill "On Prevention and Counteraction of Legalization (Laundering) of the Proceeds of Crime." The bill was drafted on the instructions of President Kuchma to implement provisions of the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime. Ukraine became a signatory to the convention in May 1997. The final draft version awaits submission to the Parliament for eventual passage. Article 214 of Ukraine's draft Criminal Code criminalizes all financial transactions involving criminally derived proceeds. Current criminal law provisions address drug-related money laundering offenses and provide for the confiscation of proceeds generated by criminal activities. The Drug Enforcement Department (DED) of the Ministry of the Interior initiated 25 criminal cases connected with drug money laundering in 2000.

Ukraine participates in the Council of Europe's Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures (PC-R-EV). In May 2000, Ukraine underwent a mutual evaluation conducted by the PC-R-EV. The final report will provide detailed suggestions to improve Ukraine's anti-money laundering program.

An exchange of diplomatic notes in September 1999 provides for provisional application of the US-Ukraine Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT). The MLAT was signed in July 1999 but is not yet in force. In December 2000, the Ukraine signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Ukraine is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

As a first step, Ukraine should enact its draft anti-money laundering provisions and adopt implementing regulations to establish the a legal, regulatory, and enforcement framework to bring its money laundering problem under control. Ukraine's current laws and regulations applicable to money laundering are ineffective and do not meet international standards. An operative anti-money laundering regime would provide additional tools for Ukrainian authorities to combat crime in general and to more easily share information with international partners on regulatory and enforcement actions concerning money laundering.

United Arab Emirates (Primary). The United Arab Emirates' (UAE) position as a major financial and trading center in the Gulf region of the Middle East suggests it is vulnerable to money laundering. While there is a recognized lack of reporting and specific statistics, evidence developed to date from international financial crimes investigations shows money laundering connections to the UAE, principally to Dubai. Most money laundering activity is believed to involve the proceeds of foreign criminal organizations outside the UAE, with the UAE serving primarily as a conduit to international financial markets. Over two-thirds of the population of the UAE is foreign. The UAE has an open economy with a sophisticated financial sector and business services. There are no foreign exchange controls; no corporate or income taxes; and the UAE has free trade zones. It has developed into the region's transportation hub.

The UAE, like all countries in the region, is a cash-intensive society. Dubai is also the regional gold center, with integrated gold trading ties between Europe and South Asia. Gold is often manipulated by money launderers around the world via trade or as part of alternative remittance systems such as the South Asia based hawala system of transferring funds. In an effort to address these vulnerabilities in the UAE, the central bank recently mandated capital reserve requirements of over US $13 million for prospective currency dealers and money-exchange houses. The net effect of this move will be to ensure that a larger percentage of the remittance business flows through the better-regulated banking system.

There is currently no legislation pertaining to money laundering per se, existing UAE laws on narcotics trafficking are broad and extremely strict; those involved in handling drug money in any way are subject, potentially, to the death penalty. A money laundering law has been in draft form for several years, and UAE authorities believe it will be passed during the first half of 2001. The proposed legislation includes criminal penalties. All sources of "illegal money" will serve as a predicate offenses for money laundering. There are no proposed cross-border currency reporting requirements.

In November 2000 the UAE's Central Bank issued new regulations for all banks, money changers and finance companies in an effort to check money laundering. The regulations took effect December 1, 2000. They require the reporting of all cash transactions exceeding 200,000 dirhams (US $54,500) and all suspicious transactions to the central bank. When suspicious activity is reported from a financial institution, the central bank is able to freeze suspect funds, make appropriate inquiries, and coordinate with law enforcement officials. The central bank has also dramatically increased its examination staff.

The UAE has recently established a unit within the central bank to act as a financial intelligence unit (FIU). It is charged with examining suspicious activity reporting and handling all requests from law enforcement and judicial authorities. The unit is exploring areas of information sharing and coordination with other FIUs.

The UAE is not an offshore center in the traditional sense, and earlier plans to establish an offshore banking center on Abu Dhabi's Saadiyat Island appear to have been shelved. However, many local businessmen do offer services equivalent to those associated with traditional offshore centers, such as nonresident incorporation. Even though there are no corporate registration agents for the UAE, it is possible to obtain essentially the same service. Someone seeking to the use the UAE as a base of operations can pay a local businessman a fee for the use of his business name, or, in a somewhat more formal arrangement, enter into a partnership arrangement. In these partnerships, the local businessman will own at least 51% of the business and the other partners will remain effectively invisible. (The partner may actually fund the entire business to gain access to the UAE as a base of operations). For this reason, it is often difficult to identify beneficial owners or investors of businesses or assets in the UAE.

The UAE is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. The UAE is a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council, which is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). The UAE is beginning to take steps to comply with the FATF Forty Recommendations and will undergo a FATF mutual evaluation in 2001. The UAE has been generally receptive to US Government overtures to cooperate on money laundering issues. The US and other countries plan to make training and technical assistance available to the UAE during 2001.

As noted, the UAE is an important regional financial and trading center. Its location, thriving open economy and first-class financial infrastructure suggests money-laundering vulnerabilities. Issues of concern such as the misuse of the international gold trade and the use of hawala to launder funds are not unique to the UAE, and these forms of alternate remittance systems are extremely difficult to identify and combat. UAE authorities have recognized the importance of international cooperation, and as have begun to take concrete steps to enact an anti-money laundering program. The UAE, however, needs to enact anti-money laundering legislation that includes the criminalization of the laundering of proceeds from all serious crimes. This needs to be followed by continued training and systematic enforcement of the law.

United Kingdom (Primary). The United Kingdom (UK) plays a leading role in European and world finance and remains attractive to money launderers because of the size, sophistication, and reputation of its financial markets. Although drugs are still the major source of illegal proceeds for money laundering, the proceeds of other offenses such as financial fraud and the smuggling of goods have become increasingly important. The trend over the past few years has witnessed the movement away from High Street banks and mainstream financial institutions for the placement of cash. In laundering funds, criminals continue to use bureaux de change (small, tourist-type, currency exchanges); cash smuggling in and out of the UK; professional money launderers (including solicitors and accountants); and the purchase of high-value assets as disguises for illegally obtained money.

The United Kingdom has implemented the provisions of the EU's Anti-Money Laundering Directive and the FATF Forty Recommendations. Drug-related money laundering has been a criminal offense in the UK since 1986. Subsequent legislation criminalized the laundering of proceeds from all other crimes. The UK has a requirement for the reporting of suspicious transactions that applies to banks and non-bank financial institutions.

Secondary regulations, affecting the financial sector only, require that systems be in place to prevent and detect money laundering.

In 1997, Guidance Notes on best practices were issued by the Money Laundering Steering Group of professional and trade bodies.

The Bank of England Act 1998 transferred responsibility for UK bank supervision from the Bank of England to the newly established Financial Services Authority (FSA). The FSA's primary responsibilities are in areas relating to the safety and soundness of the institutions in its jurisdiction. The FSA plays an important part in the fight against money laundering through its continued involvement in the authorization of banks and investigations of money-laundering activities in banks. Where appropriate, the FSA even assembles small teams of investigators to follow-up leads in newspapers and other public sources.

Once the recent Financial Services and Markets Act is fully implemented (expected in 2001), the FSA will administer a new civil-fines regime and will have new prosecution powers. The FSA will have the power to make regulatory rules in relation to money laundering and enforce those rules with a range of disciplinary measures (including fines).

In 2000 the cabinet reviewed the entire anti-money laundering strategy in the United Kingdom and published its findings in the Recovering the Proceeds of Crime report in June. As a result of the report, the Government of the United Kingdom plans to adopt new legislation that will establish a National Confiscation Agency to have responsibility for the recovery of criminal assets. It will be invested with extensive executive functions in relation to criminal confiscation and civil recovery. It will also have investigative powers, and the ability to raise tax demands in relation to suspected criminal proceeds. In December 2000 the government also proposed legislative changes to allow tax authorities to share information with police in serious criminal cases. The government also plans specific provisions in secondary legislation to extend thorough money-laundering controls to other sectors, including to lawyers, accountants and other professionals.

Suspicious transaction reports are filed with the Economic Crime Unit of the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS), which serves as the UK's financial intelligence unit. The NCIS analyzes reports, develops intelligence, and passes information to police forces and HM Customs for investigation. NCIS received approximately 14,500 disclosures for 1999. The NCIS is an active member of the Egmont Group and has Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) for sharing intelligence with foreign counterparts. An arrangement is in place with the US Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FINCEN) and Belgium's CTIF.

The UK's banking sector provides accounts to residents and nonresidents, who can open accounts through various intermediaries that often advertise on the Internet and also offer various offshore services, or as a part of private banking activities. Private banking constitutes a significant portion of the British banking industry. Both resident and nonresident accounts are subject to the same reporting and record-keeping requirements. Non-resident accounts are typically opened by individuals for taxation or investment purposes.

The UK is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention and a member of the Financial Action Task Force and the European Union (EU). The UK signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime in December 2000. The Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) between the UK and the US has been in force since 1996.

The UK should continue the strong enforcement of its comprehensive anti-money laundering program and its active participation in international organizations to combat the domestic and global threat of money laundering.

Uruguay (Primary). Historically, Uruguay has attracted foreign deposits due to its economic and political stability as well as liberal currency exchange and strict bank secrecy laws. As a regional financial center, Uruguay is susceptible to money laundering. Although the extent and exact nature of money laundering in Uruguay is unknown, United States Government (USG) and European law enforcement entities believe that the profits of drug trafficking and contraband smuggling, and other illicit activities are laundered through Uruguayan financial institutions. Except for a few isolated but important cases, there is no solid evidence of widespread money laundering in Uruguay. However, Uruguay, until recently did not have in place effective systems for detecting money laundering such as a system of mandatory suspicious transaction reporting. Moreover, Uruguay does not yet have a financial intelligence unit, which is another critical element in a government's ability to detect money laundering activities. There is a large black market for smuggled goods in Uruguay but it does not appear to be significantly funded by narcotics proceeds.

The Government of Uruguay (GOU) has taken measures to join the international fight against money laundering. Under the October 1998 Anti-Drug Law (No. 17.016), it is a criminal offense to launder funds derived from narcotics trafficking activities. The law gives the courts power to seize and later confiscate property, products or financial instruments in drug-related money laundering activities. In addition, the Anti-Drug Law also facilitates the lifting by the courts of traditionally strong bank secrecy laws to conduct money laundering investigations. If there is reasonable cause to suspect criminal use of the banking system by a specific person, the courts have the power to order access to the individual's bank accounts. However, Uruguay does not have laws allowing for the sharing of seized narcotics assets with other countries. The January 1999 Transparency Law criminalized a broad range of potential abuses of power by Government officials including the laundering of funds related to public corruption cases, and instituted financial disclosure requirements for high-ranking GOU officials.

Uruguay has bank secrecy laws; however, financial institutions must provide certain information upon the request of the central bank. Central bank regulations (91/47, 91/55, 93/68 and 1452) require banks (including offshore banks), currency exchange houses and stockbrokers to record currency transactions over $10,000, and to identify the individuals making such transactions, and make their records available to the central bank. These records must be kept for five years. Analysis and control of financial transactions by the central bank is not as consistent as desired. With USG assistance the central bank is building a computerized information system to efficiently analyze the data and detect possible money laundering activities.

In 2000, The Police Anti-Drug Directorate (DGRTID) established a financial investigations unit in order to present more complete evidence in narcotics-related prosecutions. On December 21, 2000, the central bank issued Circular 1722 requiring all entities under its jurisdiction (banks, currency exchange houses, insurance companies, stockbrokers, financial intermediaries, and investment companies to report suspicious financial transactions to a Financial Information Analysis Unit. This unit is to be created within the Superintendency of Intermediary Financial Institutions, and will be responsible for receiving or requesting and analyzing these disclosures, and forwarding them to the competent investigative authorities.

Many South Americans have traditionally used Uruguay as a tax haven. Uruguayan law permits the operation of offshore banks, mutual funds, offshore financial investment companies (SAFIs), and free trade zone companies (FTZs). Uruguay does not license offshore trusts, insurance companies, or Internet gaming companies. FTZs are used within the nine Uruguayan free trade zones for manufacturing and distribution. SAFIs operate as international business companies, and are most commonly used as holding companies. They may also be used as trading companies, brokerage firms, and import and export companies.

The regulations governing offshore banking are similar to those of regular banks and include the submission of quarterly balances, an annual audit, as well as client identification and maintenance of transaction records. The central bank licenses offshore banks and performs background checks on applicants for banking licenses. Central bank regulations do not allow the use of bearer shares by banks or other financial institutions under its control, and the Bank must authorize the purchase or transfer of shares. The 12 offshore banks operating in Uruguay managed US $1 billion in assets as of March 2000. The central bank does not supervise SAFIs, and although it is believed that a large number of SAFIs operate in Uruguay, there are no records as to the exact number. At least six offshore mutual funds operate in Uruguay.

Uruguay remains active in international anti-money laundering efforts. It is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and a member of the Organization of American States Inter-American Commission on Drug Abuse Control (OAS CICAD) Experts Group to Control Money Laundering. The USG and the GOU have an extradition treaty, which was signed in 1973 and entered into force in 1984, and a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, which was signed in 1991 and entered into force in 1994. In December 2000 Uruguay signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Uruguay is also a member of the South American Financial Action Task Force (GAFISUD), a FATF-style regional anti-money laundering body established in December 2000.

Uruguay needs to fully establish, staff, and fund the Financial Information Analysis Unit to act as a centralized unit that can coordinate domestic efforts and cooperate internationally to combat financial crimes. Uruguay should also criminalize the laundering of proceeds from all serious crimes. In addition, Uruguay should take steps to ensure that SAFIs are effectively supervised and regulated to help prevent, detect and investigate abuses of Uruguay's financial sector.

Uzbekistan (Other). Uzbekistan is not a regional financial center or a significant country for narcotics-related money laundering. Uzbekistan is not likely to be used by money launderers because it currency is not freely convertible and banking services are unsophisticated. There is a significant black market for smuggled consumer goods in the country. However, it does not appear that the market is funded by narcotics proceeds.

Article 243 of the Uzbek Criminal Code criminalizes money laundering related to any criminal activity. A decree issued in October 1998 allowed banks to offer anonymous hard currency accounts, but the measure failed to attract significant deposits.

There are strict controls on the amount of currency that can be carried across Uzbekistan's borders. Residents and non-residents may bring the equivalent of US $10,000 into the country tax-free. Amounts in excess of this limit are assessed a 1-percent duty. Non-residents may take out as much currency as they brought in; however, residents are limited to the equivalent of US $1,500.

Uzbekistan is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Vanuatu (Concern). Vanuatu's offshore sector is vulnerable to money laundering as it historically has maintained strict secrecy provisions that have the effect of preventing law enforcement agencies from identifying the beneficial owners of offshore entities registered in the sector. Because of allegations of money laundering, a few United States-based banks announced that they would no longer process US dollar transactions to/from Vanuatu in late December 1999. The Government of Vanuatu responded to these concerns by introducing reforms designed to strengthen financial regulation both domestically and offshore.

Vanuatu's financial sector includes five licensed banks (that carry on domestic and offshore business) and 60 credit unions, regulated by the Reserve bank of Vanuatu. The Financial Services Commission (FSC) regulates the offshore sector that includes 55 offshore banks and approximately 2500 "international companies" (i.e., international business companies or IBCs), as well as offshore trusts and captive insurance companies. IBCs may be registered using bearer shares, shielding the identity and assets of beneficial owners of these entities. Secrecy provisions protect all information regarding IBCs and provide penal sanctions for unauthorized disclosure of information. These secrecy provisions, along with the ease and low cost of incorporation, make IBCs ideal mechanisms for money laundering and other financial crimes.

The Serious Offences (Confiscation of Proceeds) Act 1989 criminalized the laundering of proceeds from all serious crimes and provided for seizure of criminal assets and confiscation after a conviction.

In October 2000 Vanuatu addressed deficiencies in the regulation of the banking sector by passing the Financial Transaction Recording Act. This law requires financial institutions to identify customers and beneficial owners when establishing business relations or account accommodations. Regulatory agencies in Vanuatu have instituted stricter procedures for issuance of offshore banking licenses and continue to review the status of previously issued licenses. This legislation requires all financial institutions, both domestic and offshore, to report suspicious transactions and to maintain records of all transactions for 6 years, including the identities of the parties involved. Safe harbor provisions are provided under this legislation to all suspicious transactions reported in good faith.

The new legislation provides for the establishment of a Financial Intelligence Unit within the State Law Office. The Financial Intelligence Unit will receive suspicious transaction reports made by financial institutions and may distribute them to the Public Prosecutors Office, the Reserve Bank of Vanuatu, the Vanuatu Police Force, the Vanuatu Financial Services Commission and law enforcement agencies or supervisory bodies outside Vanuatu. The Financial Intelligence Unit will also issue guidelines to, and provide training programs for, financial institutions regarding record keeping for transactions and reporting obligations. The act also regulates how such information can be shared with law enforcement agencies investigating financial crime. The law further states that preventative measures are to be imposed by financial institutions. Financial institutions within Vanuatu must establish and maintain internal procedures and provide a written statement to the Financial Intelligence Unit.

Every financial institution is required to keep records of all transactions. Four key pieces of information are required to be kept for every financial transaction: the nature of the transaction, the amount of the transaction and the currency in which it was denominated, the date the transaction was conducted, and the parties to the transaction. These records must be kept for a period of 6 years after the completion of the transaction.

There are three bases for cooperation in international matters: the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1989, the Serious Offences (Confiscation of Proceeds) Act 1989 and the Extradition Act 1988. The Attorney General, designated as the central authority for requests of mutual assistance, possesses the authority to grant requests for assistance and may require government agencies to assist in the collection of information pursuant to the request. In an effort to strengthen mutual legal assistance, Vanuatu has drafted a Bill to amend the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act and a Bill for the Proceeds of Crime Act.

Vanuatu is a member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), the Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors (OGBS), the Commonwealth Secretariat, and the South Pacific Forum. Vanuatu underwent a mutual evaluation by the APG and OGBS in 2000, and was the first APG member to undergo such a mutual evaluation. Vanuatu is not a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

The Government of Vanuatu has taken positive steps to strengthen their counter money-laundering program, especially within the banking sector. As a consequence of these reforms, the Financial Action Task Force determined at its October 2000 plenary that Vanuatu should not be included on its list of Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories with respect to the prevention of money laundering. The GOV should strictly implement its new legislation-with a focus on enforcing new reporting requirements on offshore banks-as well as enacting measures to require complete identification of the beneficial ownership of IBCs to ensure that Vanuatu's offshore sector is not used for money laundering or other financial crimes.

Venezuela (Primary). While Venezuela has considerable international financial links, it does not have an offshore financial industry. The banking sector is modern but relatively small and the country is not considered a regional financial center. However, Venezuela's proximity to drug-source countries, the weaknesses in the anti-money laundering system, and corruption continue to create conditions conducive to money laundering. The laundering primarily involves the proceeds of Colombian cocaine trafficking organizations although proceeds from contraband smuggling are also laundered through Venezuela's banks, currency exchange houses, casinos and the real estate sector.

Venezuela's Organic Drug Law of September 1993 provides the only basis for the investigation and prosecution of money laundering crimes; this law provides that a direct connection between illegal drugs and the proceeds must be proven in order to establish the offense of money laundering. Cases have been brought to trial but none has resulted in a conviction, often because of the ineffective judicial system. The Government of Venezuela (GOV) has carried out initiatives to combat corruption and placed particular emphasis on targeting corruption in the judiciary. During 2000, investigations of public officials involved in financial corruption continued and some cases went to trial. An anti-organized crime bill that would have expanded the definition of money laundering to include numerous other crimes in addition to drug trafficking was not adopted as expected in 2000.

Since 1997, the GOV has improved money laundering controls, including the stricter adoption of preventive measures such as the reporting of large currency transactions (over US $ 10,000); the reporting of suspicious financial activities (SARs); and the creation in 1998 of a National Financial Intelligence Unit (UNIF). The entities subject to these reporting requirements include: all purpose banks, commercial banks, investment banks, mortgage banks, savings and loan institutions, financial rental agencies, bureaux de change, money market funds, capitalization companies, and frontier foreign currency dealers.

The UNIF, located in the Superintendency of Banks and Other Financial Institutions, receives monthly electronic reports of large currency transactions and SARs, and works closely with the financial information units that have been created in each banking organization as required by Banking Resolution 333-97 of July 1997. The UNIF analyzes the SARs and submits a report to the competent authority for criminal investigation, which could be the National Guard, the Technical Judicial Police or the Office of the Public Prosecutor. There appears to be a certain duplication of function among these three entities. This Banking Resolution contains strict customer identification and record-keeping requirements, and provides a safe harbor protection from civil liability to bankers for reporting suspicious financial activities. During 2000, the UNIF expanded reporting requirements for banks to include currency transfers to "banking paradises" and transfers to or from major drug source countries. To further strengthen reporting requirements, the UNIF drafted a new law to replace the existing banking regulation. Venezuela does not have banking secrecy laws, and comprehensive financial and law enforcement information is available to the UNIF.

Venezuela actively participates in multilateral anti-money laundering efforts. The UNIF is a member of the Egmont Group, and has signed bilateral information exchange agreements with several other financial intelligence units. In 2000, Venezuela was elected vice-president of the Organization of American States Inter-American Commission on Drug Abuse Control (OAS/CICAD) and is a member of the OAS/CICAD Experts Group to Control Money Laundering. It has joined the US-led Black Market Peso Exchange Group along with Colombia, Panama and Aruba. It is a member of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF). Venezuela is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention and in December 2000 it signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

In 1997, the US and Venezuela signed a bilateral Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty. Although ratified by the US government, it was not acted on by the Venezuela National Assembly in 2000 and accordingly has not yet entered into force. The GOV continued to share money-laundering information with US law enforcement authorities under a 1997 Customs Mutual Assistance Agreement, and a 1990 Financial Information Exchange Agreement (FIEA). The information shared has supported domestic operations by DEA that resulted in the seizure of significant amounts of money and several arrests in the United States.

The GOV should adopt the anti-organized crime bill or other appropriate legislation to criminalize the laundering of proceeds from all serious crimes. This will provide the GOV needed tools for effective investigation and prosecution of money laundering and other financial crimes.

Vietnam (Concern). Bordering China, Laos, and Cambodia and having a long coastline make Vietnam a transit country for narcotics trafficked from the Golden Triangle and vulnerable to other forms of transnational crime. There is no indication that extensive money laundering occurs through Vietnam's banking system, but Vietnam has a large shadow economy that may be used to launder money. Vietnamese regularly transfer money through gold shops and other informal mechanisms to remit or receive funds from overseas. Vietnamese use those mechanisms to avoid the official banking system, which they distrust, and to avoid notice by the authorities and tax collectors. Officially, about US $1 billion is recorded each year in overseas remittances, but many estimate that overseas remittances through "gray" channels could be double or even triple that amount. Vietnam has expressed a strong interest in the global fight against money laundering. Vietnam's newly approved legislation criminalizing money laundering is an important step in the direction of creating a legal framework that will help Vietnam deal with money laundering and other forms of financial crime that accompany the implementation of market reforms.

The Vietnamese National Assembly approved Penal Code revisions on December 1, 1999 that included the criminalization of money laundering activity. This new code took effect on July 1, 2000. The newly approved Article 251 of the Vietnamese Penal Code criminalizes the laundering of money or property derived from any crime. Individuals who launder money through financial or banking services or other business transactions are subject to prison sentences of up to five years. If this same activity is committed by an organization, penalties of imprisonment range from 3 to 10 years. "Exceptionally serious" cases may be penalized with 8-10 years in prison.

Article 31 of the new banking law requires financial institutions to report suspicious transactions, although they are only reported to a central authority upon request. Banks are also required to maintain records sufficient to reconstruct significant transactions in order to be able to respond quickly to information requests from appropriate government authorities. The Government of Vietnam has not adopted "due diligence" legislation that make individual bankers or financial institutions responsible if their institutions launder money, however.

Vietnam is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention and participates as an observer in the Asia-Pacific Group on Money Laundering. Vietnam cooperates with neighboring and regional countries to combat money laundering and serious crimes. In December 2000 Vietnam signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

The Government of Vietnam needs to amend its laws and regulations to require due diligence by bankers and the reporting of all suspicious transactions to a central authority that will analyze and disseminate these reports, set guidelines for financial institutions, and cooperate with foreign counterparts.

Yemen (Other). The extent of money laundering in Yemen is not known. However, Yemen's banking sector is small and rudimentary. It is comprised of 11 commercial banks and two public sector specialized banks. The Central Bank of Yemen supervises the country's banks.

Yemen is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Concern). Narcotics trafficking, smuggling, money laundering, and other criminal activities are occurring at a noticeable level in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Prior to the ouster of the Milosevic regime by pro-democracy forces in September and December 2000 elections, there were indications of money laundering and smuggling by government officials, and media reports indicated that government officials and their cronies controlled state-owned companies, the banking system and the black markets for goods in short supply. Government officials were also reported to be controlling the illicit trade in petroleum products, cigarettes, alcohol, and other similarly oriented consumer products.

The new FRY government, led by President Kostunica, has not yet developed comprehensive plans to confront these problems in the face of more immediate and difficult tasks related to establishing political stability in the country. The FRY has not criminalized money laundering nor enacted any anti-money laundering legislation. The FRY does not belong to any international or regional anti-money laundering organizations. The FRY is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention and in December 2000 signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. The FRY will need assistance in achieving political stability as a government prior to developing plans to confront its criminal environment and the associated problem of money laundering.

Zambia (Other). Zambia is not a major financial or money laundering center. It does not yet have in place comprehensive anti-money laundering legislation. In July 2000, the Zambian Drug Enforcement Commission sponsored a two-day workshop in Lusaka for Members of Parliament and representatives of institutions involved with good governance issues. The theme of the workshop was the effect of drug trafficking and money laundering on the nation. The group unanimously recommended that the executive branch reintroduce the Bill on Prohibition and Prevention of Money Laundering, which had been withdrawn following its first reading in Parliament.

Article 22 of Zambia's Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1993, criminalizes money laundering related to narcotics trafficking.

Zambia is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. Zambia is expected to sign the memorandum of understanding for the newly formed Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG).

Zimbabwe (Other). Zimbabwe is not a regional financial center and is not considered to be at significant risk to money laundering.

Zimbabwe's Anti-Money Laundering Act (AMLA) criminalizes narcotics-related money laundering. The Government of Zimbabwe (GOZ) reportedly drafted legislation prior to 2000 that would have required financial institutions to establish customer identification procedures and to report certain threshold transactions to a financial intelligence unit. However, the GOZ to date has not taken further action on these proposals.

Zimbabwe is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Zimbabwe is expected to sign the memorandum of understanding for the newly formed Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG).

[End.]


Financial Havens, Banking Secrecy and Money Laundering
www.imolin.org

Issued as:  Double issue 34 and 35 of the Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Newsletter, Issue 8 of the UNDCP Technical Series

This study was prepared on behalf of the United Nations under the auspices of the Global Programme against Money-Laundering, Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, by: Jack A. Blum, Esq., Prof. Michael Levi, Prof. R. Thomas Naylor and Prof. Phil Williams.

The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Secretariat of the United Nations.

The presentation of material and the designations employed herein do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or the delimitation of any frontiers or boundaries.

Mention of firm names and commercial products does not imply the endorsement of the United Nations.

The material published herein is the property of the United Nations and enjoys copyright protection, in accordance with the provisions of the Universal Copyright Convention Protocol 2, concerning the application of that Convention to the works of certain international organizations. Requests for permission to reprint signed material should be addressed to the Secretary of the Publications Board, United Nations, New York, N.Y. 10017, United States of America.

© Copyright United Nations, 1998—All rights reserved.



Foreword

Ten years ago the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances placed the issue of the proceeds of crime on the world agenda. Among the Convention’s most important and innovative provisions were those that sought to overcome banking and financial secrecy laws where they presented impediments to criminal investigations. Over the past decade, many Member States have made great efforts to increase the transparency of financial dealings and to make financial and commercial records more accessible for bona fide investigations, with a view to giving effect to the anti-money-laundering provisions of the Convention. Today we may look back at the progress made and the challenges that lie ahead. While there has been a general trend towards enacting money-laundering laws that provide for the lifting of financial secrecy in appropriate cases, such secrecy remains a barrier in many jurisdictions, including some of those that have come to be known as "financial havens". In addition, new laundering techniques have been identified, such as the increased use of professionals, corporate registration secrecy and certain types of trusts.

To give a picture of the problem today, at a time when the United Nations General Assembly, at its twentieth Special Session devoted to countering the world drug problem together, has renewed its commitment to take the profit out of crime, I called upon four eminent experts to examine the issues of banking secrecy and financial havens in the context of the fight against money-laundering worldwide. The present study aims to stimulate discussion on bank secrecy and financial havens but is not necessarily intended to reflect the views of the United Nations on the issue. In my view, it will serve as an important contribution to the debate on these issues. I hope that it will also enhance the international community’s commitment to finding solutions to the problems that continue to hamper the progress of financial investigations worldwide.

Pino Arlacchi
Under-Secretary-General
Executive Director, Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention

                                                  Vienna
                                                  29 May 1998



Executive summary

Today, enterprise criminals of every sort, from drug traffickers to stock fraudsters to corporate embezzlers and commodity smugglers, must launder the money flowing from their crimes for two reasons. The first is that the money trail itself can become evidence against the perpetrators of the offence; the second is that the money per se can be the target of investigation and seizure. Regardless of who actually puts the apparatus of money-laundering to use, the operational principles are essentially the same. Money-laundering should be construed as a dynamic three-stage process that requires: firstly, moving the funds from direct association with the crime; secondly, disguising the trail to foil pursuit; and, thirdly, making the money available to the criminal once again with its occupational and geographic origins hidden from view.

Criminal money is frequently moved abroad and then cycled through the international payments system to obscure the audit trail. Despite a myriad of complications, there is a simple structure that underlies almost all international money-laundering activities during this stage of the process. The launderer often calls on one of the many jurisdictions that offer an instant-corporation manufacturing business. Many sell "offshore" corporations, which are licensed to conduct business only outside the country of incorporation, are free of tax or regulation and are protected by corporate secrecy laws. Once the corporation is set up in the offshore jurisdiction, a bank deposit is made in the haven country in the name of that offshore company, particularly one whose owner’s identity is protected by corporate secrecy laws. Thus, between the law enforcement authorities and the launderer, there is one level of bank secrecy, one level of corporate secrecy and possibly the additional protection of lawyer-client privilege if counsel in the corporate secrecy haven has been designated to establish and run the company. In addition, many laundering schemes involve a third layer of cover, that of the offshore trust, which is usually protected by secrecy laws and may have an additional level of insulation in the form of a "flee clause" that permits, indeed compels, the trustee to shift the domicile of the trust whenever the trust is threatened.

In essence, the rule in successful money-laundering is always to approximate, as closely as possible, legal transactions. As a result, the actual devices used are themselves minor variations on methods employed routinely by legitimate businesses. In the hands of criminals, transfer-pricing between affiliates of transnational corporations turns into phony invoicing; inter-affiliate real estate transactions become reverse-flip property deals; back-to-back loans turn into loan-back scams; hedge or insurance trading in stocks or options becomes matched- or cross-trading; and compensating balances develop into the so-called underground banking schemes. On the surface it may be impossible to differentiate between the legal and illegal variants; the distinction becomes clear only once a particular criminal act has been targeted and the authorities subsequently begin to unravel the money trail.

There have been a number of developments in the international financial system during recent decades that have made the three F’s—finding, freezing and forfeiting of criminally derived income and assets—all the more difficult. These are the "dollarization" (i.e. the use of the United States dollar in transactions) of black markets, the general trend towards financial deregulation, the progress of the Euromarket and the proliferation of financial secrecy havens.

Fuelled by advances in technology and communications, the financial infrastructure has developed into a perpetually operating global system in which "megabyte money" (i.e. money in the form of symbols on computer screens) can move anywhere in the world with speed and ease. The world of offshore financial centres and bank secrecy jurisdictions is a key part of this but can also be understood as a system with distinct but complementary and reinforcing components, many of which are readily amenable to manipulation by criminals. These components are examined in detail in the present study.

The characteristics of offshore financial centres and bank secrecy jurisdictions can be understood as a tool kit that can be used not only to launder the proceeds of drug trafficking and other crimes but also to commit certain kinds of financial crime. Not all jurisdictions are equally lax, however, and the study provides a brief overview of the geography of the world of these financial and bank-secrecy havens. This world is in a constant flux that reflects differential responses to the complex balancing act between competitiveness, on the one hand, and high ethical business standards, on the other. The optimum competitive position is one in which the centre is neither too stringent in vetting customers nor too obviously indiscriminate in accepting all custom.

Serious efforts have been, and continue to be, made to create greater transparency in financial matters, but the offshore financial world remains for a large part a "Bermuda triangle" for financial investigations.

Law enforcement success stories presented in this study convey a sense of the imaginative, and sometimes rather crude, ways in which financial havens are used to hide, move and clean the proceeds of crime, in an area usually characterized by criminal successes and law enforcement failures. The cases highlight the advantages, from the point of view of criminals, of collusion with bank employees and the use of professional launderers. They also reveal how criminals are able to exploit what for them has, in effect, become a borderless world. It is this combination of rapid and largely anonymous transfers and protective destinations that anti-money-laundering efforts need to pierce.

In this context, some issues meriting further consideration include:

The common denominator in money-laundering and a variety of financial crimes is the enabling machinery that has been created in the financial havens and offshore centres. The effectiveness of these centres in helping people and companies to hide assets is not the result of any single device. Changing bank secrecy rules alone will not help. Rather, the centres have created a tool kit composed of new corporate instruments, foundations, trusts, trust companies, banks and bank accounts. The tools are mixed and matched with jurisdictions that have made a point of non-cooperation with the rest of the international community in criminal and tax investigations. What started as a business to service the needs of a privileged few has become an enormous hole in the international legal and fiscal system. If the international community is to develop a rule of law to match the globalization of trade and the global movement of people, the questions raised by this hole in the system will have to be addressed. The world community will have to face the issue of the use of sovereignty by some countries to give the citizens of other countries a way around the laws of their own societies.



Explanatory notes

References to dollars ($) are to United States dollars, unless otherwise stated.
The term "billion" signifies a thousand million.

Abbreviations

The following abbreviations of organizations are used in this publication:


AEB American Express Bank International
BCCI Bank of Credit and Commerce International
CFATF Caribbean Financial Action Task Force
CHIPS Clearing House Interbank Payments System
DEA Drug Enforcement Agency
EUB European Union Bank
EUROPOL European Police Office
FATF Financial Action Task Force
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FRB Federal Reserve Bank
FRS Federal Reserve System
Interpol International Criminal Police Organization
IRS Internal Revenue Service
OGBS Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors
OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
SWIFT Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications System


The following economic and technical abbreviations are used in this publication:


IBCs international business corporations
GNP gross national product
MLAT mutual legal assistance treaty
PTAs payable-through accounts


Contents

Foreword
Executive summary
Explanatory notes
Introduction

I. The money-laundering cycle in action
Definition and purpose of money-laundering
Money-laundering and tax evasion
The apparatus in action
The changing frontier of money-laundering
The changing financial context

II. The global financial system, offshore financial centres and bank secrecy jurisdictions
The global financial system
The origins of offshore financial centres
The legitimate uses of offshore financial centres and bank secrecy
The offshore financial system
The geography of offshore financial centres and bank secrecy jurisdictions

III. Cases involving financial havens and bank secrecy jurisdictions
Case studies in the use of offshore financial centres and bank secrecy jurisdictions
Assessment and commentary

IV. Offshore finance, banking secrecy and the organization of crime
Inhibitors and facilitators of crime: the role of regulation and financial structures
Action against financial intermediaries
Legal provisions as inhibitors and facilitators of crime
Corporate criminal liability
Taxation and liability
Constructive trust liability
Enforcement of remedies
Conclusion

V. Issues for consideration
Sovereignty
Secrecy
International business corporations
Trusts
Lawyer-client privilege: the role of the professional
Credit cards
Currency
Elimination of free trade zone abuse
Gambling as a cover
Need for essential data
Intelligence and information exchange
Offshore banking
Securities firms
Law enforcement cooperation
Predicate offences
Training
Bankruptcy
Law reform commission
Bank secrecy
Why reforms are needed

Footnotes

About the Authors

Figures
1.  The money-laundering cycle
2.  The 10 fundamental laws of money-laundering
3.  Features of an ideal financial haven
4.  United States payments structure, 1995
5.  Promotion of the European Union Bank on the Internet

Map.  Major financial havens



Introduction

The major money-laundering cases coming to light in recent years share a common feature: criminal organizations are making wide use of the opportunities offered by financial havens and offshore centres to launder criminal assets, thereby creating roadblocks to criminal investigations. Financial havens offer an extensive array of facilities to foreign investors who are unwilling to disclose the origin of their assets, from the registration of international business corporations (IBCs) or shell companies to the services of a number of offshore banks, which are not subject to control by regulatory authorities. The difficulties for law enforcement agents are amplified by the fact that, in many cases, financial havens enforce very strict financial secrecy, effectively shielding foreign investors from investigations and prosecutions from their home countries. While bank secrecy and financial havens are distinct issues, they have in common both a legitimate purpose and a commercial justification. At the same time, they can offer unlimited protection to criminals when they are abused for the purpose of doing business at any cost.

These two issues are analysed in the present study because the recent history of international money-laundering control makes it clear that the indiscriminate enforcement of bank secrecy laws, as well as the rapid development of financial havens, constitute serious obstacles to criminal investigations and jeopardize efforts undertaken by the international community since the adoption of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988 (the 1988 Convention), which first established money-laundering as a criminal offence.

The best example of the opportunities, and immunities, offered to money launderers was the Bank for Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), which collapsed in 1991, uncovering the widest money-laundering scheme ever and leading to the seizure of more than $12 billion. The BCCI case, which is described in more detail in chapter III, generated a shock wave in financial markets and among the supervisory authorities of all countries affected by the scandal, forcing them to tighten up regulations to prevent the use of financial markets for money-laundering purposes.

However, six years later, another prominent case was revealed following the bankruptcy of the Antigua-based European Union Bank, demonstrating that the problem had gained a new dimension with the application of modern technologies. The European Union Bank was founded by two Russians and is alleged to have been used to launder the illicit proceeds of Russian organized crime. This bank, which was operating on the Internet, offered its clients (according to its advertisements on the net) "the strictest standards of banking privacy in offshore business" and the "financial rewards of offshore banking". Chapter III further analyses the case of the European Union Bank.

There are important and sobering lessons to be learned from the experience with the European Union Bank. Among the more important are the following:

In short, bank secrecy and offshore banking offer multiple opportunities for money-laundering and various other criminal activities. In the early and mid-1980s the Permanent Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Governmental Affairs in the United States Senate held a series of hearings on offshore banking and bank secrecy. The chairman, Senator William Roth, noted that "we have repeatedly heard testimony about major narcotics traffickers and other criminals who use offshore institutions to launder their ill gotten profits or to hide them from the Internal Revenue Service. Haven secrecy laws in an ever increasing number of cases prevent U.S. law enforcement officials from obtaining the evidence they need to convict U.S. criminals and recover illegal funds. It would appear that the use of offshore haven secrecy laws is the glue that holds many U.S. criminal operations together".2 If the immediate reaction to this is that little or nothing has changed in the last decade and a half, a more considered assessment might suggest that, in fact, the situation has deteriorated with a much larger cast of characters now using offshore financial centres for criminal purposes.

This study examines the world of offshore financial centres and bank secrecy jurisdictions in the context of the control of money-laundering and financial crime. It looks at offshore financial centres and bank secrecy jurisdictions as facilitators of money-laundering and other forms of crime, elucidates the ways in which they are used by criminals and identifies a series of remedies or counter-measures that would block or at the very least diminish the attractions of these havens. Chapter I outlines the various stages of money-laundering, warns against using the term in a loose or promiscuous manner and identifies various kinds of secrecy that facilitate money-laundering and other crimes. Chapter II looks at the legitimate as well as the criminal uses of offshore financial and bank secrecy jurisdictions and explains briefly how bank secrecy and offshore banking evolved. It locates offshore banking and bank secrecy jurisdictions within the global financial system, suggesting that the system is a highly congenial one for both licit entrepreneurs and for those trying to launder and hide the proceeds of crime as well as for those who typically exploit loopholes and variations in tax and other laws.

Jurisdictions that offer high levels of secrecy, and a variety of financial mechanisms and institutions providing anonymity for the beneficial owners are highly attractive to criminals for a wide variety of reasons including the potential cover and protection they offer for money-laundering and various exercises in financial fraud. Not all offshore financial centres and bank secrecy jurisdictions provide the same services, however, and there are important differences in the schemes they offer to ensure anonymity, the extent of the secrecy they provide and their willingness to cooperate with international law enforcement investigations. Consequently, chapter II also provides an overview of what might be termed the geography of offshore banking and bank secrecy.

Chapter III looks at the way in which offshore financial centres and bank secrecy jurisdictions are used by criminals. It highlights not only the way in which money is often moved to and through offshore banks or bank secrecy jurisdictions as part of money-laundering efforts, but also other ways in which offshore jurisdictions are used by criminals. Chapter IV looks at offshore banking and bank secrecy as inhibitors and facilitators for law enforcement investigations, with attention to both de jure and de facto limits to cooperation. Chapter V looks at issues for consideration in relation to preventive and control measures that might be taken to enhance compliance with the 1988 Convention and to make it more difficult for money launderers and other criminals to exploit particular banking jurisdictions with the ease and benefits they do at the moment.



I.  The money-laundering cycle in action

Efforts to curb the laundering of criminally derived incomes have only recently assumed a prominent position on the priority list of law enforcement agencies; the very term "money-laundering" is of quite recent origin. Yet it is safe to say that as long as there has been a need, whether for political, commercial or legal reasons, to hide the nature or the existence of financial transfers, some sort of money-laundering has occurred.

In medieval times when the Catholic Church banned usury as not only a crime (rather like the status achieved by drug trafficking today) but also a mortal sin, merchants and moneylenders intent on collecting interest on loans engaged in a wide variety of practices that anticipated modern techniques for hiding, moving and washing criminal money. The central objective was to make interest charges either disappear altogether (hiding their existence) or appear to be something other than what they were (disguising their nature).

This deception could be accomplished in several ways. When merchants negotiated payments over long distances, they would artificially inflate the exchange rates sufficiently to cover interest payments as well. They would claim that interest payments were a special premium to compensate for risk. They would make interest appear to be a penalty for late payment, with lender and borrower agreeing in advance that such a delay would take place. They would pretend that interest payments were really profits by using something similar to today’s "shell companies" (companies that have no real operational role). Capital would be lent to the company and then taken back again, supposedly in the form of profits rather than of interest on the loan, even though no profits had really been made. All of these tricks to deceive the Church authorities have their rough equivalents today in the techniques used to launder criminal money flows.

If money-laundering can be said to have a long history, so too can the financial havens that are so often a necessary part of it. Among the early users of such havens were the pirates who preyed on European commerce in the Atlantic during the early seventeenth century. There were places that openly welcomed the pirates for the money they would spend. And when the time came to retire from the business, pirates often sought safe havens abroad. Mediterranean city states, much like some of today’s financial haven jurisdictions, competed to have pirates (and their money) take up residence. On the other hand, sometimes their loot was used to buy pardons to permit them to return home. In fact, the year 1612 may have witnessed the first modern amnesty to criminal money: England offered pirates who abandoned their profession both a full pardon and the right to keep their proceeds, anticipating by more than three and a half centuries similar deals requested by prominent drug barons from some modern states.3 

Asset seizure in criminal cases is also not new. Many of the antecedents of modern laws facilitating the freezing and confiscating of criminally derived income and wealth have their roots in the medieval European notion of deodand (gift to God) and have come down into modern law in many countries through the English common law tradition. Originally, most forfeitures were a penalty for political rather than economic offences. Later, under common law, any felony conviction could lead to forfeiture of wealth and estates. While forfeitures are no longer used in such a sweeping way, in one respect there is basic continuity. Early forfeitures were justified in public in much the same terms as modern asset-seizure laws, namely by their deterrent effects; in fact, again like some modern forfeiture laws, it was often more because of their usefulness in raising revenues for the Crown.

Even after the practice of automatically stripping all felons of their wealth died out, forfeitures continued to be applied in peacetime to enforce customs regulations and in wartime against enemies or enemy sympathizers. It is from those traditions—seizures in contraband cases and the notion of societies at war (drug wars or crime wars now replacing military ones)—that most of the rationalization for modern asset forfeiture derives.4 

While acts of money-laundering, use of financial havens and applications of asset-seizure laws (and even "black money" amnesties5 ) all have historical precedents, not until very recently has the act of attempting to launder criminally derived income and wealth been made a crime per se. Traditionally the focus was on the underlying offence generating the money. Asset seizures, to the extent they were used in economically motivated crimes, were punishment for that underlying offence. Today there has been a radical change. Starting in the United States in 1986 and progressing rapidly around the world, the trend is now to criminalize the very act of laundering money and to make the act of laundering, completely independent of the underlying offence, grounds for asset forfeiture. In fact, in some jurisdictions that have taken this path, laundering the proceeds of crime can lead to far more severe penalties than the underlying offences.

This has not occurred without considerable controversy. The problem has been that there is something quite unique about the crime of money-laundering. Unlike the underlying offences, be they drug trafficking or armed robbery, illegal toxic-waste dumping or extortion, money-laundering consists of a set of actions; each is innocent by itself but in total they add up to an attempt to hide the proceeds of a criminal act. It is not always immediately obvious to persons outside law enforcement what harm has been done by money-laundering, who (leaving aside fiscal considerations) has been injured and therefore why it should be an offence at all. Thus, the difficulty of convincingly demonstrating the harmful effects of money-laundering is one reason for the delays and hesitations in making money-laundering a crime. In many jurisdictions it still is not.

There is no doubt, however, that the current trend is towards criminalizing money-laundering all over the world. There are several reasons for this. One is acceptance of the theory that it does little good to attack criminals while leaving the proceeds untouched: the net profits constitute both the motive, namely personal enrichment, for the underlying offence and the means, namely working capital, for further crime. There is also a presumption that, in the past, those who committed offences might have been punished, but those, like the willing money managers who facilitated it, went unscathed, and that this situation requires rectification.

There have also been more immediately practical reasons. Money-laundering statutes are seen as a handy tool, not just for widening the enforcement net to include previously exempt categories of participants in criminal acts but also for creating a means for imposing potentially heavier sentences on those charged with the underlying offence and for therefore using the threat of such heavier charges to secure cooperation. Not least, there is a trend to use asset-forfeiture laws that are so often a part of the anti-money-laundering drive as a device for financing police activities.

Definition and purpose of money-laundering

Today money-laundering attracts the most attention when associated with trafficking in illicit narcotics. However enterprising, criminals of every sort, from stock fraudsters to corporate embezzlers to commodity smugglers, must launder the money flow for two reasons. The first is that the money trail itself can become evidence against the perpetrators of the offence; the second is that the money per se can be the target of investigation and action.

Legitimate business corporations, too, might have recourse to the techniques of laundering whenever they need to disguise the payment of a bribe or kickback. In the current climate, where there has been a highly publicized backlash against corporate and public-sector corruption, laundering in bribery cases is likely to attract an increasing amount of attention. In fact even Governments make occasional use of the same apparatus—to dodge reparations, evade the impact of sanctions or covertly fund political interference in some rival state.

Regardless of who actually puts the apparatus of money-laundering to use, or what strange twists and turns it takes, the operational principles are essentially the same. Strictly speaking, money-laundering should be construed as a dynamic three-stage process that requires: firstly, moving the funds from direct association with the crime; secondly, disguising the trail to foil pursuit; and, thirdly, making the money available to the criminal once again with its occupational and geographic origins hidden from view.6  In this respect money-laundering is more than merely smuggling or hiding tainted funds, although those acts may constitute essential constituents of the process.

Perhaps the most logical way to keep the nature of the process of laundering distinct from some of its constituent parts is to stress the difference between hiding the existence of criminal money and disguising its nature. If criminal money is hidden from the view of the law, for example if it is spent in the form of anonymous cash or moved to a jurisdiction where there are no sanctions against the use of money of illegal origin, it can scarcely be described as "laundered". All that has happened is that criminally derived money has had its existence hidden from the law enforcement authorities of the place where the underlying offence has been perpetrated. However, if the money is given the appearance of legitimate provenance in a place where sanctions against its illegal origins do exist, then and only then can it be said to be truly laundered—it has had its nature disguised.

Money-laundering and tax evasion

The nature of the laundering process raises important issues of tax enforcement. While illicit money is being earned, criminals will attempt to ensure that it escapes the scrutiny of the authorities, including fiscal ones. Once the money has been laundered, this is no longer necessary. Although tax evasion and money-laundering share several techniques and can be mutually supporting, it is important to understand that operationally they are quite distinct processes. In general, tax evasion involves taking legally earned income and either hiding its very existence (if, for example, it is skimmed in cash) or disguising its nature (by making it appear to fall into a non-taxable category). In either event, it turns legal into illegal income. Money-laundering does the opposite. It takes illegally earned income and gives it the appearance of being legally earned. In terms of their impact on the fiscal position of a country, evasion and laundering also have quite opposite effects.

Earnings of a legal enterprise can be thought of as falling roughly into two categories. Part of the gross proceeds is used to cover expenses, including wages, material costs and interest payments due to those who lent operating funds. Part is left over as profit, which in turn can be either reinvested or distributed to owners who may consume it or save it.

However, when illegal goods and services are sold, the results are different. As before, part of the gross proceeds of illegal activity is used to cover expenses of operation and part represents profit, some of which may be reinvested and some distributed to owners. But there is a further division. Regardless of whether earnings are used to cover expenses or to reward owners, some remain in the illegal sector and some may be recycled into the legal one. Of that which surfaces in the legal economy, part may be used to meet expenses owed to illegal suppliers; part may be used to meet expenses owed to legal suppliers; and part may become the apparently legitimate property of the owners of the business, who, in turn, may reinvest it in illegal business, reinvest it in legal business, consume it or save it (by acquiring legitimate assets). The actual form the laundering process takes will depend at least to some degree on the intended disposition of the funds.

However, one thing remains true. All of the portion of the criminal earnings that appears in the legal economy potentially attracts the attention of the fiscal authorities. Undoubtedly criminals are as eager as any other entrepreneurs to reduce their fiscal burden, but some such burden is almost inevitable. Tax evaders under-report the earnings of their legal enterprises, thereby paying less tax than they legally should. Criminals, by contrast, over-report the earnings of any legal enterprises they use for cover, therefore paying more tax than their legitimate front companies would normally be required.

This is not to suggest that the State would be fiscally better off if legitimate businesses that evade taxes on their legally earned income shifted to explicitly criminal activity on which some taxes were paid. Clearly, even though criminals will pay some taxes on the portion of their illegal earnings that is laundered, overall they will evade taxes on as much of their overall earnings as possible. The point is that, contrary to the stereotype that sees criminal activity as an off-the-books, unrecorded and untaxed activity (with its existence hidden from the authorities), once the money is laundered it becomes at least in part on-the-books, recorded and taxed, albeit with its precise nature disguised.

Perhaps the easiest way to understand the distinction is to consider the example of the market for illicit sexual services. A prostitute working the streets might accept cash—the transaction is anonymous, it does not enter the national income accounts of the country and it escapes both formal regulation and taxation. But a prostitute working through the front of a legally registered escort agency or massage parlor might well be paid through checks or credit cards—the transaction is recorded, but it enters the national economic statistics in a misreported way, and it is subject to at least some degree of taxation. In the second example, the earnings are laundered—their nature is disguised but their existence is not hidden.

The apparatus in action

At home

The term money-laundering seems to have been coined in the United States in the 1920s when street gangs sought a seemingly legitimate explanation for the origins of the money their rackets were generating. Their reasons for so doing were varied: to hide their material success from corrupt police intent on collecting protection payments; to avoid attracting the (often brutal) attention of envious competitors; or, a little later, to evade the possibility of tax evasion charges, something discovered in the early 1930s to be a powerful weapon against otherwise impregnable criminals.

To accomplish these goals, the street gang might take over cash-based, retail service businesses. The most popular choices were clothes laundries and car washes, hence, it seems, the origin of the term. However, other businesses, such as vending-machine service companies, could function almost as well. The point was to mix illegal and legal cash and report the total as the earnings of the cover business. In so doing, all three stages of a classic money-laundering cycle were combined in essentially one step—the money was distanced (physically or metaphysically) from the crime, hidden in the accounts of a legitimate business and then resurfaced as the earnings of a firm with a plausible reason for generating that much cash. Simple though that process appears to be, it has remained the core of most money-laundering strategies, no matter how apparently complex.

There are a wide variety of techniques available today by which money can be laundered. The choice depends partly upon the following criteria:

The simplest forms of laundering take place strictly within the jurisdiction in which the underlying offence has been committed. If the sums involved are relatively small and/or episodic in nature, there are a number of techniques in which all three stages of the laundering cycle can be neatly combined. Race tracks are classic examples—the launderer simply uses his/her illegal cash to purchase winning tickets, probably paying the true winner a premium, and then presents the ticket for payment. The funds can therefore be accounted for as legitimate earnings from gambling. This is a technique with a long history, and it continues to be used today.

Much the same can occur with state lotteries—there have even been brokerage rings buying winning tickets and reselling them to persons with money to launder. An additional advantage of lottery schemes is that winnings are often tax-free.

More sophisticated techniques using the same general principle can be run with the aid of stock or commodity brokers. The person seeking to launder money buys spot and sells forward, or the reverse. One transaction records a capital gain, the other a capital loss. The broker destroys the record of the losing transaction and the launderer exits with the money now appearing as capital gains. The cost is the double commission plus any hush money demanded by the broker.

Property deals are also similar. Someone seeking to wash money purchases a piece of property, paying with formal bank instruments and legitimately earned money for a publicly recorded price that is much below the real market value. The rest of the purchase price is paid in cash under-the-table. The property is then resold for the full market value and the money recouped, with the illegal component now appearing to be capital gains on a real estate transaction.

Such techniques, while seemingly popular, are usually employed only episodically and for relatively small sums. No one can convincingly appear lucky at the track too often. To handle on-going flows of criminal money, recourse is usually had to a cash-based retail service business—car-washes and laundries, video-game arcades and video-cassette rental stores, bars and restaurants have long been favourites. The principle is simple: the illegal money is mixed with the legal and the entire sum reported as the earnings of the legitimate business.

When the sums become larger and law enforcement in the immediate jurisdiction is seen as particularly dangerous, the laundering process will more likely involve an international dimension. At this point the three stages in the cycle become both logically and chronologically distinct.

Moving the money abroad

The first task is to move the funds from the country of origin. This can be done by either sidestepping or working through the formal banking system. If the decision is made to sidestep the system, the most popular method appears to be shipping money abroad in bulk cash. Sometimes items like diamonds or gold or even precious stamps and other collectibles are also used; the criterion is that they be of high value in relation to bulk, making them physically easy to smuggle as well as relatively easy to reconvert into cash at the point of destination. However, cash is clearly far more important than valuable commodities.

Although an increasing number of countries demand the reporting of the export of all monetary instruments, the record of success is not very encouraging. Bulk cash, particularly in large denomination bills, can still be easily carried out of a country in hand-luggage. While the United States $100 bill is the favourite, others exist that could be useful provided the currency is well-known and universally accepted. The largest denomination deutsche mark and the Swiss franc notes would qualify whereas the Singapore dollar, available in $10,000 denominations, would probably be used only rarely and within a limited geographic area. Even if controls on hand luggage are tightened, bulk cash can be easily moved through checked personal luggage, particularly if the passenger travels by ship. And of course the money can be stuffed into bulk commercial containers whose sheer volume defeats any systematic efforts to monitor them. To the extent detection does occur, it is the result of either blind luck or informants’ tips. Clearly the problem of currency smuggling will increase as world trade grows, borders become more open to both people and goods and currencies become more convertible.

The person whose funds are to be moved does not have to assume the risk personally. There are professional courier networks that will handle the job and guarantee delivery. Unfortunately, sometimes couriers possess diplomatic passports, so they and their effects are at least partially immune from search and, in any event, such couriers may be subject to little more than deportation if caught. There is open traffic in diplomatic credentials that should be curbed.

Various lateral transfer schemes are also used to export money. These work through compensating balances, a simple principle that has long been used in legitimate trade, particularly when dealing with countries that have exchange controls and/or legally inconvertible currencies.

Consider the example:

            Assume Business I in country A owes $X to Business II in country B.

            Assume Business II in country B owes $X to Business III in country A.

            To settle the debts without compensating balancing:

            Business I would ship $X to Business II

            Business II would ship $X to Business III

This requires two international transfers and four distinct withdrawal and deposit transactions.

To settle the debts with a compensating balance all that happens is that Business I in country A settles the debt owed by Business II to Business III in country A. There are only two banking transactions, from the account of Business I to the account of Business II and no international transfers.

Obviously in reality the mechanics are much more complex, the sums do not exactly balance and the exchanges are usually multilateral. Still, the principle remains intact. The practice is commonplace, and there are even financial brokers who specialize in arranging such transfers.

However, the compensating balance principle is also the basis of operation of the so-called underground banking systems that are becoming more and more popular today as ethnic diasporas grow. Someone in country A seeking to move funds abroad contacts the underground banker and deposits a certain sum. The underground banker sends a coded message to his/her correspondent abroad to credit the equivalent of the deposited sum (less the fee) to a foreign bank account held in the name of the person seeking to move the money out of country A. No actual funds have to move. And the offsetting transaction occurs when someone else abroad attempts to move money back into country A. It is neat and untraceable, particularly when cemented by bonds of extended family trust typical of some ethnic communities living and conducting business abroad.

Nonetheless, it cannot be stressed too often that, like so much "informal finance", techniques of underground banking really have benign origins. They were evolved for perfectly legitimate purposes, reflect institutional underdevelopment and/or unfamiliarity with or lack of confidence in the formal banking systems and have been, in some cases, unfairly targeted by law enforcement officials for criticism. It is impossible to avoid the conclusion that ethnic and cultural misunderstandings, even on occasion prejudice, have played a role in some of the adverse attention focused on these so-called underground banking systems. They can indeed be used for criminal purposes, but so too can life insurance companies and nursing homes.7 

When the decision is made to send criminal money abroad using the formal banking system, additional precautions are required. Any large cash deposit potentially attracts attention. There are also jurisdictions that subject large cash deposits to some form of additional mandatory scrutiny. This can vary from the United States model of automatic reporting of sums above a certain threshold to others that rely instead on suspicious transaction reports.

Enormous backlogs of information are generated by cash transaction reporting systems, a problem that will be only partially solved by electronic filings on the Australian model. Ultimately cash deposit reports, whether in paper or in electronic form, are of little use unless there are not only the resources to process them but also personnel who know what they are looking for. Yet, to date knowledge about the nature, structure and operation of illegal markets remains so rudimentary that there is little logic to piling up raw information until some of those gaps in understanding are addressed.

Equally notorious, in response to the cash transaction reporting systems, are the multiple schemes launderers have devised to get around the reporting rules: prior conversion of cash to checks through formal or informal check-cashing services; breaking cash deposits down to sums below the reporting threshold; securing an exemption from reporting; and even bribing bank staff.

However, whichever system of formalized scrutiny, if any, is in operation, one rule remains. Large deposits (whether in cash or in checks) with no apparent justification potentially attract attention. Unlike the situation even a decade ago, so much public attention has been focused on instances when banks accepted a huge bundle of cash from unknown parties and either wired it abroad or converted it into bearer instruments, this avenue is likely going to be used less often. Successful money-laundering today probably requires working through a front business, one that has a credible explanation for its level of deposits and—something vital when the next stage begins—an equally credible explanation for moving the funds abroad.8 

Such a company would be one that engages regularly in international trade in goods and/or services. A clever laundering operation would assure that any "payments" it makes to supposed suppliers abroad are in odd rather than round sums and that those sums are not repeated. It might also divide the payments between "suppliers" in several countries, alternate between wire and written forms of remittance and ensure that the nominal recipients appear to have sound business reputations. Although services are the best, for there are no clear rules against which to check the prices being charged to the domestic company, there is some evidence that trade in physical goods can be used as cover for criminal money transfers too. Recent investigations by two university professors in Florida revealed huge discrepancies in the prices at which commodities enter and leave the United States when compared to international norms and even from country to country. Although it is likely that most such price discrepancies are due to tax evasion or capital flight, there is likely to be an element of money-laundering as well.9 

The above actually points to a potentially fatal weakness in money-laundering schemes that may not have been sufficiently exploited. The usual presumption of law enforcement is that, once the money is inside the banking system, most of the battle is lost. Accordingly, much of the regulatory effort is put into building, if not barriers, then at least screening mechanisms against that happening. However, money inside the domestic banking system is not yet money inside the international banking system. And there is an asymmetry in the types of front companies needed for these two distinct transactions. If the best cover for placing deposits inside the domestic financial system is a cash-based retail service business, the best cover for sending money abroad is a company that engages in international trade in goods and services. There are serious grounds for questioning why a company engaged in domestic retail services should be sending significant sums abroad, especially if done on a regular basis. And there are serious grounds for wondering why a company engaged in international trade in goods and services (which is, by definition, a wholesale operation) should have large sums of cash deposited in its domestic accounts. Such anomalies can serve as a red flag to alert bank staff that something requires further explanation.

Seeing the world

Once the money is abroad, it is time for stage two of the laundering cycle, moving it through the international payments system to obscure the trail. Despite a myriad of complications, there is a simple structure that underlies almost all international money-laundering activities during this stage of the process.

Contrary to popular stereotypes, only the rankest of amateurs would arrive at the front door of a Swiss bank with a suitcase of high-denomination United States bank notes and demand to open a "numbered" account.10  That would undoubtedly both begin and end the would-be launderer’s life of crime. To be sure, Switzerland has not lost all of its appeal as a financial haven. It is stable politically; the Swiss franc is strong and well-respected; the country plays a major role in the world gold market; and it has a variety of banking institutions. The latter range from powerful multi-functional institutions that are well-represented all over the world and that combine commercial and investment banking with fund management and stock brokerage services to small, discrete private banks that specialize in handling the affairs of the "high net-worth individual".

Over the last two decades, however, the Swiss authorities have progressively reduced the protection afforded by the country’s famed secrecy laws, signed treaties of cooperation in criminal investigation with other countries and moved actively and rigorously to freeze suspect accounts in everything from embezzlement to insider trading to drug trafficking cases. Switzerland also made money-laundering a crime per se. Undoubtedly, given the size and historical reputation of the Swiss financial system, much criminal money still finds refuge there, but it cannot be said that Switzerland rolls out the welcome mat for drug money (that deriving from tax and exchange control evasion is quite another matter), and most such money that does arrive in Switzerland probably now is subject to a pre-washing elsewhere.

Well before a reasonably sophisticated money launderer will attempt to establish a bank account in any haven jurisdiction, there are preliminary steps to be taken. Bank secrecy can often be waived in the event of a criminal investigation. It is for that reason criminal money is normally held not by an individual (even with a "numbered" account) but by a corporation. Prior to the money being sent to Austria, Luxembourg, Switzerland or any other financial haven, the launderer will probably call on one of the many jurisdictions that offer an instant-corporation manufacturing business. The Cayman Islands, the British Virgin Islands, Liberia and Panama are among the favourites, although there are many others that sell "offshore" corporations that are licensed to conduct business only outside the country of incorporation, are free of tax or regulation and are protected by corporate secrecy laws. Preferably for the launderer, such a company will already have a history of actual activity to increase the appearance of legitimacy. Once the corporation is set up in the offshore jurisdiction, a bank deposit is then made in the haven country in the name of that offshore company, particularly one whose owner’s identity is protected by corporate secrecy laws. Thus, between the law enforcement authorities and the launderer, there is one level of bank secrecy, one level of corporate secrecy and possibly the additional protection of client-attorney privilege if a lawyer in the corporate secrecy haven has been designated to establish and run the company.

In addition, many laundering schemes devise yet a third layer of cover, that of the offshore trust. There are many perfectly legal reasons for the establishment of offshore trusts, some rather dubious ones (dodging decisions of tax or divorce courts being the most common) and a few clearly illegal ones. The advantage of a trust is that the owner of assets conveys that ownership irrevocably to the trust and therefore prevents those assets from being seized by creditors. Offshore trusts are usually protected by secrecy laws and may have an additional level of insulation in the form of a "flee clause" that permits, indeed compels, the trustee to shift the domicile of the trust whenever the trust is threatened—by war, civil unrest or even by probes from law enforcement officers. The obvious disadvantage is the nominal loss of control by the owner: in theory a deed of trust is irrevocable, and the former owner can influence, but can not control, the actions of the trustee.11 

In the past Liechtenstein was a favourite place in which to set up such a trust. In fact, it was probably the only jurisdiction that is not part of the English common law tradition to have such facilities. The Liechtenstein anstalt, unlike most trusts, is a commercial entity capable of doing business; it can make the transferor of the assets the ultimate beneficiary, thereby undermining the notion that the conveyance is irrevocable. Today, however, the very term anstalt in a company name can serve as yet another red flag for revenue authorities and law enforcement officers. "Asset-protection trusts" offered by many former and current British dependencies are an equally serious problem. If suitably set up, they have all of the advantages of the Liechtenstein model. Typically, assets are first conveyed to an offshore company; control of the company is transferred to the offshore asset-protection trust; the person transferring the assets arranges to be appointed manager of the company; and the trust deed may stipulate that the transferor of the assets has the right to buy them back again for a nominal sum, thereby respecting the letter of the law of trusts while undermining its spirit.

Whatever the exact form it takes, the offshore asset-protection trust creates yet another layer of secrecy and security in a money-laundering scheme, and it can be complemented by yet more tricks and devices. Companies can be capitalized with bearer shares so there is no owner on record anywhere—the person who physically possesses the share certificates owns the company. There can be multiple systems of interlocking companies, all incorporated in different places, forcing law enforcement officers to proceed from jurisdiction to jurisdiction peeling them away like layers of an onion. There can be multiple bank transfers, again from country to country, where each transfer is protected by secrecy laws that must be breached one at a time. The funds transfer trail can be broken on occasion with the launderer picking up the money in cash from a bank in one place, redepositing it in a bank somewhere else and then wiring it to yet a third location. The trail can be further complicated if the launderer purchases his/her own "instant bank" in one of several jurisdictions that offer such facilities and makes sure that his/her bank is one of those through which the money passes, then closes the bank and/or destroys the records.12

Once the funds have been moved through the international financial system sufficiently to make their origins extremely difficult, if not impossible, to trace, it is time to move them home again, to be enjoyed as consumption or employed as capital.

Heading home

Many techniques can be used for this stage. Ten (among many) possibilities are listed below:13 

The changing frontier of money-laundering

The 10 fundamental "laws" of money-laundering are summarized in figure 2. In essence, the rule in successful money-laundering is always to approximate, as closely as possible, legal transactions. As a result the actual devices used are themselves minor variations on methods employed routinely by legitimate businesses. In the hands of criminals, transfer-pricing between affiliates of transnational corporations grades into phony invoicing, inter-affiliate real estate transactions become reverse-flip property deals, back-to-back loans turn into loan-back scams, hedge or insurance trading in stocks or options become matched- or cross-trading, and compensating balances develop into so-called underground banking schemes. On the surface it may be impossible to differentiate legal and illegal variants—the distinction becomes clear only once a particular criminal act has been targeted and the authorities subsequently begin to unravel the money trail.

The trend towards institutional commingling is enhanced by three other developments. One, which became evident first with drugs and now is increasingly apparent in other forms of illegal economic activity, is that criminal entrepreneurs have shifted from serving a set of essentially unrelated regional markets to catering to an increasingly integrated world-wide market.15 There appears to have been a parallel change in money-laundering. There is also some evidence to suggest that, in place of the old pattern of the occasional money-laundering institution that was usually linked directly to one or a few criminal entrepreneurs or groups, there has emerged what is virtually an integrated underground global financial system whose relations to criminal entrepreneurs employing its services tend to occur through a series of arms-length commercial transactions.16 Based on the (admittedly spotty) evidence surfacing in actual cases, money launderers are now more often independent contractors who are as comfortable handling drug money as washing payments for a shipment of embargo-busting arms, as skilled in assisting insider trading schemes as in moving corporate bribes.

Another aspect is that, whereas in the past the apprehension of a criminal group might well have uncovered the money-laundering apparatus along with it, now there are really two quite distinct targets of investigation and enforcement, which might require two quite separate methodologies. Pursuing transnational crime requires better exchanges of information on particular offenders and improved facilities for transnational investigation and prosecution of particular cases. It remains therefore fundamentally a matter of criminal law. Combating money-laundering, however, may require initiatives that might threaten not a particular institution but rather well-established systems of banking and financial practices that have a long historical pedigree and that are protected by strong vested-interest groups. It might require actions that particular jurisdictions could well interpret as a direct threat to their very sovereignty. As such, demands for action must occur in a context of full awareness of the uniqueness of the economic history and practices of each country affected.

A second complication comes from the fact that, while once it was relatively easy to separate the legal and illegal aspects of economic activity because the two existed in a different social and economic space, this is not the case today. Underground activities—either explicitly criminal or merely "informal"—interact with legal ones at many levels. Sweatshops in big cities in the industrialized countries hire illegal aliens who are brought in by smuggling groups that may also deal in banned or restricted commodities, are financed by loan sharks who may be recycling drug money and make cartel agreements with trucking companies run by organized crime families, all in order to sell their goods cheaply to prestigious and eminently respectable retail outlets that serve the general public. The masses of street peddlers in the big urban centres of developing countries17  sell goods that might be smuggled, produced in underground factories using fake brand-name labels or stolen from legitimate enterprises, thereby violating customs, intellectual property and larceny laws. They pay no sales or income taxes but make protection payments to drug gangs that control the streets where they operate. The drug gangs might then use the protection money as operating capital to finance wholesale purchases of drugs or arms.

The result of these and many similar sorts of interfaces is an economic complex that can no longer be divided neatly into black and white; rather, it forms a continuum of differing shades of grey.

This blurring of traditional frontiers raises new problems of money-laundering control. If economic activity is no longer divisible simply into legal or illegal and if the entire economy is riddled with entrepreneurs who bend this or that rule to and sometimes beyond the breaking point, then the more accepted it becomes for people to violate "small" laws and the greater the probability that others will decide it is permissible to break slightly larger ones, and so on up the scale.18  Moreover, the greater the degree to which legal and illegal, formal and informal, underground and over ground activities are mixed, the deeper the confusion over the origins of funds, the more difficult the job of exercising due diligence with respect to crimes deemed especially serious and the greater the problems of effective use of suspicious transaction reporting.19

The third development, which reinforces the problem, appears at first glance to be a minor statistical technicality but goes to the heart of modern economic development processes and impacts directly on the problem of policing criminal money flows. Although exceptions exist, economic progress is generally associated with a rise in the percentage of economic activity accounted for by the production of services as opposed to physical goods. As countries increase in wealth and degree of development, the shift in the composition of gross national product (GNP) from tangible goods to intangible services opens up new possibilities for the laundering of criminal money.

The best cover for laundering is a business engaged in legitimate retail trade, especially one that generates large amounts of cash on a regular basis. The higher the service content of the products sold, the greater the potential to use the legitimate retail business to hide the proceeds of crime. It is much easier in services to cloud the audit trail, since there is seldom as clear a relationship between physical inputs and the market value of outputs in a service firm as there is in one supplying physical goods. Tax authorities have long been aware that it is simpler in the services than in the physical goods industries to skim off income and under-report earnings. It is equally easy to do the opposite, to mix illegally earned with legally earned income and report it all as if it were legal. A simple rule is: other things being equal, the higher the ratio of services to physical goods’ production in a country’s GNP, the greater the facility with which its legitimate business firms can be used for laundering money.

This, in turn, has yet another implication that is potentially dangerous from the point of view of money-laundering controls. There is a widely held view that the criminal sector operates overwhelmingly with cash while the legal one uses a mixture of cash and other financial instruments. Indeed, it is common to use changes in the ratio of cash to bank instruments as a tool to estimate the size and growth rate of the underground economy. However, this simple dichotomy may be in the process of becoming obsolete. If the objective is to hide the existence of a criminal money flow or to criminalize legal income after it has been earned (by skimming and hiding) there may be few alternatives to working in cash. But if the objective is to hide the nature of a criminal money flow, an on-going alibi provided by a suitable front company, especially in the retail services field, becomes more important than anonymity. In this case there is nothing that logically precludes the use of cheques or credit cards in conducting retail deals in contraband goods and services.

Although there is a lack of data on such transactions, it would seem that while cash still dominates, the use of cheques and credit cards is rising. One of the most brilliant laundering schemes in the United States, a cocaine franchise in Boston that was dismantled in the early 1980s, worked exclusively by retail customers paying in cheques nominally on behalf of a contracting company, which deposited the money in its bank accounts to amortize a revolving line of credit that kept the supply of cocaine replenished. In some major cities today drugs can be purchased over the counter in bars if the customer gives the bartender a credit card to "run a tab". The value of the drugs is simply added to the total bill and settled with the credit card, and the books are balanced by the bartender, who "skims" the appropriate amount of cash from bona fide liquor sales. Such activities can be expected to accelerate as "smart-cards" and other forms of electronic money become more popular.

The blending of legal and illegal actions and the mixing of various degrees and sorts of criminality, along with the attendant difficulty of differentiating between ordinary financial transactions and laundering and between petty and serious crime, has two important consequences with respect to anti-money-laundering measures. The first is that it calls into question much of the enthusiasm about the potential use of artificial intelligence (AI) models and similar devices that are supposed to facilitate the task of sorting through great amounts of financial data. Such models can hardly anticipate all the subtle criminal variations on techniques and methods that appear to be completely innocent in themselves but that are intended to hide illegally obtained money. Artificial intelligence is no substitute for human intelligence. Indeed, it calls into question the very efficacy of imposing ever more severe general reporting requirements. It may well be that all such gross reporting requirements can offer is somewhat better reactive efficiency in following money flows once crimes have already been detected using traditional investigatory techniques, and even this will depend on the particular institutional conditions of the country concerned.

Therefore, it may be unwise to shift significant amounts of limited resources from old-fashioned and less glamorous policing methods to AI models that rely on collecting large amounts of raw information and/or depend on high-tech solutions.

The second consequence is that not only does the blurring of the frontiers between legal and illegal economic activities, along with the process by which illegal acts become institutionally embedded in legal business firms, make the tracing and unveiling of criminal money much more difficult, but it also raises the cost of doing so. The potential regulatory burden imposed on legitimate business and the degree of disruption of normal transactions flows probably increase more than proportionately. This is especially the case given the rule that the lower the percentage of illegal money running through a particular front, the more respectable that front appears and the more successful that front will be in the long term for laundering.

This implies that at some point Governments must balance the costs of further regulatory complications against the gains measured in terms of crime control. This is, to be blunt, quite messy. The costs of the extra regulatory burden are, in some cases, relatively easy to approximate in simple quantitative terms, but assessing the gains in terms of crime control is so complex and so mired in definitional and operational complications that it represents a logical and methodological swamp. Yet it is, alas, one into which everyone concerned with the issue of money-laundering will eventually be forced to step.

The changing financial context

Although the essence of money-laundering has not changed over the centuries, the context in which it occurs has been subject to considerable evolution. In particular there have been a number of developments in the international financial system during recent decades that have made the three Fs—finding, freezing and forfeiting of criminally derived income and assets—all the more difficult. These are dollarization of black markets, the general trend towards financial deregulation, the progress of the Euromarket and the proliferation of financial secrecy havens.

Dollarization of black markets

Along with the apparent spread of world black markets over the last few decades has come their progressive dollarization. Although most illegal transactions at the retail level are conducted in the currency of the country where they occur, around the world there has been a steadily growing appetite for United States high-denomination bank notes as a vehicle for conducting covert wholesale transactions, for hiding international financial transfers and for holding underground savings. This applies to the full spectrum of illicit and underground activity, but it also has direct implications for the proceeds of serious crimes, including drug trafficking. A foreign currency black market exchanging local currency for United States $100 bills is going to be equally accommodating to cigarette smugglers and tax evaders, dealers in banned wildlife or traffickers in heroin. The more popular the use of the United States dollar, the more easily someone can bring United States currency to parallel money markets, convert it to local currency, deposit the local currency in a financial institution and wire it anywhere else, while attracting considerably less attention than the direct deposit of the United States currency would attract. Even better, a person can convert the United States currency into valuable goods, resell the goods and deposit the money as the proceeds of legitimate commerce, thereby further obscuring the trail. The steadily expanding popularity of the United States dollar as a physical medium of exchange, means of payment and store of value is therefore a serious and direct challenge to international crime control.

Trend towards financial deregulation

The general trend towards financial deregulation is both internal and external. Internally, the trend manifests itself in the emergence of the "financial services supermarket", the integrated, multi-functional financial institution that offers clients at one and the same time deposit, transfer, security and commodity brokerage, investment management and fiduciary services along with departments skilled in creating foreign shell corporations and offshore trusts. Almost all major institutions today also offer private banking services, intruding on a field in which formerly a handful of Geneva banks had the leading reputation. Although such competition usually brings benefits to consumers in the form of lower prices, it can also lead to reduced standards of diligence on the part of the institutions. The breakdown of the traditional barrier between financial institutions also means the elimination of many of the preliminary checks and balances on the nature, provenance and destination of financial assets that a system of distinct and specialized institutions should have automatically ensured. Once money passes the first barrier to gain entry into the supermarket (which is itself competing vociferously for new business), there are no more layers of scrutiny to pass while the capacity to shift funds from asset to asset and from place to place is greatly enhanced.

Simultaneously, international capital markets are also being progressively deregulated. Countries are lowering their barriers to the domestic operation of international affiliates of foreign institutions. The numbers of intra-company transfers between branches and subsidiaries of transnational corporations are increasing, as are international money movements. In addition, many countries that used to impose some form of border control on inflows and outflows of funds have joined the general trend towards liberalization by making formerly inconvertible currencies legally tradable and by dismantling exchange controls. While many arguments have been advanced against the use of exchange controls and denouncing the distorting effects of currency inconvertibility, their existence gave some States at least one potential tool for monitoring and controlling capital movements.

The impact of deregulation shows up on many levels. Although in reality all currencies, even those formerly deemed legally inconvertible by their countries of issue, could be exchanged on parallel currency markets both at home and in big international financial centres, the rate was usually sufficiently poor as to discourage the practice. That simultaneously restricted the number of jurisdictions through which criminal money was likely to flow. Furthermore, where capital controls existed, in theory all inflows of foreign currency had to be deposited with, or at a minimum reported to, central exchange authorities, and all outflows of any serious magnitude had to be duly licensed. Thus, there were limits on the capacity of launderers to use most countries’ financial infrastructure. Today, fewer and fewer countries maintain inconvertible currencies, and all over the world exchange controls have been at least severely limited if not completely abolished. When capital movements are free, that freedom applies equally to funds of illegal and of legal origin. The more jurisdictions through which funds can flow and the more currencies into which they can be converted, the harder the job of tracing.

Furthermore, exchange controls had at least one useful purpose. They limited or at least delayed and smoothed speculative outflows of capital. Without them it is conceivable that more countries will be subject to destabilizing waves of capital flight. Drained of foreign exchange, they must offset the impact by attracting compensating inflows. This is one of the reasons some countries have adopted bank secrecy laws protecting foreign currency deposits in their banking system. It is also why some Governments have had to resort to issuing foreign exchange-denominated bearer securities. These have been rightfully criticized as presenting a golden opportunity for criminals to hide their money and obtain handsome interest in the process. However, it would seem reasonable to expect the international community, while pressing through the major international lending institutions for measures of financial liberalization, to also come up with a more positive response to countries that attempt to offset some of the short-term consequences of liberalization than merely to criticize them for aiding and abetting international criminal money flows. It can be safely said that for some countries the flight of capital poses a greater danger to their social and economic stability than the laundering of criminal money, which they may be inclined to accommodate precisely in order to offset that flight.

Presumably there is the basis here for a quid pro quo. Certain countries most afflicted by drug trafficking are precisely those to which most of the flight capital is attracted. They could pledge their support for efforts by some developing countries to stop the fiscal and financial damage caused by capital flight in exchange for those developing countries ceasing to issue bearer bonds or attempting to attract "black money" through foreign currency accounts protected by bank secrecy laws.

Progress of the Euromarket

Reinforcing the trend towards liberalization and deregulation, indeed long preceding it, has been the evolution of the Euro-currency market and the general development of an offshore sector of world finance.20  This, incidentally, is a concept widely employed but little understood. The offshore banking centres through which the Euro-currency market operates are not the same thing as financial secrecy havens. Both may exist in one and the same place, but legally and functionally they are quite distinct. Panama, for example, introduced bank secrecy in 1917, buttressed it with Swiss-style "numbered" accounts in 1959, and only introduced offshore banking legislation in 1971. The biggest "offshore" centre is actually the City of London, where bank secrecy laws are no serious impediment to criminal investigations. On the other hand Switzerland, a place which is synonymous with bank secrecy in the public mind, has no offshore banks.

In popular parlance, "offshore bank" is taken to mean any bank anywhere in the world that accepts deposits and/or manages assets denominated in foreign currency on behalf of persons legally domiciled elsewhere. In reality, "offshore" should refer to an institution that, while legally domiciled in one jurisdiction, conducts its business solely with non-residents. What offshore banks are really supposed to do is handle wholesale transactions, usually denominated in dollars, on a bank-to-bank basis. They do not deal with the general public; nor do they accept cash in suitcases. Their role is to reduce taxes, avoid regulations with respect to capital adequacy and sidestep interest-rate restrictions imposed by national authorities, not to hide drug money. It is possible for some banks that have both offshore and on-shore licences in a particular jurisdiction to breach the firewall that is supposed to exist between their two types of business. However, this is a violation of their operating principles, not a condemnation of offshore banking per se.

Still, the spread of offshore banking does have implications for money-laundering. It means more jurisdictions through which funds can be wired, thereby complicating the chase; and it does so by creating a sector largely or sometimes entirely exempt from the scrutiny of national regulators. While the initiation came from the large international banks, once offshore centres were up and running, all manner of smaller, more dubious institutions took advantage of the laws to set up shop, protected by the fact that the large institutions had a strong profit incentive to keep the offshore sector insulated from regulation.

Nonetheless, it is not clear that the existence of an offshore sector per se requires any particular form of anti-money-laundering initiative since law enforcement has long before concurred that the main point of vulnerability for money-laundering occurs when funds enter the banking system on a retail level; the main point of interest for forfeiture is when the funds come to rest inside or outside the financial system as assets whose beneficial ownership can be fixed. It might suffice to request that countries hosting offshore facilities be diligent in maintaining the firewall and in assuring that banks licensed to do offshore business are truly legitimate. The problems relating to the fourth recent development, one that is often confused with "offshore" banking, are much more serious.

Proliferation of financial secrecy havens

Over the last few decades there has been a remarkable proliferation of jurisdictions offering the protection of bank secrecy. The traditional form of protection assured clients of confidentiality and, in the event a banker breached that confidentiality, clients had recourse to civil remediation. By contrast, bank secrecy laws impose criminal sanctions on those who release information regarding clients’ transactions. There is no doubt that bank secrecy can be a useful tool for hiding criminal money. However, before issuing any blanket condemnations or recommendations, it is important to note several complicating factors. For a start, it is imperative to understand that bank secrecy can take many different forms, with different origins, functions and degrees of defensibility, as follows:

Bank secrecy, then, is a serious concern. In particular the status quo, where one country stiffens its secrecy laws to take advantage of another country that has been successfully pressured by an economically and politically more powerful neighbour to weaken its laws, is the worst of all possible worlds. At the same time it is important not to exaggerate the significance of bank secrecy or to lose sight of other barriers to finding, freezing and forfeiting criminal money. Money-laundering can proceed very easily without bank secrecy; in fact, it may well be that launderers avoid it precisely because it acts as a red flag. Professional launderers advise their clients that the only really effective form of secrecy is keeping their mouths shut.

In addition, even if actions are taken to lower or knock down completely the barrier to investigation posed by bank secrecy laws, the most important obstacle may well turn out to be corporate secrecy laws, which are more difficult to defend. It does little good to discover that the owner of a certain bank account is the "Get High Trading Corporation" of Panama if it is impossible to determine just who really runs Get High Trading.

Moreover, bank secrecy is only an obstacle once the trail has already been traced to a particular institution. No jurisdiction will ever approve the unrestricted access by law enforcement officers to lists of depositors and their transactions, but many jurisdictions, even those with bank secrecy laws, will permit law enforcement officers to penetrate bank secrecy if they are engaged in investigating something that is a crime in the particular jurisdiction that hosts the bank. The danger then is not that bank secrecy blocks information flows but that it gives those affected by the search time to move their funds to other jurisdictions. It is the potential delay between targeting the account and getting permission to investigate that is the problem, not bank secrecy per se. This could be obviated if all States that have bank secrecy laws would adhere to a common set of principles that spell out precisely the conditions under which they will cooperate in the search for criminal money and engage in peremptory freezes.

The discussion about what to do about bank secrecy, of course, raises the fundamental question of why bank secrecy laws are widespread and growing in number. Most modern financial havens are countries with growing populations, limited resources and a crisis in their traditional sources of livelihood. Their agricultural sectors are cramped by lack of fertile land or the dumping of products on world markets by highly subsidized farming in larger and better located producing areas. Some, particularly in the Caribbean, formerly had large numbers of the economically active population employed in sectors like salt harvesting or merchant shipping; when those sectors went into decline, they struggled to find others that were independent of their always limited, often non-existent natural resource endowments. Financial services were an obvious potential growth sector.21 

This has many implications. It means that the more competitive the business becomes, the lower the standards of diligence any one haven can introduce without losing customers en masse to others. That may be partly because the money that is fleeing has something to hide. It may well be that, since diligence has its costs, the service charges in a more diligent haven may become uncompetitive. It also means that havens are being driven to diversify their services to attract and hold business. An ideal financial secrecy haven today offers a significant portfolio of services, which are discussed more fully in chapter II. The characteristics of an ideal haven are summarized in figure 3. They include secrecy, the availability of services for rapid incorporation, currency exchange freedoms etc.

With a complex and interdependent system of financial services, the havens will defend all the more strongly any one component for fear that if that one is compromised the overall competitive position of the haven will be adversely affected. It is not that most haven countries seek drug money or any other type of assets derived from serious crimes. Rather they literally cannot afford to cooperate too closely. While, particularly given the growing amount of competition, fees for such services are often low and falling, they may constitute a very large percentage of government revenues and private incomes as well, representing the single fastest growing sector of the haven’s job market.

It is popular to decry the operation of such financial havens, and it is certainly true that they can have a harmful effect, particularly in terms of facilitating tax evasion and secondarily as places that foster money-laundering. It is however necessary to show some understanding of their positions, their economic vulnerability and their lack of alternative resources. In the field of drug control, the major consuming countries are willing to research and finance alternative development programmes for producing countries. Therefore, it should be possible to imagine alternative economic development solutions for such financial havens, developed in conjunction with the world business community.



II.  The global financial system, offshore financial centres and bank secrecy jurisdictions

In chapter I, money-laundering was seen as a circular process and financial havens and bank secrecy jurisdictions were identified as being an important part of the circle. Yet both bank secrecy and offshore financial centres have legitimate purposes and are integral components of a global financial system with multiple points of access and rapid capital movements, whether in settlement of business and commercial contracts or in search of higher interest rates. Consequently, when identifying ways in which offshore financial centres and bank secrecy jurisdictions facilitate criminal activities, it is also important to acknowledge that such centres continue to have respectable functions within the global financial system. Accordingly, the first part of this chapter identifies important characteristics of the global system. The analysis then focuses on the emergence of the offshore world and the legitimate purposes it serves. Picking up some of the themes identified in chapter I, the interlocking components of offshore banking centres and bank secrecy jurisdictions that are conducive to money-laundering and other financial crimes are delineated. Finally, this chapter offers a brief overview of the geography of these financial havens.

The global financial system

The move to what is sometimes characterized as a speculative global economy has been facilitated by new technologies that allow unprecedented speed in the movement of money. Flight capital, the proceeds of crime, money seeking preferential interest rates or foreign exchange arbitrage combine with contract payments and debt settlements in a vast melange of movements and transactions that is bewilderingly fast and complex. Indeed, the global financial system provides a crucial underpinning for international commerce and investment in a world characterized by global trade, the prevalence of transnational and multinational corporations and the rapid movement of investment capital. The globalization of financial services has become one of the most important dimensions of the overall globalization process. Fueled by developments in technology and communication, the financial infrastructure has developed into "a system that links countries, banks and other financial institutions such as brokerage houses and stock markets, currencies and investment portfolios in a global exchange mechanism that engages in operation 24 hours a day".22  At the same time, the development of "megabyte money" i.e. money in the form of symbols on computer screens, makes it possible to move funds almost anywhere in the world with speed and ease.22 Not surprisingly, an increasing proportion of the world’s money moves around through electronic rather than cash transactions. Although many economies in the developing world and countries in transition are still cash economies, in advanced industrialized and post-industrialized states, the most important financial transactions (in value as opposed to volume) are no longer cash-based. This is certainly the case in the United States, as illustrated in figure 4, which highlights the inverse relationship between the number of transactions that take place in cash, cheque and electronically, and the value of these transactions.23 

The massive growth of electronic payments has been made possible by the development of the electronic transfer mechanisms operated by the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications System (SWIFT), the Federal Reserve (Fedwire) and the Clearing House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS). The volume and value of the transactions that move through these mechanisms are staggering. "Each day, more than 465,000 wire transfers, valued at more than two trillion dollars, are moved by Fedwire and CHIPS, and an estimated 220,000 transfer messages are sent by SWIFT (dollar volume unknown)".24 

In many respects this system is a money launderer’s dream, offering considerable scope to imitate the patterns and behaviour of legitimate transactions, thereby following one of the most fundamental laws of money-laundering identified in chapter I. In addition, there is no obvious institutional and functional separation between the transfer of licit monies and the transfer of the proceeds of drug trafficking or other forms of crime. Differentiation is virtually impossible, thereby meeting another requirement of effective money-laundering—the ability to embed illicit transactions and proceeds within a large volume of legitimate business transfers. Another requirement of effective money-laundering is that the ratio of illegal to legal financial flows be relatively low. Once again, the electronic transfer system is ideal. According to a report by the now defunct United States Office of Technology Assessment, a reasonable guess is that 0.05 per cent to 0.1 per cent of the approximately 700,000 wire transfers a day contain laundered funds up to a value of $300 million.25  This is dwarfed by the more than $2,000 billion that is transferred by wire on an average day, greatly complicating efforts to identify the laundered funds. Furthermore, although bank-to-bank transfers of aggregate funds for settlement or loans constitute about half of the total volume of wire transfers; with the complicity of corrupted bank employees, these can also contain laundered money.25 Although there are hopes that artificial intelligence systems can offer enhanced discrimination techniques that lead to the identification of laundered money, the sheer dynamism of the financial world, "the number of financial institutions, the constantly changing relationships and varying levels of activity make it difficult to identify suspicious activity".25 The problem is compounded by the lack of a "centralized database of wire transfers and limited details about senders and recipients".26 

These difficulties are exacerbated by the inclusion in the global financial system of stock exchanges and other financial institutions that allow anonymous trading and thereby make it possible to obscure both origin and ownership of funds. Indeed, an important characteristic of the financial sector in recent years has been the proliferation of new financial institutions and financial centres, an overlapping in the services that are offered by banks and non-bank financial institutions and the development of new banking practices and mechanisms. The result has been the emergence of a more complex system offering multiple opportunities to evade regulation, monitoring and control, even though efforts have been made to strengthen oversight. "New banking practices, such as direct access banking which permits customers to process transactions directly through their accounts by computer operating on software provided by the bank" undermine "the ability of the bank to monitor account activity, such as transactions involving joint accounts and pass-through banking schemes which have been a traditional method of layering. Beneficial owners of funds can now manipulate the identity of the ultimate recipient of the funds without a review by bank officers."27   Moreover, it is possible "to create accounts within accounts, or even to provide quasi-banking services to off-line customers in a kind of bank within a bank".27 Such services "limit the utility of systems in place which allow information about both the originator and the recipient to travel with the electronic funds transfer".27 Correspondent banking relationships that are global in character place "ever more emphasis on vetoing transactions at the bank of origin".28   Yet, many of the banks of origin are in countries where little attention is given to the prevention or control of money-laundering and where "know your customer policies" are totally lacking at worst and grossly inadequate at best.

Even when efforts are made in this direction, it is relatively easy to provide a legitimate front that satisfies efforts to check the legitimacy of the customer. Unless banks know not only their customers but also whom their customers are connected to, directly or indirectly, then due diligence will be far from complete. In many cases, banks and other financial institutions have no inclination to know their customers, especially if it puts them at a competitive disadvantage. Since overly vigorous investigation of potential customers, even those who are legitimate, could make them go elsewhere, some bankers will be reluctant to engage in such activities. Although, this is understandable in a highly competitive business environment, it can all too easily result in tacit connivance between some banks and institutions and individuals or groups who are interested in moving, hiding or laundering the proceeds of crime.

Efforts to impose new laws or regulations against money-laundering will be resisted strenuously if, directly or indirectly, they also inhibit licit activities and impinge on commercial interests whether at the level of individual firms, a particular industry or economic sector, or a particular nation or group of nations. In extreme cases, of course, connivance can become collusion as the rewards of criminal enterprise are extended to those members of the licit economy who facilitate laundering activities. Money-laundering has become so lucrative that bank officials and others with access to the financial system are sometimes corrupted, as will be seen in chapter III. Even where this does not occur, however, some financial centres in some countries are willing to operate in a fairly relaxed manner and refrain from exercising due diligence and ensuring that they know customers. Inevitably, criminals will seek out and exploit the opportunities offered by such centres. Although it is sometimes contended that criminals threaten the global financial system, this is through a process of erosion of norms and standards rather than through disruption. For the most part, criminals are much more interested in exploiting the system than they are in disrupting it, and offshore financial havens and bank secrecy jurisdictions are all too often willing participants in this process of exploitation. They are also attractive to terrorists and insurgent groups seeking to launder criminal proceeds generated to support their armed struggle or to acquire weapons that can be used in their continuing campaigns of violence.

In short, the global financial system has increasingly taken on characteristics that are as conducive to money-laundering as to any other form of money movement. Easy access and a capacity to move money around the system rapidly and with a minimum of formality and regulation are perfect for money-laundering. There are many jurisdictions that can be used as channels through which money rapidly passes, as temporary havens or as final destinations. Such jurisdictions are a necessary complement to "electronic money-laundering" which "often requires the complicity of a foreign bank to serve as the immediate or final destination for illegal funds".29

Although the use of financial centres that give emphasis to secrecy does not necessarily result from criminal intent or criminal motives, the availability of jurisdictions offering services and mechanisms for asset protection (e.g. against civil litigation) is important for those who want to hide their money and ensure that it is beyond the reach of law enforcement. Indeed, as one analyst has observed, "the secrecy haven is one of dirty money’s most cherished privileges and also one of its most ardent solicitors".30  Indeed, offshore financial centres, tax havens and bank secrecy jurisdictions attract funds partly because they promise both anonymity and the possibility of tax avoidance or evasion. A high level of bank secrecy is almost invariably used as a selling point by offshore financial centres. Many Internet advertisements for banks emphasize the strictness of the jurisdiction’s secrecy and assure the prospective customers that neither the bank nor the Government will ever give bank data to another Government. When the advertising is for private banks, it also stresses protection from tax collectors.

These centres are attractive to criminal organizations seeking to launder the proceeds from their illicit activities. They offer opportunities for creating Byzantine financial trails and secreting funds in places where they are relatively safe from identification and seizure by law enforcement. Both financial havens themselves and institutions that operate within their jurisdictions have multiplied. Many of the havens also offer facilities for incorporation that are very attractive for individuals or organizations attempting to protect their anonymity and operate with a high degree of impunity and flexibility. In short, offshore financial centres and bank secrecy jurisdictions are characterized by "a minimum of transparency and a maximum of autonomy of private action. The function of the state is to insure that very privacy and secrecy by keeping encumbering regulations to a minimum".30 This is not to claim that these centres came into existence simply to provide services to organized criminals, drug traffickers, or those engaged in financial fraud. Their origins are, in fact, more complex.

The origins of offshore financial centres

The origins of "offshore banking" are shrouded in myth and mystification, in part because of widespread misconception about just what the term actually means. In popular use, "offshore banking" is often taken to mean nothing more than persons resident in one legal jurisdiction holding assets in financial institutions incorporated in another jurisdiction. Hence the frequent expression that someone has their money "offshore".

Offshore financial transactions have a precise meaning. Banks or other financial institutions operating "offshore" are exempt from a wide range of regulations normally imposed on "onshore" institutions. Their transactions are tax-exempt, not encumbered by reserve requirements, free of interest-rate restrictions and often, though not always, exempt from regulatory scrutiny with respect to liquidity or capital adequacy. Dealing with non-resident clients, almost always other financial institutions, they usually transact a wholesale banking business denominated in a foreign currency or currencies.

While the "offshore" sector is now very large and well established, it is actually of fairly recent origin, and it emerged not according to some concerted plan but step by step in response to particular circumstances. There is a frequent claim that the first step in the creation of an offshore banking system came when the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, fearing an asset freeze imposed by the United States, began holding its dollar deposits in British banks. In fact the practice of holding foreign currency deposits long predated the cold war, and the banks holding the Soviet deposits were not exempt from taxes, interest-rate restrictions or reserve requirements. To the extent that the practice of offshore banking can be said to have British roots, it was because countries or institutions or individuals could avoid British exchange controls while still enjoying the world-wide connections of the City of London by holding their money in foreign currency (almost always dollar) deposits in London.

Much more important in explaining the rise of offshore banking is the balance-of-payments crises that struck many countries, especially the United States, in the 1960s, leading them to impose capital controls on their banking institutions while, at the same time, banks were seeking to break down the traditional barriers separating various types of financial activity. Normally confined to collecting money in the form of short-term deposits, in the 1960s major Western banks began trying to tap the long-term capital market in direct competition with corporations and Governments. They therefore began aggressively marketing certificates of deposit, which could rival corporate and government bonds in attracting investors. Then, in the 1970s, major western banks began taking money so raised and aggressively lending to sovereign governments that had previously relied largely on the sale of bonds when they needed to borrow money abroad. It was really out of these changes—the urge to avoid taxes and interest-rate regulations, the desire to tap longer-term sources of funds (of which the legendary surpluses of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) were only one part), and the decision to get into the sovereign lending business—that led to the emergence of a modern offshore banking sector.

The headiest period of growth of the offshore banking system was in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Since then there have been significant changes in world finance that have restricted that growth and even put it into reverse. The OPEC surpluses are no more. There has been, since the great debt crisis of the 1980s, a substantial decrease in sovereign syndicated borrows in favour of more conventional forms of international investment flows (direct investments) and a more hospitable environment for countries that have adopted more conservative financial management techniques to sell their bonds. Furthermore, as Governments all over the world slash or eliminate reserve requirements, reduce taxes and liberalize financial regulations, the incentive to do business offshore has been considerably reduced. Offshore banking will remain a feature on the world financial scene for some time to come, but its relative importance is likely to continue to decline. The decline, however, will be neither uniform nor rapid. The offshore financial sector continues to attract not only substantial demand but also new suppliers willing to offer what can appropriately be described as international minimum standards.

The legitimate uses of offshore financial centres and bank secrecy

There are legitimate purposes for both bank secrecy and the use of offshore financial centres and the services they provide. Bank secrecy has its root in common law and is an important dimension of both personal and corporate privacy. "Withholding financial information from competitors, suppliers, creditors and customers, is a right that business people assume from the outset . . ., confidentiality and the judicious use of information is generally assumed in business as a critical component of rules of the game in market-oriented economies."31  At the same time, personal financial matters that rely on the maintenance of banking confidentiality are a key right of citizens in liberal democracies where bank data is protected by a wide range of laws, both civil and criminal. Indeed, most countries have some legislation on the subject. Even the United States, which is often seen as the country seeking the most bank related information, has a bank secrecy act. The laws vary from the criminal and draconian to simple civil law remedies. The most important laws covering bank secrecy make the disclosure of customer information to any party outside the bank a crime. In many cases there are exceptions for local bank regulators and auditors. But, in some jurisdictions, auditors face the same criminal penalties as the banks for disclosure and must be citizens or permanent residents if they are even to be allowed to examine bank data.

Although global deregulation has made offshore financial centres less distinctive, they retain an important niche that is perhaps tarnished but should not be obscured by their exploitation for dubious purposes. In some cases, small or poor nations, particularly but not exclusively in the Caribbean, have established themselves as offshore financial centres in order to attract funds, provide jobs and facilitate economic development. They offer low or nonexistent tax rates that are attractive to investors, company owners and ordinary citizens anxious to reduce their tax burdens. Indeed, both bank secrecy jurisdictions and offshore financial centres attract deposits from citizens who want to avoid taxes through legitimate tax loopholes. They also attract those trying to evade taxes through concealing much of their wealth by secreting it in jurisdictions that place a premium on confidentiality and do not regard tax evasion in another country as a crime. In the early 1980s, the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs in the United States Senate conducted a series of hearings that not only highlighted criminal exploitation of offshore financial centres but also the extent of the illegal use of offshore banking "to facilitate tax fraud" by the "man next door".32  With improved communications and the use of the Internet, this phenomenon is almost certainly more widespread than it was 15 years ago.

Yet the use of offshore financial centres and bank secrecy jurisdictions by criminal organizations and by ordinary citizens for tax evasion should not obscure the legitimate roles that these centres continue to play, especially in a world where money moves constantly in search of the best rates of return, where vast sums can be made through arbitrage and where there has been a move away from an investment economy and the embrace of what many observers call a speculative economy or "casino capitalism".33  The following examples support this statement:

In short, as one economic geographer has noted, "offshore finance is an essential and characteristic element of the contemporary world financial system".37  It is also something that will continue to be a part of a vibrant and expanding global economy. The real issue, therefore, is not to issue blanket condemnations or make efforts to eliminate bank secrecy and offshore financial services but to ensure that the legitimate uses of these facilities remain available while making it much more difficult to use them directly for criminal activities or for laundering the proceeds of drug trafficking and other forms of organized crime. The objective is not to create total transparency; such an objective is simply not realistic. The appropriate focus is on legitimate government inquiry—requests from foreign Governments and law enforcement agencies for specific information that will assist in criminal investigations. Unfortunately, too many jurisdictions see such inquiries as a threat to their reputations for secrecy and are reluctant to cooperate because of the impact on potential customers.

The offshore financial system

To understand the world of offshore banking and bank secrecy, it is important to see it not only as a legitimate part of the global financial system but also as a system of its own with distinct but complementary and reinforcing components, several of which are readily amenable to manipulation by criminals, whether those engaged in fraud or those concerned with moving or laundering the proceeds of drug trafficking, financial fraud or various other criminal activities. Not all jurisdictions, of course, offer the same level of services that can readily be exploited by criminals. Nevertheless, criminals and their specialist advisers seeking to repatriate their money to their home bases, to move it out of the reach of law enforcement or to disguise its origins and ownership find in the offshore financial havens a set of characteristics that in many respects seem to be tailor-made for their purposes.

These components include:

TEXT BOX INSERT:  The role of professional money launderers

"Professional money-laundering specialists sell high quality services, contacts, experience and knowledge of money movements, supported by the latest electronic technology, to any trafficker or other criminal willing to pay their lucrative fees. This practice continues to make enforcement more difficult, especially through the commingling of licit and illicit funds from many sources, and the worldwide dispersion of funds, far from the predicate crime scene."

Source:  United States of America, Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (March 1997).

These characteristics of offshore financial centres and bank secrecy jurisdictions are not only mutually reinforcing but also make such havens attractive to criminal money. In effect, the characteristics described above can be understood as a tool kit that can be used not only to launder the proceeds of drug trafficking and other crimes but also to commit certain kinds of financial crime. Not all financial centres are equally inviting, however, and what good money launderers do is mix and match particular tools with certain jurisdictions.

TEXT BOX INSERT:   A former money launderer discusses offshore financial centres

Kenneth Rijock, a former Miami lawyer who was convicted of money laundering and served two years in federal prison, now gives lectures on money-laundering and how to combat it. What follows are excerpts from an article in Money-laundering Alert which is reprinted here with permission.

I learned that one of the greatest assets money launderers have are offshore banks.

Located mainly in the so-called "tax-shelter" countries, offshore banks offer the money managers of criminal organizations, including drug traffickers, the opportunity to launder funds with maximum safety and confidentiality at minimum risk. I know that by my own experience.

Money launderers are attracted by a business environment where income, corporate and inheritance taxes do not exist, where there are no exchange control laws, and where bank and corporation secrecy laws prohibit even an inquiry into the ownership of companies and bank accounts.

In a typical visit that I would make to one of the secrecy havens in the Caribbean to launder money, I would pay a call on a cooperating bank institution. When I would arrive with my client, by air or sea, the bank’s representative would facilitate our passage through customs. When a client advises that he is arriving with millions in cash, nothing is left to chance.

Some of my trips to offshore banks involved renting a Lear jet owned by a former Air Corps bomber pilot, filling it with clients and cash and flying non-stop to a seldom-used World War II-vintage airfield, where the runway was barely long enough to handle jet aircraft.

Once out of the port, a short ride follows to a shopping center comprised entirely of banks, trust companies and management firms. At the bank, the funds are quickly counted, checked for counterfeits, and deposited in an account opened in the name of a shelf corporation which has been previously created by our local counsel.

Signature cards are passed out, with my advice that the depositors should not sign their own name. The identification of the depositors and the origin of funds are never discussed. Two former prominent depositors at a certain bank, whom I represented, actually visited a toy store and used rubber stamps with the images of Minnie Mouse and Goofy in place of signatures.

Certificates of deposit would be issued. The originals generally would remain at the bank for security reasons because I did not want them to be in the United States subject to subpoena. Bank statements would either be held at the bank, or mailed to the office of our local attorney.

The funds deposited would immediately be couriered by the bank to its correspondent banks in New York or London, for deposit in the bank’s own accounts. The depositor would be paid a rate of interest of one percent less than the bank was receiving on the funds. The offshore banks have either an ultra-conservative or non-existent lending policy, thus insuring that the funds earn safe returns for the bank’s owners at little risk to depositors.

Once those steps were taken, I would be free to transfer the funds to large banks in Europe, Asia or Latin America, having succeeded in completely disguising the criminal origin of the money.

Investments then would be made in the United States by wire transfers, by checks drawn on the offshore bank’s accounts in correspondent banks in the United States, or by payments to third parties who facilitate the transfer of goods, services or other assets.

After making the deposits, we would enjoy a lunch of lobster and champagne .... and return from our "business trip" with empty luggage.

As traffickers expand their operations, they may deem it advisable to form their own banks in tax shelter countries, thereby adding an additional layer of secrecy to their operations.

In one of the islands where I laundered substantial sums, there are approximately 300 banks operating with licenses granted by that island’s government. Only about 10 actually maintain physical banking offices there. The others are operated by management firms for absentee owners or exist only as accounts in other banks.

Because the offshore banks which attract drug traffickers are generally locally owned by business entrepreneurs with strong political connections, the banks are usually insulated from United States judicial or diplomatic inquiry.

Typical tax shelter countries have minimal contacts with the United States and enforcement agencies generally receive a cold welcome.

Political considerations aside, until the black holes of laundering havens are closed down, no significant progress will be made in the effort to control money-laundering. Local authorities must be convinced to close down the banks that openly cooperate with money launderers.

Reprinted with permission from "Lawyer reveals laundering millions offshore" Money-laundering Alert, vol. 5, No. 7 (April 1994)

The geography of offshore financial centres and bank secrecy jurisdictions

In some offshore financial centres and bank secrecy jurisdictions serious efforts have been made to minimize the influx of dirty money through more careful regulation. By the same token, in spite of efforts to regulate the offshore banking world, not all jurisdictions are equally regulated. Even in those that are, there is sometimes a large gap between the legal framework and its implementation. Furthermore, when pressure to close the gap between law and implementation is effective in some of the offshore banking havens or bank secrecy jurisdictions, those that are not pressured tend to be the major beneficiaries. As Switzerland has responded to external pressure for more transparency and greater cooperation with foreign law enforcement, for example, dubious money has almost certainly migrated elsewhere. As pointed out in chapter I, these jurisdictions are highly dynamic and are motivated in part by competition for deposits and other forms of business.

All this poses enormous dilemmas both for international supervision and regulation and for the offshore financial centres themselves. The balancing act at the international level is to impose safeguards against and obstacles to illegal activities without at the same time constraining or obstructing legal transactions. So long as there are difficulties in distinguishing between the licit and the illicit, there are real tradeoffs between an approach that over-regulates and one that under-regulates. The balancing act for the offshore financial centres themselves is to attract customers through the provision of banking confidentiality and other kinds of legitimate services that protect money without also acquiring a reputation for "dirty banking". The competition among offshore financial centres takes place through the provision of sophisticated services, financial mechanisms and tax concessions. Although some jurisdictions are more innovative than others, for the most part the menu of available options is not particularly divergent. Consequently, if there is overly vigorous implementation of "know your customer" rules in one jurisdiction, then this will put the haven at a disadvantage compared to other havens where the formalities and checks on customers are kept to a minimum. The more stringent and scrupulous one is about due diligence and vetting customers, the more likely it is that some customers will take their business to venues that ask fewer questions and present fewer obstacles. On the other hand, if a haven develops too unsavory a reputation as a home for "dirty money" or a haunt of organized crime and drug traffickers, then not only will legitimate money go elsewhere as respectable companies move their businesses to avoid tarnishing their reputations but so too will more sophisticated criminals who want to avoid any taint by association. The financial centre will also become the target of considerable external pressure to clean up its act. Not surprisingly, therefore, the offshore banking and bank secrecy world is in constant flux that reflects differential responses to the complex balancing acts relating to competitiveness and cleanliness. The optimum competitive position is one in which the centre is neither too stringent in vetting customers nor too obviously indiscriminate in accepting all custom.

As a result, providing a definitive survey of the world of offshore banking and bank secrecy is virtually impossible. This is a dynamic and ever-changing system in which there are constant developments in rules and regulations, in the opportunities offered by individual jurisdictions, in the relative attraction of particular jurisdictions both for licit money and for the proceeds of crime, and in the pressure placed on offshore financial centres by the international community, and especially by the United States, as part of the continuing effort to combat drug trafficking and transnational organized crime.

Moreover, it is a world over which opinions are sharply divided. Some observers argue that the offshore banking sector is losing its distinctiveness and therefore its attractiveness. According to Michael Giles, chairman of international private banking at Merrill Lynch: "In market after market, the whole structure of foreign exchange controls, the whole fear of having your savings and your capital confiscated or eroded by runaway local inflation, is decreasing".42  The implication is that there is a diminishing need for the services of offshore financial centres and bank secrecy jurisdictions. It would be a mistake, however, to underestimate the importance of the offshore financial world. The Cayman Islands, for example, one of the most important offshore jurisdictions, is generally judged to be the fifth largest financial centre in the world, behind London, New York, Tokyo and Hong Kong. There are over 570 banks licensed in the Cayman Islands, with deposits of over $500 billion. Mutual funds licensed or registered in the Islands, offshore insurers and non-resident and exempted companies are other important dimensions of Cayman financial activities.43 

Not surprisingly, therefore, the offshore financial world is clearly seen as one in which important opportunities remain. As a result, it is constantly welcoming new members. Some of the more recent additions to the world of offshore finance have been remote islands in the South Pacific. Perhaps even more surprising has been the attempt by the state of Montana in the United States to become an offshore centre, a development that seems to have encouraged Hawaii to explore a similar option. This trend has created considerable consternation among some specialists. As one money-laundering authority noted: "money gets smuggled out of the United States and goes through various layers of transactions offshore. Then it comes back into the state of Montana, and it looks like it came from the late Mother Teresa’s convent. Who in the state of Montana is going to ensure there are safeguards to prevent this?"44 

Thus, while there is no universal definition of the term, many expert observers point to a number of jurisdictions as having the requisite characteristics of a financial haven. The countries, territories, cities or areas falling into this category are shown below (see also the map, below).

The Caribbean:  Anguilla, Antigua, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Costa Rica, Netherlands Antilles, Panama, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Turks and Caicos Islands

Europe:  Andorra, Campione, Cyprus, Gibraltar, Guernsey, Ireland (Dublin), Isle of Man, Jersey, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Madeira, Malta, Monaco, Sark, Switzerland

Asia and the Pacific:  Cook Islands, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Labuan, Macao, Marianas, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Samoa, Singapore, Vanatu.

Middle East:  Bahrain, Dubai, Lebanon

Africa:  Liberia, Mauritius, Seychelles

Within this world, important and difficult judgements have to be made about how flexible to be. Different jurisdictions have responded in different ways to the dilemmas of competitiveness and cleanliness discussed above.

Bermuda, for example, which hosts about 40 per cent of the world’s captive insurance companies, has been extremely cautious and is regarded as one of the more scrupulous jurisdictions that, for the most part, has attracted the right kind of business. Yet even in Bermuda, there are virtually unregulated areas of financial activity such as insurance companies and mutual funds that have the kind of multiple account capabilities that facilitate money-laundering. Moreover, the fact that Bermuda is generally more careful and moves more slowly in the incorporation of companies than some of its competitors is frequently seen as a disadvantage. Some members of the Bermuda offshore community, for example, have expressed concern that it takes five days to incorporate a Bermuda company—significantly longer than some of Bermuda’s competitors. There is also anxiety about Caribbean competitors taking spillover work that is of dubious origin but that nevertheless provides them with important advantages.

One of the competitors the has been criticized for lacking discrimination about its customers has been Antigua. United States News and World Report commented in 1996 that no one has extended an invitation to dirty money like Antigua, which has "a virtually unregulated banking industry, no reporting requirements and secrecy laws that punish violations of bank clients" confidentiality. The number of banks there grew by 75 per cent in 1995; anyone with $1 million can open a bank, and many consist of nothing but a brass plate or a room with a fax machine".45  Although the European Union Bank fiasco has led to increased pressure on Antigua to "clean up its act", it is not certain that there have been any fundamental changes. The authorities in Antigua have attempted to play down the European Union Bank case while also suggesting that they have taken measures to prevent future occurrence of this kind. What they have not explained adequately, however, is how a country with a population of between 65,000 and 70,000 can develop the capacity for adequate supervision of the myriad and complex financial services and institutions available on the island. Until there is such a capacity, the changes in Antigua will be merely cosmetic.

Another country that apparently wants to develop a rather different image of its offshore activities is Panama. In the past, loose regulations and tight secrecy laws made Panama extremely attractive to those who wanted to hide or launder the proceeds of crime. In 1998, however, there have been reports that Panama, which still has over 100 banks from 30 countries and a bank sector that accounts for 11 per cent of GDP, is addressing fears about lack of supervision. The President of the Panamanian Banking Association wants to transform Panama into a major financial centre "homogenous with London, Zurich, New York or Miami".46  Some steps have been taken in this direction, and Panama has created a financial analysis unit to track money movements. Yet, as one of the cases in chapter III reveals, millions of dollars suspected of being the proceeds of drug trafficking were channeled back to Colombia via Panama during the mid-1990s. Moreover, because the United States dollar is, effectively, the currency of the country, Panama is likely to remain one of the favourite jurisdictions for money launderers attempting to put proceeds of crime into the financial system.

In Europe there is continued controversy over bank secrecy in Switzerland in particular and also in Luxembourg. Yet in Switzerland bank secrecy is not what it was. Pressure from other countries for greater transparency, concerns about the infiltration of Russian organized crime, the passage of new laws against money-laundering, the broadening of criminal laws and thereby the potential scope for the implementation of mutual legal assistance have all placed major dents in bank secrecy. Moreover, Switzerland is taking serious initiatives to combat money-laundering. Yet, there is also a sense in some quarters that the change is being exploited by competitors. According to one banking official, "the assertion that Swiss bank secrecy is no longer as watertight as it once was, or even that it has become full of more holes than Emmenthal cheese, is not new. It is being spread about in the mass media with a malicious undertone by competing foreign financial centres. Paradoxically, they are often the same people who criticize Switzerland because of its apparently rigid protection of secrecy."47  Accompanying this is deep-seated concern that Switzerland’s "enormous competitive advantage" in the area of client confidentiality is being eroded, and in the words of one bank official, "the time has come to take a stance and defend in a lucid and resolute manner an asset of which the country may be proud and which it cannot do without".48 

Luxembourg, which has over 220 banks in the city and is seventh in the world in terms of assets in foreign currencies, has also been under siege. It was the country which, in effect, brought BCCI to the world. More recently, it has faced criticism from Germany for its policy on taxes and from Belgium on the grounds that Luxembourg’s secrecy laws attract dirty money from African dictators.

For those who are concerned that neither Switzerland nor Luxembourg offer the protection they did in the past, Liechtenstein could be an attractive alternative. It is usually described as one of the world’s best tax havens, with stricter bank secrecy than in Switzerland, and even as the place Swiss citizens go if they want to hide money. Moreover, Liechtenstein offers a wide range of services including the Anstalt discussed in chapter I. Liechtenstein is also the only continental European country to have trust regulations that bring with them demand for work in the areas of litigation, intellectual property rights and the licensing of patents.49  Other alternatives include Austria, which still has the Sparbuch (bearer savings account book) without customer identification for Austrian citizens, and the Czech Republic, which also offers anonymous passbook accounts.

Another area where competition is keen is the Mediterranean. A few years ago Cyprus appeared to be the offshore financial centre of choice for Russian organized crime, but it has strengthened its regulatory framework and increased its capacity for financial monitoring. Other Mediterranean centres include Malta and Lebanon, which is also moving aggressively to reestablish its pre-eminence and has increased the scope of the activities in which offshore companies are permitted to engage and reduced the already low tax rates on profits of holding companies.

In the Asia and Pacific region, the competition, if anything, is even greater. Labuan, Malaysia’s offshore jurisdiction, is implementing a major campaign to attract business. Other participants in the offshore financial business include the Cook Islands, Niue and Vanuatu, all of which are vigorously promoting their offshore financial centres. In 1994 the Government of Niue passed laws covering international business companies and asset protection trusts as well as banking and insurance. The International Business Companies Law was modeled on that developed by the British Virgin Islands, with some additions that point to the market niche: the name of the company can be registered in Chinese script; directors may keep the company records and share register outside Niue; and agents with businesses elsewhere can act as deputy registrars with the authority to incorporate companies. The willingness of Niue to provide charters in any language desired and the limited population base highlights once again the contrast between the lavish provision of financial services, institutions and mechanisms and the meager resources for supervision and oversight.

While some of the smaller jurisdictions have almost certainly attracted dirty money, perhaps the most brazen attempt to enter the offshore financial world at the bottom end of the market was initiated by the Seychelles, which, in the mid-1990s, passed an economic development act offering citizenship, with no questions asked, to those who placed deposits of $10 million or more in the islands. Under pressure from the United States and other members of the international community, the Seychelles backed away from the sale of its sovereignty.

None of this is meant to ignore efforts to establish closer supervision, more effective oversight or greater transparency in the world of offshore financial centres. Some jurisdictions, such as Mauritius, have been very careful in regulating their offshore sectors. There has been a series of measures from the early 1980s when the United States became seized of the issue after a series of Senate hearings illuminated offshore banking and the way it could be exploited by drug traffickers and other criminal organizations. Part of the problem, however, is that the issue of bank secrecy goes well beyond the traditional offshore financial centres and jurisdictions such as Luxembourg and Switzerland. There can perhaps be no definitive listing of jurisdictions that refuse to lift bank secrecy to accommodate criminal investigations, as the situation in this regard is subject to continual change, and judgements about appropriate levels of cooperation with law enforcement agencies will differ. The United States’ review of international anti-money-laundering provides some clues as to where bank secrecy is an impediment to criminal investigations. The State Department’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, released in March 1998, gives an assessment of whether or not bank secrecy can be lifted to facilitate criminal investigations at the domestic and international levels. The countries that are listed as not having laws mandating banks to cooperate with domestic law enforcement investigations into money-laundering or are unwilling to lift bank secrecy are: Afghanistan, Belarus, Belize, Bolivia, Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Laos, Lebanon, Morocco, Mozambique, Nauru, South Africa, Thailand and Vanuatu. All of these countries except Belize also lack laws permitting or requiring banks to cooperate with investigations by third-party Governments through sharing records and making available financial data. They are joined in this by the following countries and territories: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Côte D’Ivoire, Estonia, Gibraltar, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Romania, Slovakia, Sri Lanka, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.50 

If some of these jurisdictions lack the will to impose greater regulation and to seek greater transparency in financial matters, in the smaller offshore financial centres and bank secrecy jurisdictions, the problem is also one of capacity. There are too few regulators to oversee the transactions and the institutions that are involved in them. Although there might have been some improvements recently, for a long time one bank inspector and one insurance adviser were responsible for regulating a burgeoning companies sector in the British Virgin Islands where the number of new companies incorporated annually greatly exceeded the size of the population.

If at least some offshore financial centres and bank secrecy jurisdictions remain a magnet for money launderers and various other criminals, there are efforts  to clean up the situation and movement towards acceptance of norms, laws and regulations. The more important law enforcement and regulatory milestones include the following developments:

If serious efforts have been, and continue to be, made to impose more effective supervision on offshore financial centres and to create greater transparency in banking matters, there is clearly still a long way to go. Not only are there jurisdictions that refuse to accept the prevailing norms; even in those financial centres where the banks are under increasing scrutiny and control, other mechanisms for secrecy provide what appear to be more than adequate substitutes. As a result the world of offshore financial centres and bank secrecy jurisdictions is still an attractive one for money launderers and those engaged in various forms of financial fraud, as the next chapter reveals even more clearly. The offshore financial world is appropriately described as a "Bermuda triangle" for investigations of money-laundering, complex financial fraud and tax evasion. Money trails disappear, connections are obscured and investigations encounter so many obstacles that they are often abandoned. The next section offers glimpses of this world in operation provided by investigations that, for very specific reasons, were able to navigate through the black hole.



III.  Cas
es involving financial havens and bank secrecy jurisdictions

Often described as the white collar crime of the 1990s, money-laundering is in fact a crucial accompaniment to many forms of criminal activity ranging from drug trafficking and organized crime to financial fraud. The diversity and sophistication of many money-laundering operations are very impressive, with major criminal organizations using a wide variety of mechanisms and methods. Italian organized crime groups, for example, have used banks and casinos in Nicaragua to launder their money, while some of the New York mafia families have been linked with laundering schemes in Brazil. For their part, Russian criminal organizations seem to have a highly diverse approach to their profits, with reports that "dirty" money of one kind or another is going to Israel via Antwerp, through Gibraltar and into Spain, into the London real estate market and into the Caribbean. There have also been reports of an emerging triangular relationship among Russian, Italian and Colombian criminal organizations, in which they provide a variety of services, including money-laundering, for one another.

Poland is another country that seems to be afflicted by money-laundering, both by indigenous criminals and by groups from outside. With 49 million bank accounts for 7.5 million inhabitants, Poland has reportedly been the target of Italian and American mafia organizations who use multiple bank transfers between Polish banks and financial institutions in the Caribbean. Groups within Poland also seem to have become active in money-laundering and, in several cases examined by prosecutors in Poland, there seems to be an important connection with Liechtenstein.53  If States in transition are increasingly infiltrated by organized crime and money-laundering, so too is the developing world. According to a report in the mid-1990s for the Department of Foreign Affairs in France, French citizens are implicated in money-laundering in central Africa using horse racing and casinos. The author of the report expressed concern about the project for a Sao Tome free zone, which, in his view, could allow criminals to use commercial and financial trade for drug trafficking and money-laundering in Francophone Africa.54  The implication is that there is no part of the world that is immune from the laundering of criminal proceeds.

The real difficulty in dealing with money-laundering, both analytically and operationally, is that if the "fundamental laws" outlined in chapter I are followed it is virtually impossible to detect.

Consequently, in many of the cases that actually result in convictions, money-laundering is only one part of a much more comprehensive indictment. In some instances, poorly conceived attempts to launder money helped to alert law enforcement to the criminal enterprise and activities. In many cases, however, it was the initial criminal activities that brought the individuals or groups to the attention of law enforcement and the money-laundering component only became visible in the course of the subsequent investigation. Nevertheless, by presenting an array of cases (mostly but not exclusively based on United States reports, which are numerous and well-documented), it should be possible to convey a sense of the diversity of money-laundering and the sometimes imaginative and sometimes rather crude ways in which offshore financial centres are used to hide, move and clean the proceeds of crime. To think of offshore financial centres in terms only of money-laundering, however, would be a mistake. They are also used as a base to commit certain crimes and to provide coverage for a variety of dubious and criminal financial transactions. The following case studies of money-laundering and financial fraud with an offshore component are intended to highlight this diversity.

Before examining the cases, however, it should be emphasized that these are the law enforcement success stories in an area usually characterized by criminal successes and law enforcement failures. Estimates of the annual turnover from global drug trafficking have been estimated by the World Drug Report55 of the United Nations International Drug Control Programme to be somewhere around $400 billion, while the proceeds of all forms of organized crime have been estimated to be as high as one billion dollars. The proceeds obtained through various forms of financial fraud almost certainly exceed those from drug trafficking, while the money involved in tax evasion is some multiple of the proceeds of crime, although precisely what multiple is uncertain. Indeed, because of the clandestine nature of criminal activity, particularly successful criminal ventures, such estimates are inherently problematic. The point, here, however, is simply that the amount of dirty money that finds its way into offshore financial centres and bank secrecy jurisdictions is enormous. Set against this, the assets that are seized or recovered in cases where law enforcement is successful are negligible.

Case studies in the use of offshore financial centres and bank secrecy jurisdictions

The BCCI case

In July 1991, more than $12 billion in assets of BCCI were seized after regulators discovered evidence of widespread fraud. The collapse of the bank did not come as a complete surprise. Investigations into its conduct had been taking place for several years in the United States and the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, the action of the regulators and the abrupt end to the bank’s activities sent large shock waves through the global financial system. As more and more revelations about the Bank appeared, however, what was most striking was not that it had been forced to cease operating but that it had operated for so long with such freedom and so little interference from Governments and regulators. The Bank had claimed to make profits that seem to have been largely fictitious and had been wholly indiscriminate about its customers, providing services for drugs traffickers, dictators, terrorists, fraud merchants, intelligence agencies, arms dealers and the like. The notion of due diligence, of knowing the customer, was not part of the bank’s lexicon, let alone its operating procedures. Furthermore, "BCCI was not just built on secrecy and deception, but it also sold them as an essential part of its banking service".56  Created by Agha Hasan Abedi as a bank for the developing world, BCCI, by the time of its demise, had become known in some circles as the "Bank of Crooks and Criminals International".

Post-mortems of the BCCI scandal abounded, providing the material for several books and creating the impetus for more careful regulation of the global financial system. One of the most comprehensive investigations was done by the staff of the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate. The report was scathing in its condemnation of a bank that ". . . was from its earliest days made up of multiplying layers of entities, related to one another through an impenetrable series of holding companies, affiliates, subsidiaries, banks-within-banks, insider dealings and nominee relationships. By fracturing corporate structure, record keeping, regulatory review, and audits, the complex BCCI family of entities . . . was able to evade ordinary legal restrictions on the movement of capital and goods as a matter of daily practice and routine".57 

BCCI was able to commit or facilitate a variety of crimes through a variety of means, including the use of shell corporations, the exploitation of offshore financial centres and bank secrecy havens, and the diffusion of its corporate structure. Complexity was accompanied by high-level political influence. Although headquartered in Luxembourg, BCCI’s global scope meant that it was not accountable to any particular jurisdiction or subject to one set of regulations. If the oversight system was inherently weak, however, this weakness was fully exploited by the Bank, which divided its operations between two auditors, neither of whom looked at the totality of its activities and was, therefore, able to obtain a real sense of its involvement with money-laundering and various forms of fraud and corruption. In addition, BCCI used the Cayman Islands and the Netherlands Antilles to create a maze of front companies that provided a wall of secrecy about its depositors and its activities. And even when authorities such as the Bank of England learned of some of BCCI’s criminal activities, they did not move to close the Bank for another two years. Perhaps most disturbing of all about BCCI is that, as the Kerry and Brown report to the Foreign Relations Committee made clear, it was "not an isolated phenomenon, but a recurrent problem that has grown along with the growth in the international financial community itself. Given the extraordinary magnitude of international financial transactions ... the opportunities for fraud are huge, the rewards great, and the systems put in place to protect against them, far from adequate."58

The European Union Bank of Antigua

In the aftermath of the BCCI scandal, intense efforts were made to improve the regulation and oversight of the global banking system. Yet, in July 1997, six years after the regulators forced BCCI to cease trading, the European Union Bank of Antigua collapsed. In this case the bank officials disappeared along with the deposits. Tiny in comparison with BCCI, the case of the European Union Bank shows that regulation and oversight of the global financial system still have many loopholes. Indeed, the story of the European Union Bank is a perfect example of the way in which the offshore banking jurisdictions and bank secrecy havens facilitate criminal activity. In many ways, it also appeared to be the prototype bank of the future, soliciting for deposits on the World Wide Web and offering anonymity, avoidance of what was portrayed as burdensome and expensive accounting requirements, and excellent returns of as much as 9.91 per cent on a one-year, $1 million certificate of deposit.

The European Union Bank was initially registered as an offshore bank in Antigua on 8 June 8 1994 as the East European International Bank Ltd. On 18 August 1994, it changed its name to European Union Bank Inc. Its parent company was named as Swiss Investment Association SA, an international business company registered in the Bahamas. The European Union Bank was apparently set up by two Russians, Alexandre Konanykhine and Mikhail Khodorovsky, who seem to have presented themselves as officers of the Menatep Bank of Moscow. Perhaps the best indicator of the bank’s uncertain origins, however, is that Konanykhine, one of the founders, was already a highly controversial figure who is alleged to have absconded from Moscow in 1992 after embezzling $8.1 million from the Exchange Bank. Reportedly, on 27 February 1995, the Board of Governors of the United States Federal Reserve System, in a restricted memo, said it had been advised by the Bank of England that Konanykhine had visited Antigua in January 1995 and met, "government officials to request their cooperation in keeping Menatep’s ownership of European Union Bank confidential", something that Konanykhine denied.59 Khodorovsky, who was in fact a top official at Menatep Bank, not only denied that Menatep was involved with EUB but also dismissed the allegations regarding Menatep’s ties to organized crime.

The Bank, in September 1995, launched its Web site and claimed to be the first Internet bank with customers able to create and manage accounts on-line via any Internet connection. In July 1996, it was announced by Lord Mancroft, then the Bank’s chairman and a member of the British House of Lords, that the European Union Bank would seek funding through shares that would be sold over the Internet. At this time, it was claimed that the Bank had backing of $2.8 million. The Bank also claimed to have 144 accounts with account holders in 43 countries. The largest deposit was apparently $400,000. Mancroft admitted that the benefits of banking with European Union Bank included tax evasion as an attraction for prospective customers, noting in an interview that, "we offer no frills. Customers do not get clogged down with paperwork." At the same time he denied allegations that the bank was involved in money-laundering, claiming that most money-laundering was done "under the noses of established banks in western capitals". He also claimed the bank had hired a former official of the United States Department of Justice to ensure the probity of the Bank’s dealings.60 

The reassurances about money-laundering were belied by the Bank’s advertising, which was explicitly aimed at persons seeking to evade taxes or find a haven for dirty money where it would be beyond the reach of law enforcement and emphasized that this was "the least expensive and securest means of client-bank interaction ever". Some of the World Wide Web advertisements are reproduced in figure 5. As the June 1996 issue of Money-laundering Alert noted, "the EUB allows customers access to a full range of offshore private banking services from any country . . . Customers can open numbered accounts, in which the customer’s identity is known only by an EUB private banker, or coded accounts, which are numbered accounts that operate by passcode rather than signature."61  Customers could also incorporate a business on-line "under the Antiguan International Business Corporations Act that requires no disclosure of shareholders or of beneficial owners.61

Not surprisingly, the European Union Bank came to the attention both of those monitoring organized crime activity and of bank regulatory bodies. Indeed, almost from the outset red flags were raised by the auditors, Coopers and Lybrand. On 31 July 1995, their report noted that they were unable to satisfy themselves as to the collectability of the loans due from the parent company and, consequently, were unable to state whether the financial statements presented by the Bank presented fairly the financial position of the company as of 31 December 1994. The collapse of the Bank, however, was preceded by a series of much more public warnings and ultimately by indications that the Government of Antigua, responding to international pressure, was taking steps to move against it.

One of the most important warnings was issued by the Bank of England in October 1996. The Bank of England advised intending depositors to carry out appropriate due diligence on the European Union Bank, noting that there was no guarantee for their deposits.

At around the same time, U.S. News and World Report warned that Antigua had an unregulated banking industry, with no reporting requirements and secrecy laws that punished violations of client confidentiality. It suggested that many banks on the island consisted of "nothing but a brass plate or a room with a fax machine".45 An article in the Washington Post by Douglas Farah raised similar concerns. It was becoming clear that there was little or no due diligence in Antigua regarding bank charters so long as the person setting up the bank had $1 million, the amount necessary to open a bank on the island.

In the Spring of 1997, the state of Idaho took out an injunction to stop the bank from soliciting deposits through the World Wide Web. The Idaho Department of Finance issued the order on 29 May 1997. The cease and desist order required the European Union Bank of Antigua, its officers, directors, employees and agents to cease soliciting deposits from Idaho residents. According to the order, the European Union Bank was not chartered to operate as a bank or any other form of financial institution in the state of Idaho, and it was therefore unlawful for it to engage in banking by soliciting deposits in the state. The difficulty for the state of Idaho, of course, was that it had no power to implement the order. Nevertheless, this was another red flag with Idaho, echoing the Bank of England and warning that deposits were not protected by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

There were also growing pressures on Antigua itself. Antigua shut down five Russian and Ukrainian banks and asked for the assistance of Rodney Gallagher, an adviser on Caribbean financial services to the British Foreign Office and author of an important report on offshore banking in British crown dependencies. In a letter in March, Antigua’s Finance Ministry told the European Union Bank that it was "not in good standing". Nevertheless, this did not prevent it from continuing its operations, leading the Ministry in June to warn potential investors to proceed with great caution. A few weeks before the collapse, the government of Antigua also asked Coopers & Lybrand, the auditors, to investigate the Bank, and the Office of National Drugs and Money-laundering Policy of Antigua issued a fraud warning just prior to the collapse. All this was not only too little too late but might even have been a factor in encouraging the Bank owners to abscond with the deposits. In an important twist on the classic stable door metaphor, this was a case of encouraging the horse to bolt—in this case taking with him all the depositors’ money—by threatening to shut the door rather than actually doing it. The two Russians, Serbeveo Ushakov and Vitaly Papsouev, who at this point seemed to be the owners of the Bank, apparently fled to Canada.

In the aftermath of the collapse, the head of Antigua’s Office of National Drugs and Money-laundering Control Policy noted that new legislation required all banks to disclose information about owners, directors and investors and that he was committed to cleaning up offshore banking on the island. The question is whether there will be sufficient resources to enforce the regulation.

The Johnny Kyong case

In 1990 Johnny Kyong was convicted of supplying heroin to the New York mafia. Apparently he moved his profits through bulk shipments of cash to Hong Kong or through a Venezuelan company to bank accounts in Hong Kong and from there used the fie chien or Asian underground banking system to move funds to Burma and Thailand to purchase more drugs.62 

The Spence money-laundering network
in New York

A fascinating example of money-laundering was uncovered in New York in 1994. It involved a network of 24 people, including the honorary consul-general for Bulgaria, a New York city police officer, two lawyers, a stockbroker, two rabbis, a firefighter and two bankers in Zurich. A law firm provided the overall guidance for the laundering effort while both a trucking business and a beer distributorship were used as cover. The Bulgarian diplomat, the firefighter and a rabbi acted as couriers, picking up drug trafficking proceeds in hotel rooms and parking lots, while money was also transported by Federal Express to a New York trucking business. The two lawyers subsequently placed the money into bank accounts with the assistance of a Citibank assistant manager. The money was then wired to banks in Europe, including a private bank in Switzerland, at which two employees remitted it to specific accounts designated by drug traffickers. During 1993 and 1994 a sum of between $70 million and $100 million was laundered by the group.63  It turned out, however, that the bank had supplied a suspicious activity report to law enforcement agencies. Furthermore, the assistant bank manager, although initially arrested, was subsequently reinstated and still works for Citibank. In the final analysis, this seems to have been a case where a suspicious activity report actually played a critical role in the downfall of the money-laundering network.

The Franklin Jurado case 1990–1996

One of the most fascinating convictions in the United States in recent years for money-laundering was that of Franklin Jurado, a Colombian economist and Harvard graduate who not only laundered significantly amounts for Jose Santacruz Londono of the Cali cartel but also developed an explicit and well thought out scheme for cleaning money.64  Jurado was arrested in 1990 in Luxembourg, where law enforcement officials also seized computer disks with records of 115 bank accounts in 16 locations "from Luxembourg to Budapest" and details of a vast money-laundering scheme. The five stages of the scheme were designed to clean the proceeds of drug trafficking and make them immune from seizure. In many ways, they are no more than a variant on the classic money-laundering cycle described in chapter I of this study. In Jurado’s view, however, the phases were carefully designed so that the assets would "move from a higher to a lower level of risk". The five stages were as follows:

According to one report, Jurado laundered 30 million French francs through accounts in large French banks. He had noted that, in the "Blue Book" of laundering countries, France was worth a detour and had identified French financial institutions that were particularly accessible to laundering.66  In Jurado’s assessment, however, there were higher ratings for Austria, which he observed was "extremely open to our type of deposits" and offered "extraordinary facilities in terms of confidentiality and banking discretion", for Hungary, which desperately wanted Western capital, and the Channel Islands, which was a "financial paradise". Switzerland, in contrast, he believed should be avoided because United States pressure was creating a "lack of trustworthiness in reference to confidentiality".65 In spite of his research and his carefully phased strategy, Jurado was arrested in Luxembourg in 1990, apparently before funds were transferred to the European front companies. His arrest was accompanied by the seizure of $46 million from 140 bank accounts in Europe and Panama and this was followed closely by the seizure of funds in several New York bank accounts including $3.4 million held by a Panamanian company, Siracusa Trading Corporation. In April 1996, Jurado was sentenced to seven and a half years in prison.

Refrigeration USA

In a case in Florida, an executive and several other employees of Refrigeration USA, a corporation based in Miami and Hallandale, Florida, pled guilty to conspiracy to import the controlled refrigerant gas, CFC-12 into the United States without the permits required by the Clean Air Act. Their scheme involved false bills of lading filed with United States Customs as well as the Environmental Protection Agency and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The CFC-12 was bought in Europe and payment was made from accounts opened under fictitious names in Switzerland and the Channel Islands. Nominee corporations in the Turks and Caicos Islands were used for concealing activities and to impede the IRS in its collection of excise taxes. Bank records were used in the trial after being provided by the Turks and Caicos Islands in accordance with the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom. The sums involved were substantial, with almost $4.5 million in cash held in offshore accounts. This was forfeited along with property in Miami and London worth over $3 million and cylinders of CFCs with a market value of $6.7 million.67 

American Express Bank International

In June 1994, Antonio Giraldi and Lourdes Reategui, officials with American Express Bank International (AEBI), were convicted of laundering drug proceeds obtained from trafficking by Colombian and Mexican individuals. The origin of the money was concealed and disguised by the two banking officers, who developed both a business and a personal relationship with Ricardo Aguirre Villagomez, the main money launderer and front man of the Gulf Cartel. The bankers created an investment portfolio in financial havens supported by corporations located in Mexico and investment corporations in the Cayman Islands, which were then used to guarantee loans. Investigations that were carried out in both Mexico and the United States, and that involved both independent activities and joint efforts, resulted in not only the conviction of the bankers but also of Villagomez himself.

As a spin-off from the investigation, a major Texas drug trafficker was also arrested. He had become a client of Giraldi and Reategui at Bankers Trust (New York) and later at AEBI. The bank officials "created a series of offshore holding companies for the defendant and opened bank accounts in the names of the various offshore companies, into which the defendant secreted his drug trafficking proceeds via electronic wire transfers. From February 1989 through 1993, the defendant wire transferred approximately $17 million into these accounts. All of the $17 million was traced to Mexican banks or to accounts held by Mexican banks in United States’ banks in El Paso, Texas. During 1993, the defendant liquidated the funds held by his offshore companies through wire transfers to Mexican bank branches and to another offshore investment company".67 Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) requests to Mexico, Switzerland and the Cayman Islands were critical in compiling evidence, and in June 1997, after pleading guilty, the Texan trafficker was sentenced to life imprisonment.

The Fortuna Internet fraud case

In February 1997, the United States Department of Justice announced that it had recovered $2.8 million for victims of fraud. The money had been obtained through a fraudulent marketing scheme run by Fortuna Alliance on the Internet. Promising consumers enormous profits for a modest enrollment, Fortuna wired the money it received to offshore trust accounts in the Swiss American Bank, Limited, in St. John’s, Antigua. The Department of Justice, on behalf of the Federal Trade Commission, succeeded in obtaining an order from the High Court of Antigua freezing the funds.68 

The Sagaz case

In March 1998, Gabriel Sagaz, the former president of Domecq Importers, Inc., pled guilty to a charge of conspiracy to defraud for actions that had taken place between 1989 and August 1996. Sagaz and several colleagues had embezzled over $13 million directly from the company and received another $2 million in kickbacks from outside vendors who invoiced for false goods and services. Sagaz approved the phoney invoices and, after the vendors were paid by Domecq Importers, Inc they issued checks to shell corporations controlled by Sagaz and his colleagues. The cheques were deposited in offshore bank accounts opened by Sagaz and his colleagues, thereby adding tax evasion to the charges.69 

The Harrison (Iorizzo) oil gasoline
tax fraud case

In June 1996, the United States Department of Justice announced that Lawrence M. Harrison, formerly known as Lawrence S. Iorizzo, had been sentenced to over 15 years in prison for a tax fraud in Dallas. He had been convicted in March 1996 on charges of motor fuel excise tax evasion, conspiracy, wire fraud and money-laundering. Iorizzo had been the key figure in motor fuel tax evasion schemes that had proved so lucrative for Russian criminal organizations in New York, New Jersey and Florida in the 1980s and that also included payments to some of the New York Mafia families. After going into witness protection, Harrison along with other family members and associates had purchased a small Louisiana corporation, Hebco Petroleum, Inc., in 1988 and became involved in the Dallas/Ft. Worth wholesale diesel fuel and gasoline markets. Although Hebco’s invoices included state and federal taxes, the company kept this revenue. According to the indictment, between June 1989 and January 1990, Hebco grossed approximately $26 million in fuel sales. During the same period, the company sent approximately $3 million from Texas bank accounts to a Cayman Islands account from which it was forwarded to European bank accounts, apparently to fund a similar fraud scheme in Belgium.70 

The Petroplus case

In August 1995, 25 persons, 15 of whom were Russian immigrants, were indicted for their role in another fuel tax evasion scheme that defrauded the United States Government and the state of New Jersey by over $140 million in tax revenues on approximately a half-billion dollars of motor fuel. The scheme involved the purchase of hundreds of millions of gallons of tax-free home heating oil, which was then sold to a firm called Petroplus as tax paid diesel fuel. The process was hidden by inserting sham and nominee companies (known as "middle companies") in the distribution chain to generate false and fraudulent invoices. A financial consultant employed by one of the organizers arranged for the use of several foreign bank accounts to conceal the proceeds.71 

The Russo Cable case

The Russo Cable case involved fraud in the sale of cable television converters and descramblers that allowed the purchasers to obtain free access to cable television services. It also involved bribes by a company called Leasing Ventures to a security agent who turned out to be working undercover for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). In July 1994, one of the defendants actually traveled with the agent to the Cayman Islands to establish an offshore bank account. This was done at the Guardian Bank, where the chairman John Mathewson, who was also named in the indictment, opened a bank account that allowed for the concealment and disguising of the origin of the payments from Leasing Ventures. Mathewson also created a sham entity named the Hanson Corporation to receive payments for the security agent and provide false invoices. The bank account was accompanied by the issuance of Visa Gold credit cards "that permitted access to monies in the Hanson account by the holder in the United States without revealing the existence or ownership of the offshore bank account".72  A bank account in London was also used by one of the defendants to collect and make wire transfer payments in connection with parts used for cable piracy. As the indictment noted, this offshore banking arrangement concealed the cable piracy operations "by creating the appearance that an independent foreign entity was conducting the sales".72 The scheme involved proceeds somewhere in the region of $10 million, so was certainly not negligible. It also had a fascinating footnote. Mathewson attempted to plea bargain with prosecutors by turning over the records of the Guardian Bank. The Cayman Islands government came to court in the United States in an attempt to prevent this. In effect, it wanted to avoid the release of information on tax evasion and thereby protect its status as a secrecy jurisdiction. The case, however, was thrown out by a federal judge.

The Singh brothers case

In May 1996, in a case involving the proceeds of drug trafficking and alien smuggling, the Singh brothers were convicted of laundering approximately $5 million. The brothers used the south Asian underground banking system, known as the "hawallah" system, and also placed deposits that were small enough to avoid cash transaction reports into both personal and corporate bank accounts under their control. These funds were wire transferred to foreign accounts.73 

The Herman case

The Herman case resulted from a joint investigation by United States Customs and the Corpus Christi, Texas, Police Department’s Organized Crime Unit. The operation began in 1992 and involved undercover agents as drug transporters. The leader of the trafficking organization, however, believing that the transporters were part of a large Colombian drug trafficking organization, offered to launder money for them. This was done through bank accounts in Antigua, Aruba, El Salvador, Mexico, Spain and the United Kingdom. Subsequent convictions for money-laundering included both American and Mexican bank officials and several entrepreneurs and accountants in Corpus Christi.74 

The Detroit retired bank executive case, 1996

In a 1996 money-laundering case in Detroit, a retired banker, along with his son, was convicted of money-laundering and sentenced to over 15 years imprisonment and the forfeiture of his $400,000 home and $2 million in cash. The result of a joint investigation by the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and the IRS Criminal Investigation Division, the case involved a Jamaican cocaine, heroin and money-laundering organization based in Detroit. The defendant had been a bank executive at the Gulf Bank of Kuwait New York City branch and between 1984 and 1992 apparently laundered about $7 million, depositing it in secret bank accounts in the Cayman Islands and Kuwait. In 1993 and 1994, he was the subject of a "sting" operation in which he laundered $100,000 in cash. The money brought to him by undercover agents was deposited into a Michigan bank account of his automobile export corporation and used to buy automobiles that were then shipped to Kuwait. The customers wire transferred their payments to Barclays Bank in London and the undercover agent was given access to this account.67

The Globus case, 2 April 1997

In April 1997, indictments were issued against a group, largely comprised of Russian emigres, for allegedly operating a massive securities fraud scheme involving misrepresentations about a company called Globus Group, Inc. The misrepresentations resulted in the price of Globus shares rising from $0.25 in January 1996 to $8 per share by September. In October, after the defendants stopped pushing the stock, the Globus share price collapsed to less than $0.40, with the result that legitimate investors incurred substantial losses. Although Globus was portrayed as an Internet service provider linking importers to exporters, it was in reality a shell company with no assets. The directors of Globus had offshore bank accounts in the Bahamas and elsewhere in the Caribbean in the names of various fictitious corporate entities, such as "Virgo Bay, Ltd." and "Leeward Cove Holdings, Ltd". Globus stock was sold to the public via these corporate shells. The proceeds were deposited in the offshore accounts, then back to the defendants.75 

BAJ Marketing

In March 1998, the United States Attorney’s office in New Jersey asked for a temporary restraining order to stop four offshore corporations in Barbados from marketing fraudulent direct mail schemes to consumers in the United States. The order was directed against BAJ Marketing Inc., Facton Services Ltd., BLC Services Inc. and Triple Eight International Services. With no offices or sales staff in New Jersey or anywhere else in the United States, the businesses trick consumers into sending "fees" to win prizes of up to $10,000—prizes that never materialize. The companies were actually owned or controlled by four individuals from Vancouver, British Columbia, all of whom had actually been indicted in Seattle for operating an illegal gambling scheme.76 

The Vito Pietanza case

The Vito Pietanza case was a fraud scheme involving stolen cheques from Schenkers International Forwarding, Inc., a company that arranged for the shipment of IBM products overseas. IBM paid Schenkers for its services by cheque on a monthly basis. Some of these cheques were diverted and cashed in the Cayman Islands. The laundering was simple, with the defendants traveling to the Cayman Islands and returning with several cashiers cheques under $10,000.77 

The Defrauding of the National Heritage Life Insurance Corporation

In 1997, a case in Florida involving fraud and money-laundering was brought to trial. Over a five-year period, five people had used various schemes to defraud the National Heritage Life Insurance Corporation. One of the counts was against a former attorney who had transferred around $2.2 million to an offshore account in the Channel Islands.78 

The Juarez Cartel case

In March 1998, it was reported that the Juarez cartel, one of Mexico’s most powerful drug trafficking organizations, had attempted to buy a small domestic bank, Grupo Financiero Anahuac, in 1995 and 1996. Efforts were made by the cartel’s financiers to invest $12 million in Anahuac during 1995 and 1996, but national banking authorities, suspicious about the origins of the investment funds and the small commission charged by brokers, prevented the completion of the sale. Even so, by November 1996, when Mexican regulatory authorities seized control of the Anahuac group, the Juarez organizations had reportedly laundered close to $50 million through the bank can connected financial institutions in the Cayman Islands.79 

A lawyer’s case

In one case in the United States, used by the Financial Action Task Force to illustrate the role of professionals such as attorneys in money-laundering, a lawyer created a sophisticated money-laundering system that utilized 16 different domestic and international financial institutions, including many in offshore jurisdictions. Some of his clients were engaged in white collar crime activities and one had committed an $80 million insurance fraud. The laundering was hidden by "annuity" packages, with the source of funds being "withdrawals" from these. The lawyer commingled client funds in one account in the Caribbean and then moved them by wire transfer to other jurisdictions. Funds were transferred back to the United States either to the lawyer’s account or directly to the client’s account. The lawyer also arranged for his clients to obtain credit cards in false names, with the Caribbean bank debiting the lawyer’s account to cover the charges incurred through the use of these cards.80 

The Manchester-Hong Kong connection

The Manchester-Hong Kong connection case involved a group of drug traffickers in Manchester, England, the leader of whom made considerable profit from importing cannabis. Some $2 million of the proceeds was transferred to Hong Kong, much of it through a shell company that the leader had bought and that was operated on his behalf by a secretarial company. Large cash deposits in British banks were used to purchase bank drafts and cashier checks that were payable to the shell corporation. Several other companies, some legitimate, were also recipients of the proceeds which were then sent to several other jurisdictions including Switzerland.80

The DeBella case

The DeBella case involved a British businessman who commissioned a banker in Antigua, Michael DeBella, to collect money owed as a result of a Nigerian oil deal. Although DeBella was successful in collecting the funds, he not only failed to pass the money on to the businessman but also failed to return a $600,000 escrow payment the businessman had deposited in a bank in Antigua. Subsequently, DeBella pleaded guilty in a United States court to other instances of defrauding clients, but the bank refused to return the businessman’s money and, indeed, the bank responded to requests for help in recovering the money by alerting the account holder to move the money—an excellent example of the walking accounts discussed in chapter II.45

The Salinas case (MLA)

One of the most notorious cases of alleged money-laundering in recent years has been that involving Raul Salinas, brother of the former Mexican President. It has been claimed that Salinas, taking mordida to new heights, accepted large bribes from drug traffickers, especially Juan Garcia Abrego and his organization. One of the most remarkable aspects of the case is that Senior Citibank officer Amy Elliott, whose testimony on the practice of due diligence had helped lead to the conviction of Giraldi in the American Express International Case discussed above, played a pivotal role in helping Salinas move money out of Mexico. Accounts for Salinas were established in several Swiss banks, including Confidas, a Citibank-owned entity in Geneva, and Pictet & Cie. Citibank’s senior officer in Switzerland, Executive Vice president Hubertus M. Rukavina, served as a board member of Confidas. Important assistance also seems to have been provided by Joseph Oberholzer, who retired after a long career with the Union Bank of Switzerland and who had previously been involved in laundering money for Julio and Sheila Nasser David, Colombians indicted by the United States in 1993. 81  It was eventually revealed that Swiss authorities had frozen $132 million in the bank accounts used by Salinas.

The Danish drug trafficking and
money-laundering case

The Danish drug trafficking and money-laundering case began with suspicious transaction reports relating to instances at Danish banks in which large amounts of money were deposited into accounts and quickly withdrawn as cash. Although the account holders were not known drug traffickers, subsequent investigation revealed that they were involved in the importation of hashish. After withdrawal from the banks, the cash was transported to Luxembourg where two of the individuals had 16 accounts in different banks, or Spain and subsequently Gibraltar, where they had 25 accounts. Critically, in avoiding suspicion at these later stages, the receipts from the Danish banks for the withdrawn money were used to prove the legal origin of the money, even though the same receipt was sometimes used at several banks. In the end, the traffickers were convicted and confiscation orders were issued for $6 million and $1.3 million respectively.80

The Santa Fe de Bogota case

Reportedly, a group of companies successfully laundered approximately $150 million, through foreign investment operations using fictitious corporations in Panama, the Cayman Islands and the Isle of Man. This was a classic case of the third phase of money-laundering outlined in chapter I. In order to bring proceeds of drug trafficking home to Colombia, front companies were created that were ostensibly to receive foreign investments. The companies were given names similar to large multinational firms. A network called Mobil Ami was used to process the substantial "foreign investments" that, in four to six months, included over $178 million from Panama and $121 million from the United States.82 

Yamaichi Securities Co.

In November 1997 it was revealed that Yamaichi Securities organizations, one of the top four Japanese brokerage companies, had liabilities exceeding 200 billion yen that had been hidden from Japanese regulators through the use of dummy companies in the Cayman Islands. The debts seem to have been run up through improper "tobashi" trading activities (in which brokerage firms temporarily shift investment losses from one client to another in order to prevent a favoured customer from having to report losses) but were then booked at the dummy firms in the Caymans that were not subject to the same scrutiny as Yamaichi’s consolidated account.83 

A case of payable-through accounts84 

In the payable-through accounts case, the IRS Criminal Investigation Division investigated tax evasion by three suspects living in Florida. It was important not so much for the crime as for its relationship to pass through accounts or payable-through accounts (PTAs)—accounts held in United States banks by foreign financial institutions to allow customers of these institutions to use the banks for withdrawals, deposits and wire transfers. The case involved Ansbacher, a financial institution specializing in trusts and located in the Bahamas. Ansbacher, a subsidiary of the First National Bank of Southern Africa, had an arrangement to receive deposits from United States customers through a pass through account at Marine Midland Bank in New York. Unlike many other PTAs, Ansbacher’s account did not use sub-accounts or numbers to identify the transactions of its customers. The IRS was alerted to the account when the suspects cashed three checks totaling $500,000. Subsequently, a summons was issued to Marine Midland requiring production of records covering all transactions through the PTA over eight intermittent months ending in February 1997. Ansbacher appealed against the summons on the grounds that it required production of bank records wholly unrelated to those persons being investigated. The IRS contended that the lack of sub-account designations in the Ansbacher account made it necessary to examine the use of nominee accounts. In July 1997, a federal Court in New York ruled that the IRS be given access to all the records of all customers with banking privileges at the PTA held by Ansbacher at Marine Midland, albeit with the proviso that the access was to be used exclusively in the investigation of the suspects. The judgment was greeted in parts of offshore world as a real threat. Ansbacher’s managing director in the Bahamas was actually reprimanded for cooperating with the United States and not informing the Central Bank of the Bahamas promptly that the IRS was seeking information about its clients. It was suggested that he had failed in his "duties and responsibilities" regarding the preservation of bank secrecy.

Assessment and commentary

After examining these cases, there are several conclusions that stand out:



IV.  Offshore finance, banking secrecy and the organization of crime

"No man is an island, entire of itself. Every man is a piece of the Continent; a part of the main."

    John Donne: Devotions XVII

In this chapter, the aim is to apply, in the context of money-laundering and banking secrecy the sort of logic used increasingly in modern discourses on crime prevention. The policy drivers for a global anti-laundering and mutual legal assistance policy are:

Except perhaps in the area of mutual enforcement of other countries’ tax regimes, it has gradually become accepted in principle that harmonization is a good thing in the war on crime. But the question of how, given traditional conceptions of sovereignty, international comity and legislative congruence can best be achieved remains a subject of heated debate. This is partly a question of respect for autonomy and partly a question of diplomatic realpolitik, but the favoured international model following up treaties, conventions and regulatory agreements has been the "mutual evaluation" strategy adopted by FATF, now developed by the European Union and the Council of Europe. There is scope for divergence of opinion as to whether, as a matter of practicality of resource limitations, FATF has been able to achieve substantive as well as procedural equivalence: in part, some member countries and financial institutions (sometimes on a global basis) have sought to become "market leaders" in compliance, thereby intentionally creating an un-level playing field, though one with virtuous intent. (Such virtue sometimes follows a scandal that produces a regulatory credibility problem, whether for a bank or for a country.) However, it is inherently a difficult empirical matter to determine the extent of compliance of institutions and countries under current and indeed under all conceivable conditions, since so much financial behaviour is not transparent. For example, even where compliance is high for most clients, a few specially favoured clients may be treated differently, and even a rigorous approach of unannounced total inspection rights might not yield sufficient evidence to demonstrate compliance or non-compliance at critical moments (whether these "moments" are created by multi-million dollar deposits offered by relatively unknown figures from the underworld or by well-known but apparently respectable senior government ministers from countries generally believed to be highly corrupt).

Although it would be unfair to categorize FATF methodology, which has now been adopted by the Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors as well as the offshoots such as CFATF, as ensuring procedural rather than substantive compliance, the focus on the procedural was an inevitable first-stage strategy on the route to greater international harmonization, and it is not always easy to see what "functional equivalence" amounts to at the working level. A similar argument could be made in relation to international mutual legal assistance, especially where legal systems (e.g. common law versus civil code) are so radically divergent.

Inhibitors and facilitators of crime: the role of regulation and financial structures

Measures against money-laundering and the promotion of mutual legal assistance are properly viewed as a sub-set of strategies to disrupt, regulate and inhibit criminal markets. Interest in the functioning of criminal markets other than narcotics has been both late and intermittent. The reasons for this are a poor analytical focus on macro-features of markets and an unduly narrow view on situational opportunity and routine activities. It has become conventional not to ask wider policy or political questions about what motivates potential offenders and the way in which this motivation is influenced by their life-chances or by social exclusion but to concentrate instead on the routine activities that surround criminal behaviour. A recent shift in approaches to crime prevention, however, signals a greater appreciation of the need to take account of social and cognitive elements in the motivational environment. Thus, conventionally, crimes are committed as a result of:

It is not the purpose of the present study to examine in detail the motivations of offenders who wish to launder money, even though interesting questions may be posed about why, given similar opportunities, many do not engage in laundering or tax evasion, and why the proportions doing so or not doing so might vary in different countries and cultures. Nor, for that matter, does the study cover the imaginative component of ideas for property crime, which in this case lie well beyond the mundane activities, such as vandalism, shop theft and burglary, from which the situational opportunity focus sprang. Many "objective" opportunities for fraud and money-laundering remain unrealized, not just because non-offenders lack the motivation or greed, or fear the consequences of involvement, but also because many non-offenders cannot readily envisage (or are insufficiently rigorous in thinking through) the possibilities that do in fact exist. But, in spite of these deficiencies, there is no a priori reason why one should not apply this sort of logic—suitable targets, incapable guardians and motivated offenders—to the extent and organization of crime, provided that one does not confuse (a) "activity measures", such as seizures of drugs, number of suspicious transaction reports, proceeds of crime seized and/or confiscated or even arrests of major offenders, with (b) "final outcome measures", such as lower narcotics consumption or reduced fraud, as is all too commonplace in practice among law enforcement officials and politicians. For example, if drug seizures go up, it could mean (a) that drug consumption is rising; (b) that drug production and distribution to or through particular geographical "hot spots" are rising; or (c) that customs and police are becoming more efficient. It is also possible that the seizure rate increase reflects a combination of these factors. Similarly, if the number of countries or territories that consciously or unconsciously launder the proceeds of crime (an activity measure) is reduced, this will have a major effect on the level of crime or on the level of a particular type of crime (an outcome measure) only:

Such effects might vary by type of crime. While stressing the importance of judging performance against clear objectives, the value of incrementalism, i.e. taking progress towards an objective one step at a time, or of crime reduction as an end in itself cannot be denied: enormous progress has been made in increasing international transparency and in achieving functional equivalence in regulation, and reducing harm is itself a considerable benefit even if harm (whether serious drug abuse or fraud and corruption) is not eliminated altogether. (The conviction of serious offenders and/or the deprivation of their proceeds of crime is an inherently good thing, and it often makes people feel better to see "bad people" put out of circulation. But it is an empirical question whether or not such punitive actions lead to less crime overall, whatever the effects on the criminal behaviour of offenders thus punished. If organized crime is modeled like an illicit corporation, the removal of executives may make only a modest difference to the activity levels as a whole, although one could equally counter that removing the "old guard" may encourage blood-letting between rival successors and ambition by young pretenders.)

Another key issue that is not normally thought through in other areas of crime is the so-called "depth of field" in money-laundering and in the drugs distribution and fraudulent fronting businesses. Transnational flows and business deals may be put together simply to demotivate and deter financially limited criminal investigations (as was pointed out earlier, it is not just the absence of formal cooperation in mutual legal assistance but also the cost and delays in undertaking investigations that give criminals the edge), but multi-site activities also may be put together as genuine parts of a business front that would appear legitimate to potential victims among professionals, international investors, depositors and trade creditors. (Thus, the name "European Union Bank" was chosen to lend plausibility to a bank operating out of Antigua.) Ironically, it is the "offshore" status of an institution, with all the cultural paraphernalia of tax evasion and exchange control circumvention that the term historically evokes, that lends credibility to the scam, except among the cognoscenti such as in the Jurado case discussed in chapter III. Perceptions of risk may take some time to permeate the globe, which is why multiple Internet banking frauds operating out of the same jurisdiction are possible, presumably with different victims.

Bankers and professionals (accountants and lawyers) are, or can be made to become, capable guardians by imposing liabilities of various kinds upon them, relating to both general systems performance, e.g. the legal requirement to have adequate anti-laundering mechanisms in place, and personal performance, e.g. stringent criminal penalties for those assisting in disposing of the proceeds of crime. In practice, the effects of these measures will vary depending on what professionals and primary offenders believe to be the chances and consequences of their being detected and acted against (not necessarily by means of criminal law). This in turn depends on the nature of the rules governing behaviour and on the loopholes, such as reliance on the due diligence of others further up the line, that exist unintentionally or even deliberately, for example as a result of lobbying or even governmental complicity in reduced compliance. As suggested above, professionals’ ingenuity means that there is no level playing field. The more that criminals can use a reputable country and/or reputable firm of professionals, the less likely it is that anyone will question their bona fides. The fact that the mainly legitimate complex routing of deals happens for tax and exchange control avoidance and for "corporate raiding" makes similar transfers by criminals less suspicion-generating than they might otherwise have been. But, as legitimate rationales for offshore finance centre utilization diminish, as highlighted elsewhere in this study, the ability of criminal transactions to hide in the interstices of legitimacy ought logically to diminish also, since there is more scope to look at the commercial rationality of transfers on the part of those financial institutions and company formation agents that are genuinely interested in preventing laundering. The greater the compliance that is given by banking and other financial supervisors to the requirement to have "adequate" systems for the detection and reporting of money-laundering, the harder it will be for institutions to evade problems by choosing not to ask or by failing to consider asking too many questions.

Individual motivation and social networks are key components in explaining criminal markets, but to broaden such an approach into one more suited to analysing a market, it should be noted that motivated offenders are required to face the following problems:

For simpler crimes for gain (street robbery, for instance) no finance capital is needed and only evading conviction is likely to be (eventually) a problem, although evading asset confiscation might be more salient if profitability was enhanced by an effective distribution and disposal method for stolen credit cards. For other offender types, all of these stages might have to be dealt with. The extent to which witting or unwitting facilitators of crime actually have to face these problems depends not only on the jurisdictions in and from which they operate but also on what role they can be proven to play in the crime. The less "hands on" they are, the more difficult it may be to convict them, but also—subject to their expected capacity for violence— the less control they will have over being cheated by partners. Whatever the circumstances, however, when dealing with organized crime the "success" of control measures, even at the law enforcement level, has to be seen in relation to all the roles that are played in the setting up of the crimes, in the commission of crimes and in turning the proceeds of crime into utilizable media.

Part of the "costs and benefits" of crime include attitudes towards particular forms of behaviour in the social groups, if any, to which the potential offender belongs or with whom he or she identifies. Thus, ways of rationalizing behaviour may enable offenders to feel more comfortable about their actual or contemplated crimes. Examples of such rationalizations in the realm of money-laundering and organized crime are:

Many lawyers, accountants and bankers are (often unselfconsciously) adept at not asking questions that would require them to refuse business or even to report their clients or potential clients to the authorities. But a major component of the motivation for crime is also the expected probability and scale of reward, while the reverse is the expectation (if contemplated) of prevention and/or salient punishment. Any form of crime for economic gain can have its relative attractiveness rating altered significantly by changes in detection and sanction levels both for it and for other crimes such as narcotics sales.

Action against financial intermediaries

Conceptually, and at the risk of straying into political science and diplomacy, it is useful to divide countries into "victims", "offenders" and "intermediaries" for any given type of offence, whether it be drug trafficking, fraud, tax evasion etc. Some countries, such as Switzerland and the United Kingdom, may fall into all three categories, other countries into one or two. The appreciation by victim countries that offshore financial centres play a key role in facilitating criminal objectives, whether intentionally or unintentionally, as intermediaries has produced the demand for international enforcement powers through FATF and for mutual legal assistance measures, civil and criminal and corporate and individual. The more fraud and drug use that offshore financial centres experience, i.e. the more frequently that they and/or their citizens become victims, the more likely they are to cooperate voluntarily with such measures for international comity. This is not the case at present, however, nor are many "offshore finance" territories the primary source of fraudulent or drug trafficking activities; they tend to be more intermediaries through which the primary villains channel their funds, demonstrating again the importance of depth of field when looking at criminal behaviour as an international system. If more banks like the First Cayman collapsed leaving victims in the Cayman Islands without recourse to assets that allegedly had been spirited overseas to banking secrecy jurisdictions, then, even with the new compensation scheme in place, the costs rather than just the benefits of secrecy would be more salient in the minds of the locals. If locals on the Cook Islands, Niue and Sark were to become victims of the frauds committed by companies incorporated there or by residents there (or in other similar "proceeds of crime havens"), they might shift their views on the benefits of secrecy. Whether offshore centres like it or not, the pressures for transparency and for greater local accountability will grow, and this will shift the cost-benefit analysis for those that use financial services products, wherever advertised (e.g. on the Internet, in The Economist, in the International Herald Tribune and in other locations such as airline magazines). For example, if the Channel Islands are subjected to a clamp down, this will affect those trusts that are used to set up another layer of secrecy but that operate through Guernsey and Jersey, because of the individual and corporate liability rules established thereby.

Looked at from the perspective of legitimate business, tax avoiders and criminals alike, there is some sort of trade-off between shelter from external surveillance and from legal cooperation with "victim countries’, on the one hand, and the desire to keep one’s investment safe, on the other. The countries that offer the most secret facilities, for example the Cook Islands, may not be seen as places where one is free from the risk of having one’s capital stolen. Furthermore, those with accounts or companies there may find financial institutions in mainstream countries reluctant to accept their bona fides. Switzerland used to offer both confidentiality and security of capital; now it offers security and banking competence but only modest confidentiality (and low or negative interest rates). However, Swiss banks have moved many of their operations to other jurisdictions, such as Liechtenstein, in response to tax and disclosure regimes at home. Under the legal changes discussed later (as well as political pressures), the Channel Islands have been moving in the same direction as Switzerland. One unintended effect of this is to distort the meaning of data about size of financial sector in any one jurisdiction: if many Swiss banks are operating in the Cayman Islands, Jersey, Liechtenstein etc., statements about the decline of Switzerland as a banking centre or about greater regulation of banks in Switzerland may have little meaning. The latter would mean "greater regulation of Swiss banks" only if in practice as well as in the procedural manual there were harmonized anti-laundering regulations applied world-wide within the banks (which often does happen for convenience of group compliance audits).

Given the substantial measure of success in introducing anti-drugs trafficking and then "all-crime" anti-laundering (and, up to a point, proceeds of crime confiscation) measures in the developed world, one of the key remaining facilitators of crime has been the tax avoidance/evasion exemption in the laundering regulations of many countries. It may not be essential for tax evasion to be a predicate offence for money-laundering charges: the United States, for example, does without is. But if financial and other institutions are permitted not to pass on information about conduct that otherwise would be suspicious on the grounds that they think (or say they think) that the funds are "only" tax money, this offers both them and their customers an easy way of rationalizing doing the business for themselves and representing to a court or regulators in future that they did not think the funds were proceeds of crime but rather tax "dodges", thereby evading conviction and/or severe regulatory action. Thus, the United States does include tax matters in its suspicious transaction reporting regime. Given that few institutions have satisfactory methods of satisfying themselves and others that particular funds are not the proceeds of crime and are tax avoidance/evasion, the tax exemption both facilitates the cognitive judgement that they can do the business without informing the authorities and denies the authorities information that might be used for identifying the laundering of drugs and fraud proceeds. (Some tax regimes may be viewed as oppressive and information about money transfers is sometimes used improperly by the authorities in their official capacity or by individuals in a corrupt capacity, but provided that taxation levels, however high, are democratically decided, residents arguably are obliged to pay what the law requires.) Financial institutions in offshore centres themselves commonly argue that they are no longer dependent on "hiding" the proceeds of tax evasion or even avoidance and that their market niche arises from nimble and flexible responses to market conditions: to the extent that this is actually so, the removal of the tax exemption from anti-laundering regimes would have little effect on their main source of business and would isolate the non-compliant nations.

The greater the domestic clamp down on taxation and the more resentful that citizens are about paying taxes (or about anti-laundering measures), the greater will be the demand for banking secrecy, but for basically legitimate persons and corporations, the greater the extra-territorial liabilities placed upon them for avoiding responsibility, the more they endanger themselves by using off-shore services provided that there is a substantial risk that the secrecy will be overcome or that local accounting treatment will nullify the advantages of moving their funds offshore. The market for secrecy is partly reflected in differential pricing of incorporation in different countries, although that is not the sole determinant of pricing policy. But the greater the secrecy in the jurisdiction, the more tempted some countries (or, for that matter, enterprise criminals of a particular genre) are to achieve their objectives by extraterritorial means, whether those means are attempts to excommunicate the offender country economically or the physical kidnapping of individuals therefrom.

The sorts of measures that make sense against facilitators of crime (by increasing inhibitors) depend on the sorts of crime involved and the diplomatic possibilities. Where crimes have victims, including Governments, with civil causes of action as plaintiffs, this sets up a different set of possibilities than where there are no discernible victims. The United States resolves this difficulty, or seeks to do so, by means of the legal fiction that all proceeds of drug trafficking are the property of the Government; other countries do not. But given the competitive market for financial services products, devices such as the "walking accounts" discussed in chapter II clearly act as facilitators of crime and inhibitors of responses by making it very much more expensive, if indeed possible at all, to pursue the defendants either for evidence or for recompense. Since the desire to get one’s money back is one of the primary motivations for reporting fraud,86  no civil plaintiff and few Governments will be willing to make a massive outlay if they expect very little prospect of return and, in practice, the aims of justice will be defeated without this necessarily appearing in case law, since anticipated returns determine actual cases brought.

At the time of writing, some major issues remain uncertain, even at a conceptual level. One of the highest profile ones is the extent to which the alleged embezzlements of many millions by one-time heads of State (e.g. from Haiti, Pakistan, Philippines, Zaire) are likely to be made more returnable ex post facto and deterred in future by the array of legal changes, including the OECD Convention. If all that is achieved is that the major prestigious finance centres avoid direct deposits from such sources but that the proceeds of crime, whatever their institutional form, are distributed elsewhere, there will have been some gain in reducing the risk of local corruption, if any were needed, but little else. It is precisely for this reason that global action is a prerequisite of successful laundering reduction rather than simply displacement strategies.

Legal provisions as inhibitors and facilitators of crime

Even human rights supporters must logically acknowledge that the law itself is an important facilitator or inhibitor of organized crime: the principal issues are whether repressive law can be effective and whether the need for "order" should be sufficient to justify such repression of civil rights. If mutual legal assistance is available only for indictable crimes and tax offences are merely summary offences, this will make a difference to international investigations. This is one reason why drugs-only anti-laundering measures were inadequate and, although tax evasion can be made a reportable suspicion even if a country does not permit mutual legal assistance on tax matters, its value is likely to prove considerably weakened as a result. If a company director is permitted to resign immediately upon incorporation and/or hand an undated letter of resignation and assignation of rights over to the beneficial owner, this makes a difference. In the island of Sark, for example, the same individual can be a director of over a thousand British companies and hundreds of Manx and Irish companies, and the speed of incorporation implies very little due diligence indeed. However, the very fact that a place is, or is believed to be, under the general supervision of an American, British, French or other regulatory and legal system is a major factor enabling it to succeed in imagery as respectable. The present study will concentrate on English and Commonwealth legal provisions because, although they by no means have a monopoly on abuses, they (along with overseas territories of the Netherlands and Liechtenstein anstalts) are where a lot of the criticism, both accurate and otherwise, of offshore finance centres has arisen in the international arena.

Corporate criminal liability

One of the means by which countries seek to implement policy on business activities that normally belong outside the sphere of public law is through corporate criminal liability and individual liability for the acts of corporations on the part of executives: those who are colloquially known in the United States as "vice presidents responsible for going to jail’. Again, the fundamental theory is a pragmatic one: if one imposes vicarious liability on the company and/or its directors and officers, directors will pay greater care to their responsibility than they would otherwise do. The assumption often implicit in such conceptions is that the companies made liable were intended to remain in operation anyway; otherwise, there is less of a controlling effect from the lifting of the corporate veil, although even there, the possibilities of financial recovery from individual directors may be enhanced. The common law countries may have had difficulties of implementation and case law, but historically the civil law countries of continental Europe have never been able to countenance the concept of liability for an entity that has no consciousness, although they are beginning to do so now. It is a fair summary that corporate criminal liability has been going through an expansionist phase during the 1990s, reflecting the greater realism of the courts towards modern large companies and the practicalities of decision-making therein. The typical nineteenth century model of the owner-manager of a closely managed company has been replaced by a complex hierarchy of control and devolved budgeting and responsibility in flatter structured corporations where performance targets are set by the centre and it is up to the sub-groups to decide how, subject to the law, they are to attain them. The courts have gradually realized this and adjusted corporate criminal liability to the new situation.

Nevertheless, except in the United States, the area of corporate criminal liability has been much neglected outside of areas such as corporate manslaughter, which will not be discussed here. The agreement to execute unlawful conduct is an offence from the moment the agreement is made and ends only when the act is performed, abandoned or frustrated. A director of a company who is solely responsible for the conduct of the company’s business cannot be convicted of conspiracy, since the director’s mind and that of the company are inseparable, even though the company is a separate legal entity. However, excepting that "sole director" situation, a company may be convicted of conspiracy with the director or with other parties and may be convicted of conspiracy to defraud on the grounds that these must be performed by a human agency and can become acts of the company.

The company in principle may have imputed to its "state of mind" the acts and state of mind of its directors and managers who represent its "directing mind and will". However, there may be circumstances when not all directors and managers are of the same mind. In the Meridian case,87 the Privy Council ruled that corporate criminal liability for failing to declare a substantial shareholding applied even where the chief investment officer and the senior portfolio manager of an investment management company in New Zealand bought shares in another company without telling their own managing director or the board (and with apparent intent to skim most of the profit from the deal for themselves personally). It seemed obvious to the trial judge that, if the chief investment officer and senior portfolio manager had authority to buy the shares, their knowledge that they had done so should be attributed to Meridian, the company. The style of management of Meridian may be familiar to any offshore finance centre: the members of the board lived in different parts of the world and met only once a year, before the annual general meeting; other matters that required a board resolution were circulated by post; and there was only modest supervision by the managing director (raising, in the authors’ mind, questions about how the board’s salaries were merited).

Lord Hoffman, for the Privy Council, sought to make more modern and intelligible the doctrines of corporate responsibility, civil and criminal. He argued that the primary rules of attribution of responsibility— the articles and memorandum of association—are "obviously not enough to enable a company to go out into the world and do business" and:

"It therefore builds upon the primary rules of attribution which are equally attributable to natural persons, namely, the principles of agency . To say that a company cannot do something means only that there is no-one whose doing of that act would, under the applicable rules of attribution, count as an act of the company."87

Their Lordships clearly reasoned that of corporate liability required knowledge by the board, companies could easily defeat the objectives of disclosure requirements simply by paying little attention to the acts of their servants (although from the point of view of preventing internal fraud and corruption, this is a very risky tactic, if genuinely practised). Likewise, it affirmed that where a servant had a duty to make a tax return, the failure to do so honestly should be attributed to the company.88  Nonetheless, they left some scope for argument:

It is a question of construction in each case as to whether the particular rule requires that the knowledge that an act has been done, or the state of mind with which it is done, should be attributed to the company.88

Taxation and liability

Another area of importance arises from a toughening of attitude on taxation in the English courts. In March 1997, two professionals and a lay client were convicted for tax offences (R v. Chipping and others, unreported). The prosecution case was that while the lay client was stated to be only a consultant to three Jersey companies, central management and control actually lay with him, so the failure of the companies to notify their liability for what should have been United Kingdom corporation tax constituted a conspiracy to cheat the Revenue. The Jersey companies could just as easily have been ones from any offshore centre specializing in incorporation, except that Jersey companies might look more "normal" and respectable to tax inspectors because of the island’s proximity to the United Kingdom. In the first count, the lay client was convicted because the jury was convinced that monies paid to one of the Jersey companies were his own income rather than that of the company or its (nominee) shareholders. The second count involved convincing the jury not just that the documentation was incomplete but that the client rather than the Jersey director was the person who was in substantive charge of the activities of the company (as testified by witnesses to dealings): the company had told the Revenue that it was foreign resident, making it hard to claim later that this was not the objective of the scheme. Prima facie, if the Chipping case was correctly decided, then anyone, including an accountant, who is concerned with the operation of such a company and who knowingly participates in causing the company to "neglect" to make a tax return could be convicted. The point is that in an ambience of plea bargaining or the attempt of the other parties involved to negotiate their way out of prosecution by casting what happened in a favorable light to themselves, any professional advisers take risks unless they are sure that the plan has been properly worked out. This does not necessarily mean that anyone in an offshore centre will be prosecuted for complicity, nor that some accountants, faced with the loss of income from their demanding employers or worse consequences if those employers are, say, Colombian narco-trafficantes, will not carry on with the schemes and hope that they will not be detected. But it may reduce general levels of demand for offshore centre services.

Constructive trust liability

During the 1990s, there has developed in common law but not civil code countries the concept of constructive trust, which is particularly important in dealing with fraud and corruption cases. The idea behind constructive trust liability is to make professionals such as accountants, bankers and lawyers who act as intermediaries in financial transactions liable to those who are actually the owners of funds even if they did not personally steal or benefit unlawfully from the transactions, other than by way of professional fees. The object is first to provide some effective avenues of financial compensation for those who suffer loss, especially where the principal offenders and their assets cannot be found or recovered, and second to motivate intermediaries to take greater care that their clients are behaving more properly than they might otherwise be motivated to do. Even the profits that can be made from corrupt investments, for example, can be reclaimed. An early example that struck terror into accountants, lawyers and bankers was Agip Africa, in which accountants in the Isle of Man were held liable to account for funds stolen from Agip by ex-employees who employed them to set up companies through which they funneled the fraudulent money transfers.89   The judge (now Lord Justice Millett) in that case may have been influenced by the low prestige not just of the companies but of the accountancy firm, as well as by the fact that the companies had plainly been set up solely for these transactions and had not conducted any legitimate business (although, taking a generous view, the company agents may not have known this when they formed the company). The fact remains that the "attribution rules" (discussed earlier in Meridian) also can fix liability on intermediaries in civil actions.

Essentially, there is little doubt that those who either deal with assets in breach of trust or implement a fraudulent scheme in which they steal assets for their own benefit can be held liable to the beneficiaries of the trust or the fraud victims. But in many cases,80 civil remedies against offenders will be useless because they appear to have no money or are unavailable because of walking trusts or other overseas asset protection trust devices, leaving "deep pocket" (i.e. wealthy) intermediaries (or their insurance companies) to pay if anyone at all. (An example is the Maxwell case, where bankers and accountants contributed almost all the funds to repay victims. This has been the pattern in most major fraud cases, in which the money has been used to support an expensive lifestyle or incompetent business activities, leaving the counter-parties to the transactions as the non-criminal beneficiaries without any liability.) In this respect, the Privy Council decision in Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v. Tan is crucial.90 

Prior to the Tan case, a party, whether individual or corporate, who was not him/herself subject to a trust relationship could be required to account for losses as a constructive trustee if he/she either:

The key problem with this was that, whereas a civil or criminal prosecution against the principal perpetrator would have to prove fraud or a dishonest breach of trust, those intermediaries who neglected to make inquiries with sufficient effort would be liable for the full loss caused by the fraudulent plan. The courts gradually imposed further necessary conditions before accessories were made liable, including "want of probity",91 which means not acting as an honest person would in the circumstances, although any accountant or solicitor who failed to comply with professional "best standards" might be liable under the "want of probity" principle.

In the Privy Council judgement, Lord Nicholls observed that "dishonesty on the part of the third party would seem to be a sufficient basis for his liability, irrespective of the state of mind of the trustee who is in breach of trust".91

He went on to argue that:

"The standard of what constitutes honest conduct is not subjective. Honesty is not an optional scale, with higher or lower values according to the moral standards of each individual. In most situations there is little difficulty in identifying how an honest person would behave. Honest people do not intentionally deceive others to their detriment. Unless there is a good and compelling reason, an honest person does not participate in a transaction if he knows it involves a misapplication of trust assets to the detriment of the beneficiaries. Nor does an honest person in such a case deliberately close his eyes and ears, or deliberately not ask questions, lest he learn something he would rather not know, and then proceed regardless."91

However, there are situations, he acknowledged, where honesty is not self-evident, and one such relates to the taking of risks. In addition to the circumstances known to the third party at the time, the "court will also have regard to the personal attributes of the third party such as his experience and intelligence, and the reason why he acted as he did" (p. 107). It looks as if this grants an unfair advantage in reduced liability to the junior lawyer of modest intellect who states that he was simply following orders. But in relation to negligence, "as a general proposition, however, beneficiaries cannot reasonably expect that all the world dealing with their trustees should owe them a duty to take care lest the trustees are behaving dishonestly" (p. 108). Nevertheless, there may still be a successful claim in negligence, even if constructive trust offers no remedy. So when acting for a company, as for an individual, professionals will be expected to take those steps that an honest person can be expected to do (as adjudged by the courts, not by their golfing or sailing companions), unless they are to fall foul of constructive trust liabilities in fraud and corruption cases. In drug laundering cases, however, except where one party steals from another and they choose to go to court while expecting mutually to conceal the source of the funds (since the court as a matter of public policy will be unlikely to enforce such trusts for the proceeds of crime), considerations of constructive trust do not apply.

Enforcement of remedies

"[Applications to trace assets] develop into an international paper chase, in which disclosure of documents by one respondent leads to applications for further information from another respondent and so on. My impression is that these exercises are often not cost-effective . . . the outcome is often no more than a few miserably small sums remaining in disused bank accounts. The bulk of the money has been dissipated in ill-advised commercial speculations, such as the Maxwell share support operation."92 

Issues of national and/or territorial sovereignty have been implicit or explicit in many of the major laundering investigations of the past twenty years. During the 1990s, the trend has accelerated by which—reflecting the globalization of commerce—the courts have granted the power to enforce not just judgements but also pre-trial disclosure and asset-freezing orders in various parts of the world. As (now Lord) Hoffman J. has noted in relation to yet another fraud case that led to no criminal prosecutions but was rather dealt with through the civil courts:

"In many large cases involving allegations of fraud and embezzlement, the greater part of the interlocutory stages of the action is concerned with the endeavours to trace assets against which a claim can be made. The function of the judge at this stage is not so much to decide or even define the issues between the parties as to supervise the investigation by the plaintiff. It is a remarkable fact that this whole panoply of remedies, frequently trenching upon principles of civil procedure previously regarded as settled, has been created by the judiciary without any statutory assistance."93 

These remedies are having to be applied in a number of large alleged frauds where funds held in trust are transferred through a myriad of offshore finance centre companies: for example, senior corporate officers were alleged to have stolen funds from the Spanish corporate arm of the Kuwait Investment Authority, and the English court rejected the proposition of the defendant that he had no obligation to disclose the whereabouts of his assets world-wide before the resolution of his challenge to the jurisdiction of the court.94  In Credit Suisse Fides Trust SA v. Cuoghi,95 the defendant lived in England and—with a Swiss employee of the plaintiff—was sued for $21 million which they allegedly had defrauded. The court held that a world-wide Mareva injunction and an ancillary disclosure order in England should be awarded against him, despite the fact that no substantive proceedings were taking place in England nor were any of the assets in dispute there. (The Swiss have no power to order a non-resident to disclose assets outside Switzerland.) The Court of Appeal took the fact that Cuoghi was domiciled in England as sufficient to base its powers, though whether they got the full sum back seems doubtful. Sometimes, large sums have been recovered for creditors—£72 million in Derby v. Weldon96  and, with much circumlocution, as the funds (even without a "jurisdiction-hopping" trust deed) were channelled through various jurisdictions, £1 million from the corrupt former Deputy Crown Counsel in Hong Kong97 —and courts in both the United Kingdom and the United States are capable of striking out the defenses of non-resident defendants and entering judgements for the plaintiffs. Where a witness is in fact the agent of the defrauded company plaintiff, even banking secrecy can be overcome in countries such as Switzerland. But often, the money has gone completely and neither civil litigation nor confiscation of the proceeds of crime in the criminal courts can bring it back even in principle.98 

Frustration at the inability to control crime in some other jurisdiction, especially in the American courts,99  often leads to the preference for "order" rather than "law" internationally as well as domestically. In the United States, section 442 (2) of the Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations Law states: If disclosure of information located outside the United States is prohibited by a law, regulation or order of a court or other authority of the state in which the information or prospective witness is located, or of the state of which the prospective witness is a national:

(a) A court or agency in the United States may require the person to whom the order is directed to make a good faith effort to secure permission from the foreign authorities to make the information available;

(b) A court or agency should not ordinarily impose sanctions of contempt, dismissal or default on a party that has failed to comply with the order for production, except in cases of deliberate concealment or removal of information or of failure to make a good faith effort in accordance with paragraph (a);

(c) A court or agency may, in appropriate cases, make findings of fact adverse to a party that has failed to comply with the order for production, even if that party has made a good faith effort to secure permission from the foreign authorities to make the information available and that effort has been unsuccessful.

In cases involving United States claims to extraterritorial jurisdiction, the British courts have tried to steer a middle course and have treated potential civil claims of constructive trust as a reason for refusing payments to account-holders, while not granting them to the American courts either.100   The British courts have dealt with this creatively by granting the means to ensure as far as possible that the objective of equity would not be undermined by allowing defendants to hide and/or dispose of their assets prior to judgement so that the plaintiffs end up with vast legal expenses and no effective relief.

This cannot be done without producing some conflicts of laws with those jurisdictions that offer banking secrecy and other devices as a marketing tool for what economists term "the law of comparative advantage". One way of dealing with such conflicts is to adopt the "balancing of interests" approach.101  But this is conceptually vacuous unless there is some methodology specified about how one might prioritize one set of interests over another in a principled way (rather than "the United States can give us more problems so we had better do what they say"102 ) and might get other countries to go along with one’s priorities.

Although there is no power to require full discovery from an individual or corporate third party who is not a defendant, the United Kingdom developed a principle in Norwich Pharmacal:103 

"If through no fault of his own a person gets mixed up in the tortious acts of others so as to facilitate their wrong-doing, he may incur no personal liability but he comes under a duty to assist the person who has been wronged by giving him full information and disclosing the identity of the wrong-doers."

The object of this is to trace the funds, and this is so even where there is no immediate prospect of a trial because, without the writ, there could be no identification of the defendants.

Finally, the Privy Council case Brannigan and others v. Davison (1997) anticipation 238 (PC) dealt with a New Zealand Court of Appeal case known as Controller and Auditor-General v. Davison (1996) 2 NZLR 278. This related to a major scandal known colloquially as the "Winebox case",104  in which New Zealand First Leader Winston Peters MP—then in opposition, now in the Cabinet—accused the Commissioner of the Inland Revenue and the Director of the New Zealand Serious Fraud Office of covering up tax fraud involving misuse of tax credits issued to a number of substantial New Zealand companies (not fly-by-night fraudsters or drugs traffickers) by the Government of the Cook Islands, which are administered by New Zealand. Witnesses in New Zealand were given disclosure orders by a commission of inquiry, with which they refused initially to comply on the grounds that answers were forbidden by the secrecy laws of the Cook Islands, flourishing court orders from the Islands to support their stand. The New Zealand Court of Appeal rejected a (perhaps half-hearted) appeal from the Controller and Auditor-General of New Zealand that the Cook Islands Government had sovereign immunity from a New Zealand court order to disclose documents, and this was not appealed further.105  In the end, the Privy Council upheld the view of the Court of Appeal that they were required to comply. It has not been possible to gather data on the economic effect of this ruling on the demand for Cook Islands companies, but this would be one measure of impact. Impact would also depend on international knowledge, rather than rumor, about the law and also on expectations about future levels of international efforts to overturn secrecy in any given country; these might all be areas where knowledge of the true levels of secrecy and international cooperation may be imperfect.

Conclusion

Inhibitors and facilitators of crime, especially those types of crime that do not evoke innate social sentiments, are not natural phenomena: they are socially and legally constructed. What is relatively novel about international organized crime phenomena is that they involve the physical and jurisdictional distancing of part of the system of crime beyond the reach of the countries where the victimization occurs, whether the crimes be illegal drug use, fraud, illegal arms possession and use, illegal immigration or tax evasion. (These are the principal revenue-generators that require money-laundering, although there are obviously other cross-border crimes such as car theft and major robberies.) There are many aspects of modern commercial life that facilitate crime: digital mobile pay-as-you use phones that require no registration of ownership, making surveillance much more difficult, are simply one example. For the purposes of the present study, the types of facilitation that affect international crime for gain include:

Inhibiting factors typically take the form of national and international action that counteracts abuses after they have developed; such action is often scandal-driven. The principal forms of abuse of secrecy appear to have shifted, as controls have been developed, from individual bank accounts to corporate bank accounts and bureaux de change operations and then on to trust and other corporate forms that can be purchased readily without even the modest initial and ongoing due diligence that is exercised in the banking sector. Fake or partly genuine charitable trusts, which are used to conceal commercial bribery, for example by assisting the children of the target bribee, and to launder funds supposedly accruing from fund-raising, can be constituted more or less at will, subject to the definition of charity at law. (National rules vary: in Bermuda, for example, the same person or entity can both establish a trust and be its beneficiary; in the Channel Islands, they cannot, at least not without losing tax benefits that are a principal rationale.) Sovereignty itself has been franchised, with lawyers in Panama or London being able to create companies in Niue from their own offices without anyone having to leave their own jurisdictions, making the concept of territorially based law redundant, despite the pride with which attempts at extraterritorial powers are greeted. In the case of trusts, the rule against perpetuity has been revoked, with Cook Islands trusts able to manage forever the assets of beneficiaries whose identity is not disclosed and cannot usually be inferred from trust deeds. Irrespective of the particular places, which change over time as regulation is tightened, the conceptual basis for these methods of hiding ownership and quantum of assets appears hard to justify.

In response, there has been a substantial shift in policy across the board in imposing duties to assist in preventing laundering and in ex post facto cooperation, provided that these requests can be framed within mutual legal assistance treaties and other instruments, such as the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) or the Commonwealth Scheme. Informants state that in practice requests from the United States (and the contemplation of those requests) do act as an incentive to due diligence practices by professionals in, for example, the Caribbean and even Switzerland, precisely because it is known that the United States is likely to take severe extraterritorial measures. But regulatory jurisdiction-shopping by offenders still abounds.

However, some of the key practical questions that need to be addressed are:

There are costs to independent self-government and the democratic right to be different that arise from international harmonization. Furthermore, the appropriateness of any balance between national rights and the interests of crime prevention are not always self-evident to all parties or even to neutral observers. However, in disentangling the global infrastructure of crime and its interaction with social values and legal rules, the authors have intended to sharpen the focus necessary to take informed decisions on these important issues. Against this background, chapter V delineates the considerations that need to be taken into account in devising policy options to combat money-laundering and other financial crimes that are carried out through offshore financial centres and bank secrecy jurisdictions.



V.  Issues for consideration

Sovereignty

The concept of sovereignty as agreed to by the Member States of the United Nations, and as applied in international law, gives the sovereign State control over its territory, its citizens and its residents. A corollary of this concept is that no Member State should assist citizens or residents of another State in the violation of the laws of their home country.

Much of the difficulty raised by issues of bank secrecy and offshore financial centres arises from the broad way in which some jurisdictions have interposed their own sovereign status to block the power of other States in the exercise of their prerogatives on their own citizens and residents regarding their actions in their home countries. These sovereign States have offered tools explicitly designed to defeat the laws of other countries. Many of these tools are made available only to non-residents and can only be used offshore. The sale or rental of sovereign status degrades national legal institutions. Further, it blocks the development of an international rule of law that is an essential concomitant of a globalized economy.

Although there are times when international law properly allows one State to shelter the citizens of another from the operation of the laws of their home country, the circumstances are limited. Examples include the political exceptions in extradition treaties, the granting of asylum to persons fleeing political persecution and the protection of individuals against crimes against humanity. These exceptions, which are recognized in international conventions, are morally justified and the problems they address must be considered when privacy and secrecy are debated. These exceptions aside, the fact is that almost everything that is hidden by bank secrecy and financial privacy laws is being hidden to protect the owner from taxation, criminal prosecution and civil court judgements.

Secrecy

The issue of financial secrecy encompasses broad issues concerning the right to privacy. As noted above, such issues are quite complex and are treated differently around the world. The present study has focused on the narrow issue of the right of a Government to obtain information from other Governments and foreign institutions in the pursuit of a criminal investigation.

The much broader issues of information privacy are becoming more complex every day because of the growth of global databases and the speed and ease of communication. The most serious aspects of information privacy relate to private efforts to access information rather than to the formal legal efforts of other countries. There is no clear understanding among countries regarding the legal jurisdiction to regulate and protect data privacy. Although some countries have put strict policies in place, if information is accessed from a remote location through some form of intrusion, the international machinery for protecting against the intrusion is all but nonexistent. As noted earlier, data generated in one country can be located on a computer server in another country, controlled by an operator in yet another country and be about a person or entity located in a fourth country. All four countries may have an interest in either obtaining or protecting the information. Assuming that the person to whom the information relates has a right of privacy, which country is obliged to protect that right from private efforts to get the data?

Even if an understanding about primary responsibility existed, as a practical matter, the enforcement of privacy rules has become next to impossible. Consider, for example the difficulty of prosecuting a person who has hacked into the telephone records of a person in another country and then sold the information to a person in a third country.

Because of this growing complexity, it is suggested that Member States may wish to begin discussions about new conventions regarding the legal status of information-based issues. Unless the issues are addressed in agreements that go far beyond today’s mutual legal assistance treaties and the 1988 Convention, the ability of the world’s judicial systems, both civil and criminal, to handle problems arising from global business transactions will be seriously compromised.

A range of treaties and conventions on judicial cooperation and on the specific issue of the prevention of money-laundering call for the exchange of information in response to a formal request from a signatory Government. Unfortunately, the mere existence of an agreement is not an appropriate measure of the reality of cooperation. Effective cooperation requires effective response machinery. An investigator looking for the proceeds of a drug crime needs information in hours, not months or years. To make information exchange work, there must be political will and a commitment to the rule of law. In a number of cases Governments have agreed to cooperate, but the agreement has been a cosmetic cover to protect the local money-laundering industry.

For example, in response to bilateral pressure, one country adopted requirements relating to the identification of the beneficial ownership of all corporations incorporated under its laws. The law firms in that country immediately made arrangements to become the authorized agents for the chartering of corporations in other jurisdictions that have no requirements for identification of beneficial ownership. In other cases, the countries lack adequate machinery for responding to requests, a circumstance that delays the delivery of the information to a point where it becomes useless.

 

Money launderers use a variety of devices to make the investigation of financial crimes and the recovery of criminal proceeds difficult. The next suggestions relate to the control of the working tools of money launderers. These tools are used in almost all money-laundering arrangements.

International business corporations

IBCs are at the heart of the money-laundering problem. As noted earlier in the study, virtually all money-laundering schemes use these entities as part of the scheme to hide the ownership of assets. A threshold question for consideration by Member States is whether IBCs should be permitted to do business, open bank accounts and trade outside of the jurisdiction of incorporation under any circumstances. The corporation was created as a legal entity in order to give business people the opportunity to conduct their affairs without risking all their assets. At its heart was the concept of limited liability. As a general rule, this protection from liability required the corporation to have a certain stated capital that had to be paid in. Liability was then limited to the amount of paid-in capital.

Incorporation also allowed the separation of ownership and management. A shareholder in a corporation need not be an active partner or participant in the business. This separation has allowed the creation of companies that have broad public ownership and that can seek capital in the world markets. None of the advantages offered by the corporate form require anonymity of either ownership or management.

In the world’s leading commercial jurisdictions, corporations are required by law to have regular meetings and keep books and corporate records. Failure to follow these corporate formalities will end the protection of the corporate form. The corporation is subject to service of legal process through a registered agent in every place it does business. In short, in exchange for giving the owners of the business limited liability and access to passive capital investment, the State that authorizes incorporation insists that there be a real business, that it has been capitalized and that the entity is subject to the jurisdiction of its courts.

In contrast, in most jurisdictions the IBC operates without any government requirements. On the condition that it do no business in its home jurisdiction, the IBC may hide its ownership and need not pay taxes. In many jurisdictions it is not required to keep books and records. The purpose of the IBC’s corporate form is to enable its owners to act with complete anonymity, but the concept of limited liability has been extended to a concept of no legal responsibility for any action.

IBCs are routinely used in money-laundering schemes because they provide an impenetrable layer of protection around the ownership of assets. They are central to virtually every effort to conceal the origin and destination of goods in international commerce, to circumvent arms control laws and to evade taxes by moving profits and assets out of the reach of the tax collector.

One approach to the problems raised by this new kind of corporation would be an international agreement not to recognize corporate entities that do not have full authority to do business in their home jurisdiction. Such an agreement would bar IBCs from opening bank accounts and engaging in securi- ties and commodities trading. It would deny them the right to own real property outside of the country of incorporation and would deny them the right to do business.

A second, and drastic approach would be to limit the use of the IBC to regulated financial institutions. For example, many banks currently refuse to open accounts for IBCs that have not been formed by the bank itself. These banks believe that under the prevailing due diligence rules they must know the beneficial owners of the company. A bank that creates the corporation will always know its beneficial owner. Thus, it will always be in a position to respond to official requests in connection with a criminal investigation.

Trusts

Trusts are important and useful instruments in the transfer and management of assets. A creation of common law, trusts allow the holders of assets to put them in the hands of others to protect the interests of minor children or those legally declared incompetent. They allow for the distribution of family assets in the future according to the needs of family members. They are also used to transfer and hold assets for charitable purposes. Such purposes are commendable. The problems arise when the trust is used to conceal the origin and distribution of illegal funds. Unfortunately, trusts that hide the identity of the grantors and the beneficiaries have become a standard part of money-laundering arrangements.

In the older common law jurisdictions, trusts are governed by a substantial body of law that places limits on their term and imposes obligations on the trustees to protect the interests of both settlors and beneficiaries. Trustees cannot be removed without a legal challenge, and the terms of the trust are fixed. Unless these features are present, the law regards the trust property as the property of the trust settlor and thus as subject to legal process and seizure as if the settlor owned the assets directly. In the major common law jurisdictions, these requirements limit the usefulness of the trust for concealing and protecting the proceeds of a crime.

In recent years, a number of jurisdictions have amended their trust laws to make them attractive as a way to conceal assets. These jurisdictions offer trusts that are designed to place the assets out of the reach of the settlors’ home country Governments. The trust laws include provisions that make a trust immune from foreign lawsuits once it has been in place for one year. This makes it impossible for foreign law enforcement authorities to question whether the trust has been established with the proceeds of a crime and impossible to recover the funds if in fact it has.

The laws of such offshore centre jurisdictions permit trust instruments to be written in a way that hides the identity of both the settlor and the beneficiaries. The true beneficiaries are indicated in side letters, frequently termed "letters of wishes." In some cases these instructions are called a "memorandum of wishes". The settlor can retain control of the assets through a person designated the trust protector. The trust protector has the power to change the beneficiaries and to change the trustees.

As in the case of the IBC, these specially designed trusts have gone far beyond their original purpose of having assets managed and controlled for the benefit of others.

Many money-laundering schemes marry an international business corporation to an offshore trust. The shares of the IBC are held by the trust. The trustees make the grantor of the trust the chief operating officer of the corporation and give him or her the authority to draw assets, draw a salary and use a corporate credit card. Thus, the beneficial owner of the assets has instant access to his or her money and control over assets without any of the normal indicia of ownership. Efforts to go after the assets of the corporation will be blocked by the laws of the trust situs.

To curb the abuse of offshore trusts, States may wish to consider limiting the scope of protection given to non-residents and non-citizens who establish trusts. At the very least, States may wish to consider imposing requirements that will enable investigators to identify the beneficial owners of all trusts. Some possibilities include:

States may wish to consider limiting offshore "asset protection" trusts. These trusts protect the assets of individuals from civil judgments in their home countries. A common provision of asset protection trust law is that the courts of the trust domicile cannot entertain a challenge or a claim made against the assets of the trust if the claim is filed more than one year after the date the trust is created. The issue of whether sovereign States should use their status and legal authority to protect the assets of citizens of other States from their own civil and criminal justice systems is an important one. In common law countries, civil courts act as a first line of defence against fraud. Suits for fraud allow the victim to recover consequential damages that survive bankruptcy proceedings. In fact, most fraud cases are remedied through civil litigation, which acts as a substantial deterrent. If criminals can shield assets by using an asset protection trust, the only deterrent will be criminal prosecution.

In many jurisdictions, trusts and IBCs are administered by unregulated trust companies. Criminals can use a trust company that operates in an offshore financial centre with secrecy legislation to completely conceal the transfer of assets. The unregulated trust companies conceal assets by moving the shares of a corporation from one account to another, by changing corporate names, by merging corporations and by changing trust documents on the instruction of the settlor. Although they are not deposit takers, the opportunity they offer for illegal behaviour poses risks for the entire international business community. Such companies should be subject to the same regulatory standards as banks. They should be held to the same "know your customer" standards. They should be required to keep careful records of stock transfers and to insure that transactions that they undertake do not become a substitute for regulated bank transactions.

In addition to acting as "black boxes" for financial transactions, unregulated trust company operations in secrecy jurisdictions have been known to manufacture false paper trails and false documentation to assist smugglers, tax evaders and money launderers. They have routinely provided invoices, receipts and other documents to help fool the customs and tax authorities of other countries. Such services are not legitimate and should be illegal even if the clients are in another jurisdiction and the documents supplied have no impact in the place where they are created.

Lawyer-client privilege: the role of the professional

Money launderers frequently use lawyers and accountants to help them hide funds. All too frequently, unscrupulous lawyers provide advice on money-laundering to their clients on the assumption that they will be protected by the rules of privilege that protect the confidentiality of the lawyer/client relationship. The protection of privilege is often quite effective because the people who ask for help in concealing assets frequently consult lawyers who do not live in their home country. For example, an American wanting to hide money may consult a lawyer in the United Kingdom who will then enlist the assistance of another lawyer in the Cook Islands. Together they will produce shell companies and trusts in the jurisdictions they have selected and will provide bank references to open the doors of the international financial system.

Such professional assistance in hiding money is inappropriate in both civil and criminal cases. No lawyer can justify assisting in concealing the proceeds of a crime. Further, lawyers should be the subject of professional discipline if they know that the client will have to lie under oath to keep the money hidden.

If the funds the lawyers are protecting are the result of criminal activity in any jurisdiction, it should be a crime for professionals to assist in hiding the funds. Lawyers and accountants should be cautioned that if they help hide criminal proceeds they will be held responsible for assisting in a crime. Further, their advice in this area should be placed clearly outside the bounds of professional privilege and confidentiality.

Credit cards

Credit and debit cards are the way people who have laundered money draw ready cash without leaving a financial trail. As one advertisement for a bank put it, it is the best way to stay in touch with your offshore account. Most credit card accounts outside of the United States are tied to a bank account. Many of these accounts are in banks in countries that have stringent bank secrecy laws. The banks assure their clients that the card account information is protected by the same rules that protect the other account information.

It may be useful for States to consider an agreement whereby the State where the credit card or debit card is used has equal rights to, and equal control over, the account data. Without that level of control, the citizens and residents of a country will be able to put much of their financial life beyond the reach of inquiry by their own Governments. Obviously, States will also have to address the issue of privacy, but this issue is secondary to legitimate requests for help from a law enforcement agency in pursuit or a criminal investigation.

Currency

The worldwide circulation of banknotes by Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States and a few of the other leading developed countries has created a store of value for criminals around the world. Because currency is anonymous, most street-level crimes, including drug purchases, are made in cash. The drug business generates a massive amount of currency through its street sales. Thus, the first step in any money-laundering scheme is to place the currency in a bank. National Governments have instituted controls on large cash deposits to block initial placement. As controls on currency in domestic banking systems have grown tighter, the launderers have looked for alternative ways of converting the currency to bank entries. Their search has led to international markets.

The currency of choice for illegal transactions is the United States dollar, which circulates widely outside of the borders of the United States. Indeed, of the $400 billion in United States currency in circulation, $300 billion is in circulation outside the United States. The dollar is freely convertible and is easy to exchange anywhere in the world. The ideal country for the placement of drug money is one in which the United States dollar circulates as a parallel currency. In that setting the presence of large amounts of cash is easily explained. Some countries such as Panama, which uses the dollar as it currency, are particularly vulnerable. Some Caribbean countries and countries in the former Soviet Union in which the dollar circulates as a parallel currency are similarly vulnerable. The introduction of the euro in European countries may provide another widely usable currency for illicit transactions. In this regard, some observers have pointed out that issuance of large-denomination euro notes (e.g. 500) could facilitate the movement of bulk cash and thus assist money-launderers.

Selling currency to foreigners for foreign use is a highly profitable business for national treasuries. Currency may be viewed as an interest-free loan to the issuing Government. The issuing Government captures the interest it would otherwise have to spend. The United States Federal Reserve estimates its income from the foreign purchase of United States banknotes at $16 billion a year.

One radical way to control the illegal use of currency would be to periodically recall it in order to exchange it for another form of bank note. During a recall, any holder of a large amount of unexplained currency would be in a difficult position. A recall would force criminal organizations caught with a large amount of currency to absorb huge losses. It would create uncertainty and difficulty for them. So far, this solution has not been attractive to the countries that have currencies that circulate outside of their own borders. Apart from the problem of the feasibility of such an approach, the issuing Governments would likely fear that regular recalls would destroy the attraction of holding foreign banknotes.

Elimination of free trade zone abuse

When tariffs were high, free trade zones could be justified as a place to assemble goods and a place to break large shipments into smaller lots for transhipment without imposing another layer of tariff. Since tariffs have declined, the usefulness of free trade zones for legitimate purposes has declined as well.

In recent years, free trade zones have become centres for "re-papering" shipments to conceal the origin, the ultimate destination and the value of goods in international trade. The zones have been used for illegal drug shipments, illegal arms shipments, the movement of stolen and counterfeit goods and the violation of international embargos.

Today the zones are convenient places to arrange to have drug money pay for goods that will generate bank deposits in other countries. In this type of money-laundering, the trafficker pays for the goods with drug proceeds in the country where the goods are manufactured. The goods are then shipped to a company in a free trade zone to conceal the source of the payment. They are then shipped to the final destination where the goods are sold for the local currency and a local currency account is created. A legitimate trade transaction has thus covered criminal laundering.

States may wish to consider whether the time has come for reevaluation of the trade zone concept. A critical evaluation of the legitimate uses and benefits of zones is overdue. It may well be that a substantial cutback in the use of zones is appropriate. The limitation on the uses of zones would have the significant additional benefit of limiting customs fraud and the movement of diverted and counterfeit goods.

If the zones are to continue in operation, the documentation relating to shipments in and out of a zone must become transparent. All goods transiting through a zone should be required to have the paperwork relating to the original purchase of the goods accompany them. The documentation should include the source and method of payment and the identity of the purchaser for each transaction from the point of origin onward. The trade zone should require documentation of shipments in and out and should be prepared to make the documentation available to criminal investigators.

Gambling as a cover

Gambling casinos have been used to hide the proceeds of drug sales for more than 50 years. Casinos are ideal vehicles for laundering because they generate large amounts of unaccounted for cash. The cash can be deposited as an evening’s take without attracting attention. Casino gambling has expanded dramatically around the world over the last few years. Casino chains are operating in Africa, Asia, Latin America and Europe. They are also a feature of a large number of financial havens.

Because of the vulnerability of casinos to money-laundering operations, it is essential that the industry be more carefully regulated. For example, before a casino licence is granted, the identity and bona fides of the beneficial owners must be verified. All casino employees should be screened for past criminal connections. Finally, casinos must be monitored to see whether the business done relates to the cash deposited. In this way, regulators would be better able to spot suspicious transaction trends.

Need for essential data

During the early stages of preparation of the present study it became apparent that detailed and accurate information on the size and scope of offshore financial centre activity was impossible to obtain. Many countries do not publish statistics on their international banking and business operations. Few or no data are available on the number of IBCs that have been formed, on the number of trusts under administration or on the size and type of assets these entities hold. In cases where the data are available, they are presented in a form that may lead to double counting of amounts.

The data on financial centre operations of banks are somewhat better because banks are more strictly supervised. Home country regulators require their institutions to produce information on offshore operations. But because brokerage firms, trust companies and corporate "service" firms do not report their activities, much of the public discussion is based on guesswork.

All financial centre countries should publish data in a reasonably coordinated way to form a basis for informed answers to serious policy questions. The data should include information about banks, brokerage firms, trust companies, mutual funds and insurance operations. Data should also include information on both the asset holdings and the flows of funds through accounts of all types. In addition, it would be useful for the international community to be able to identify by nationality and residence the customers of the centres.

Good information will help determine the importance of the financial centre operations to the local economy. It will help in the evaluation of the nature of the business the centres attract, and changes in the flows will help in evaluating the presence or absence of drug money.

Intelligence and information exchange

Good intelligence is essential to effective control of financial crime. Victims of fraud are slow to report the crime because they fear embarrassment. Often they do not want to be seen as an attractive target for a further hit from another group of criminals. Money-laundering itself is a consensual crime and, as such, leaves no angry victims behind. As a result, it is unreported. All too frequently money-laundering investigations grow out of the follow-up to a drug case during which police search for a drug trafficker’s money. As a result, the police reaction to the groups that support the crime of money-laundering is often slow and ineffectual. It is essential to have substantial police efforts focused on the people who assist and enable the crime.

For money-laundering and financial crime investigations to be successful, they must be based on the intelligent use of intelligence. If 10 drug cases produce a money trail that leads to the same bank or group of banks, it should be obvious that the banks should be the next targets of investigation. The difficulty is that the information that would allow the targeting of the bank is rarely collated and analysed.

Similarly, when a criminal gang is involved in prime bank fraud or securities fraud and it victimizes people in four or five different countries, the police in each country treat the case as sui generis. It may take months or even years of investigative work for law enforcement agencies to recognize that they are dealing with a well organized multinational enterprise.

Solving this problem requires well developed international police intelligence capacity. The specific crime reports must be gathered in a single location, analysed for common elements and forwarded to the police agency in the best position to act. The Governments of the countries in the European Union are attempting to meet this need through the European Police Office (EUROPOL).

Historically, this kind of police intelligence activity has raised concerns about misuse of information. The twentieth century is replete with instances of governmental spying on its own citizens. The problem is finding a way to balance the needs for intelligence with the need to protect the rights of citizens.

One possibility is assisting the development of non-governmental tools for assembling intelligence about fraud and money-laundering. Several examples already exist. The international art community maintains data bases to enable the tracing of stolen art. Several major international banks share information on efforts to compromise their security. In the United States, the National Consumers League maintains the National Fraud Information Center that takes telephone calls from people who believe they have been victimized and refers them to the appropriate law enforcement agency. It then collates data on complaints in order to identify criminal gangs. The privately collated data are then turned over to law enforcement authorities.

Another possibility is an international agreement that would create specialized law enforcement systems to deal with limited categories of international crime. For example, the World Bank and its affiliates have been victimized by fraud in their operations, but that fraud is not the subject of criminal law and has rarely been prosecuted. States may wish to consider creating a series of "international crimes" and establishing appropriate international law enforcement machinery to deal with fraud directed against international institutions.

Similarly, it may be possible to define international crimes on a regional level. For example, the European Union is the victim of a number of fraud-related crimes, such as agricultural subsidy fraud and cigarette and alcohol smuggling. A number of countries in the European Union are about to launch the Euro, but there is no international police agency with the specific task of protecting the currency from counterfeiting and fraud. It would make sense to consider the creation of Union-wide crimes and appropriate law enforcement machinery to deal with these crimes.

On the more immediate level, an important initiative for the United Nations is the development of an expanded international criminal law library and data base that should include criminal law texts and case materials from all Member States. It should also include related regulatory material, such as the banking and securities regulations relating to information, as well as the rules and procedures for gathering of evidence in a criminal case. The information should be available on-line, in electronic form. The availability of a library of this nature would enable prosecutors and law enforcement officers to find out how to get information from another country at the touch of a computer key.

The database should also include up-to-date directories of the responsible officials in each country. Law enforcement and private security officials should be able to identify the responsible official in each country by consulting an on-line directory. In the current environment, it may take weeks of work to find out which agency has responsibility for a particular area of investigation and who the responsible person to deal with is.

The expanded on-line library might also include information about pending cases of money-laundering and other financial crime from around the world. This would enable law enforcement officials to stay current on crime typologies and on new developments. In assembling the information and obtaining financial resources, it would be appropriate to consider inviting the participation of private institutions such as the loss recovery departments of insurance companies, the private security officials of financial institutions and other non-governmental organization (NGOs).

Offshore banking

Over the last 50 years, all of the world’s major banks have opened branches in offshore financial centres. The branches serve a variety of purposes. Some are "brass plate" banks—legal fictions that are used to book deposits and loans so that they fall outside the regulatory rules of the bank’s home country. Others have substance and either service the local market or operate as service centres for the international business community. Whatever the purpose, the operations have become very substantial. Indeed, the parent bank cannot be effectively supervised without a comprehensive review of these operations.

In the past, such offshore financial centre banks have been covered by the local rules of bank secrecy. The rules have blocked home country regulators from direct supervisory activity in the offshore centres. Supervision has been accomplished through indirect audit techniques. Because of the BCCI affair, the bank regulators and central bankers have proposed that all banks be open to on site visits by home country regulators. This higher level of supervision will allow regulators to insure bank compliance with due diligence and "know your customer" rules.

The dangers created by the gap in bank regulation of branches and subsidiaries in unregulated jurisdictions have been demonstrated time and again. The Venezuelan banking system was destroyed by the unregulated offshore operations of its banks. Japan has faced a series of banking crises that have involved the movement of bad loans, improper securities transactions and outright fraud to offshore subsidiaries and affiliates.

Similarly, the international community has had to deal with the consequences of allowing a bank with a home office in a jurisdiction with little regulation to operate internationally. BCCI used the division of responsibility between regulators and among auditors to make itself a global criminal enterprise. Following BCCI, the countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) set high standards for authorizing foreign bank operations in their territory. The ownership of a bank must be revealed and the bank must be subject to supervision.

The "international" bank—chartered by a financial centre but not regulated and not allowed to offer services to residents of its home country—remains a major gap in the control system. A number of jurisdictions have been willing to "charter" banks upon presentation of the required fees. As long as they do not do banking business with the local population, their books are unexamined and their practices are uncontrolled. These "banks" can offer criminals full access to the world banking system through their relationships with major banks.

Once a shell bank has established correspondent accounts, it can use those accounts to accept money and make payments without being subject to the rules of the country where the correspondent bank is located. For example, in a recent case a shell bank in Beirut was used to handle the proceeds of financial fraud originating in Germany and the United States. The victim was directed to deposit funds with the American correspondent for the credit of the shell bank for the further credit of the criminals. Under the prevailing rules of international banking, once the funds have gone to the "shell" bank’s account, it is outside of the reach of the correspondent bank’s jurisdiction.

States may wish to consider an international agreement on the subject of limiting shell banks. The issues that might be addressed are:

Securities firms

As noted earlier, criminals can use securities brokerage firms to launder money as easily as they can use banks. Until recently, the entire focus of anti-money-laundering efforts was on banks. It should now be clear that regulators will have to treat other financial institutions in much the same way that they treat banks.

Brokers will have to be held to the same due diligence standards as bankers. They will have to be required to report suspicious transactions, and they will have to be sure they know the beneficial ownership and the provenance of funds that they manage.

Law enforcement cooperation

The world’s law enforcement agencies have made commendable progress in improving international cooperation in cases of money-laundering and financial fraud. Their efforts have been aided by the growth in the network of mutual legal assistance treaties and by the informal network of law enforcement officers who work together on these problems. Despite the improved cooperation, problems remain.

The growing volume of financial crime has placed impossible demands on the existing systems. National police agencies are faced with the problem of whether to allocate resources to national investigation or to international cooperation. At the same time, speeding up information exchange and responding to requests for investigative help are becoming ever more urgent issues as the scope of international financial crime grows.

The present system is essentially bilateral and case-driven. The country and the law enforcement agency that initiates a criminal investigation is in charge. Requests for assistance come from that agency as the investigation proceeds. The case-driven system is poorly equipped to deal with very large and very complicated cases. It relies on the country initiating the investigation to cover all the costs and provide all the human resources. It tends to overlook the full development of aspects of the case that cannot be prosecuted in the courts of the initiating country. The effort given to the case may not be proportionate to its real importance because of the priorities of the initiating country.

A formal system of large case coordination would speed the law enforcement efforts. Investigators could be asked for information as the need arises in the investigative process. They could get permission to interview witnesses, apply for search warrants and look for evidence without clearing the bureaucratic hurdles that hamper international investigations.

The system envisioned would not require any member country to change its investigative procedures or the rights it guarantees to its citizens. It would be designed to short-circuit the process of formal intergovernmental communication and to place investigators from one country in the system of another country as the need arises.

It might also be possible for member countries to develop a system under which the police and prosecutors of one country could be designated to act as police in other countries if they work under the supervision of the other country’s Government. Such cross designation would solve the problem created by requests for information that are forwarded to foreign Governments. The police assigned to those requests are not fully familiar with the case and often cannot ask the right questions. Moreover, there is a tendency for police to give foreign requests for assistance a low priority.

As cases grow in complexity, member countries may wish to consider the creation of an entirely new cooperative mechanism for management of the investigation and the gathering of evidence. For example, States may wish to consider establishing an international panel of judges and examining magistrates. Each country involved in a complex case would have its panel member participate in a case team that would coordinate investigation at the national level and expedite requests for information and cooperation. The panel would be in a position to insure that all evidence is gathered in a lawful manner and is admissible in the courts of other countries. They would be able to enlist the assistance of authorities in their own countries to initiate parallel investigations. They would be in a position to suggest priorities and evaluate prospective targets. They would be in a position to allocate costs and share in the recoveries.

Predicate offences

Money-laundering is a derivative crime. Its status as a crime depends on the genesis of the funds involved. As time has gone on, the international community has expanded the number of predicate offences and thus the definition of the crime. Much of the change in the definition has been on an ad hoc basis as particular crimes have come to public attention.

The time may have come to end the artificial division of criminal money into categories depending on the nature of the crime. As long as some criminal money can be laundered legally, the financial system will argue that its financial centre arrangements to hide funds have a legitimate purpose. Bankers and brokers who are asked to launder money will argue that they thought the money was legitimate because, although criminal in nature, it came from a non-predicate crime. Saying that it is safe to help hide some money coming from some crimes sends mixed messages and undermines efforts to solve the problem.

One possible approach would be to have member countries agree that any funds that are derived through criminal activity are funds that can give rise to a charge of money-laundering. Using this approach, if tax evasion is a crime in the country where the funds originated and the funds are being hidden because they are the result of a tax crime, hiding the funds and moving them would be money-laundering.

Similarly, if the funds derive from bribes or other improper payment to government officials, it should be clear to the entire financial community worldwide that the funds will be tainted and moving them will be the internationally recognized crime of money-laundering. By placing all criminally derived funds in the category of "criminal" for money-laundering purposes, bankers and financial institutions will be reluctant to assist in the looting of countries.

The argument is often made that assisting legal tax avoidance is a legitimate function of the financial centre. If the avoidance is in fact legal, the arrangements should not require secrecy. The legitimate inquiry of another Government will lead to a satisfactory answer.

Training

Financial crime is complex, and the investigation of financial crime requires highly trained investigators with special skills. These skills are in short supply around the world. Traditional police training does not include courses in accounting, international finance, the international banking system and the working of financial markets. Yet to follow the trail in a complex financial case a working knowledge of all these areas is essential.

Further, police and prosecutors need specialized training in the legal problems that arise when they operate in the international environment. They need training in the procedures and legal systems of other countries, the legal machinery used to initiate cooperation, foreign rules of evidence and the differences in criminal law relating to financial transactions in different countries.

International organizations and a number of donor countries have made significant efforts to improve the training of law enforcement officials around the world. The United Nations and other intergovernmental bodies such as Interpol and the World Customs Organization have all participated. But for these courses to be fully effective, the participants need a knowledge base that is very difficult to acquire.

In addition to the existing programmes, a graduate programme for mid-career law enforcement, legal, judicial and private-sector compliance officials should be established. The programme should have a regular curriculum, a full time faculty and the capacity to provide training in a number of languages. It should offer a formal degree at the masters level. To accommodate the professional demands of the prospective students, the school should include a six- to eight-week residential segment and a six-month segment of supervised independent study. The model might be the mid-career business administration programmes offered by the world’s leading business schools. Such programmes bring the students together for an intensive two- to three-week session as the year opens and then bring them back for a final month of intensive class work.

The programme could be funded through tuition payments by private-sector participants and by the Governments that send officers for training. Donor countries could provide scholarship funds for students from countries with limited budgets.

The programme would have to be located near a major financial centre so that it could draw on available local expertise and offer students direct exposure to the financial institutions they are studying. A location near a financial centre would also permit the use of part-time faculty drawn from the business and banking community. A portion of the programme might include internships at international financial institutions to provide participants with practical knowledge.

Such a programme could also become an important source of research information, specialized publications and new ideas for the control of financial crime.

Bankruptcy

Bankruptcy has long been the exclusive domain of national legislation. However, in recent years a number of bankruptcies involving large financial institutions and involving international financial fraud on a massive scale have focused attention on the need for a global convention on the administration and investigation of the affairs of a bankrupt institution.

Some States have chosen to put a ring fence around the portion of the bankrupt enterprise within their jurisdiction and have barred receivers and trustees from other jurisdictions. When the cases have involved fraud and government corruption, this splintered approach has added to the cost of managing the affairs of the bankrupt company and has helped criminals who have played a role in the bankruptcy to hide their trails. Nowhere has this been more evident that in the collapse of BCCI, which had been involved in laundering billions of dollars in criminal money. Because records were scattered across the globe and because the rules regarding access to the papers were so complex, many of the key figures in the investigation were able to evade prosecution. The criminal investigations became very costly and time-consuming. Many important figures were never brought to the bar of justice.

Just as in a complex international criminal case, a multinational bankruptcy case requires central management and administration. It requires the participation of officials from many countries, and it requires the collection of records.

Because bankruptcy frequently involves issues of financial crime and money-laundering, it is suggested that consideration be given to a convention governing the administration of the estate of the bankrupt. The convention should address issues of jurisdiction, polling the assets of the bankrupt for distribution and the relationship of the trustees and receivers to the criminal justice system.

Law reform commission

The United Nations has been engaged in drafting model laws for use by Member States. This useful activity could be expanded through the creation of an international commission of jurists, legal experts and academics who would meet regularly to consider drafts of uniform laws regarding issues of secrecy, laundering and financial crime.

The legal systems of Member States have not kept pace with the evolution of international financial crime. The world legal systems are at their best when they deal with localized, understandable crime. As noted earlier in the study, financial crime is elusive. It involves elements in different jurisdictions, a large number of people and institutions, and a range of complex financial instruments.

Many Member States have begun to grapple with these problems. However, for any solution to be effective, the international community will have to move along parallel tracks. Most assistance and extradition treaties require the crimes that are the subject of the treaty to be defined in the same way in each jurisdiction. There are a wide variety of views about the authority of the courts and the role of the courts in a case that merely "passes through" a jurisdiction without causing identifiable damage.

Model laws that have been debated by a panel of international experts would be a helpful tool for national Governments struggling with the issues. The prestige of the international panel would assist Governments in moving legislation forward.

It may be that the law reform efforts are best begun on a regional basis, where the legal systems are similar and the countries are used to working together. Thus, the well-developed cooperation machinery of the countries of the Caribbean Community (Caricom) could provide a framework for the convening of an expert group to work on a set of model laws for the region.

Bank secrecy

Today more than ninety jurisdictions offer themselves as providers bank secrecy. Some are secrecy jurisdictions that have signed mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATs) and that regularly and routinely cooperate in money launder investigations. Others are jurisdictions that assert their complete unwillingness to cooperate with any foreign investigation. Any effort to control money-laundering and financial crime must address the secrecy issues head on.

The highly sensitive issues of banking secrecy and the security of financial information cannot be discussed in the abstract. The issues involve balancing the privacy interests of the individual against the commercial interests of the holder of the information, the law enforcement interests of the State or foreign country, and the public’s right to know. How the balance is set will depend on what the information is about, who owns it, who wants it, and what it will be used for.

There is broad agreement on the need to protect the privacy rights of individuals. In the United States these rights have been given constitutional status by the Supreme Court. In Europe, the members of the European Union have adopted privacy standards that put a high value on the privacy rights of the individual. Many countries have appointed government ministers who have a "privacy" portfolio.

The concerns surrounding the issue of bank secrecy are very real. People with substantial private wealth are targets for criminals of all kinds. In some parts of the world kidnapping has become an industry. In a part of the former Soviet Union, it has been said that criminal gangs bought banks in order to determine who had a bank account that was large enough to make kidnapping worthwhile. Equally serious issues arise when Governments engage in human rights violations. For much of the twentieth century, Governments around the world spied on their citizens to maintain politi- cal control. Political freedom can depend on the ability to hide purely personal information from a Government.

Privacy issues have been greatly complicated by the advent of electronic commerce and corporate global financial data networks. The networks that support ATM machine operations, service credit card networks and handle international wire transfers are examples. Credit card security operations monitor the spending patterns of individual card holders to prevent fraud. Their computers store information about the spending habits of individual cardholders and are programmed to flag "out of the ordinary" transactions for further verification. Banks with global operations have centralized computer files that can be accessed from most of their offices around the world. These electronic networks mean that information is at once nowhere, yet is everywhere. They make it possible for thousands of people around the globe to access highly sensitive data about individuals and corporations.

The right to transaction privacy is especially important. Every time an individual makes a purchase through the electronic banking system, the individual leaves a trail. The trail can offer an incredible amount of very personal information. It can disclose where people are, what they are doing and what their tastes are as well as activities that are perfectly legal but potentially embarrassing. Few people would argue that personal information of this kind should be easily available to third parties—private or governmental. The question that needs to be answered is when does a Government’s right to know outweigh an individual’s right to privacy?

The answer lies in the difference between privacy and impunity. In much of the world, the most difficult issue facing society is the fact that some members of society, because of rank, social position or wealth, can do anything they want without being held legally accountable. For government to work, all citizens must be equally legally accountable for their actions. When the issue of legal accountability is at stake, the right of privacy must give way.

For example, if a Government wishes to recover money that one of its employees has stolen, that Government has a clear right to information about what happened to the money. By engaging in the crime of theft, a government employee has given up the right to keep matters relating to the crime, including financial information, secret from the Government.

The bank secrecy laws in a number of financial centre jurisdictions should be considered using the same balancing test, based on whether laws protect real privacy interests or protect account holders against accountability under the law. In the name of protecting privacy, many of these jurisdictions have agreed to protect account holders from the demands of other Governments for financial information in connection with criminal investigation. More often than not, the real protection is against legal accountability, not against an improper invasion of privacy.

Financial centre jurisdictions lack the resources and capacity to punish illegal private intrusion into global networks. Their criminal laws do little or nothing to prevent private commercial exploitation of information or indirect exploitation by others with access such as the credit card companies and credit bureaus. There is no public machinery for tracking or policing the international banking networks against unauthorized disclosure—everything depends on the private efforts of the bank.

In fact, the privacy laws are only effective insofar as they bar another Government from access to the information. Under the law of nations, Governments are restricted to making formal requests for information through appropriate channels. If information is disclosed to another Government by a banking official who acts without authority, it will become public in the other jurisdiction when the case comes to trial. The banker who cooperated illegally will be exposed.

Looking beyond the bank secrecy jurisdictions, none of the world’s legal systems have kept pace with the changes in information technology. Some countries have passed laws to protect against illegal access to information, computer sabotage and the distribution of illegally obtained data. But even these countries have a very limited law enforcement capacity. Illicit entry into systems is hard to detect and can be done from remote locations. In several recent cases, the hackers who gained access did it by working through dozens of telephone connections around the world. Very few law enforcement officials have the training and the ability to investigate such cases. Because the cases invariably cross international borders, all the same problems of international law enforcement cooperation that hamper money-laundering investigations hamper computer crime investigations.

The debate over bank secrecy is converging with a global debate about the issues of personal privacy and data protection. The growth of the Internet and the growth of electronic commerce have raised many of the same questions as the issues of financial secrecy laws in financial centres. Internet browsers want to be sure that they can visit sites and access information anonymously. They would like to be able to make purchases over the Internet without leaving an electronic trail. They would like to be sure their messages are at least somewhat secure. Setting standards for privacy protection and encryption, policing the electronic networks for intrusion and providing the possibility of private remedies will all require international agreement and international cooperation.

It may be that the time has come for a broad international convention on all the outstanding privacy issues, including both electronic information exchange and the banking privacy question. The convention could address banking privacy questions such as:

At the same time an international agreement sets real data privacy protections, it should make clear that privacy will not be accepted as a cover for evasion of legal responsibility. Thus the issue of secrecy in both civil and criminal cases should be discussed. If a civil fraud case requires data from a secrecy jurisdiction, States may wish to consider allowing some limited access by the civil litigants to information relevant to the case.

Subject to possible exceptions for cases of political persecution, an international agreement could also standardize the machinery for requesting and exchanging information, set the parameters for the use of the information by the requesting country and set a uniform standard of "reasonable cause" on which requests for information in criminal cases can be based.

The definition of crimes vary significantly from country to country. Some countries consider conspiracy to be a crime while others do not. Some countries treat attempts at crime differently than others. Some countries criminalize tax evasion and others do not. As a result, Member States may also wish to consider the idea of accepting the requesting country’s definition of a crime when considering information requests. That way all foreign criminal acts will open the door to information.

At present, most data requests to bank secrecy jurisdictions are made under bilateral mutual legal assistance agreements. A number of prominent jurisdictions have entered into agreements with the United States and the European Union. These include Switzerland and the Cayman Islands. The MLAT defines the circumstances under which the agreement can come into play, designates "competent authorities" in both the requesting and the receiving countries, and spells out the procedures for making the request. Most MLATs are based on an agreement as to what criminal offences are covered, and most require that the dealings among competent authorities take place at the foreign office level.

This bilateral system of MLATs contemplated investigations that involved information in a single foreign country. It grew out of the Lockheed aircraft investigations of the 1970s in which the United States developed information about bribes that Lockheed paid. A number of foreign countries, most notably Japan, asked for access to the American investigative materials. This request evolved into the first MLAT.

As shown earlier in this study, most current international efforts to launder money involve several countries, many different bank accounts and many different entities. Even when there are MLATs in place with a secrecy country, investigators must go through a time-consuming process of making requests on a country-by-country basis, waiting to receive the data from one country before having enough information to make the request of another country.

This bilateral system is far too cumbersome and time consuming. In discussions of a broad convention on bank secrecy and money-laundering cooperation, Member States may wish to consider establishing a multilateral mechanism for managing information requests that would streamline and automate the process.

Why reforms are needed

The international narcotic trade launders a minimum of $200 billion a year. A substantial portion of that money moves through the bank secrecy, financial centre jurisdictions. Law enforcement efforts in the best of years recovers amounts in the range of $100 million to $500 million. Although some participants in laundering schemes are arrested and convicted, the vast majority of professionals who assist are not. This is not a picture of success.

In addition, the number of fraud cases coming to public view is soaring. Many of these are large financial frauds in which large sums of money have disappeared and are beyond recovery. Around the world, Governments are searching for funds that have been taken from their treasuries by corrupt government officials. The list includes Brazil, Ecuador, Haiti, Pakistan, Panama and Peru, among others. The missing money has been laundered using the machinery described in this study.

The international community has resolved to limit corrupt practices. New conventions on the subject have been put in place in the Americas and Europe. The European Union is working on machinery to control fraud directed at the Union as a whole. The Bank for International Settlements is working on enhancing its regulatory guidelines to prevent the use of financial centres to avoid regulation. The Government of Venezuela is actively trying to recover money stolen from its banking system—an amount so large that it has ruined the economy and caused hardship for the majority of its citizens. Governments around the world, from India to the United States, from Argentina to Russia, are finding that they are losing much of the tax revenue due under their laws because of the calculated use of foreign secrecy. The situation is so bad that the opportunity to commit the crime of tax evasion is advertised openly on the Internet by hundreds of firms.

The time has come to connect the dots. The common denominator in all of these problems is the enabling machinery that has been created in the financial havens. The effectiveness of these centres in helping people and companies hide assets is not the result of any single device. Changing bank secrecy rules alone will not help. Rather, the centres have created a tool kit composed of new corporate instruments, foundations, trusts, trust companies, banks and bank accounts. The tools are mixed and matched with jurisdictions that have made a point of non-cooperation with the rest of the international community in criminal and tax investigations.

What started as a business to service the needs of a privileged few has become an enormous hole in the international legal and fiscal system. It is estimated that there are now more than a million anonymous corporations. Consultants for the offshore banking centres say that the centres are home to more than $5,000 billion in assets—$1,000 billion in bank deposits and $4,000 billion held in the form of stock, bonds, real estate and commodities.

If the international community is to develop a rule of law to match the globalization of trade and the global movement of people, the issues raised by this hole in the system will have to be addressed. The approach will have to be systemic rather than by individual cases, and it will have to face the issues of the use of sovereignty by some countries to give the citizens of other countries a way around the laws of their own society.



Footnotes

1 Jack Blum, testimony in Hearing of the House International Relations Comittee on International Organized Crime and Global Terrorism (1 October 1997).

2 Crime and Secrecy: The Use of Offshore Banks and Companies, Committee on Governmental Affairs Report to the United States Senate. Report 99-130 (August 1985), p. 4

3 Cf. R. T. Naylor, "The big wash: an enquiry into the history and practice of money-laundering", unpublished manuscript (1997).

4 For a critical review in the context of the United States of America, see Steven Kessler, Civil and Criminal Forfeiture: Federal and State Practice (New York, Clark, Boardman and Callaghan 1994). For a severe criticism of the logic and application of such laws, see David Fried, "Rationalizing criminal forfeiture", Journal of Law And Criminology, vol.79, No. 2 (1988).

5 An examination and criticism of such amnesties is in R. T. Naylor, "From underworld to underground: enterprise crime, "informal sector" business and the public policy response", Crime, Law and Social Change, vol. 24, 1996.

6 This definition parallels, though is slightly different from, that suggested by the Financial Action Task Force which divided money-laundering into placement (the fusion of cash into the legal economy or smuggling it out of the country); layering (separation from source by creating complex covering structures) and integration (placing laundered funds back into the economy). It also differs from the terminology used by the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances where the terms preferred are conversion (of cash to another asset, possibly involving placement in a financial institution), concealment of the true source or ownership and creation of a perception of legitimacy.

7 For an excellent and well-informed critique see William Cassidy, "Fei-ch’ien flying money: a study of the Chinese underground banking system", address to the Twelfth Annual International Asian Organized Crime Conference, 26 June 1990.

8 The laundering techniques summarized in what follows are drawn from Naylor, The Big Wash . . ., chaps. 2–5.

9 The first money-laundering case using transfer price manipulation was brought down by the United States late in 1996, see Money-laundering Alert (January 1997).

10 This is a strange term. All bank accounts are numbered. The issue here is that the account is coded, so that no one except top management can find out who the beneficial owner is. See Nicholas Faith, Safety In Numbers: The Mysterious World of Swiss Banking (New York, Viking Press, 1982). This book has much fascinating history but its denunciations of Swiss banking practices are now quite out of date.

11 There is a survey of the relevant laws in James Lorenzetti, "The offshore trust: a contemporary asset protection scheme", Journal of Commercial Law Review, vol. 102, No. 2 (1997). For a more popular exposition, see Arnold Goldstein, How To Protect Your Money Offshore (Deerfield Park, Florida, Garrett Publishing, 1996).

12 Naylor, The Big Wash . . ., chap. 4.

13 Ibid, chap. 5.

14 Their use was outlined by FinCEN (Financial Crimes Enforcement Network) in Trends: A Bulletin of Financial Crimes and Money-laundering (May 1993).

15 This transformation in drug markets was traced by, among others, Pino Arlacchi, Mafia Business: The Mafia Ethic And The Spirit Of Capitalism, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1988); and Rensselaer Lee III, The White Labyrinth: Cocaine and Political Power (New Brunswick, Transaction Publishers, 1989).

16 On this development, see R. T. Naylor, Hot Money And The Politics Of Debt, 2nd ed. (Montreal, Black Rose Books, 1994).

17 These are sometimes touted as a new entrepreneurial class that will lead those countries to economic prosperity. This is the rather contentious thesis of Hernando de Soto, The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution in the Third World (New York, 1989).

18 This point is made particularly well in Francisco Thoumi, Political Economy and Illegal Drugs in Colombia (Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Reinner, 1995).

19 This interface is examined in Naylor, "From underworld to underground . . .

20 An excellent analysis of the rise and pending decline of the offshore financial sector is in Marcel Cassard, "The role of offshore centers in international financial intermediation" IMF Working Paper (Washington, September 1994). However, the IMF definition of an offshore centre which the paper uses is rather problematic based as it is on ratios of external to internal financial assets rather than a legal distinction between offshore and onshore activity.

21 These features are highlighted with respect to the British Caribbean in Rodney Gallagher of Cooper and Lybrand’s Report, Survey of Offshore Financial Sectors in the Caribbean Dependent Territories (London, HMSO, 1990). The same is true for the new havens in the Indian Ocean and the South Pacific. In fact even Luxembourg greatly accelerated the development of its international financial management business to offset the impact of the decline of its steel industry.

22 Joel Kurtzman, The Death of Money (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1993), p.11.

23 E. H. Solomon, Virtual Money (New York, Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 39.

24 Office of Technology Assessment, Information Technologies for the Control of Money-laundering (Washington, Government Printing Office, September 1995), p. 1. [Hereinafter referred to as OTA Report.]

25 Ibid. p. 9.

26 Ibid. p. 65.

27 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 1996 (Washington, Department of State, March 1997), p.106.

28 Ibid. p. 102.

29 OTA Report, op. cit., p. 10.

30 Anthony P. Maingot, "Offshore secrecy centers and the necessary role of states: bucking the trend", Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, vol. 37, No. 4 (Winter 1995).

31 Ingo, Walter, Secret Money (Lexington, Massachussets, D.C. Heath, 1985), p. 2.

32 This point is made in the preface of Staff Study of the Crime and Secrecy: The Use of Offshore Banks and Companies made by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate (February 1983), p. III.

33 Susan Strange, "From Bretton Woods to the casino economy", in S. Corbridge, N. Thrift, and R Martin, (eds.) Money, Power and Space (Oxford, Blackwell, 1994) p. 49–62.

34 Peter S. Crook, "The offshore sector", presented at the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force Meeting on Typologies, Trinidad, 25-26 March 1998, p. 1.

35 OTA Report, op. cit., pp.10–11.

36 Ibid. p. 11.

37 Susan Roberts, "Fictitious capital, fictitious spaces: the geography of offshore financial flows", in S. Corbridge, N. Thrift, and R Martin (eds.), Money, Power and Space (Oxford, Blackwell, 1994), p.111.

38 We are grateful for this point to a former agent with the United States Drugs Enforcement Administration.

39 This point is made by Professor Alan Block, Pennsylvania State University.

40 Pieter den Hollander and Willem Vergeer, "Crocodiles in the swamp", Rotterdam Algemeen Dagblad. 25 May 1996, p. 49, translated in FBIS-TDD-96-019-L.

41 See "Report of the Secretary-General on Control of the Proceeds of Crime" (E/CN.15/1996/3, para. 83), Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, Fifth Session (Vienna, 21-31 May 1996).

42 George Graham and Robert Wright, "Winds of change on treasure islands", Financial Times. (24 January 1998), p. 9.

43 Roisin Cater, "Cayman Islands", International Financial Law Review (April 1997), p. 23.

44 Charles Intriago, quoted in, "Montana law woos investors Bahamas-style", San Francisco Chronicle (17 December 1997).

45 See "Rum sort of banking: drug traffickers and con artists vie in the crowded waters offshore", United States News and World Report (28 October 1996).

46 "Panama to capitalize on clean bank image", Financial Times (17 February 1998).

47 Daniel Zuberbuhler, director of the Swiss banking commission, quoted in William Hall, "Secrecy laws: screen has been drawn back briefly", in "Survey—Swiss banking and finance", Financial Times (31 October 1997), p. 2.

48 Benedict Hentsch, quoted in "Time to take a stand on assets", in "Survey, Switzerland 98", Financial Times (23 March 1998), p. 4.

49 Richard Z. Chesnoff, "Liechtenstein: a mouse that roars", United States News and World Report, vol. 102 (22 June 1987), pp. 46-47.

50 See United States of America, Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (March 1998), pp. 160–165 in particular.

51 Alfred Zanker and Patricia M. Scherschel, "Why its getting tougher to hide money", U.S. News and World Report, vol. 100 (2 June 1986), p. 43.

52 Caitlin Randall, "Moves to tame the tiger", in "Survey, private banking", Financial Times (26 November 1997) p. 2.

53 Jaroslaw Knap, Jacek Szczesny and Krzysztof Grabowski, "An automatic washing machine", in Poznan WPROST (in Polish) (8 December 1996), pp. 40, 42, 44. See FBIS-TDD-97-002-L.

54 "Drug cartels using South Africans to smuggle contraband" (Johannesburg, SAPA, 5 October 1995), document No. FBIS-TDD-95-035-L.

55 United Nations International Drug Control Programme, World Drug Report (New York, Oxford University Press, 1997).

56 N. Kochan and B. Whittington, Bankrupt: The BCCI Fraud (London, Victor Gollancz, 1992) p. 216.

57 See the Executive Summary of The BCCI Affair, A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate by Senator John Kerry and Senator Hank Brown (December 1992), 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, Senate Print, pp. 102–140.

58 Ibid., "Introduction" and "Summary of investigation".

59 Douglas Farah, "Russian crime finds haven in Caribbean" Washington Post (7 October 1996), p. A15.

60 Ken Young, "Internet bank to promote share offering", Internet Business, (3 July 1996).

61 See "Antigua cyberbank tests laundering curbs", Money-laundering Alert, vol. 7, No. 9, p.1.

62 This case is discussed in John L. Evans, "The proceeds of crime: problems of investigation and prosecution",in Ernesto U. Savona, Responding to Money-laundering: International Perspectives (Amsterdam, Harwood Academic Publishers, 1997), p. 194.

63 "Motley group of money launderers hung out to dry in New York", DEA World (Winter 1995) pp. 8–9. See also "Bagging a bumbling band of alleged money launderers; ring is said to have brought cash-stuffed duffels right to the bank", Washington Post (4 January 1995), p. A23.

64 The analysis here draws heavily on Mark Schapiro, "Doing the wash: inside a Colombian cartel’s money-laundering machine", Harper’s Magazine, vol. 294, No. 1761 (February 1997), pp. 56–59. See also David Andelman, "The new Johnstown flood", Management Review, vol. 84, No. 1 (November 1995) and Michael Cooper, "U.S. indicts a fugitive over drugs", New York Times, late edition, 8 June 1995, Section B Metropolitan Desk, p. 3 and Jim McGee, "From respected attorney to suspected racketeer: a lawyer’s journey", Washington Post (18 June, 1995), Section A, p. 17.

65 Schapiro, loc. cit.

66 Thierry Fabre and Jean-Baptiste Jacquin, "Where billions in drug money go", L’Expansion (in French) (22 February 1996), pp. 56-61. FBIS-TDD-96-016-L.

67 Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 1997 (Washington, D.C., March 1998).

68 "U.S. recovers $2.8 million for Internet fraud victims", Department of Justice News Release (24 February 1997).

69 "Former president of American subsidiary of world’s No.2 liquor company pleads guilty to embezzlement, and kickback conspiracy", Department of Justice News Release (12 March 1998).

70 "Former organized crime figure sentenced in million dollar fuel tax fraud scheme", Department of Justice News Release (7 June 1996).

71 "Fuel tax evasion – indictment", News Release by U.S. Attorney for the District of New Jersey (7 August 1995).

72 "Operation Cabletrap – indictment", News Release by U.S. Attorney for the District of New Jersey (21 June and 27 June 1996).

73 "Singh brothers – sentencing", News Release by U.S. Attorney for the District of New Jersey (10 May 1996).

74 Details of the case can be found at www.usdoj.gov/usao/txs/.new/drug/html.

75 FBI, New York, Office Press Release (2 April 1997).

76 "BAJ marketing—temporary restraining order", News Release U.S. Attorney for the District of New Jersey (2 March 1998).

77 "Pietanza, Vito information—filed document", U.S. Attorney for the District of New Jersey (6 May 1997).

78 "Insurance fraud, money-laundering", News Release by U.S. Attorney for the Middle District of Florida (24 July 1997).

79 "Cartel ‘laundered millions’ through bank", Financial Times (25 March 1998).

80 This case is taken from the FATF 1997-1998 Typologies Report.

81 The analysis here is drawn from a series of reports in Money-laundering Alert (January 1996 to January 1997). See also "Dirty linen: Mexico", The Economist, vol. 343, No. 8017 (17 May 1997), pp. 36–37.

82 "Colombia: money-laundering network uncovered in Santa Fe de Bogota" El Espectador (in Spanish) (4 September 1996). FBIS-LAT-96-177.

83 "Yamaichi hid off-book debt at dummy firms in Caribbean", Tokyo Kyodo (22 November 1997). FBIS-EAS-97-327.

84 Discussion of this case rests heavily on "IRS CID summons pierces secrecy in Bahamas PTA at Marine Midland", Money-laundering Alert, vol. 9, No. 4 (January 1998), p. 5.

85 John L. Evans, "International money-laundering: enforcement challenges and opportunities", Southwestern Journal of Law and Trade in the Americas, vol. 3, No. 1 ( Spring 1996).

86 M. Levi and A. Pithouse, White-Collar Crime and its Victims (Oxford University Press, forthcoming).

87 Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd. v. Securities Commission (1995) 2 A.C. 500, P.C.

88 Moore v. I. Bresler Ltd. (1944) 2 All ER 515.

89 Agip (Africa) Ltd. v. Jackson (1992) 4 All ER 385 (1989) 3WLR 1367, affirmed (1992) 4 All ER 451.

90 3 All ER 97 (1995).

91 Eagle Trust plc v SBC Securities Ltd (1993) 1 WLR 484; Polly Peck International plc v Nadir (No. 2) (1992), 4 All ER 769.

92 L. Hoffman, "Changing perspectives on civil litigation", Modern Law Review, vol. 56, No. 303.

93 Arab Monetary Fund v. Hashim (No.5) (1992), 2 All ER 913. For extended discussions of these issues, see L. Hoffman, loc.cit., p. 297; L. Collins, "Provisional and protective measures in international litigation" Essays in International Litigation and the Conflict of Laws (1994), and C. McLachlan, "The jurisdictional limits of disclosure orders in transnational fraud litigation", International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol.47, No. 3.

94 Grupo Torras v. Fahad and others (1996), 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 7 (CA). The power to grant interim relief under s.24 of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 applies.

95 3 All ER 724 (1997).

96 No. 6, 1 WLR 1139 (1990).

97 Attorney-General for Hong Kong v. Reid (1994), 1 AC 324. This was hardly cost-effective, but was aimed at depriving the offender of his ill-gotten gains as a matter of principle.

98 Levi and Pithouse, op.cit.; M. Levi, "Taking the profit out of crime: the UK experience", European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, vol. 5, No. 3 (1997), p. 228.

99 See Alfadda v. Fenn 149 FRD 28 (SDNY, 1993).

100 See, for example, Nanus Asia Co. Inc v. Standard Chartered Bank (1990), 1 HKLR 396.

101 See, for example, the ruling of Drake J. in Re Santa Fe (1984), 23 I.L.M. 511.

102 There is a sense in which one could describe the triumph of the toughest as a principle, but that is not what one normally means by the term. Theoretically, agreement to the methodology should lead to agreement to the results thereof, but this would require too much consistency from governments and courts around the world to be plausible.

103 AC 133 (1974), p. 175.

104 For an overblown journalistic account that fed the scandal, see I. Wishart The Paradise Conspiracy, (Auckland: Howling at the Moon Productions Ltd., 1995).

105 2 NZLR 278 (1996).

106 One should not always read sinister political intent here. "Central authorities" are seldom well-staffed with skilled, motivated personnel. They may not appreciate the significance of particular requests and simply deal with them seriatim. Of course, as a tautology, if Governments really take an issue seriously, then they will ensure that this does not happen.

107 See M. Gold and M. Levi, Money-Laundering in the UK (London, Police Foundation, 1994); M. Levi and L. Osofsky, "Investigating, freezing and confiscating the proceeds of crime", Police Research Group Paper 61 (London, Home Office).



About the Authors

Jack A. Blum, Esq., is a partner in the Washington D.C. law firm of Lobel Novins & Lamont and is frequently retained by government agencies and private litigants as an expert in complex international money-laundering, financial fraud and tax evasion cases. Mr. Blum served as Special Counsel to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, where he was responsible for the investigation of the Lockheed Aircraft bribes, General Noriega’s involvement with drug trafficking, and BCCI. He is currently a senior editor of the journal Crime Law & Social Change.

Michael Levi is a Professor of Criminology and Director of the White-Collar and Organised Crime Research Unit at Cardiff University. His many books and international articles address the topics of regulating fraud, money-laundering in the United Kingdom, the investigation, freezing and confiscation of the proceeds of crime, and studies of economic crime prevention. He has recently completed a book White-Collar Crime and its Victims. Among his official positions is Scientific Expert on Organised Crime for the Council of Europe.

R. T. Naylor is a Professor of Economics at McGill University in Montreal. His major fields of study are smuggling, black markets and international financial crime. His material has been published in several well-known journals including Crime, Law and Social Change, of which he is senior editor. His best-known book is Hot Money And The Politics Of Debt (New York, London and Montreal, 1987 and 1994).

Phil Williams is a Professor in the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs and Director of the Ridgway Center for International Security Studies, University of Pittsburgh. He is the editor of the Journal of Transnational Organized Crime and has published articles on transnational organized crime, drug trafficking and nuclear material trafficking in such journals as Survival, Washington Quarterly, Scientific American and Current History. He is currently completing a major book on the subject of transnational organized crime.


 

Figures


Figure 1.  The money-laundering cycle - Not available in Internet format; refer to print edition.

Figure 2.  The 10 fundamental laws of money-laundering


Figure 3.  Features of an ideal financial haven

Major characteristics:

- No deals for sharing tax information with other countries
- Availability of instant corporations
- Corporate secrecy laws
- Excellent electronic communications
- Tight bank secrecy laws
- A large tourist trade that can help explain major inflows of cash
- Use of a major world currency, preferably the United States dollar, as the local money
- A Government that is relatively invulnerable to outside pressure
- A high degree of economic dependence on the financial services sector
- A geographic location that facilitates business travel to and from rich neighbours

Additional characteristics:

- Time zone location
- A free-trade zone
- Availability of a flag-of-convenience shipping registry

 

Figure 4.  United States payments structure, 1995 - Not available in Internet format; refer to print edition.


Figure 5.  Promotion of the European Union Bank on the Internet

About the European Union Bank:

The European Union Bank strives to give our European and international clients easy, quick and secure computer access to European Union Bank’s complete range of offshore banking services.

Incorporated in Antigua and Barbuda under the International Business Corporations Act (IBC) of 1982, European Union Bank provides multicurrency banking and financial services to clients throughout the world. With utmost privacy, confidentiality and security, European Union Bank clients receive excellent interest rates, offered in a stable, tax-free environment.

Oppressive and chaotic tax structures in many countries dilute capital investment and force prudent investors to seek tax shelters and protection. European Union Bank, operating fully within the law, offers tax protection to clients who seek to wisely protect their assets by using favorable Caribbean tax shelter programs that have long been available to international financial and business communities. Most major banks and financial institutions maintain offshore subsidiaries in the Caribbean for these reasons.

Since Antigua does not impose any taxes on a bank’s income or accounts, European Union Bank is able to pay interest rates that are higher than banks in other countries. Additionally, since there are no government withholding or reporting requirements on accounts, the burdensome and expensive accounting requirements are also reduced for you and for the bank.

European Union Bank maintains the strictest standards of banking privacy in offshore business and financial transactions. Indeed, Antigua has stiff penalties for officers or staff that violate the banking secrecy law.

Until recently, the only barrier to offshore banking was the remoteness of the bank from its clients. Modern technological advances and world telecommunication improvements have removed that barrier. Now clients of European Union Bank can communicate with the bank at anytime from anywhere via the Internet. From the convenience of their office or home, account holders can check balances, wire money, or take out a loan as easily as if they had been transported to Antigua. With an Internet connection, you also can take advantage of the financial rewards of offshore banking with European Union Bank. Modern computer communications make this way of banking the easiest, least expensive and securest means of client-bank interaction ever.

European Union Bank account holders can receive banking information, transfer money and give any other instructions to the bank 7 days a week, 24 hours a day with Bank Online computer services.

Clients may also provide European Union Bank with instructions using more conventional methods of communication, such as telephone, telefax, telex or mail, each employing time-tested, effective security procedures.

Services available from banking with European Union Bank include:

A major concern of all banking clients but particularly those that are involved with offshore banking is for the complete security and secrecy of their financial transactions. European Union Bank is very aware of the concerns of its clients and is therefore offering two separate but related accounting functions that will give its clients maximum security but at the same time enable the clients to have easy access to their funds.

There is nothing new about the concept of a numbered account: they have been offered in Swiss banking circles for centuries. However, many clients do not fully understand how they can take advantage of this possibility.

A numbered account is where a number is allocated by the Bank in the form of a random selection of numbers and letters and used as the identification for a particular account. Any instruction from the account holder to the bank for wiring money, making payments, investments, etc. will be done using this number only so the client’s name will never be used in any correspondence.

It must be emphasized that the only persons who know the identity of that particular numbered account holder will be the private banking officer in the Bank and the account holder. The customer must fully understand that the numbered account, i.e. the identifying number, in lieu of the customer’s name, is different from the account number which refers to the normal "named" account.

Use of the numbered account gives complete anonymity to the client while still retaining the client’s full control over her or her funds..

Coded accounts

European Union Bank, with the high tech advances in electronic banking, is well aware that the authority to operate a customer account can no longer be the simple signature of yesteryear. To give the clients the availability of managing their funds using personal computers, there must be a method put in place which will ensure that the only person activating that account is the person who has the necessary authority.

A coded account is a numbered account where not a client’s signature, but a special personal passcode is used as the identification of the client. Any instruction to the bank for wiring money, investments, etc. will be considered valid if it carries the account number, the code, and is given in accordance with the specified procedure. At European Union Bank a client can choose from several possible authentication procedures, one which suits his/her need the most. Use of coded accounts gives absolute privacy to the client.

The banking secrecy law

Under Antiguan law, no person shall disclose any information relating to the business affairs of a customer, that he/she acquired as an officer, employee, director, shareholder, agent, auditor or solicitor of the banking corporation, except pursuant to the order of a court in Antigua. The court can only issue such an order in connection with an alleged criminal offence.

Antiguan International Business Corporation as a perfect privacy tool




 



For information on how to obtain a printed copy of the report, please contact:

United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention
Global Programme against Money Laundering
P.O. Box 500, A-1400, Vienna, Austria
tel: 431.26060.4313
fax: 431.26060.6878